Examination of Witnesses (Questions 356
- 379)
WEDNESDAY 24 MARCH 1999
RT HON
GEORGE ROBERTSON,
MP, REAR
ADMIRAL SIMON
MOORE and MR
CHRIS HOLTBY
Chairman
356. Secretary of State, thank you very
much for coming. I know it has been a terribly worrying time for
you. These are very grave times in which we are living. It is
unfortunate that, because of the juxtaposition of the continuing
crisis in Kosovo and the problem that we were going to spend most
of our time on Bishopton, with regret I will say to our colleagues
from Bishopton that we do not think it would be appropriate to
deal with the problem of Bishopton in what remained of the time
after dealing with Kosovo, so I extend my profound apologies to
them, especially those who have travelled all the way from Scotland
and Bristol to attend. I have spoken to Mr Dromey who fully concurs
with the decision that we have made. People from Royal Ordnance
know better than anybody the importance of the problems of dealing
with external crises and I appreciate, Mr Dromey's decision on
this. Again, profuse apologies. Could I welcome you, Secretary
of State, in these difficult circumstances. What I propose to
do with your permission is to spend at least an hour on the question
of Kosovo and then we will leave you to get on with dealing with
the problems at hand. Would you like to make an opening statement?
(Mr Robertson) Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate
that and I too apologise to those who were and are interested
in the future of Royal Ordnance at Bishopton. I asked to come
here because I want to get that issue clarified and I am not reneging
from that. I hope to have the opportunity of coming to you before
you come to your conclusion on that subject, but this is one of
the gravest days that we and our NATO colleagues face. I am happy
to be in front of the Committee today because I think it gives
an additional opportunity, on top of the Prime Minister's statement
yesterday and cross-examination to the House, to get what information
I can prudently give to the House at this time. In addition to
that of course there is coincidentally tomorrow a debate in the
House on defence, the Armed Forces in the world, which will again
provide an opportunity for the House of Commons in plenary session
to discuss that. I will be opening that debate. There are opportunities
but the Defence Select Committee is by far the most appropriate
body here for going over some of these details in as much as we
can give them. I am accompanied here by Rear Admiral Simon Moore,
who is the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations),
and Chris Holtby, who is from the Ministry of Defence's Balkan
Secretariat. Given that we are here at short notice, I hope that
we can help you with what information you need. I will say a few
words in introduction to provide some further detail on what the
Prime Minister said yesterday in the House. As this Committee
will already know, last October NATO threatened to use force to
secure an agreement from Serbia to a cease fire and an end to
the repression that was then taking place in Kosovo. At that time
diplomatic efforts, backed up by the threat of NATO military action,
led to the creation of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission.
The establishment of that mission enabled tens of thousands of
Kosovars to return to their homes. We have said to them and to
President Milosevic that we would not tolerate the brutal suppression
of the civilian population and we must continue to honour that
promise to the thousands of innocent civilians who only wish to
have an opportunity to live in peace. At that time Milosevic gave
an undertaking to the United States envoy, Richard Holbrooke,
that he would withdraw Serb forces so that their numbers returned
to the level before February 1998. That is roughly 10,000 internal
security and 12,000 Yugoslav Army troops. He has not fulfilled
that commitment. Indeed, we believe that the numbers have increased
and that there are now some 16,000 internal security forces and
20,000 Yugoslav Army troops in Kosovo with a further 8,000 army
reinforcements poised just over the border. On the 30 January
this year (just a few weeks ago) NATO warned President Milosevic
that it would act in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe
which was likely (and still remains likely) if he failed to come
into compliance with the October agreements if the repression
was continued and if there was no peace agreement. Despite the
intense diplomatic efforts which we have all seen he has so far
failed to meet any of these requirements. The NATO position is
absolutely clear. Our overall political objectives remain to help
achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis by contributing to the
response of the whole international community. More particularly,
NATO made it clear in a statement of the 30 January that its strategy
is to curb the violence and support the completion of negotiations
on an interim political settlement. That remains our aim but President
Milosevic has failed to respond to the most intense diplomatic
efforts and the time has now come for NATO to act. Our military
objective—our clear, simple, military objective—will
be to reduce the Serbs' capability to repress the Albanian population
and thus to avert a humanitarian disaster. Military action has
the agreement of all 19 NATO nations and to achieve the military
objective NATO has available some 200 fast jet aircraft. The United
Kingdom has eight Harrier GR7 aircraft equipped with Paveway laser
guided bombs. In addition, the United Kingdom is currently providing
one air to air refuelling tanker which will support all NATO aircraft
and provide a significant multiplier to the NATO force package.
At sea we have one of the most potent of weapons available to
NATO. HMS Splendid, which is equipped with Tomahawk land attack
cruise missiles, is in the area and available for operations.
The United Kingdom Tomahawk land attack missile is the conventionally
armed, submarine launch missile with a range in excess of 1,000
nautical miles. This Committee will already be familiar with the
capability of this weapon system from its operations in the Gulf.
In addition, HMS Iron Duke and HMS Somerset are in the Adriatic
along with NATO vessels from Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Turkey and the United States and a French task force. On the ground
there are forces from six NATO nations already in Macedonia: the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the United States and
Norway, but these will not deploy to Kosovo without the consent
of both parties following the acceptance of a peace deal. In all
some 13,000 troops are immediately available. While at this stage
I would not wish to speculate on what elements may be involved
in any initial military actions, I would like to stress that whatever
action is taken, that action is taken on behalf of all NATO allies
with the aim—the clear and, I believe, justified aim—of
averting a humanitarian disaster.
357. Thank you very much. I thought whilst
you were making your statement that we could divide the areas
of questioning into discrete sections, but I reached the conclusion
that we that would be totally impossible so I am afraid, Secretary
of State, that you are going to have to face questions moving
swiftly from one area of your responsibility to another. The long
build-up whilst negotiations have been proceeding turned out to
be a fruitless effort on our part but has given us the opportunity
of building up sufficient forces for whatever military and political
strategy is going to unfold probably over the next few days. Are
you satisfied, Secretary of State, that we have sufficient forces
in situ to meet all of the potential actions that Milosevic
might take? It seems to me that ground forces are rather limited
in number, particularly in the light of the size of the Yugoslav
National Army forces. Are you confident that they will at least
be able to defend themselves should there be any of his getting
his retaliation in first either by moving into Macedonia or moving
into Bosnia, with a lot of ammunition stored in Bosnia? Are you
satisfied that we have sufficient forces at our disposal to meet
that wide range of possible contingencies?
(Mr Robertson) Yes, I am. I would have had to
be before we embarked upon anything like this. Many members of
this Committee, indeed the whole Committee, know Lieutenant General
Sir Mike Jackson who is the Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps, and I of course take his judgement on these matters. He
is some 20 miles away from the Kosovo border and he is satisfied
that force protection is maintained. Can I make the point that
if the Yugoslav Serbian forces attack NATO troops that are in
Macedonia or in Bosnia, they will be attacking people who are
engaged in peacekeeping operations and who represent no threat
to him. It would therefore be a gross violation of international
law to do so and would lead to an immediate and considerable response
and in self-defence from us.
358. Are you satisfied that our air force
contribution is sufficient?
(Mr Robertson) Yes. We have supplied to SACEUR
what SACEUR required from this country. The force configuration
is a matter of the judgement of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
and we have supplied what he required from us. To go into what
our capability is and what his objectives are would be to disclose
operational information. It sounds like a small component of the
total number of planes that are there, but they have got the particular
qualifications that SACEUR wanted as part of that package and
they have to be seen in terms of the overall package there as
well. In addition, within the last brief period we were able to
add HMS Splendid to what is available to SACEUR in the circumstances
that he might decide they could be useful.
359. And we would have the ability, I presume,
to increase our number of aircraft swiftly should occasion merit
it?
(Mr Robertson) SACEUR is in command. We are in
a situation that is virtually unprecedented. There is a similarity
to Bosnia when an activation order was passed, but the Secretary-General
of NATO last night passed over the activation order to SACEUR
and SACEUR therefore request what we have. We have clearly got
other commitments which are something that applies to us and not
necessarily to everybody else, but we are capable of supplying
what he believes is necessary and it is a decisive contribution
to the force that is there should it be necessary for that force
to be used.
360. Would you have at your disposal the
number of aircraft that other allies are contributing, or is that
classified?
(Mr Robertson) We are contributing what we need
to contribute. They have particular characteristics in terms of
the precision guided weapons that are on board which have been
seen in action recently and which have proved their capability.
It is precisely the number that SACEUR wanted from the United
Kingdom. There will be planes from 13 air forces in the air as
and when SACEUR makes the decision to deploy them if diplomacy
has completely failed. It is worth making the point to the Committee
today, and to anybody else who might be listening in the outside
world, that at any point President Milosevic can stop the violence,
can go back to the levels that he promised to keep to, or the
levels of forces that he promised last October, and he can sign
up to the Rambouillet agreement which is an agreement that will
safeguard the positions of the Serbian Kosovars and indeed the
long term future of his country.
361. I presume that at the last minute,
should he be prepared to do so, he would have to come up with
something serious and not simply delaying what appears now to
be the inevitable.
(Mr Robertson) Absolutely. We are only interested
in him being serious about stopping the violence. That is the
criterion. There is a lot of loose talk around in some parts of
the media, although I have to compliment our own media for a very
balanced coverage of what are ominous circumstances. Talk about
our bombing Serbia is loose and inaccurate. The targets will be
military targets exclusively. The military objective is precise
and clear and that is to diminish the ability of the Serbian forces
to continue with the violence against the civilian population
that they have bene involved in.
Mr Colvin
362. Secretary of State, the media have
also been critical about the legal basis for the use of force.
At the moment that rests on United Nations Security Council Resolutions
1160 and 1199 which are under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which
covers action in respect of threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace and acts of aggression. I should have thought that was
enough, but could you reassure the Committee that you do not feel
that any further Security Council Resolution is required in order
perhaps to give a more unambiguous authority for all necessary
means to be used to deal with the present situation?
(Mr Robertson) No, we do not think it is necessary.
We think that there is a sufficient authority in existing Security
Council Resolutions and indeed the use of force in international
law can be justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming
humanitarian catastrophe. Since it is commonly agreed that that
is what we are facing there is no doubt about the legality of
the operation we are involved in. Speaking as I do on behalf of
the United Kingdom and as Chairman of the Defence Council, I have
a particular personal responsibility in this regard which would
turn into a legal one if it came to it. I am satisfied that the
Resolutions lay down very clear demands, especially Resolution
1199, which, as well as the exceptional circumstances, give us
an absolute legal base.
363. You have referred to the humanitarian
problem, but are our soldiers on the ground going to be equipped
and trained for dealing with the refugee problem? That is going
to be severe and is likely to increase maybe as a result of air
strikes. We are going to get more refugees fleeing the country,
are we not?
(Mr Robertson) The refugee crisis will undoubtedly
grow. It is already quite significant. It is estimated that 20,000
people inside Kosovo have been displaced since last Sunday, since
the breakdown of the negotiations. That is growing with every
day that passes, with every bombardment that takes place. The
number of those displaced in Kosovo alone inside the country and
into the outside world is now 420,000. That is 20 per cent of
the population there. These population movements are considerable.
I was in Macedonia three weeks ago. At that time the number of
refugees coming across the border was very small and they were
actually being accommodated by the Macedonian people in an amazing
act of hospitality to their brethren across the border, but that
is now turning into a very significant tide. If violence at the
present level by the Serbs were to continue that would certainly
turn into a very large number. Yesterday I was with Mr Akis Tsohatzopoulos,
the Defence Minister of Greece, who was paying a visit to me in
this country. The Greeks already are host to a very large number
of refugees from Kosovo and fear very significant increases in
those numbers. Into Albania, into Macedonia, into Bulgaria and
Romania, and even right up into Germany, which has already got
something like 400,000 Albanian refugees as a whole, we are talking
about a pretty significant flow of refugees destabilising many
of these countries. That is one of the ways in which it affects
us.
364. I can understand the hospitality in
Macedonia where a quarter of the population is Albanian, but I
understand that the Macedonians have now closed their frontier
which, from a practical point of view, would seem a fairly difficult
thing to do. What instructions have been given to our forces on
the ground there?
(Mr Robertson) It is actually a very simple thing
to close the border because there is only one road that goes from
Macedonia into Kosovo. It divides into two beyond the border but
these are not super highways. There are humanitarian agencies
in Macedonia now and our forces will clearly look, as they would
always do, to help wherever they can with the refugee flows. It
may not be our particular job to do so but, as I say, there are
12,000 to 13,000 troops in a small country. Remember that Macedonia
is the size of North Yorkshire and has a population roughly similar
to Greater Manchester. It has the youngest Prime Minister in Europe,
aged 33, and the oldest President in Europe, who is 83. They are
taking on a huge challenge and when I met the Prime Minister I
could not help but be impressed by the way in which they have
recognised their place in the world so suddenly and been willing
to take on these huge burdens that have come from being host to
very large numbers of foreigners.
Mr McWilliam
365. I hope, Secretary of State, and I am
really speaking through you to a wider audience, that everybody
understands how impressed we have all been by the diligence, patience
and hard work of the contact group in the run-in to the Rambouillet
agreement. Indeed, their patience was beyond what we thought was
reasonably possible. Can you satisfy me that the rules of engagement
for our forces are sufficiently robust to enable them adequately
to defend themselves?
(Mr Robertson) I can. I cannot go into details
because we never do. General Jackson is now in charge of the ARRC
in the area and there is nobody more robust practically anywhere
you can imagine than General Jackson. Being there in residence,
so close and with a large number of British troops, both in the
Ark and in the potential implementation force, I think he recognises
that. We are not ignorant of the risks. Of course there are risks
involved in this whole operation and it would be foolish to deny
it. Our people are in what is going to be a very dangerous territory.
We know that, but the alternative to doing that is not doing anything
at all and that would be much worse.
Mr Hancock
366. With 50,000 Serbian soldiers either
in or around Kosovo, once we attack the opportunity for them to
give instant payback to the Kosovars is obviously a very great
incentive on their part. They will be able to dish out a lot of
punishment very quickly. What is the plan to safeguard the interest
of those Kosovars who are very close to where the Serbian soldiers,
the regulars in the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police, are
at the present time. Secondly, is there a proportion of the air
power available to protect the interests that we have been able
to secure in Bosnia and possibly elsewhere if the Serbs in those
parts of the former Yugoslavia decide that they will support the
Milosevic position?
(Mr Robertson) I do not wish to say anything about
what we would do in self-defence of our forces. Essentially one
of the key components would be the determinance of what the other
side might expect. We have got of course the capability to act
in self-defence of our forces. I do not believe that anybody in
Belgrade mistakes the message of what an attack upon NATO would
mean for them. It is not something that I think they would easily
contemplate, but if they did it, they would have to face up to
the fact that we would react very strongly indeed. I do not think
we should go beyond that. He would be taking on the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation and 19 countries who are united in this endeavour.
This is not an operation that involves the United Kingdom alone.
There are 18 other countries that are part of it. You asked about
the percentage of air power———
367. No. I asked specifically about how
we would protect the Kosovars who are on the ground very close
to the 50,000-odd regular Yugoslav and Serbian police who are
in Kosovo today.
(Mr Robertson) We would clearly take that into
account if that was the situation. The air verification operation
has been ongoing since October and we have therefore got information
that comes back as a result of that. We are conscious that we
do not want to add to the miseries of those who are in that location,
but we would obviously still be conscious of our own force protection
necessities.
368. Would it be right for me to assume
that many of the strategic military targets we will be aiming
at are Yugoslav forces already in Kosovo?
(Mr Robertson) You are talking about where the
air targets might be?
369. Yes.
(Mr Robertson) I cannot answer that question.
I make the point that they will be military targets. The military
objective is clear without any doubt and that is to reduce, diminish,
his capability of attacking the civilians. A lot of planning has
gone into this. If you remember, the first threats were made last
October. We have done a huge amount of work in both the civilian
side of the Ministry and the military side of the Ministry as
well as through the NATO planning procedures so that if it comes
to using military action in the next few days we know what it
is we need to hit, we know how to hit it and we know with just
how much force to hit it.
370. Would you assume that HMS Splendid
would take part in the initial attack of what would probably be
several hundred Cruise missiles?
(Mr Robertson) We are not saying anything at all
about HMS Splendid other than the fact that she is in the area.
Mr Blunt
371. Secretary of State, to what level do
you believe we need to reduce the Yugoslav National Army and the
internal security troops in order to prevent them suppressing
Albanian citizens of Kosovo?
(Mr Robertson) By enough to stop them doing it,
to reduce their opportunities of doing it.
372. Can I put it to you that a prolonged
air campaign may enormously degrade the number of functioning
armoured vehicles, but it is going to be very difficult with an
air campaign to go beyond reducing them to effectively an infantry
army, which would surely still be sufficient to continue what
is happening in Kosovo today, and indeed it might make the clearance
rather more bloody? What appears to me to be happening is that
since President Milosevic decided that he was going to defy NATO,
and he appears to have taken that decision about a week ago, he
then appears to have given order to clear at least northern Kosovo
and that is why we are now seeing this enormous swathe of refugees
from the ethnic cleansing which would appear to be going to get
worse. My concern is that in a sense, however much we bomb the
Yugoslav National Army, if Serb will holds then it is going to
be impossible with air power to achieve our objective which is
degrading his military capability so that he cannot oppress the
local population.
(Mr Robertson) You have to make a number of calculations
in this which involve the diplomatic, the political and the military
elements in this. There is no computer into which you can put
all the information and it will give you a printout that says,
"Do this, this and this, and it will produce an outcome".
We are dealing with somebody whose unpredictability matches his
brutality. Therefore we must act on the basis of what we think
is right and what we can do in the knowledge of what he has done
in the past and how he has reacted in the past. I fear that he
and maybe some other people in Belgrade misunderstand NATO's intention
or NATO's will and determination, and that that may be leading
them into making false decisions. If that is the case then they
will only discover when things to start to happen that they are
wrong. This is not a secure dictatorship. There are democratic
elements inside Serbia although they are oppressed and they may
well find it difficult to articulate their case, but once things
start, if it gets to that, then they will have to make a calculation
as well. We are setting out to reduce his military capability
to conduct that violence in the only way that is open to us at
the present time. We have got weaponry and we have got the means
that we are confident can do that job.
373. It would appear from the reports that
we are getting of the political situation in Serbia that even
the liberal Serb parties you are referring to, seem to be, as
one might expect, rallying patriotically to the leadership, and
so precisely what role the opposition plays is open to question
and I do not think we can expect the reaction from them that you
imply. You spoke about the unpredictability of this exercise.
Would it not be more predictable and would not the military advice
be that you could actually predict and control the outcome if
you were prepared to take the decision to conduct this operation
as a land/air operation with both ground forces and air troops
and then you could predict the outcome?
(Mr Robertson) I do not think so. It is a pretty
unanimous view of the military commanders that we should not get
involved in a land campaign because the sheer numbers that would
be involved are so considerable and that is why, when I spoke
to our troops on a hillside in Macedonia three weeks ago, I gave
them the commitment that they would not fight their way into Kosovo.
We have the capability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
has got the capability for strategic air strikes that we believe
can have a significant effect on the military capability of the
Yugoslav forces to commit the levels of violence that they have
been engaged in up to now and to challenge their political will
to go ahead with something that is clearly not in the Serbian
national interest. In a way this is a reminder to them that the
Rambouillet agreement actually has something very substantial
for the Serbs within it, but they seem incapable of understanding
that, of seeing that, because some of them clearly do not believe
that the international community means business. The frustration
of NATO is shared by others who have traditionally in the past
been more understanding of Serbia. The Russians have tried to
get the message over that the Rambouillet agreement is in the
Serbian best interest, but have not been able to do so. Our objective
is to stop the violence, not to bomb them back to the negotiating
table. It is not our objective to do that. It is to stop the escalating
violence that is going to create these refugee flows at the humanitarian
disaster which we all see looming in front of us.
374. But unless we are prepared to use ground
force, the military capacity of Serbia, particularly its armoured
forces and its armoured infantry forces that it would need to
take on a NATO army or armed force attack in Serbia are not needed
by Serbia. There is no threat to Serbia of that happening. I am
obviously including Kosovo in this. If the Yugoslav Army is reduced
to the status of an infantry force, and it is not realistic I
believe to expect air power to go further than that, we are going
to be left with the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing continuing
to happen in Kosovo, possibly in greater numbers than we have
now, and then I fear that the humanitarian crisis will worsen.
I wonder how we are going to react to the enormous pressure that
will come, since we will have 25,000 troops in Macedonia, to act
to bring the situation to a conclusion, which we could do if we
had the will to deploy the very large number of ground forces
that you indicate.
(Mr Robertson) I know you were yourself in the
army and in reconnaissance, which is even further ahead sometimes
than the front line. I do not know how willing you would be—presumably
you are still on a reserve list—if I were to call you back
in order to lead——
Chairman: And Mr Brazier!
Mr Blunt
375. Perhaps I can answer that point.
(Mr Robertson) It is not a frivolous point. The
people who would have to do it have rejected that as an option
but the Serbian threat, or any other military threat, is made
up of a capability and an intention. Of course every last soldier
in the Serbian Army with a gun and a bayonet could in extremis
cause carnage. The capability may be there. The question is whether
the intention would be maintained. Creating a desert and calling
it peace, creating carnage in Kosovo and calling it part of Greater
Serbia, is not going to be an achievement. Milosevic at the moment
has got all of the controls. He is the driving force. He has got
no competition. Our objective here is not to try and get into
his mind. It is to use strategic precision bombing on military
targets to reduce his ability to order the kind of ethnic cleansing
that we have seen up to now.
Laura Moffatt
376. Secretary of State, I know that we
all feel—I certainly do myself—that we have the moral
authority to take some action, but I think that there is a difficult
question, as Mr Solana quite clearly says, that we are not waging
war with the Yugoslavians. We would all accept that. What troubles
me is that if you were a Serb on the ground and bombs started
to fall, you might have a different view, and with the closure
of the only independent radio station during the night there is
little or no information getting to them for them to understand
that this is truly a humanitarian act to stop aggression towards
people on the ground who are in the most dire conditions. What
can we do to try and improve that situation? How can we make people
on the ground understand that this is truly to stop aggression?
(Mr Robertson) I think it will be clear, if it
comes to that, that our targets are military and do not involve
civilian or urban targets. That is a message that will get through
despite the fact that the media is state owned and controlled.
The other fact is that in this day and age it is actually almost
completely impossible to control media, especially in the centre
of Europe where satellite footprints extend beyond it. I did a
programme near midnight last night for BBC World who claim some
vast audience in hotels all over the world, and presumably in
Belgrade, but who say they have information to suggest that it
is actually there in the Serbian military information command
centre as well. There is a message that has to get through at
an international level that this is happening, that we have no
argument with the Serb people and that what is being done in their
name has almost certainly not got their support. They may want
to hold on to Kosovo and it has a precious status in their history.
They may believe that it is right that they should stand up to
what is portrayed as external aggression. But I cannot believe
that the Serbian people that I have met over the years, the ordinary
Serbs, would be party to the kind of violence, the bombarding
and the destruction of villages, the massacre of innocent elderly
men, women and children because they happen to be close by what
is believed to be a KLA stronghold, or would subscribe to that.
That is a message that we have to get across. If military action
has to be taken, it will be taken with the heaviest of heavy hearts.
It will be taken with precision guided weapons, and it will be
taken against only military targets with a very clear objective,
not to bomb common sense or even self-interest into the mind of
President Milosevic, but to reduce the military capability that
is being used against a civilian population.
Mr Hood
377. Secretary of State, I agreed with the
Prime Minister yesterday when he told the House that doing nothing
was not an option. Some of the comments that are made about expressing
worries about this and that seem to come from an area where people
are maybe looking at it not as positively as you would expect
them to do in the seriousness of the situation. But when we visited
the NATO headquarters as a Committee a few weeks ago, we had discussions
with the military there and they talked about the need to have
an end game. We had a discussion about the ways and means and
whether there was an end game. This is probably the reason why
it has gone on so long to get agreement round what that end game
is. The Prime Minister told the House yesterday that to send ground
troops you would be talking about a figure of 100,000. I find
it difficult to understand, if air strikes are not successful,
how we can move on from there without putting ground troops in.
To say we are not going to put ground troops in and just rely
on air strikes is an area where I need to be convinced that air
strikes are going to succeed. What is the end game, Secretary
of State, if the air strikes do not succeed?
(Mr Robertson) We would not be undertaking the
possibility of the sanction unless we were confident that we could
inflict significant damage on his military capabilities and his
ability to repress the population. That is the limit to what we
can do. That is the limit to what international law allows us
to do. That in itself is quite significant. Putting ground troops
into that part of the world is not just a daunting military challenge;
it is human challenge as well. It might even be a legal challenge.
The objective here we are confident is inside international law,
achievable and, given the capabilities of all NATO acting together,
likely to be able to reduce significantly this military machine
and therefore the ability to go ahead with that. Into that you
have to feed the ingredients of his political will, the political
will of the forces there, to take that and not to question it.
Mr Holby has just been pointing out that a member of the Serbian
Parliament which rubber-stamped the decision yesterday in the
way that it does actually stood up and said that there was no
fighting in Kosovo. Partly they are starved of information, partly
they do not want to know the information, but we have got an obligation
to get as much in as possible. I go back to this argument about
the footprint of the BBC World Service or other television providers.
The Internet is now a method by which people can have an access
to the outside world. We have to get over the message that there
is actually an end game here which makes sense. The end game is
the Rambouillet agreement. If you look at the ingredients of that,
and I am very proud of the achievement of the Foreign Secretary
and his French opposite number at Rambouillet, they put together
an agreement which provides for Kosovo staying not just inside
Yugoslavia but inside the Federation and guarantees the integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Kosovo Albanians have
signed up to it. The people who were standing for independence,
some elements of whom were fighting for a greater Albania, said,
"We are willing to compromise our objectives and sign up
to it." There is an end game there for Milosevic to take
and he is being advised to take it by the Russians, never mind
by the NATO countries as well. We have to have a degree of confidence
on what it is we can realistically do. It may be that Admiral
Moore—I know he is a sailor—might want to give you
an impression from somebody who serves in the forces about the
prospect of a land invasion force incursion into Kosovo.
(Rear Admiral Simon Moore) The idea is a very
difficult one, as the Secretary of State has said, but in many
terms. First of all, where you are operating is very difficult;
secondly, it would be very difficult to supply the armed forces,
and thirdly it would be very difficult to get the whole of the
act together in sufficient time to make a difference. Therefore,
the reliance on a strategic air campaign is absolutely the right
strategy at the moment.
378. At the moment. What happens if it does
not work? What happens if it does not drive Milosevic to the negotiating
table to accept a peace deal? What happens then?
(Mr Robertson) NATO would then have to consider
it. The international community would then have to consider what
was to be done about it. The precise objective that is set there
and which we think can be achieved is to cause huge damage to
the structure that he has there and which he is presently using
against the Kosovar people. It is all too easy to say "what
if, what if, what if?" down the line. What if Albania burst
into flames? What if the refugees have crossed into Macedonia:
you will crush that government? What if Bulgaria and Romania are
destabilised? There are a lot of possibilities here. What we are
doing at the moment is acting in order to stop some of the repercussions
that will certainly happen if what is happening at the moment
goes on. Macedonia is a very young democracy. It is a part of
former Yugoslavia, finding it difficult in that part of the world,
but I think making huge strides forward. Albania is in total crisis
at the present moment. The destabilisation of Albania if this
conflict goes on will be even greater. I was in Romania and Bulgaria.
I think the Committee has been out to that part of the world as
well. These are fledgling democracies. The Balkans aflame are
going to burn more than just Belgrade and those who are in the
immediate environs. The international community is acting here
to stop the conflagration. There is something ironic that the
Century started with a war that commenced in Sarajevo and here
we are, nine months away from the end of the 20th century, trying
to put out the fires in exactly the same part of the world. Maybe
we have learned during the Century that sometimes you have to
act quickly in order to make sure that it does not get out of
control and destabilise the whole country.
Ms Taylor
379. Secretary of State, you are very clear
that we have a capability of defining military targets and actually
taking them out. This is the whole basis of what you are suggesting
to us. Can I ask you to restate that so that I can here it once
again from you? I know you have been saying it and you said it
to Crispin Blunt and others. I want to be sure in my mind that
that is exactly what you are saying: "We know where these
targets are, we can isolate them, and we actually can take them
out." We all know that Milosevic is waiting for civilian
casualties to make his statement: "This is what Britain is
doing to us. This is what NATO is doing to us." I would really
like you to restate that for me please.
(Mr Robertson) There is no casualty-free conflict
in this day and age. There is no way that you can insure against
casualties on either side. But you can use the increasingly sophisticated
weaponry that is available. We have already shown members of the
Committee—and I think the Committee is coming in to look
at more information today—what happened in Operation Desert
Fox. We can show the world from some of the photography there,
the battle damage assessment on Iraqi military targets during
Operation Desert Fox just how forensic and how accurate the weaponry
is that is available against military targets. We are confident
that with the meticulous planning that has gone into it President
Milosevic's military machine is going to take a very considerable
hit and therefore reduce the chances of further violence against
civilians. He is well armed, both on the ground and in terms of
equipment. A lot of it is quite old but still very reliable. It
was supplied in some cases by western governments, including ours,
who were supplying the former Yugoslavia quite legitimately—I
do not think any criticism can be made of that—and we therefore
know its capabilities. The forces of Yugoslavia have shown over
the years that they are brave and they do not easily give in,
but what is being done in their name and the name of Serbia is
a disgrace and a stain which, if they knew about it, I am sure
they would hold back. If Milosevic is hell-bent on taking his
country, as he has over the years, into these disasters one after
another, at some point the people of Serbia are going to say "Stop".
It has already happened in the last 18 months. The demonstrations
we all saw in Belgrade gave us great heart. They were finally
suppressed but the people of Serbia are not all sheep. I cannot
believe that they themselves would back a President who has been
so nationally suicidal as this one has been.
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