NATO ENLARGEMENT
72. In paragraph 140, the Committee comments: "There
should be no doubt that the principal challenges [of integrating
the new members into NATO] are not those that have been faced,
but those that lie ahead. ¼
We have been most impressed by the will shown by the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland since the Madrid Summit to address deficiencies
and by the progress achieved. But it would be unrealistic to expect
the integration of new members to be either rapid or straightforward."
73. The Government agrees that the efforts made by
the new members have indeed been impressive. But there is still
much work still to be done, in which a key role will be played
by NATO's collective force planning process. The UK's bilateral
defence co-operation programmes can also give important support
to the process of integration, and are designed with this in mind.
The time and effort required both of the new members and of NATO
to complete fully the integration process are factors which NATO
will need to take fully into account in future decisions on enlargement.
74. In paragraph 141, the Committee comments: "We
remain disappointed that NATO has not made publicly available,
as we have requested, declassified versions of its studies on
the financial and military implications of enlargement."
The Government notes the Committee's remarks, but has nothing
to add to the Ministry of Defence's letter printed at page 118
of the evidence.
75. In paragraph 154, the Committee comments: "We
believe that further enlargement in the near term should be approached
with caution. Further enlargement should be based on an assessment
of the benefits and costs for both existing and potential new
members."
76. The UK strongly supports further enlargement
as and when the time is right, in accordance with the policy set
out by the Madrid and Washington Summits. The Government wishes
to make further accessions a success, and therefore agrees that
caution is merited. As the Committee implies, the impact on NATO's
effectiveness is an extremely important factor in decisions on
future enlargement. The Government has however noted very carefully
the unanimous view of the governments of the aspirant countries
that the benefits of NATO membership far outweigh the costs. Existing
members of the Alliance take the same view about their own membership
of NATO. Collective defence is cost-effective defence; and the
level of security provided by membership of the Alliance would
be difficult if not impossible to achieve using the resources
of any individual member.
77. It is in any case difficult for NATO to make
judgements about the costs of membership for aspiring countries
without detailed planning, whilst precise judgments on the costs
and benefits are principally for the governments concerned to
make. NATO can however provide guidance and assistance. For those
countries that have decided to seek membership, therefore, the
Membership Action Plan approved by the Washington Summit will
help them gain a clearer understanding of questions relating to
membership, including the costs and obligations of membership.
78. In paragraph 163, the Committee comments: "There
must be no champions - particular Allies unwilling to accept any
enlargement that does not include their favoured candidates -
and no "beauty contest" among the aspirant members.
NATO must make the criteria upon which membership will be offered
clear and intelligible, without offering any guarantee of automatic
membership, and offer candidates assistance in meeting those criteria
where appropriate. Now is the time for practical measures rather
than rhetoric."
79. The Government strongly agrees that decisions
about future enlargement should not be made on the basis of clientism
or "beauty contests".
80. The Government notes the Committee's comment
about criteria for membership. The Madrid Declaration and the
Washington Summit Communiqué made clear that the willingness
and ability of individual aspiring countries to assume the responsibilities
and obligations of membership form only one strand of the factors
which have to be taken into account. It would be wrong to encourage
aspiring countries to believe that there is any automatic path
towards membership or that fulfilment of particular criteria will
"qualify" a country for membership. The Membership Action
Plan approved by the Summit, copies of which were placed in the
Library of the House on 26 April, makes it explicit that participation
in the Plan does not imply any timeframe for any decision to invite
an aspirant to begin accession talks with the Alliance nor any
guarantee of eventual membership.
81. Through the Membership Action Plan, NATO is ready
to provide advice, assistance and practical support to countries
wishing to join NATO. It includes the following elements:
- the submission by aspiring members of individual
annual national programmes on their preparations for possible
future membership, covering political, economic, defence, resource,
security and legal aspects;
- focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant
countries' progress on their programmes that includes both political
and technical advice, as well as annual 19+1 meetings at Council
level to assess progress;
- a clearinghouse to help co-ordinate assistance
by NATO and by member states to aspirant countries in the defence/military
field;
- a defence planning approach for aspirants which
includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.
The Government believes that the Membership Action
Plan does indeed meet the requirement that the Committee identifies
for practical measures, not rhetoric.
82. In paragraphs 168 to 170, the Committee comments:
"While we would encourage NATO come up with a "Madrid
plus" package that will effectively aid aspirant members,
NATO is not the appropriate forum for economic and political assistance.
Other organisations exist for these purposes; NATO is however
the only organisation which can encourage interoperability, civilian
control of the military and the reform of the armed forces, all
extremely important tasks for candidate states. A "Madrid
plus" package for membership candidates should include clear
targets in those areas and strategies for achieving them in collaboration
with the Alliance. We are far from persuaded that membership will
benefit the security of every state seeking to join the Alliance.
But if doors are closed, the possibilities of finding constructive
alternatives will be diminished, if not lost. On the other hand,
we fear that "waves" of enlargement or strict timetables
will only exacerbate division, rivalry and insecurity. It is our
belief that further enlargement should be limited, gradual and
conducted on a case-by-case basis. We also believe that the attitude
of Russia - and the security of Ukraine - are factors that must
also be taken into account." The "Madrid plus"
package to which the Committee refers was launched at the NATO
Summit. It focusses on issues which are relevant to NATO membership.
The Government agrees that while economic and political issues
are clearly relevant, and in fact comprise the first chapter of
the Membership Action Plan, NATO itself is not the most appropriate
forum for providing assistance in these areas.
83. The Government agrees with the Committee that
the door to NATO membership must remain open, not least for the
reasons that the Committee highlights. The door will remain open
so long as Article 10 of the Washington Treaty continues to apply
and so long as European States in a position to further the principles
of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area are not members.
84. As has already been made clear, no timeframes
for future decisions are implied by the Membership Action Plan
or the Summit Communiqué, although the enlargement process
will remain under continuous review and will be reviewed by NATO
Heads of State and Government at their next meeting, not later
than 2002. The Government agrees that further enlargement should
be conducted gradually. While the Summit Communiqué makes
it clear that each aspirant should be considered on its own merits,
it may be preferable, for practical and legislative reasons, to
avoid a succession of single accessions, while avoiding artificial
linkages.
85. The Washington Summit Communiqué reaffirmed
the inherent right of all states to choose the means to ensure
their own security; no third party has, or can have, a veto over
NATO's decisions on enlargement. At the same time, however, the
Government, the Allies and the aspirant countries are aware of
the need to take broader European security issues into account
in the enlargement process and to listen to others not directly
involved in the process. NATO's Partnership with states across
Europe, including Russia and Ukraine, as well as the bilateral
relationship between Allies and Partners, form a crucial element
in these dialogues. For the aspirants themselves, discussion of
political issues will, inter alia, form an element in the
programme of activities NATO will undertake, agreed at the Washington
Summit.
86. In paragraph 171, the Committee comments: "We
perceive a serious prospect that the respective enlargements of
NATO and the European Union could proceed at cross purposes. ¼
It is time that the perennial NATO-WEU-EU dialogue about collective
defence became a broader dialogue about the enlargement of the
Western security community, and the security of the whole of Europe."
87. The processes of enlarging NATO and the EU are
separate and proceed according to separate criteria. Nonetheless,
the Government recognises that both have essential and complementary
contributions to make to the spreading of security in Europe and
that countries aspiring to join both organisations will find that
reform efforts in the political and economic areas bring them
closer to membership of both.
88. The Government notes the Committee's comment
on the concerns felt in Central and Eastern Europe about the risk
of an enlarging EU drawing new dividing lines. The Government
too is aware of these concerns.
Ministry of Defence
May 1999
