Common New Generation Frigate, CNGFHorizon
and its Principal Anti-Air Missile System, PAAMS
The Common New Generation Frigate, a collaborative
programme with France and Italy, was planned to replace the UK's
Type 42 destroyers in the early part of the next century. While
the contract for the development and initial production of the
Principal Anti-Air Missile System has been initialled by industry,
the "Horizon" project, the frigate and its other systems,
has not progressed satisfactorily. The three nations agreed on
25 April that they would proceed quickly to signature of a contract
for the missile system, but that it would not be cost-effective
to pursue a single prime contract for the ship. The UK will now
take forward its ship programme through a national prime contract,
building on the tri-national project work already carried out
and pursuing opportunities for co-operative procurement in equipping
1. CNGF has comprised two distinct collaborative
programmes: the Principal Anti Air Missile System, PAAMS, and
the ship with its other systems, Horizon, both derived from the
single Tri-Partite Staff Requirement for CNGF. The requirement
was approved by the three participating nations, the UK, France
and Italy, in December 1992. The UK requirement was, and continues
to be, for a ship to provide effective area air defence against
aircraft and missiles, to replace the Type 42 destroyers. At the
start of Project Definition for Horizon in 1995, the intention
was that PAAMS would provide an anti-air warfare capability sufficient
to meet the most stressing threat foreseen. It was subsequently
agreed that the initial capability sought should be sufficient
to meet the most stressing threat forecast at the in-service date
for CNGF, but that a growth path to provide the capability necessary
to address future predicted threats would also be identified as
part of this work.
2. The principal cost/capability trade-off
in the PAAMS programme has been the acceptance of a capability
sufficient to meet the threat at ISD, rather than beyond. Studies
into cost/capability and programme/capability trade-offs for Project
Horizon to achieve an affordable CNGF are under way as part of
Phase 1 of its programme which is scheduled to be completed by
31 October. This work will be carried forward into the UK's national
3. The UK planning assumption is for the
acquisition of 12 CNGF. This number would be tested by operational
analysis to support the main Gate submission for Full Scale Engineering
Development and Initial Production, FSED&IP, for the warship.
The Horizon Memorandum of Understanding assumed
French and Italian procurement of four and six ships respectively.
4. The requirement to replace the Type 42
destroyers was scrutinised in the Strategic Defence Review. No
changes were made to the operational case underpinning Project
Horizon which will now be addressed by a national warship contract.
5. The replacement for the Type 42 destroyers
equipped with PAAMS would provide area defence against aircraft
and missiles, including local area defence against modern anti-ship
missiles, to protect lightly armed or unarmed ships. In this role,
the warships would support maritime assets across the range, from
Ro Ro vessels through amphibious assault ships to aircraft carriers,
in both UK national and allied/coalition operations. In addition,
the Type 42 replacementwould be a multi-role, general purpose
platform capable of operations across the spectrum of tasks, from
peace support to high intensity warfare.
6. The warship and PAAMS are planned to
replace the Type 42 destroyer and its GWS30 Sea Dart weapon system.
The Type 42s are scheduled to leave service at approximately 6
monthly intervals, starting in late 2006, with the exception of
HMS Birmingham, which leaves service in 1999.
7. The ISD for CNGF was defined as the completion
of Part IV Trials, which indicate the ship is fit to enter service.
The original estimated ISD was December 2002. This slipped, largely
owing to the need to synchronise the warship and combat system
programmes, and the internationally agreed ISD for CNGF was amended
to June 2004. The latest offer from industry pointed to a UK first
of class being further delayed until 2007. We are confident that
a national programme can be delivered within a similar timescale.
8. PAAMS is to be procured from an international
joint venture company, EUROPAAMS, acting as the prime contractor.
This was also the intention for Horizon through the Horizon International
Joint Venture Company, HIJVC. Details of membership are at Annex,
along with membership of competing consortia for certain key equipments.
Prime contractor members were nominated by their governments,
with the exception of the GEC-led consortium forming the UK element
in the HIJVC, which was selected by competition. UKAMS, the UK
member of EUROPAAMS, began as a jointly owned subsidiary of Siemens
Plessey, GEC and BAe SEMA, who were selected on their industrial
capabilities to provide the equipment required. Following subsequent
restructuring, UKAMS is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Matra
9. The full development and initial production
for PAAMS is to be let by single tender under French law. The
MoU requires, however, that the prime contractor holds competitions
for as many of the sub-contracts as possible. Partners have agreed
on common procurement of several sub-systems, including the PAAMS
launcher and long-range radar, but have decided to procure different
multi-function radars. France and Italy are procuring the Empar
radar, already developed for the Franco-Italian Famille de Systemes
Sol-Air Futur, FSAF, family of ground-to-air missiles, from which
PAAMS will be developed. The UK is procuring the more advanced
10. The UK national warship will be procured
from a single prime contractor empowered to manage the overall
programmeincluding integration with PAAMS. Wherever possible
the results of the Horizon Phase 1 workincluding equipments
selected through competitionwill be incorporated into this
overall contractual arrangement.
11. Before the 1996 MoU was signed, the
UK considered a number of procurement options, including life
extension of Type 42s and acquisition of off-the-shelf alternatives.
Whereas PAAMS appears still to offer the best available balance
of cost and operational effectiveness. Horizon has not demonstrated
its viability, see paragraph 16. Since satisfactory progress has
not been made, the UK is to proceed with a national solution.
Phase 1 of the Horizon programme (Project Definition and Initial
Design) will, however, be completed as planned later this year
so that its deliverables are available to benefit the design and
build of a national warship.
12. The CNGF MoUs were signed in July 1994
for the Horizon programme and in March 1996 for the PAAMS programme,
plus supplements to both programmes detailing work in the forthcoming
phases. The two programmes have been managed by separate tri-national
government project teamsthe Horizon Joint Project Office
in London and the PAAMS Programme Office in Parisreporting
to tri-national steering committees. A PAAMS/Horizon Charter set
out arrangements for co-ordination between the two programmes.
13. At 1 April the Horizon Joint Project
Office, including its tri-national satellite offices in Rome and
Toulon, had a total of 86 staff37 UK, 26 French and 23
Italian Supplement 1 to the Horizon MoU set its budget at £118
million for phase 1, Design Definition and selection of sub-contractors,
split equally between the participants. The budget for phase 2,
Full Development and Initial Production, for which a further MoU
supplement would have been required, had not been set. The tri-national
Joint Project Office will monitor the completion of Phase 1 until
it disbands. Until then the Head of the Joint Project Office reports
to a 2-star tri-national Steering Committee which receives advice
on the user requirement from a 2-star tri-national Naval Committee,
and on technology issues from the "Co-operative Technical
Assistance by Governments" team.
14. The PAAMS Project Office has a staff
of 21eight UK, four Italian and nine French. The UK share
of the costs of FSED&IP will be higher than those of France
and Italy because of the costs of developing the Sampson radar,
used only in the UK variant, and because the UK will make a contribution
to the cost of Franco-Italian technology for PAAMS.
15. The aim has been to delegate as much
programme management work as possible to the Joint Project Office
and PAAMS Project Office. A directorate within the MOD Defence
Procurement Agency has been co-ordinating UK policy and funding
for both PAAMS and Horizon. It has an annual running costs budget
of £4.3 million, including the salaries and expenses of UK
staff working in the Joint Project Office and the PAAMS Project
16. The PAAMS contract, to be placed on
behalf of the three nations by France under French contracting
laws, has been initialled by industry. However, the Horizon International
Joint Venture Company was unable to put forward proposals for
an affordable ship that would deliver the capability and in-service
dates required. It did not demonstrate that it had established
itself as a strong prime contractor with a robust supporting industrial
structure that could manage the development and build of the warship
and its main systems. The UK will now pursue a national prime
contract and seek the maximum benefit from collaboration over
equipment for the ships.
17. Export potential is necessarily constrained
by the system's high technological specification and cost. The
Sampson multi-function radar, and its single faced variant, have
export potential worth perhaps several billion pounds over the
next 15 years. PAAMS should have export potential for the entire
system or elements of it. There could be prospects in refit programmes
as well as in new build hulls.
18. For Horizon, the GEC-led consortium,
including BAe and Vosper Thorneycroft, was selected by competition
against a VSEL-led consortium. The French and Italian members
of the International Joint Venture Company are both state-owned
monopoly warship contractors. For PAAMS, the Matra Bae Dynamics
UKAMS consortium was formed out of the companies possessing the
technologies crucial to the programmenotably the existing
FSAF contractors and the Sampson supplier Siemens Plessey Systems,
now BAe Defence Systems Ltd. The International Joint Venture Company
would have been responsible for selecting the suppliers of equipments
for Horizon, and for doing so strictly on the basis of value for
money and UK Government contracting standards. This will now be
the responsibility of the national prime contractor. Tri-national
consortia, listed at Annex were competing for each of the Combat
Management System, Fully Integrated Communications System and
Electronic Warfare System.
19. The Horizon MoU states that the primary
consideration is value for money and thus, as a general principle,
no formal work share is defined. Work share would, however, broadly
equate to cost share throughout the duration of the programme,
with the aim of achieving an overall balance, with consideration
also being given to the quality of work shared by the industries
of the three nations.
20. PAAMS work share is constrained by existing
FSAF arrangements, but the aim is to achieve equitable work share
throughout the life of the programme as far as possible, subject
to considerations of cost-effectiveness and competition.
21. Work on the warship programme will now
be taken forward by a MoD integrated project teamworking closely
with industry in accordance with Smart Procurement principles
for the effective management of affordability, timescale and risk.
The work completed on Horizon to date will be incorporated where
possible in the national programme.
22. PAAMS completed Project Definition in
1993 and is ready to enter Full Systems Engineering Development
and Initial Production. Supporting R&D activities centre on
the FSAF programme and the UK multi function electronically scanned
radar programme, which is contributing to Sampson development.
Risk reduction work has been carried out, including modelling
by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency to demonstrate the
achievability of the PAAMS performance objectives.
23. Under Phase 1 of the Horizon programme,
competitive Project Definition contracts for the Full Development
items within the combat system were placed and combat system and
platform equipment selection was being processed. Now that the
decision has been taken to proceed with a national programme for
the warship, the intention is to make as much use as possible
of this work done under Horizon Phase 1, due to be completed in
24. Future milestones will depend on decisions
still to be taken on the placing of contracts. Table 1 below shows
the currently planned milestones and approved budget.
|Approved expenditure||£198 million
|Start of PAAMS FSED/IP||September 1996
|Completion of Horizon Phase 1||July 1998
25. Delays in the PAAMS programme were largely related
to the slow progress in agreeing a procurement strategy with partners,
and then in negotiating a satisfactory contract; progress on Horizon
was delayed by the need to maintain alignment with PAAMS and,
more recently, by lack of progress by the International Joint
Venture Company. Cost reductions have been achieved by management
of the detailed requirement.
26. Table 2 below shows expenditure to date. Forward
commitment amounts to £15 million in 1999-2000. For the PAAMS
Full Systems Engineering Development & Initial Production
and national warship contracts, the total cost is expected to
be of the order of ***. The years of peak expenditure are expected
to be 2005-06 to 2008-09.
|Spend to date
|1996-97Start of Horizon Phase 1
1 Includes aborted NFR90 programme costs, around £7 million.
27. Under the terms of the MOU, the UK carries liabilities
in respect of additional expenses associated with winding up the
Horizon Joint Project Office/International Joint Venture Company.
28. A common support arrangement for spares and maintenance
was proposed for CNGF. Under the national programme, opportunities
for co-operative procurement will be pursued, including any opportunities
for shared support.
29. Ship staff training and spares storage are potential
bottlenecks. Increased use of experienced Type 42 crew would reduce
the load on pre-joining training, and thus the training bottleneck,
when the Type 42 replacement comes into service. Use of computer
based training will reduce disruption to operational programmes.
"Just In Time" stock management techniques will reduce
the volume of spares to be held, thus minimising the need for
new storage facilities during the transition period.
30. Assuming a class of 12 ships, nine or 10 would on
average be available at any one time to the Commander in Chief
Fleet for tasking, while two or three would be undergoing maintenance,
including one or two in full refit. It is not planned to hold
any ships in storage or as in-use reserves.
31. Commonality of the majority of PAAMS systems and
sub-systems, including in particular the Aster missile, will ensure
a good level of interoperability with both France and Italy. In
the warship context, the requirement for interoperability, will
be re-examined under the revised procurement strategy, but given
the primary Force Anti-Air Warfare role of the ship this will
remain a high priority.
32. The sales potential of Type 42s is being considered.
33. The Type 42 replacement is planned to have an in-service
life of 25 years.
34. The Type 42 replacement's systems and sub-systems
will be updated as appropriate throughout the life of the system
to take account of developments in the operational environment.
It is likely that the Future Surface Combatant and Future Carrier
programmes, currently in the early stages of concept development,
may both draw on major elements of the Type 42 replacement.
|Warship Prime Contractor||Horizon IJVC Ltd
Vosper Thornycroft Ltd
Fincantieri and Finmeccanica
|Nominated Horizon Prime Contractor
|Selected March 1995|
not yet legally
|Combat Managment System PD||HEPICS
CSEE Defense, Matra Cap
|Competitive Tenderer with EuroCombat
|Competitive Tenderder with HEPICS
|Fully Integrated Comms System PD||NICCO Ltd
|Competitive Tenderer with ITALTEL
|ITALTEL||BAe Defence Systems,|
Bull SA Europe,
ITALTEL, Bull HN
|Competitive Tenderer with NICCO|
|Electronic Warfare System PD||ARCEO
||Racal Defence Systems|
Matra Defence Equipment
|Competitive Tenderer with JANEWS
|Competitive Tenderer with ARCEO
Sea Lift Assets: Roll-on Roll-off Ships
The Strategic Defence Review identified a need for four additional
Roll-on Roll-off vessels, making a total of six, to support the
deployment of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. At the end of March
we issued invitations to four selected companies to negotiate
about a Public Private Partnership arrangement, with a view to
a decision on the procurement route at about the turn of this
year; the award of a contract in summer 2000; and the start of
the service, if practicable, by autumn 2000.
1. The Strategic Defence Review concluded that, in addition
to the two Roll-on Roll-off RoRo ships already approved for the
Joint Rapid Deployment Force, JRDF, there was a requirement for
further vessels. Operational analysis established that a total
of six RoRos would be required for the timely deployment of early
entry equipment for the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. JRRF.
2. The requirement is for guaranteed delivery of JRRF
equipment and for availability of the service for worldwide delivery
at sustained speeds of 18 knots. The vessels to meet this requirement
will be commercial vessels without military enhancements. Ship
size will depend on balancing optimum load carrying capacity against
the need to operate to small ports without specialist facilities
such as RoRo berths and craneage, and limited or "no deep
3. Readiness of the sixth ship has been extended from
20 to 30 days to allow industry more scope to earn commercial
revenue and thus offset costs to the MoD. Trade-offs between operational
risk and value for money will be tested in negotiations.
4. The long-term requirement is for a capability of six
vessels in total.
5. Operational analysis in the SDR subsumed earlier studies
of strategic lift to identify the number of RoRo vessels, and
6. The RoRo ships will provide guaranteed sealift for
the leading elements of the JRRF. They can be used across the
full range of missions and military tasks that require deployment
of UK forces into theatre througha seaport of disembarkation.
The vessels will either be deployed as part of a maritime task
group or operate independently, subject to the nature of any military
7. The RoRo vessels do not replace any existing platforms,
but provide a capability which otherwise would have to be found
by chartering ships taken up from trade.
8. The ISD for the RoRos is defined as the provision
of a six-vessel service at the defined JRRF readiness, which we
aim to achieve in the autumn of 2000. The date will be reviewed
later this year. The full long-term service will be provided on
a phased basis, allowing the interim ships, see paragraph 10,
to be withdrawn in a co-ordinated fashion.
9. For the original JRDF requirement, a market survey
showed that, although there were a few RoRos available on the
charter market, their quality was variable. The MoD could not
therefore rely on suitable specialist vessels being available
at short notice. There was a pressing need to provide at least
some sealift capability to support the JRDF on, or around, the
time when the force would become operationally available, so a
three phased approach was adopted.
10. In phase one, the MoD surveyed vessels immediately
available for charter. RFA Sea Crusader, formerly MV Celestine,
was accepted on a two-year charter from Oceanarrow (UK) Ltd, starting
in October 1996, with an option for a third year, which was subsequently
taken up. In phase two, further work was undertaken on an interim
solution. The option selected was a bare-boat charter of two RoRos
from Stena UK. This was subsequently modified to the charter of
one RoRo. RFA Sea Centurion, from Stena and the running on of
RFA Sea Crusader for a further period. Phase three, to analyse
the options for meeting the requirement in the long term, is now
proceeding to identify solutions to the larger post-SDR requirement.
We hope that it will be possible to meet the requirement cost-effectively
through a Public Private Partnership, PPP, arrangement.
11. The interim requirement could not be met by new-build
or purchase/conversion and the selection was, therefore, made
from vessels either available, or likely to become available,
for charter on the commercial market. The options considered included
time or bare-boat charter. In the event, bare-boat charter offered
best value for money. For the long-term requirement other options
are being considered.
12. The issue of export potential does not arise directly
in the circumstance of this procurement.
13. Both the interim and long-term requirements are being
addressed through competition. The long-term requirement may involve
a new build by the selected PPP contractor. In such circumstancesthe
build of commercial, non-warlike vessels to be owned by a PPP
contractor, rather than procured by the MoDthe competition
has not been restricted to UK yards.
14. The programme will be managed using a Smart Procurement
15. The initial requirement was met through the charter
of RFA Sea Crusader in October 1996. This was augmented by entry
into service, in October 1998, of RFA Sea Centurion, Sea Centurion's
sister ship, Sea Chieftain was due to enter service later this
year in place of Sea Crusader. However, difficulties with the
build of Sea Chieftain have led to the cancellation of the contract
with Stena for this vessel, and the retention instead of Sea Crusader.
16. The long-term RoRo requirement will, if practicable,
be met through PPP arrangements. After advertisement in the Official
Journal of the European Community and the MoD Contracts Bulletin,
a Pre Qualification Questionnaire phase was conducted in 1997-98
for the pre-SDR requirement for two ships, in order that suitable
companies could be identified for receipt of the detailed invitation
to negotiate ITN. Following the SDR, discussions were held with
industry to confirm that there is a tender field fully capable
of meeting the increased requirement. The ITN was issued on 31
March to Andrew Weir Shipping, the Maersk Group, Novomar SA and
Sealion, which includes the Kvaerner Group.
17. Key milestones as currently planned are:
|Initial Gate approval of Outline Business|
Case and Statement of Requirements Issue of ITN
|Assessment of bids||Autumn 1999
|Main Gate approval of|
Full Business Case
|Contract award||Summer 2000
|Commence service||Autumn 2000
18. Our estimate of the likely cost of a conventional
charter arrangement for six vessels is *****. We would expect
a PPP solution to offer better value for money than commercial
charter. Financial commitment to date is around £0.1 million
largely for external advice. Under PPP arrangements service payments
should be fairly constant, barring surges for operational reasons
or major exercises.
19. A claim for damages for delay in the delivery of
Sea Chieftain is being pursued against Stena.
20. Under PPP arrangements, the contractor would be expected
to carry out in-service support. Several crewing options, embracing
Royal Fleet Auxiliary, commercial/Sponsored Reserve manning and
mixtures of these options are available to bidders and decisions
will depend on the value for money of the solutions offered. The
contractor will be responsible for crew management and training,
except possibly for some operational training of Sponsored Reserves.
21. The intention is that all six ships, under a PPP
arrangement, with optimum risk transfer, should be at the graduated
readiness required for the JRRF. This readiness will be tested
to explore best value for money balanced against operational risk.
There is a very high usage requirement currently foreseen for
three ships and a relatively low usage for the other three.
22. Other nations are showing a keen interest in the
UK approach to strategic sealift although, to our knowledge, none
has firm plans to acquired its own capability. Other European
nations may request assistance from UK RoRo ships to lift their
military equipment for training and operations, and such use of
spare capacity could offset costs to the MoD.
23. The currently chartered RoRo ships will be returned
to their owners on entry into service of their replacements.
24. A PPP arrangement for six ships would be for approximately
20 years to establish a long-term arrangement that delivers best
value for money.
25. We shall keep under review the level of service provided
by the RoRo ships.
Bowman will provide a secure, robust data and voice communications
system in support of land operations, to replace the Clansman
combat radio and the HQ infrastructure element of the Ptarmigan
trunk system. It will also play a key role in the MoDs Battlespace
Digitization initiative. A risk reduction programme is currently
under way under a contract with Archer Communications Systems
Ltd. It is planned to seek approval to place the first production
contract in 1999.
1. Bowman is required to provide a secure combat communications
system for the Army and elements of the other Services, in support
of land and littoral operations. It will serve as the primary
means of voice and data communication for tactical level operations,
where operations are characterised by mobility and are undertaken
by many individual platforms and by dismounted individuals.The
system will, therefore, be based on radio communications that
can operate without relying on fixed infrastructure. As well as
manportable versions, Bowman will be an integral part of the communications
fit of major equipments such as the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank,
the attack helicopter, and warships. In addition to radios, Bowman
will also provide a local area subsystem. That subsystem will
distribute information within key platforms and around deployed
divisional, brigade and unit level headquarters, as well as providing
the inter-connection between Bowman and other military and civil
communications systems. A management information system will enable
operational deployment of the system to be planned and managed.
2. The requirement for Bowman was first endorsed in 1988
as a two-stage project; stage one to provide a replacement for
the Clansman capability with a simple vehicle harness, and stage
two to enhance this new system to allow for increased data and
interoperability requirements. Approval was given to enter a competitive
Project Definition phase for stage one, PD1 and a simultaneous
Feasibility Study phase for stage two, FS2. The latter concluded
that the system demonstrated in PD1 would not support the data
demands of the number of information systems that would be in
service with Bowman and which would be needed to support the digitization
programme. The requirement was therefore revised to include additional
capacity for data transmission and the computing infrastructure
to support new information systems. These included the local area
subsystem, an additional radio, known as the High Capacity Data
Radio, and computer terminals. FS2 also demonstrated that it would
be lower risk for the communications harness for Bowman, known
as the Vehicle Integrated contractor rather than provided by the
MoD as a separate project. This system was, therefore, merged
with the Bowman requirement in 1997.
3. Close liasion with the prime contractor has led to
agreement on a series of cost/capability/time trade-offs. In particular,
the delivery of capability will now be staged elements of the
system that are assessed to require prolonged development to reduce
risk will be delivered after the in-service date. Some detailed
reductions in functionality have also been agreed. Commercial
off-the-shelf, COTS, computer terminals will be used. Where feasible,
BOWMAN will be certified to less stringent US Military Build Standards
rather than to UK Defence Standards, which increases the degree
of commonality with US systems on which some elements of the system
will be based. More limited protection against jamming and interception
of transmissions will be accepted for some radio types.
4. The number of combat radios required depends primarily
on the force structure and numbers of vehicles and other platforms
in service. The current assessment is that about 55,000 manpack
and vehicle mounted radios will be procured. BOWMAN radios would
be installed in some 23,000 vehicles, 43 major ships and some
450 battlefield and support helicopters and transport aircraft.
These numbers are subject to review.
5. The Strategic Defence Review highlighted the importance
of effective command, control and communication systems and confirmed
the requirement for BOWMAN. Force changes arising from the SDR
are likely, however, to have an impact on the numbers of equipment
required and the programme for converting units.
6. As the primary means of communication at the tactical
level for land operations, BOWMAN will be used across the spectrum
of conflict, for all missions and at all scales of deployment.
BOWMAN will be central to the command and control, and therefore
the effective deployment, of forces used for military tasks ranging
from disaster relief to regional conflicts.
7. BOWMAN will replace the Clansman family of combat
radios, which has been in service since the 1970s. It will also
replace those elements of the Ptarmigan trunk communication system
within tactical headquarters, that is vehicle borne HQs at divisional,
brigade and unit, ie, battlegroup, level.
8. BOWMAN was orignially endorsed against an ISD of December
1995. In 1993 this was revised to June 1999 as a result of budgetary
constraints and an increased understanding of the technical complexity
of the project gained from the Phase 1 Feasibility Studies. During
the competitive PD1 phase, the ISD was revised to April 2001 for
budgetary reasons. Following the completion of PD1, the ISD was
slipped to March 2002 as a result of the revised procurement strategy
and the re-definition of the ISD to reflect the delivery of a
true operational capability. Since August 1998 the ISD has been
defined as the date when a brigade HQ and two battle groups are
equipped and capable of deploying on operations other than war.
*** The Clansman family of combat radios, and the relevant elements
of Ptarmigan, will progressively removed from service over the
period 2002-08, as BOWMAN is introduced.
9. Development of the system was carried out by two competing
consortia YEOMAN, led by Siemens Plessey Systems, now British
Aerospace Defence Systems, and Racal, and CROSSBOW, led by ITT
UK Ltd. Following international competition in 1993, contracts
were placed with these two consortia for both PD1 FS2. The opportunities
for international collaboration at system level were also assessed
at that time, but the timing of the UK's requirement did not coincide
with that of any of our major NATO partners. However, it was decided
that the contractors providing other nations new combat radio
systems would be invited to bid for BOWMAN.
10. Following completion of PD1 in late 1996, the competing
consortia announced their intention to form a joint venture company,
known as ARCHER Communications Systems Ltd, to bid jointly for
the BOWMAN supply contract. This resulted in a review of the procurement
options open to the MoD, namely continuing with either one of
the consortia, continuing with ARCHER or finding a new prime systems
integrator. A revised, single source, procurement strategy for
BOWMAN and the remainder of the risk reduction work was approved
in March 1997, and a risk reduction contract was placed with ARCHER
in August 1997.
11. Following that work, the supply phase has been separated
into three packages of work, linked to the incremental introduction
of technology and the staged delivery of capability. Each package
will be contracted for individually. Before the first supply contract
is awarded, further risk reduction work, known as Package 0, is
being undertaken to ensure that the necessary systems integration
and demonstration of progress can be acheived before contractual
commitment. The contract for Package 0 was placed in October 1998
at a value of £185 million.
12. In order to achieve best value for money for sub-system
solutions. ARCHER is required to hold competitions wherever possible.
Some 60 per cent of sub-contracts will be subject to competition.
Where sub-contract competition is not possible, the MoD applies
NAPNOC, no acceptable price no contract conditions.***
13. The options of upgrading Clansman or procuring an
austere or enhanced military off the shelf solution were examined,
but were considered to be less cost-effective options for meeting
the requirement. Collaboration was also considered, but not found
to be viable, see paragraph 9.
14. There will be marketing opportunities in those countries
operating VHF and HF radios bought from the selected Bowman suppliers,
ITT and Racal, which might be upgraded using elements of the Bowman
system, or in those countries which wish to improve their capability
at Brigade level and below. The sophistication and cost of Bowman
will limit the market for the total system, but there will be
scope for supplying parts in many countries.
15. Of the procurement options considered, only Archer
combined all aspects of design, manufacture, assembly, systems
integration and support in the UK and would maintain a significant
UK capability in all these areas.
16. The project is now following Smart Procurement principles,
including a "partnering" approach with Archer. It will
use technology and modules developed in Project Definition and
for other customers. A contract strategy of incremental acquisition
17. FS1, FS2 and PD1 have been completed. The award of
the package 0 contract in October enables Archer to complete subsystem
definition and subcontractor selection, prepare for and commence
system integration, and prove the platform installation design
process prior to full commitment to "Supply and Support".
On completion of this work, it is planned to award the first of
the production contracts, Package 1, later this year. The principal
area of risk is the integration of subsystems supplied by a number
of different sub-contractors. A further key risk is the timescale
for contracting for installation design, certification and conversion
in over 200 platform types with complex existing design rights.
18. Key milestones now in prospect for this project are:
Approval for Supply phase:
|Placement of Supply contract:||late 1999
COST SUMMARY. APPROVED
AT 31 MARCH
1998 AT 1998-99 PRICES
|Breakdown of procurement costs||Development
|Current estimate of costs||£139 million
|Estimate of costs at MOD approval||£122 million
Reasons for difference: costs resulting from changes to the
scope of work undertaken in the early phases, +£11 million
accounting adjustment; +£1 million slippage of PDI work;
+£5 million. Expenditure at 31 March 1998 was £115 million.
An additional contract, valued at £185 million was placed
in October 1998.
*** The years of peak expenditure are likely to be 2002-03
and 2003-04 onwards.
The revised ISD for Bowman has resulted in additional costs
of £9m to run on Clansman longer than originally planned.
19. There are two aspects to Bowman support: the provision
of initial spares and facilities to support operations, which
will be provided with the prime equipment and installations, and
on-going support that enables re-provisioning, corrective action
and contractor support to ensure sustainability of the deployed
system. The planned single Supply and Support contract will encompass
both aspects. The level of support required is being determined
using integrated logistic support principles. The importance of
reliability and spares availability, and their impact on equipment
sustainability, is reflected in the draft contract. The use of
existing spares and equipment, where appropriate, has been mandated.
Training is being addressed under the tri-Service Training Needs
Analysis, which will identify, the recommended training methodology,
including training media.
20. The Bowman conversion programme is a major task that
will be carried out over a period of eight years. Conversion will
be by operational grouping, principally brigade, there is therefore
a vital link between conversion planning and the Army's Formation
Readiness cycle. Units will be converted in their "other
tasks" year. The Bowman Fielding Plan addresses the requirement
to provide support to both the new system and that being replaced.
Dual Clansman and Bowman training will be needed at certain locations.
21. In accordance with the principles of whole fleet
management, Bowman equipment not assigned to the front line will
in effect be held in reserve, although there will be no formal
war reserve. Spares to support Bowman will be held in storage,
under arrangements still to be decided.
22. National interoperability for land operations will
be achieved, since all elements of the three Services that take
part in the land or littoral battle will be equipped with Bowman.
International interoperability with other nations is more difficult.
The intention is that Bowman should meet currently agreed and
likely future NATO standards. Use of extant US national protocol
standards was considered, but was not judged to offer an acceptable
degree of protection for the lifetime of Bowman. A standard for
encryption has been agreed by certain countries, including the
US and UK, and will be adopted by Bowman. Standards developed
for Bowman could be made available for adoption for the next generation
of US tactical radio communications, or as future NATO standards.
23. Defence Export Services will consider the most appropriate
disposal route, sale or scrap, for Clansman equipment that is
no longer required. Relevant parts of Ptarmigan will be retained
as spares to support the Ptarmigan elements remaining in service.
24. Bowman is planned to be in service for at least 25
25. Given the pace of change in information systems technology,
it is likely that there will be developments that require technology
insertion over the course of Bowman's service life, and the system
is being designed accordingly.