Conclusion
47. The TA, and independent TAVRAs that support them,
are a vital component of the British Army. The Secretary of State
promised the House, when announcing the proposed restructuring
of the TA, that it would produce a modern Territorial Army that
is more relevant, more useable and more fully integrated into
our armed forces and our defence plans.[149]
We intend to test these claims against reality as the restructuring
unfolds. To achieve these goals, the TA will need to be fully
manned, properly equipped and above all well-trained. We welcome
assurances from the Minister of State that where problems arise
they will be corrected. We will monitor the implementation
of the restructuring of the TA, and the longer-term effects the
restructuring will have. To provide us with the necessary information
to assess the success of the restructuring, we sought from the
MoD a quarterly report detailing the following information:
(i) the recruited strength of the TA and
the Cadets;
(ii) wastage levels;
(iii) number of regular and non-regular
Permanent Staff Instructors;
(iv) numbers of days trained at formed unit
or higher level;
(v) success rates of tests for operational
competence; and
(vi) numbers of unit level command posts
held by territorials.
The MoD responded that—
Since the restructuring will be in mid-flow at the
end of March, it is likely to be of limited use to the Committee
to have information at that date. We propose to make the first
return after the TA Summer Camp period (say in October), next
year. Quarterly reports on all the aspects set out in your minute
will place a considerable burden on TA units who will need to
be closely involved in their production; as the Committee has
noted, we should be aiming to minimise the burden of reporting,
and so we propose:
(1) Quarterly reports on the recruited strengths
of the TA and the cadets; and on wastage levels.
(2) Annual reports on the numbers of regular
and non-regular Permanent Staff Instructors, and numbers of unit
level command posts held by territorials; in practice, there will
not be much variation in the strengths against establishment for
these posts and more frequent reporting will not add value to
the exercise.
(3) Annual reports also of the numbers of man
training days at formed unit (battalion or equivalent) level including
any that are carried out at higher levels; and of the numbers
of TA assessed to be fit for role. In this latter respect, the
Committee should note that TA units are not tested collectively
for operational competence, and the fitness for role of individuals
is primarily assessed during the summer camp period.[150]
We do not find these proposals wholly satisfactory.
48. We therefore propose a compromise position between
our original request and the MoD's proposal. Beginning with March/April
this year, we propose that this Committee should be supplied with
quarterly reports of—
(i) the recruited strength of the Territorial
Army and the Cadets;
(ii) wastage levels;
(iii) number of regular and non-regular
Permanent Staff Instructors; and
(iv) numbers of unit level command posts
held by territorials.
As from 1st October of this year, we also seek an
annual report on—
(v) numbers of days trained at formed unit
or higher level;
(vi) numbers of TA volunteers assessed to
be fit for role.
If, as the MoD suggests, the figures for items (iii)
and (iv) show negligible variation over the first 12 months of
the proposed reporting cycle, we will be content to review our
request. We do not think it appropriate to delay the first quarterly
report until October, since a central purpose is to monitor progress
in restructuring. We recommend that the MoD implement this
system of reporting from March/April 1999.
49. The future of the Territorial Army is a subject
which arouses strong passions amongst its members and supporters,
as the debates in the House following the Strategic Defence Review
demonstrated. The volunteers who comprise the TA, and those who
give so much time to administer it through the TAVRAs, have fought
hard to defend the institution, and we have lent some support
to that fight. The TA has not always been its own best advocate,
and may on occasion have harmed its case by overstating it. But
it is a good case. We are unimpressed by an apparent unwillingness
within the MoD, including some senior elements of the Regular
Army, to listen to the voice of the volunteers. The tone, if not
the ostensible content, of the MoD's response to this debate has
sometimes bordered on the patronising and offensive.
50. The honest brokers between the two parts of our
one Army must be Ministers. We hold these Ministers to account
on behalf of Parliament. As the dust of the debate stirred up
by the Strategic Defence Review begins to settle, any spirit of
factionalism between the regular and volunteer Services must be
dispelled, and it is the duty of Ministers to ensure that it is.
We expect the future relations between the two parts of the Army
to be characterised by mutual respect. The regular Chain of Command
hold the purse strings and most of the trumps in the pack. Its
officers therefore have a particular obligation to listen to,
and to demonstrate that they have listened to, the views of their
volunteer colleagues. It is the duty of Ministers to act, and
be seen to act, quickly and fairly when conflicts, perceived or
otherwise, between the two parts of the Army appear. We expect
Ministers closely to monitor relations between Land Command and
the TAVRAs and not to be afraid to knock heads together if relations
start once more to sour. Otherwise, we will certainly not achieve
a Territorial Army fit for the future. Without that, the Army
will be incomplete.
149 Modern Forces for the Modern World, A Territorial
Army for the Future, Volume
1, Foreword Back
150 Ev
p 37 Back
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