Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 11

Memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom Working Group on Arms[72]

COVERING LETTER

  This document, jointly prepared by our organisations, highlights some of the most important issues that we would like to see addressed in the Committee's forthcoming report. [These and other issues are explored in greater depth in the evidence previously submitted by members of the UK Working Group on Arms.] Whilst welcoming the 1997 and 1998 reports, the UK Working Group believes that there is scope for significant improvements in the format and content of the Annual Reports, for example, through more precise summary descriptions, and the inclusion of information on quantities, values and end-users.

  Furthermore, we also feel that improvements can be made to the system of parliamentary scrutiny of UK government arms export policy in practice. We believe that the QSC has an essential function in carrying out retrospective scrutiny of UK arms exports policy, and strongly urge that this committee be made a permanent fixture.

  Equally, however, we hope that the Quadripartite Select Committee will recommend the establishment of a confidential parliamentary committee to scrutinise sensitive licence applications and to provide information and advice to Ministers. We believe that this will ensure a full and consistent application of the guidelines set out in the European Code of Conduct on arms export.

INTRODUCTION

  This submission highlights some of the most important issues that the organisations comprising the UK Working Group on Arms would like to see the Quadripartite Select Committee address in its final report to the Government.[73] It also recommends ways in which the UK, along with its partners in the EU, can work towards a truly transparent and accountable arms export policy.

  The UK Working Group welcomes the publication of the first and second Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls as significant progress towards a more transparent and accountable arms export policy. We also see it as a significant move towards a more demonstrably "joined-up" approach to strategic exports controls—the report being the first comprehensive report of the policy and implementation of controls covering the work of a number of Government departments. Production of an Annual Report also demonstrates a recognition that NGOs, the media, parliamentarians and, above all, the public have a right to know what weapons are being sold and to whom.

  However, as the Government has, itself, acknowledged, this report is not as comprehensive or as detailed as it could be. Furthermore, the UK Working Group would argue, that the annual publication of post-facto Reports does not ensure full accountability in UK arms exports. We firmly believe that parliamentarians should play a role in scrutinising sensitive export applications before licensing decisions are taken.

  In terms of the substance of the Reports, some minor improvements were made to the 1998 Report over the previous year. However, there remains insufficient detail in the Annual Reports for parliament, media, NGOs and the public to effectively scrutinise the export licence decisions against the Government's guidelines and the EU Code of Conduct. Without current, precise, and comprehensive information covering all forms of UK transfers, it is impossible to say categorically whether or not the UK has sanctioned the export of military equipment which could be used to abuse human rights, exacerbate armed conflict and undermine sustainable development.

  On a more positive note, in the introduction to the Report, the three Secretaries of State commit themselves to "consider the suggestions for changes in the light of the forthcoming substantive Report to be published by the Committees". The UK Working Group welcomes this Government's aspiration to improve both the quantity and quality of data released to Parliament and the general public about UK arms sales. The report and recommendations of the Quadripartite Select Committee are therefore crucial to the further development of policy in this area, as the Government moves towards introducing new primary legislation on arms exports controls.

SECTION 1: IMPROVEMENTS IN THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS

  The UK Working Group believes it is in the best interest of the UK Government to provide as detailed and specific information as possible about monetary value, quantity and end-user of military equipment licensed and transferred. A lack of accurate information in this regard can often result in the public, the media and NGOs assuming the "worst case scenario" with regard to particular licences granted.




More precise summary descriptions

  Without greater detail in the report, accountability is inhibited. In many cases the level of detail provided is not enough to enable a judgement to be made as to whether an arms transfer meets the export guidelines. For example, "aircraft spares" or "electronic equipment" could both include a range of equipment which may be fairly benign, or equally could be very sophisticated and of potential concern if exported to a particular destination. There is significant difference between licensing exports of two-way radios and licensing advanced computer systems for weapons targeting. Parliament cannot reach a judgement as to whether a licence application should or should not have been granted, unless it is clear exactly what type of equipment is involved, and thus how it may be used if it reaches particular hands.

  Recommendation:Future Annual Reports should present information in sub-categories [such as ML 10(a)] and, when appropriate, provide more detailed summary descriptions, ie instead of "components for combat aircraft", the exact nature of the component and type of aircraft should be specified, such as "airbrake actuator for hawk". This would make scrutiny of export licences granted and refused much more effective and accurate. Generic terms like "electronic equipment" defy analysis and should not be used.

Information on quantities and values

  Information on the quantity and value of equipment licensed for export is crucial to allow parliament and the public to assess government policy. The Annual Report fails to specify the value of each licence or how many items can be transferred under it. This makes it impossible to judge whether the Government is abiding by its commitment to consider the development implications of arms transfers (Criterion Eight of the EU Code of Conduct). Furthermore, without the provision of information on the quantity of equipment under each licence, it is impossible to make an accurate assessment of the risks of diversion and transhipment (Criterion Seven of the EU Code). For example, in 1998, 71 licences were granted for the export of small arms to the Channel Islands—more than were granted for export to France. An assumption that each export licence was for several hundred firearms would give rise to concerns regarding diversion or transhipment. However, if it were to be revealed that each licence was for a small number of items, such potential concerns would be allayed.

  It has been argued that the provision of such information would compromise commercial confidentiality. However, in the United States this detail is disclosed without any apparent harm in this regard. The US Section 655 Report contains, in country by country format, the quantity and the dollar value of each item authorised for export. Arguments have also been put forward that the maximum quantity allowed under a licence is not an accurate indicator of what has been exported. However, it is important to recognise that this is in fact an accurate indicator of Government policy in terms of what it will allow to be exported. As a maximum quantity is specified under all licences, and with the addition of a new computerised licence processing system at the DTI, the provision of this information should be a relatively straight-forward task.

  Recommendation:Future Annual Reports should include information on the value and quantity of equipment to be exported under the specified licence following the example of the US Report. At a minimum, the Government should provide this information in "value bands" (eg value band A: £250,000; value band B: £250,000—£1 million; value band C: £1 million—£10 million; etc.)

Information on end-users

  Descriptions of equipment mean little without information on the end-user. Presently, for example, the 1998 report simply states that "assault rifles" were licensed to Zimbabwe without giving any indication of the end-user of the rifles. Parliament or the public might well consider that, for certain countries, an export to a police force with a poor human rights record was inappropriate while an export to game wardens should be allowed. In the view of the UK Working Group the release of such general classification of end-user would facilitate more accurate analysis of the implications of an export without jeopardising commercial or political confidentiality.

  Recommendation: Forthcoming Annual Reports should specify details of the general classification of end-users for each licence in the recipient country (army, navy, air force, police, other state body, commercial organisation etc.)

Information on licences refused

  The Annual Report gives no descriptive text for export licences refused. It is therefore difficult to understand why, for example, one ML2 licence was refused for Bahrain, whilst another ML2 licence was granted.

  Recommendation: Future Annual Reports should contain a great deal more information about what military equipment has been refused and why. This level of information should be equivalent in extent and format to that provided for licences granted.

Greater transparency in transfers

  The Annual Report included some details from HM Customs and Excise on the value of transfers of "other weapons including small arms". Whilst this additional information is to be welcomed, the UK Working Group on Arms again has concerns that the data has been aggregated to such an extent that its potential utility has been lost.

  Recommendation: In the short term, HM Customs and Excise data should be dis-aggregated to distinguish transfers of small arms from other equipment. However, over the longer term, the system of collecting data on exports should be improved so transfers can be linked to licences granted. One proposal is to amend internationally-agreed CN codes across the EU to ensure better dis-aggregation of customs data. Another idea is to require exporters to keep records and provide the Government with information on their deliveries. A precedent for this is the voluntary provision, by exporters, of information on their deliveries of major conventional armaments to enable the Government to complete its UN Register returns.

SECTION II: IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCOUNTABILITY

  Whilst welcoming significant strides towards greater transparency in arms export policy made by the current Government, there is still a need for enhanced accountability in this crucial area.

Prior Scrutiny

  The UK Working Group advocates adoption of a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny—based on a Westminster committee—of sensitive export licence applications for two main reasons:

    —  It would significantly enhance accountability of arms export policy in practice.

    —  It would facilitate an objective and consistent application of the export guidelines of the EU Code of Conduct in the UK.

  The 1998 White Paper on Strategic Export Controls and the Trade and Industry Committee's subsequent report put forward three main arguments against prior parliamentary scrutiny of individual licence applications:

    1.  That it would be "administratively onerous" and slow down the decision-making process for licence applications.

  However, since such a committee could restrict their scrutiny to sensitive licence applications, there is little cause to suspect that the licensing process as a whole would be significantly affected. At a minimum, the committee could consider those sensitive licence applications that are referred to Ministers (approximately three per cent of the total number of licence applications or around 200-300 per annum).

    2.  That commercially and diplomatically sensitive information could be released to the public, thus damaging competitiveness and embarrassing the Government.

  However, such a committee could meet in private and all information and discussions would be strictly confidential. The UK select committee which monitors the work of the intelligence services provides a model of a committee in receipt of highly sensitive information which remains confidential. There should, therefore, be no appreciable impact on either political or commercial confidentiality.

    3.  That it would set a worrying constitutional precedent, blurring the distinction between parliament and executive.

  However, the committee could function in an advisory capacity, able to recommend the granting or refusal of an application but with the decision resting ultimately with the Government. The committee's view could be considered by the Minister alongside advice from officials.

  Recommendation: The Quadripartite Select Committee should recommend the establishment of a confidential parliamentary committee to review sensitive licence applications and to provide information and advice to Ministers. QSC members will be aware of the Swedish system through previous evidence submitted and the recent visit to Sweden by a number of joint committee members. However, for such a system to be adopted by the UK some adaptations would need to be made. If the Swedish committee was transferred to the UK without adaptations, the head of the Export Control Organisation would chair the committee and the relationship between the executive and legislative might be confused. The UK Working Group, therefore, suggests that a UK version of the Export Control Council could take the form of a committee in the Westminster model which could consider the foreign policy, defence, trade and development implications of licence applications. Civil servants from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence, Department of Trade and Industry, and Department for International Development could be called if necessary to provide background information for the committee. As well as seeing all licence applications referred to Ministers, the committee might want to consider licence applications to embargoed destinations and those applications without precedent. They may also wish to examine licence applications to those countries which pose particular development or human rights concerns.

Retrospective Scrutiny

  Not withstanding the UK Working Group's views on prior parliamentary scrutiny of sensitive export applications, we also believe that public and parliamentary scrutiny and debate on the Annual Reports should be sustained. This would allow for the substance and format of the Annual Reports and the implementation of UK arms export policy to be reviewed on an ongoing basis.

  Recommendation: The UK Working Group strongly recommends that the Quadripartite Select Committee is established as a permanent committee to monitor, evaluate and scrutinise the development of strategic export controls in all its aspects. Building on established practice in the US, this committee should have the right to seek more detailed information, in confidence if necessary, on the granting of specific export licences as required. In addition, an annual parliamentary debate should be held before a full session of Parliament on the substance of the Annual Report and on the implications for UK export policy. This should be established practice each time a Report is published. Finally, the publication of the Reports should be made a Statutory requirement which binds all future governments whatever their political complexion.

Concluding Remarks

  The Quadripartite Select Committee has a seminal role in shaping future development of UK arms export policy and in enhancing transparency and accountability in this critical area. The UK Working Group on Arms strongly urge the Committee to seize the opportunity and establish a precedent for increased parliamentary involvement in assessing UK arms export policy in practice. As the world's second largest exporter of arms, it is incumbent on the UK to demonstrate leadership on this issue, both as part of the development of the EU Code of Conduct, and in terms of the UK's role within other international and regional fora where the UK exerts considerable influence.

January 2000


72   For the purpose of this brief the UKWG on arms comprises Amnesty International, BASIC, Christian Aid, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld. Back

73   Also see previous submissions by Amnesty International, BASIC, Oxfam and Saferworld to the Committee. Back


 
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Prepared 11 February 2000