APPENDIX 11
Memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom
Working Group on Arms[72]
COVERING LETTER
This document, jointly prepared by our organisations,
highlights some of the most important issues that we would like
to see addressed in the Committee's forthcoming report. [These
and other issues are explored in greater depth in the evidence
previously submitted by members of the UK Working Group on Arms.]
Whilst welcoming the 1997 and 1998 reports, the UK Working Group
believes that there is scope for significant improvements in the
format and content of the Annual Reports, for example, through
more precise summary descriptions, and the inclusion of information
on quantities, values and end-users.
Furthermore, we also feel that improvements
can be made to the system of parliamentary scrutiny of UK government
arms export policy in practice. We believe that the QSC has an
essential function in carrying out retrospective scrutiny of UK
arms exports policy, and strongly urge that this committee be
made a permanent fixture.
Equally, however, we hope that the Quadripartite
Select Committee will recommend the establishment of a confidential
parliamentary committee to scrutinise sensitive licence applications
and to provide information and advice to Ministers. We believe
that this will ensure a full and consistent application of the
guidelines set out in the European Code of Conduct on arms export.
INTRODUCTION
This submission highlights some of the most
important issues that the organisations comprising the UK Working
Group on Arms would like to see the Quadripartite Select Committee
address in its final report to the Government.[73]
It also recommends ways in which the UK, along with its partners
in the EU, can work towards a truly transparent and accountable
arms export policy.
The UK Working Group welcomes the publication
of the first and second Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls
as significant progress towards a more transparent and accountable
arms export policy. We also see it as a significant move towards
a more demonstrably "joined-up" approach to strategic
exports controlsthe report being the first comprehensive
report of the policy and implementation of controls covering the
work of a number of Government departments. Production of an Annual
Report also demonstrates a recognition that NGOs, the media, parliamentarians
and, above all, the public have a right to know what weapons are
being sold and to whom.
However, as the Government has, itself, acknowledged,
this report is not as comprehensive or as detailed as it could
be. Furthermore, the UK Working Group would argue, that the annual
publication of post-facto Reports does not ensure full accountability
in UK arms exports. We firmly believe that parliamentarians should
play a role in scrutinising sensitive export applications before
licensing decisions are taken.
In terms of the substance of the Reports, some
minor improvements were made to the 1998 Report over the previous
year. However, there remains insufficient detail in the Annual
Reports for parliament, media, NGOs and the public to effectively
scrutinise the export licence decisions against the Government's
guidelines and the EU Code of Conduct. Without current, precise,
and comprehensive information covering all forms of UK transfers,
it is impossible to say categorically whether or not the UK has
sanctioned the export of military equipment which could be used
to abuse human rights, exacerbate armed conflict and undermine
sustainable development.
On a more positive note, in the introduction
to the Report, the three Secretaries of State commit themselves
to "consider the suggestions for changes in the light of
the forthcoming substantive Report to be published by the Committees".
The UK Working Group welcomes this Government's aspiration to
improve both the quantity and quality of data released to Parliament
and the general public about UK arms sales. The report and recommendations
of the Quadripartite Select Committee are therefore crucial to
the further development of policy in this area, as the Government
moves towards introducing new primary legislation on arms exports
controls.
SECTION 1: IMPROVEMENTS
IN THE
TRANSPARENCY OF
THE ANNUAL
REPORTS
The UK Working Group believes it is in the best
interest of the UK Government to provide as detailed and specific
information as possible about monetary value, quantity and end-user
of military equipment licensed and transferred. A lack of accurate
information in this regard can often result in the public, the
media and NGOs assuming the "worst case scenario" with
regard to particular licences granted.
More precise summary descriptions
Without greater detail in the report, accountability
is inhibited. In many cases the level of detail provided is not
enough to enable a judgement to be made as to whether an arms
transfer meets the export guidelines. For example, "aircraft
spares" or "electronic equipment" could both include
a range of equipment which may be fairly benign, or equally could
be very sophisticated and of potential concern if exported to
a particular destination. There is significant difference between
licensing exports of two-way radios and licensing advanced computer
systems for weapons targeting. Parliament cannot reach a judgement
as to whether a licence application should or should not have
been granted, unless it is clear exactly what type of equipment
is involved, and thus how it may be used if it reaches particular
hands.
Recommendation:Future Annual Reports
should present information in sub-categories [such as ML 10(a)]
and, when appropriate, provide more detailed summary descriptions,
ie instead of "components for combat aircraft", the
exact nature of the component and type of aircraft should be specified,
such as "airbrake actuator for hawk". This would make
scrutiny of export licences granted and refused much more effective
and accurate. Generic terms like "electronic equipment"
defy analysis and should not be used.
Information on quantities and values
Information on the quantity and value of equipment
licensed for export is crucial to allow parliament and the public
to assess government policy. The Annual Report fails to specify
the value of each licence or how many items can be transferred
under it. This makes it impossible to judge whether the Government
is abiding by its commitment to consider the development implications
of arms transfers (Criterion Eight of the EU Code of Conduct).
Furthermore, without the provision of information on the quantity
of equipment under each licence, it is impossible to make an accurate
assessment of the risks of diversion and transhipment (Criterion
Seven of the EU Code). For example, in 1998, 71 licences were
granted for the export of small arms to the Channel Islandsmore
than were granted for export to France. An assumption that each
export licence was for several hundred firearms would give rise
to concerns regarding diversion or transhipment. However, if it
were to be revealed that each licence was for a small number of
items, such potential concerns would be allayed.
It has been argued that the provision of such
information would compromise commercial confidentiality. However,
in the United States this detail is disclosed without any apparent
harm in this regard. The US Section 655 Report contains, in country
by country format, the quantity and the dollar value of each item
authorised for export. Arguments have also been put forward that
the maximum quantity allowed under a licence is not an accurate
indicator of what has been exported. However, it is important
to recognise that this is in fact an accurate indicator of Government
policy in terms of what it will allow to be exported. As a maximum
quantity is specified under all licences, and with the addition
of a new computerised licence processing system at the DTI, the
provision of this information should be a relatively straight-forward
task.
Recommendation:Future Annual Reports
should include information on the value and quantity of equipment
to be exported under the specified licence following the example
of the US Report. At a minimum, the Government should provide
this information in "value bands" (eg value band A:
£250,000; value band B: £250,000£1 million;
value band C: £1 million£10 million; etc.)
Information on end-users
Descriptions of equipment mean little without
information on the end-user. Presently, for example, the 1998
report simply states that "assault rifles" were licensed
to Zimbabwe without giving any indication of the end-user of the
rifles. Parliament or the public might well consider that, for
certain countries, an export to a police force with a poor human
rights record was inappropriate while an export to game wardens
should be allowed. In the view of the UK Working Group the release
of such general classification of end-user would facilitate more
accurate analysis of the implications of an export without jeopardising
commercial or political confidentiality.
Recommendation: Forthcoming Annual Reports
should specify details of the general classification of end-users
for each licence in the recipient country (army, navy, air force,
police, other state body, commercial organisation etc.)
Information on licences refused
The Annual Report gives no descriptive text
for export licences refused. It is therefore difficult to understand
why, for example, one ML2 licence was refused for Bahrain, whilst
another ML2 licence was granted.
Recommendation: Future Annual Reports
should contain a great deal more information about what military
equipment has been refused and why. This level of information
should be equivalent in extent and format to that provided for
licences granted.
Greater transparency in transfers
The Annual Report included some details from
HM Customs and Excise on the value of transfers of "other
weapons including small arms". Whilst this additional information
is to be welcomed, the UK Working Group on Arms again has concerns
that the data has been aggregated to such an extent that its potential
utility has been lost.
Recommendation: In the short term, HM
Customs and Excise data should be dis-aggregated to distinguish
transfers of small arms from other equipment. However, over the
longer term, the system of collecting data on exports should be
improved so transfers can be linked to licences granted. One proposal
is to amend internationally-agreed CN codes across the EU to ensure
better dis-aggregation of customs data. Another idea is to require
exporters to keep records and provide the Government with information
on their deliveries. A precedent for this is the voluntary provision,
by exporters, of information on their deliveries of major conventional
armaments to enable the Government to complete its UN Register
returns.
SECTION II: IMPROVEMENTS
IN ACCOUNTABILITY
Whilst welcoming significant strides towards
greater transparency in arms export policy made by the current
Government, there is still a need for enhanced accountability
in this crucial area.
Prior Scrutiny
The UK Working Group advocates adoption of a
system of prior parliamentary scrutinybased on a Westminster
committeeof sensitive export licence applications for two
main reasons:
It would significantly enhance accountability
of arms export policy in practice.
It would facilitate an objective
and consistent application of the export guidelines of the EU
Code of Conduct in the UK.
The 1998 White Paper on Strategic Export Controls
and the Trade and Industry Committee's subsequent report put forward
three main arguments against prior parliamentary scrutiny of individual
licence applications:
1. That it would be "administratively
onerous" and slow down the decision-making process for licence
applications.
However, since such a committee could restrict
their scrutiny to sensitive licence applications, there is little
cause to suspect that the licensing process as a whole would be
significantly affected. At a minimum, the committee could consider
those sensitive licence applications that are referred to Ministers
(approximately three per cent of the total number of licence applications
or around 200-300 per annum).
2. That commercially and diplomatically sensitive
information could be released to the public, thus damaging competitiveness
and embarrassing the Government.
However, such a committee could meet in private
and all information and discussions would be strictly confidential.
The UK select committee which monitors the work of the intelligence
services provides a model of a committee in receipt of highly
sensitive information which remains confidential. There should,
therefore, be no appreciable impact on either political or commercial
confidentiality.
3. That it would set a worrying constitutional
precedent, blurring the distinction between parliament and executive.
However, the committee could function in an
advisory capacity, able to recommend the granting or refusal of
an application but with the decision resting ultimately with the
Government. The committee's view could be considered by the Minister
alongside advice from officials.
Recommendation: The Quadripartite Select
Committee should recommend the establishment of a confidential
parliamentary committee to review sensitive licence applications
and to provide information and advice to Ministers. QSC members
will be aware of the Swedish system through previous evidence
submitted and the recent visit to Sweden by a number of joint
committee members. However, for such a system to be adopted by
the UK some adaptations would need to be made. If the Swedish
committee was transferred to the UK without adaptations, the head
of the Export Control Organisation would chair the committee and
the relationship between the executive and legislative might be
confused. The UK Working Group, therefore, suggests that a UK
version of the Export Control Council could take the form of a
committee in the Westminster model which could consider the foreign
policy, defence, trade and development implications of licence
applications. Civil servants from the Foreign Office, Ministry
of Defence, Department of Trade and Industry, and Department for
International Development could be called if necessary to provide
background information for the committee. As well as seeing all
licence applications referred to Ministers, the committee might
want to consider licence applications to embargoed destinations
and those applications without precedent. They may also wish to
examine licence applications to those countries which pose particular
development or human rights concerns.
Retrospective Scrutiny
Not withstanding the UK Working Group's views
on prior parliamentary scrutiny of sensitive export applications,
we also believe that public and parliamentary scrutiny and debate
on the Annual Reports should be sustained. This would allow for
the substance and format of the Annual Reports and the implementation
of UK arms export policy to be reviewed on an ongoing basis.
Recommendation: The UK Working Group
strongly recommends that the Quadripartite Select Committee is
established as a permanent committee to monitor, evaluate and
scrutinise the development of strategic export controls in all
its aspects. Building on established practice in the US, this
committee should have the right to seek more detailed information,
in confidence if necessary, on the granting of specific export
licences as required. In addition, an annual parliamentary debate
should be held before a full session of Parliament on the substance
of the Annual Report and on the implications for UK export policy.
This should be established practice each time a Report is published.
Finally, the publication of the Reports should be made a Statutory
requirement which binds all future governments whatever their
political complexion.
Concluding Remarks
The Quadripartite Select Committee has a seminal
role in shaping future development of UK arms export policy and
in enhancing transparency and accountability in this critical
area. The UK Working Group on Arms strongly urge the Committee
to seize the opportunity and establish a precedent for increased
parliamentary involvement in assessing UK arms export policy in
practice. As the world's second largest exporter of arms, it is
incumbent on the UK to demonstrate leadership on this issue, both
as part of the development of the EU Code of Conduct, and in terms
of the UK's role within other international and regional fora
where the UK exerts considerable influence.
January 2000
72 For the purpose of this brief the UKWG on arms
comprises Amnesty International, BASIC, Christian Aid, International
Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld. Back
73
Also see previous submissions by Amnesty International, BASIC,
Oxfam and Saferworld to the Committee. Back
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