Select Committee on Defence Third Special Report

ANNEX A

THE FUTURE OF NATO - GOVERNMENT REPLY TO DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE'S THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 1998-99, HC 39

1. The Government is grateful for the Committee's report on the future of NATO, and in very large measure agrees with its observations. The Government has considered the principal observations made by the Committee and offers the following responses.

GENERAL

2. In paragraph 8, the Committee comments: "The debate on defence and security issues, both within Parliament and the media, is often muted and sometimes ill-informed, and has been for many years now. The future shape and scope of NATO is fundamental to the future stability and security of the UK, Europe and the world at large It should be of concern to us all. We hope that Parliament will be given an opportunity to debate this issue in advance of the departure of Ministers to the Washington Summit."

3. The Government agrees that there should be a vigorous and well-informed debate on defence and security issues. This informed its approach to the Strategic Defence Review, in which the greatest possible input and involvement was sought from outside Government circles. The Government also agrees with the Committee's remarks on the importance of NATO and its future to the security both of the UK and the wider international scene. NATO is the cornerstone of Britain's security and defence policy. For this reason, the Government makes the maintenance of the Alliance's military effectiveness and political cohesion one of its highest priorities.

4. The Government notes the Committee's observation about the desirability of a debate before the Summit. In the event, this did not prove possible, but the Government reported fully on the outcome of the Summit, for instance in the Prime Minister's statement on 26 April and subsequent exchanges (Official Report, columns 21-36), and arranged for copies of the documents published by the Summit to be placed in the Library as soon as possible.

ROLE OF NATO

5. In paragraph 29, the Committee comments: "We wish to see the new Strategic Concept outline a new direction for NATO for the years ahead. New roles must be outlined and prioritised. The changing security environment means that new challenges must be faced, and new roles and responsibilities taken on. NATO has already done well to reconfigure itself to meet post-Cold War challenges. However, its core function of territorial defence must not be undermined by its new missions, and NATO must retain its military capability to fulfil Article 5 tasks, however remote such threats may seem."

6. The Government agrees that collective defence in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains the bedrock of the Alliance, and endorses the Committee's comments in its Conclusions (paragraph 174) that "despite the increasing possibilities of NATO's involvement in other types of operation, Article 5 must remain at the very core of the Alliance." The Government also strongly agrees that, as the Committee says in paragraph 175, "the new strategic environment does require that NATO now do more than simply defend its own territory."

7. The new Concept recognises this. For example, it sets out the Alliance's fundamental security tasks as follows (paragraph 10):

Security:

To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation:


To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interest, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence:


To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

Crisis Management:

To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

Partnership:


To promote wide-ranging partnership, co-operation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

These tasks make quite clear that NATO recognises its wider role beyond collective defence.

8. Besides this clear statement of what NATO is for, the Strategic Concept gives direction to NATO planners to give active encouragement to the development of the modern flexible forces required to carry out the full range of the Alliance's tasks. The Concept, together with the Defence Capabilities Initiative also launched by the Summit, will promote the development of flexible, mobile, deployable, sustainable and survivable forces along the lines set out in the Strategic Defence Review.

FORCE STRUCTURES

9. In paragraph 31, the Committee comments: "The same conclusion [as reached in the SDR], that we must retain the capability to engage in high-intensity warfare as well as to participate in less intensive operations, is applicable to NATO's force structure, although we regretfully may have to accept that some members will continue to have conscript forces primarily configured for Article 5 operations that will not be deployable for less intensive operations."

10. The Government agrees that it is essential to maintain the capacity for high-intensity operations in order to be capable across the range of missions. The emphasis in the Strategic Concept and the Defence Capabilities Initiative on such modernisation issues as deployability should encourage an increase in the proportion of Allied forces that can be deployed and sustained distant from their home stations. In identifying the most important areas for improvement, and with a special focus on interoperability, the work has concentrated on the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability and on command, control and information systems. The UK will give its full support to the work of the temporary High Level Steering Group established by Heads of State and Government to take forward the elements of the Defence Capabilities Initiative.

11. In paragraph 34, the Committee comments: "The new Strategic Concept must provide a clear steer as to the capabilities required by the Alliance over the next ten to fifteen years." The Government agrees, and believes that the Concept agreed by the Washington Summit does so.

NUCLEAR POLICY

12. In paragraph 39, the Committee comments: "We look forward to this statement [by HMG on the UK's strategic and sub-strategic nuclear strategy], particularly if it clarifies the sub-strategic role of Trident. ¼ While we recognise that nuclear weapons remain central to NATO's strategy, the Alliance's nuclear policy will continue to evolve, and we welcome open debate upon it."

13. The Government draws the Committee's attention to the written Answer given by the Defence Secretary to Jim Fitzpatrick MP (Official Report, 26 March 1999, column 433) about the UK's strategic and sub-strategic nuclear strategy, which stated that:

"The purpose of our nuclear forces is to deter aggression against the United Kingdom or its Allies. The Strategic Defence Review confirmed that, in addition to its strategic deterrent role, Trident would also perform the sub-strategic nuclear role, formerly assigned to RAF Tornado aircraft. A sub-strategic element is an essential component of a nuclear deterrent policy. In extreme circumstances of self defence, a capability for the more limited use of nuclear weapons would allow us to signal to an aggressor that he has miscalculated our resolve, without using the full destructive power that Trident offers."

14. In paragraph 40, the Committee comments: "We agree [with Sir Michael Alexander] that greater nuclear transparency by NATO could only be beneficial." NATO decisions on nuclear matters are of course for collective decision by all Allies concerned. The Government aims to be as open as possible, consistent with necessary security considerations, about nuclear matters, as the Strategic Defence Review made clear.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

15. In paragraph 44, the Committee comments: "We expect to see the new Strategic Concept clearly outline NATO's competences for peace support operations and its plans for cooperation with other organisations to pursue lasting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. We note the important work being done by NATO on Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning in working with humanitarian aid agencies and relevant government agencies, and hope that this work will be pursued further."

16. Both the new Concept (paragraphs 14-17, 25, 31, 32) and the Summit Communiqué (paragraphs 17, 20, 37-40) set out NATO's understanding of the role of other institutions and NATO's own willingness to work in a mutually reinforcing way with them. Paragraph 31 of the Concept makes clear that NATO will seek, in co-operation with other organisations, including the UN and the OSCE, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

17. The Committee will be aware of the vital role played in ameliorating conditions for refugees from Kosovo by British and other NATO troops in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO, as a military alliance, is not suited to fulfil such humanitarian roles on a long-term basis, and NATO is learning from experience about the best ways to involve specialised humanitarian agencies as early as possible in such situations and to hand over responsibility as fully as possible to such agencies at the earliest possible stage.

18. The Government draws the Committee's attention to the explicit recognition in the new Strategic Concept (paragraph 60) of the vital role of Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). The Committee will be aware of the new impetus given by the Strategic Defence Review to developing effective links and mutual understanding between the armed forces and Government Departments on the one hand and non-governmental organisations on the other.

COUNTER-PROLIFERATION

19. In paragraph 46, the Committee comments: "We ¼ would support NATO's adoption of a non-proliferation mission. But NATO must be aware of the limitations of its role in counter-proliferation: its principal objective in this area should remain the more even-handed prevention, or reversal, of proliferation through diplomatic means and the support, rather than duplication, of the work of other international organisations."

20. The Committee will be aware that the Summit launched an initiative to improve overall Alliance political and military efforts to respond to the risks posed to Alliance security posed by the spread of nucleasr, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. This initiative will integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to proliferation and will:

• ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them;

• improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues;

• support the development of a public information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of proliferation issues and Allies' efforts to support non-proliferation efforts;

• enhance existing Allied programmes which increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WD threats;

• strengthen the process of information exchange about Allies' national programmes of bilateral WMD destruction and assistance;

• enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of the their civil populations against WMD risks; and

• create a WMD Centre within the International Staff at NATO to support these efforts.

NATO's intention is not to duplicate the valuable work of other international organisations. The Summit Communiqué makes clear that the Alliance's principal non-proliferation goal, and that of its members, continues to be to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Communiqué also reiterates NATO's full support for, and the strengthening of, the international non-proliferation régimes.

LEGAL BASE FOR NATO OPERATIONS

21. In paragraph 52, the Committee comments: "That NATO cannot act without the consent and agreement of all 19 of its members, each of which belongs to the UN and respects that organisation's philosophy, ought to ensure that any operation is legitimate under international law."

22. The Government agrees with the Committee's assessment of the commitment of all NATO members to the UN and to upholding international law, which is reflected in the new Strategic Concept and in the Washington Summit Communiqué. As the Prime Minister told the House on 26 April (Official Report, column 35), the Communiqué makes clear that NATO wants to act with United Nations support, but "we cannot ¼ say that those are the only circumstances in which we shall ever act."

23. The Government agrees with the Committee's view (paragraph 176) that "insistence on a UN Security Council mandate for non-Article 5 operations would be unnecessary" and that giving Russia a veto over such action would be both unwise and inconsistent with the NATO/Russia Founding Act.

24. The Government notes the Committee's comment (paragraph 51) about Kosovo not being seen as a precedent. Whether or not any Ally or Partner does subsequently seek to cite the action taken over Kosovo as a precedent, the key requirement for NATO action will remain that of proceeding by consensus, as the Committee notes in paragraph 52.

KOSOVO

25. In paragraph 57, the Committee comments: "This Committee will monitor the developments [in Kosovo] carefully and we will ask the government to give us a considered view at the end of NATO offensive action and after the first six months of any peace enforcement deployment on how the arrangements have worked in practice. We will wish to take evidence, inter alia, on the military advice given to the North Atlantic Council, the military assessment provided to UK ministers and the co-ordination of political objectives and military strategy."

26. The Government notes the Committee's intentions, and will of course support the enquiry once it is mounted. The Government will provide information and briefing on an ongoing basis, and arrange such visits as are necessary to support the Committee's work.

GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE FOR NATO OPERATIONS

27. In paragraph 61, the Committee comments: "The Secretary General of NATO has said that the question of NATO's global reach will be addressed in a precise manner in the new Strategic Concept and we look forward to this clearer indication of NATO's view of its global role."

28. The Government's evidence to the Committee made clear (for instance, Questions 61 and 62) that it saw flexibility on this point as being desirable. Risks can arise from geographically diverse areas, especially with the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and while NATO's emphasis will naturally be on areas closest to members' territories, it cannot ignore, or be seen to ignore, risks from further afield.

29. The Prime Minister made clear to the House on 26 April (Official Report, columns 35-36) that NATO is still essentially a regional alliance, but that it is changing and adapting because the wider world is changing and adapting. The new Concept allows NATO the flexibility to take action beyond collective defence when NATO believes it necessary, but this does not change the basic nature of the Alliance.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE

30. In paragraph 68, the Committee comments: "In formulating the arrangements for a strengthened ESDI, there must be no decoupling of the transatlantic alliance which would alienate our North American Allies. There must be no duplication of NATO resources. And there must be no discrimination amongst the European countries on the basis of their differing relationships with the EU and the Alliance."

31. The Government agrees with these aims. Strengthening a common European policy in security and defence and strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance must go hand-in-hand. At the Washington Summit, NATO marked an important further stage in this process, welcoming the initiative launched last year by the Prime Minister, declaring its readiness to develop further the Berlin arrangements as the EU defines its own defence arrangements, and stressing the importance of ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU Allies in EU-led crisis management operations.

32. In paragraph 70, the Committee comments: "An enhanced ESDI in some form - whether or not it is developed exclusively within NATO, or in some other arrangement involving more closely the EU - continues to have significant, potential, practical defence benefits."

33. The Government agrees. An enhanced European security and defence capability will allow the European nations to make a better and more coherent contribution to NATO, strengthening the Alliance overall, and underpin the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy with the potential to take military action, when NATO as a whole is not engaged.

34. In paragraph 71, the Committee comments: "Under no circumstances must the development of the ESDI, now or in the foreseeable future, be seen to be an attack on the transatlantic nature of the Alliance."

35. The Government strongly agrees. The continued engagement of our North American Allies in European security and the strength of the transatlantic link are fundamental to the UK's security and defence policy. The Washington Summit Communiqué acknowledged (paragraph 9) that a stronger European role would help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance for the 21^st century.

36. In paragraph 75, the Committee comments: "We regard the reference [in the St Malo Declaration] to means outside the NATO framework with concern and believe that this element of the declaration may mean different things to each of the parties."

37. The St Malo Declaration sets out the agreed view of the British and French Governments that military action might be taken under the political control of the European Union ether using NATO assets or drawing solely on national or multinational means. It also emphasises the need to avoid unnecessary duplication of NATO capabilities in any structures to be created in the EU.

38. In paragraph 86, the Committee comments: "There is a large measure of agreement on the aims of a strengthened ESDI though there are differences of emphasis between the main players. It will be necessary to reconcile the industrial, political and military elements whilst maintaining transatlantic cooperation. In addressing the industrial restructuring element, close attention will need to be paid to security of supply issues."

39. While there is considerable common ground on this issue, the Government recognises that there are inevitably differences of emphasis as the work progresses. The Government intends to continue to play a leading role in the development of this initiative, and in finding arrangements that are satisfactory to all parties.

40. Moreover, the Government agrees that close attention will need to be paid to security of supply issues. The Government has consistently stated that industrial restructuring should not affect the supply of defence materiel necessary to discharge its military commitments.

41. In paragraph 89, the Committee comments: "If the EU is to be merged with the WEU, NATO together with Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, will have to reconsider their relationship to take account of those nations' traditions of neutrality." The Government has always recognised that all EU Partners and NATO Allies will need to agree any new arrangements. This will be a guiding principle as detailed work is taken forward.

42. In paragraph 90, the Committee comments: "We recommend ¼ that the UK should press for a clear statement of support for the development of the ESDI to be included in the new Strategic Concept." The new Strategic Concept includes, at paragraph 30, a statement of support for the continuing development of the ESDI and a recognition of the advantages this will bring. Furthermore, in paragraph 9 of the Washington Summit Communiqué, NATO Heads of State and Government welcomed the new impetus given to the development of a common European policy in security and defence, and in paragraph 10 set out measures to enhance further the effectiveness of ESDI.

43. In paragraph 92, the Committee comments: "We hope that the Washington Summit will produce a convincing plan, based on the findings of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, to bring our European Allies' force structure into line with NATO's new missions. ¼ We hope that the Washington Summit will lay the foundations for a mature reconsideration of measures to improve complementarity and interoperability amongst the European Allies' armed forces, and will embody a recognition that this will involve further pooling of national resources, with the trade-offs that such a development implies. ¼ We would see great advantage in the Washington Summit announcing the creation of a second, European-led, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps."

44. The Government agrees that the military capabilities and operational effectiveness of European Allies' forces must be improved to enable them to make a more effective and coherent contribution to European defence capabilities, and to ESDI within NATO, and to allow Europeans to take action when NATO as a whole is not engaged militarily. The Alliance recognises that improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities through the Defence Capabilities Initiative should strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance. Amongst other things, it has taken into consideration the ability of European Allies to undertake European-led operations, and has examined ways to improve the capability of multinational formations. The Summit did not address the question of a second ARRC.

45. In paragraph 93, the Committee comments: "We would see advantage in the Washington Summit producing a clear statement of NATO's view of the proposed integration of the WEU and the EU." The Government believes that it is premature to draw conclusions on the institutional arrangements necessary to support its approach to European security and defence. This has not been the focus of the debate so far. The Washington Summit Communiqué welcomed the work under way in the EU and declared NATO's readiness to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, building on the Berlin arrangements for WEU-led operations.

46. In paragraph 95, the Committee comments: "A stronger European Security and Defence Identity could strengthen the Alliance and reinforce its transatlantic dimension. We believe that by making Europe more capable of acting without the USA in defence of its own interests it will, paradoxically, make the USA more ready to remain within the Alliance and work with its European Allies. We would support any move which would have the effect of bringing closer transatlantic cooperation, and which might as a consequence make unilateral military action by the USA less likely. But the advantages of a strengthened ESDI do not lie only to the West. Russia finds the EU a much more natural partner in developing European security cooperation than it does NATO. The EU has a fundamental role to play in securing, through political and economic means, the stability of Europe." The Government agrees that a stronger European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the Alliance and reinforce its transatlantic dimension.

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Prepared 21 May 1999