Infantry Battalions
7. In the supporting documents to the announcement,
the MoD set out the three new roles for the TA. They are
to provide individuals and formed units as an integral
part of the deployable army;
to provide a framework upon which larger reserve
forces can be built in times of threat; and
to provide a link between the military and civil
society.[26]
These roles are encapsulated in the new mission statement
for the TA, which is
To provide formed units and individuals as an essential
part of the Army's order of battle for operations across all military
tasks in order to ensure that the Army is capable of mounting
and sustaining operations at nominated states of readiness. It
is also to provide a basis for regeneration, while at the same
time maintaining links with the local community and society at
large.[27]
8. To fulfil its mission the MoD has concluded that
an established strength of 41,200 is required [28]
to provide for both the TA and the University Officer Training
Corps (which is currently 3,500 strong[29]).
Of this number, 7,100 will be members of the Infantry[30]
which is to be restructured from the 33 existing battalions into
15 new battalions.[31]
In evidence to the Committee,[32]
General Walker explained
There is an operational requirement for some five
battalions as formed battalions to undertake what I would call
key point activities in this country that came out of the operational
requirement. The remaining ten battalions, including in this particular
case the parachute battalion, are designed to be a pool of general
reserve infantry who can undertake tasks that infantry can normally
undertake up to unit level training and in the event of a crisis
would be used to provide war establishment reinforcement and battle
casualty replacement.[33]
Although the tasks of the five 'mobilised' battalions
are classified[34] we
were told that there is a requirement for five battalions' worth
of TA infantry for deployment in the event of a regional conflict.[35]
Home defence against a strategic threat would need larger forces
but the view of the MoD is that "a strategic threat is ten
years downstream, which would give the country time in which to
regenerate sufficient forces."[36]
In its supplementary written evidence the MoD explained the rationale
of this structure in more detail
There are two main requirements for Territorial Army
infantry: to provide specific support for Home Defence and the
framework for regeneration in a time of crisis. But we do not
plan to have two different kinds of infantry battalion to meet
these requirements. Both requirements stem from the planning assumptions
set out in the SDR White Paper and in the Government's response
to the Committee's report on it: that the threat of direct conventional
military attack on Britain has receded to a degree where the warning
times for such an attack can be measured in years; that we nonetheless,
and while shifting the emphasis towards and ability to conduct
expeditionary operations, do not neglect Home Defence; and, while
we will rely more on regeneration in future, we have retained
key aspects of the organisation and infrastructure for Home Defence.
The requirement for the five TA infantry battalions
for Home Defence was based on the assumption that a Full Scale
of Effort (i.e. a strategic attack on NATO), we would have a requirement
for 45 battalions of infantry. 40 of these are needed to meet
tasks that require regular forces, and the balance can be provided
by the TA. The five TA battalions, each of three companies, plus
13 of the 40 regular battalions would be assigned to guarding
Key Points in the UK. The second requirement is to have sufficient
TA infantry so as to provide the basis on which larger reserve
forces can be generated in the event that they are required, without
the need to maintain these larger numbers in peacetime. By retaining
the further ten battalions of TA infantry, we have also been able
to ensure that the TA retain a reasonably widespread footprint
or presence in the country as a whole.[37]
9. Despite the reductions in the overall establishment
of the TA, the MoD committed itself to retaining the geographical
spread of the TA. This is in line with our recommendation in our
report on the SDR, and we welcome it in principle. In the supporting
documents, the MoD states that 'the new TA structure will maintain
a widely spread representation of the Army across the regions
and counties.'[38]
However, to achieve this, battalions have been spread more thinly
and over a wider area. In its supplementary evidence, the MoD
explained
We intend that all TA infantry units in the new structure
are organised similarly not only to be able to carry out both
roles alongside their regular counterparts but also to reflect
the regions they represent. For that reason, all 15 battalions
will conduct training at up to battalion level, enabling them
to conduct operations at that level should be required; but most
training will be conducted at sub-unitmainly companylevel,
to reflect the likelihood that it is at this level that the majority
of the TA infantry will operate in a crisis, in which they will
reinforce, as sub-units or individuals, the regular Order of Battle.
As the Commander in Chief Land explained at the evidence session
on 9 December, the manning of the new battalions will be designed
to delegate to company level more of the support that is currently
provided at battalion level. We expect to have sufficient notice
of a crisis that would give rise to a requirement for TA infantry
in formed battalions, to be able to select and, if necessary,
enhance units to ensure that they have the right mix of skills
and capabilities.[39]
Whilst this structure has succeeded in retaining
a relatively wide presence nationally, both our witnesses from
the TAVRAs and the Minister agreed that a trade-off between cap
badges, retaining the geographical spread of reservist opportunities
and retaining combat effectiveness had had to be made.[40]
However, their views differed as to the success of the final package.
10. The Minister of State told us
The first thing that was established was what do
the TA need to be combat effective, what level of TA do we need
to be able to reinforce our regular commitment? The second thing
was what functions do we need? The third thing was to try to preserve
the important traditions that exist in the Army through cap badges.
Balanced against that was the need to have a footprint around
the country[41]
He believed that a balance had been struck that gave
them the right package in which the geographical spread was fair
in the regional sense and also fair within regions.[42]
Our witnesses from the TAVRAs took the view that there are shortcomings
in the new structure.[43]
Colonel Putnam raised questions about the effectiveness of the
new battalions
... the proposals are very clear in that each company
will have two platoons and one support platoon. That support platoon
will be either recce, assault pioneers, GPMGSF[44]
or mortars. If you have a three company battalion, you cannot
have all four of those. One would be missing. If you have a three
company battalion that also has retained a reserve band, the band
takes the place of one of the support platoons, and therefore
you can only have two of those four support requirements. That
seems to me to be making it very weak. Equally, those support
platoons are where you want to put the two or three year soldier
once he has got through his first year of recruit training, to
retain his interest and increase his expertise and employability
in the event of call-up.[45]
Furthermore, as the battalions are spread over a
larger area, the opportunity for reservists to train in the various
disciplines within the battalion diminish. Colonel Putnam continued
We have a battalion stretched between Canterbury
and, say, Farnham, and the assault pioneers are in Canterbury
and the GPMGSF role is in Farnham. It is likely that a soldier
in Canterbury will finish up with a narrow expertise because he
cannot be expected to drive 130 miles to Farnham to be trained
on a GPMGSF role.[46]
11. A striking example of potential problems of spreading
battalions across the country was presented to us when we visited
10 Para (V) at the Duke of Yorks' Headquarters in Chelsea. Before
the reorganisation, there were two reservist paratroop battalions,
10 Para (V) in London, and 4 Para (V) in Glasgow. Under the present
restructuring, the two battalions are being amalgamated to form
one battalion. The need to "draw from the parts of the country
where we can get the right people"[47]
as well as retaining the geographical spread appears to have necessitated
this country-wide battalion. However, with companies based in
Scotland and in the south of England it will prove difficult for
them to receive training above the company level. Indeed, our
witnesses from the TAVRAs believed that commanding such a battalion
could be a "potential nightmare".[48]
In such cases, as the TAVRAs acknowledged, there may be an argument
for basing the whole battalion in one area, even if it is at the
expense of the geographical spread.[49]
While defending the decision, the Minister did admit that there
was a "problem in geography."[50]
The TAVRAs further noted that training at the company level could
be affected by this new structure. Colonel Putnam argued that
even if you start with a company of 110 men, once you remove the
support platoon, those elements needed to staff the Battalion
HQ,[51]
and the training recruits[52]
for the purposes of training, a company will, effectively, become
a platoon.[53]
When the MoD comes to finalise the establishment of the battalions
we will expect to see evidence that it has taken these concerns
into account.
12. This Committee has yet to be convinced that the
right balance has been struck between overall numbers and geographical
spread which will allow the infantry battalions to train at the
levels and to the standards necessary for them to fulfil the roles
required of them. The Minister stated his aim to have "an
effective and efficient and well resourced TA."[54]
We recommend that the MoD monitors closely the impact of the
proposed new structure on training, and if it becomes apparent
that the proposed structure is failing to deliver effectively,
undertakes to increase the establishment of individual units to
such a level that can. We return to this recommendation in
our conclusions.
13. Central to the question of training is the level
of support the TA receive from the Permanent Staff Instructors[55].
The MoD are currently running an exercise, to conclude in the
middle of February, which will set the level of support in terms
of regular and non-regular Permanent Staff Instructors (PSIs).[56]
While we do not yet know what those levels will be, we agree with
the TAVRAs that understaffing the PSIs would have serious implications
for the ability and willingness of volunteers to remain in the
TA.[57]
The Minister said that there would be sufficient support from
the non-permanent staff and the same level of regular input, proportionately,
as there had been in the past, and gave us his assurance that
the "necessary level of support will be there and if anybody
draws it to our attention that it is not then we will do something
about it".[58]
We note that a higher proportion of the new TA is to be composed
of units requiring disproportionate numbers of permanent staff
(such as Signals) and a higher proportion are to be at higher
readiness. It is reasonable to assume that the TA's permanent
staff needs will be proportionately higher than they were before.
We consider it likely that a smaller but better-trained TA will
require a higher proportion of Permanent Staff Instructors than
it has had in the past. We will hold the Minister to his assurance
that the position will be regularly reviewed[59]
and that should it become clear that training is falling below
levels necessary for the effectiveness of the TA to be maintained,
it will be increased.
26 Modern Forces for a Modern World: A Territorial
Army for the Future, Volume
1, para 9 Back
27
ibid Back
28
ibid, para 10 Back
29
Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, The Strategic Defence Review,
HC 138-III, p 524 Back
30
Modern Forces for a Modern World: A Territorial Army for the Future,
Volume 1, corrigendum to para 11 Back
31
ibid, para 9 Back
32
QQ 109-151 Back
33
Q 111 Back
34
Q 113 Back
35
Q 117 Back
36
Q 115 Back
37
Ev p 36 Back
38
Modern Forces for a Modern World: A Territorial Army for the
Future, Volume 1, para 7 Back
39
Ev p 36 Back
40
QQ 45-99, QQ 109-111 Back
41
Q 109 Back
42
ibid Back
43
QQ 14-26 Back
44
General Purpose Machine Gun Sustained Fire Back
45
Q 14 Back
46
ibid Back
47
Q 110 Back
48
Q 44 Back
49
Q 46 Back
50
Q 110 Back
51
Q 122 Back
52
Q 14 Back
53
Q 16 Back
54
Q 133 Back
55
Permanent Staff Instructors are individuals from the Regular Army
who train the Territorial Army Back
56
Q 125 Back
57
Q 17 Back
58
Q 131 Back
59
Q 103-131 Back
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