Memorandum by A F Taylor Esq, Cranfield
University (AS 32)
Thank you for the opportunity to submit comments
to the Transport Sub-Committee on aspects of aviation safety.
Please note that although I am responsible for much of Cranfield's
work in aviation safety the comments and opinions that follow
are my own and are not necessarily shared by all of my colleagues
Aviation safety may conveniently be divided
into two parts: the reduction of the rate at which accidents occur
and the reduction of the fatality and injury rate in those accidents
that do still occur. This two pronged attack is reflected in both
airworthiness requirements and accident and incident investigation
procedures and is of great importance. Although my interests are
wide and cover both parts most of my experience has been in the
second part, that of improving the overlapping fields of crashworthiness,
cabin safety and survival, passenger protection and emergency
The Committee will not need reminding that 10
years ago it studied Aircraft Cabin Safety, reporting1
in December 1990. One particular point that I will return to is
the extremely poor response that some of that report's recommendations
received from the Government and the Civil Aviation Authority
Another point that will be repeated throughout
is that aviation safety must be considered at an international
level, in few cases will a single country be able to act alone.
Accident statistics have to be considered worldwide and actions,
changes and improvements have to be agreed and/or made on an international
1. Safety lessons
Although it would appear that deregulation has
been achieved with no loss of safety, there is no room for complacency.
As usual we need to stay running fast in order to keep the number
of accidents at a standstill, this however is not enough if we
are to balance the anticipated increase in traffic over the next
decade or two.
My personal experience of the new low cost airlines
is limited to easyJet who certainly appear not to have cut costs
on safety. For example attention to cabin safety briefings and
cabin checks on easyJet flights have been amongst the best I have
ever observed. I am more concerned that these new airlines will
be forced to use airports that are not fully equipped with navigation
and approach aids. Research has shown2 that both CFIT
(Controlled Flight Into Terrain) and (ALA) approach and landing
accidents are much more likely to occur when such equipment is
lacking. Our concern should not be confined to within the UK but
should include wherever UK airlines operate, or indeed perhaps
also wherever UK citizens fly.
2. Trends in aviation accidents
Overall the level of safety throughout the world
is remarkably good but there are such wide variations between
different years and between different areas of the world that
it can be misleading to take much notice of short-term trends.
While 10 years might seem a reasonably long-term and the number
of accidents and fatalities (see appendix) may be seen to have
been fairly constant, there is insufficient data from too many
of the accidents to ascertain all that has happened. Thus while
an insignificant increase from an average of 1,365 fatalities
per year from 1979 to 1988 to 1,378 per year during the last decade
shows an encouraging improvement in the rate of fatalities per
million flights, the forecast increases in traffic with variations
between different parts of the world make useful predictions concerning
future fatalities impossible. Despite the lack of firm data it
may be assumed that of these some 40 per cent, or an average about
550 per year, have died in survivable accidents where cabin safety
issues1 are all important.
In the above context it is worth recalling a
survivable accident that illustrates the gap that sometimes appears
between the approaches of investigators and regulators, this is
the DC-10 accident at Sioux City on 19 July 1989. According to
the CAA3 this was an accident that typified one where "it
would be unrealistic to expect that more than a very marginal
increase in survival would have resulted from improved fire precautions,
evacuation provisions or seating". While no-one would
disagree that this was a very severe accident many investigators
would consider such a categorisation as inappropriately defeatist
and consequently counterproductive to the search for improved
According to the NTSB there were 296 people
on board of whom 111 died, the accident report4 states that "35
passengers died of asphyxia due to smoke inhalation, including
24 without traumatic blunt force injuries. The other fatally
injured occupants died of multiple injuries from blunt force impact.
Of the remaining 185 persons on board, 47 sustained serious injuries,
125 minor injuries, and 13 were not injured."
Although parts of the cabin may have been totally
non-survivable it is difficult to accept that only a marginal
reduction in the number killed would have resulted from some of
the structural and restraint system improvements under consideration
at the time and since. In particular and given the above information
concerning the large number with few if any injuries, what of
the 24 without injuries who died of asphyxia due to smoke inhalation?
Surely some of the measures discussed before and, more extensively
after Manchester could have helped many of these passengers to
Unfortunately judgments such as those by the
CAA that deny that more passengers might have survived in particular
accidents have also seriously affected their estimates of the
total number of lives that might be saved per year and hence the
stated benefits of safety features recommended by the investigators.
Consequently, the opinion of many others has been influenced.
Thus incorrectly categorising other similar accidents in the same
way has undoubtedly seriously and wrongly diminished the case
for making cabin safety improvements.
The high level of safety achieved in the past
decade, particularly in Europe and North America, nevertheless
presents the industry with a difficult problem, the cost of making
aviation even safer. For example in 1993 the CAA issued a summary5
of the extensive work done on cabin water mist systems and reported
upon separately. The conclusions were that they would be effective
and with no insurmountable problem areas. However it was "estimated
that water spray would save an average of 14 lives annually worldwide
or 6 lives in the US, Canada and European countries of the JAA"
". . . giving a cost per life saved of $22 million to $32
Such costs do seem to be very high when expressed
in this way but if instead one considers the cost in terms of
dollars per ticket then the extra to an individual becomes trivial.
It is believed that at present there are no plans to proceed further
with water mist systems, thus already having decided not to proceed
with smokehoods, despite the Transport Committee's arguments1
passengers are now left with no additional protection from smoke
and fumes at all.
In the UK there have been several accidents,
fortuitously non-fatal, that have suggested that more attention
should be given to aircraft maintenance procedures, particularly
to the human factors (HF) aspects. Worldwide it is disappointing
that the considerable efforts made to reduce the number of Controlled
Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents2 has not yet resulted
in the anticipated improvement.
No analysis of general aviation accident trends
has been attempted.
3. Lessons from recent high profile accidents
What one hopes has been learned from accidents
such as the TWA 800 centre fuel tank explosion in July 1996 and
the Swissair in-flight fire last September is that one should
be wary about accepting past accident statistics as a pointer
to the risk of similar accidents in the future. What has been
discovered is that much aircraft wiring does deteriorate with
age and consequently that older aircraft could now present a higher
risk than that calculated from past events alone.
A possible lesson is that emergency procedures
and crew training must reflect the varying nature of emergencies
and the resulting priorities. It has been suggested (we must await
the accident report to confirm or deny this) that Swissair's emergency
procedures called for fuel to be jettisoned to bring the weight
down before landing, whereas deciding to get down as quickly as
possible and to make an over-weight landing might have been preferable.
This has similarities to the fatal 1977 DC-10 accident in Chicago
when the crew followed procedures which allowed them to reduce
speed following an engine failure after take-off (actually the
engine had fallen off). Had the crew maintained their speed the
aircraft would have been controllable and could probably have
Of major importance is the need for the world's
aviation authorities, or regulatory agencies, to work together
to agree worldwide safety improvements and to follow them through
into airline service. Coincident with this is the need for accident
investigation agencies, where appropriate, to make safety recommendations
to the world's agencies and not only to their local agency. Thus
the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) should address
not only the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) but all such agencies.
At present the CAA cannot react without agreement with the European
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAAs) and the JAAs may feel reluctant
to act without the agreement of the US Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Awaiting such agreement may delay the introduction of safety
improvements by many years, for example changes suggested by the
CAA following the 1985 Manchester B737 fire have still not been
4. Other critical safety issues
Of particular concern is the growth of traffic
to and from parts of the world which have not been able to keep
up with the improvements that have contributed to the very high
level of safety found in Europe and North America. The Committee
might consider ways in which the international aviation community
could assist such parts of the world to improve their facilities
and to maintain them at an acceptable level thereafter.
No comment concerning training, congestion or
pilot retirements is offered, brief reference to maintenance is
made at the end of paragraph 2.
5. The adequacy of current safety oversight
The very high level of safety in British aviation
could not have been achieved without a significant input from
the CAA, it therefore should be accepted that the safety oversight
provided by the CAA is, at the very least, adequate and in most
areas much better than adequate. However the current high level
of safety both in the UK and in much of the rest of the world,
coupled with the predicted increase in air traffic over the next
decade, requires that we do better than just stand still so far
as accident rates are concerned. The travelling public is probably
must influenced by the frequency of TV and newspaper headlines
concerning passenger transport aircraft accidents and is not concerned
with "rates" at all. To even maintain this frequency
at the current level requires a significant improvement in accident
and fatality rates over the next few years and although this has
been recognised by all, including the CAA, there is little evidence
that very much useful action has been taken to facilitate the
As will be known to members of the Transport
Committee, the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions is responsible
for investigating accidents and incidents, establishing causal
factors and safety deficiencies and making safety recommendations
with the objective of preventing (or making less likely) future
accidents, fatalities and injuries. In the past most of these
recommendations have been addressed to the CAA and the CAA has
been obliged to respond, setting out whether or not it accepts
the recommendations. In addition the CAA publishes an annual Progress
Report6 describing the current situation with respect to all of
the AAIB's safety recommendations that are still "open".
However as recommendations are almost invariably of a general
nature so as to leave the CAA to decide, for example, how best
to reduce or eliminate the safety deficiency, there have been
many occasions7 when recommendations have been accepted only for
no action to be taken, that is there has been a review or some
research has been commissioned but these have led to no changes
being made to regulations or procedures. Consequently the high
level of acceptance of safety recommendations often quoted is
totally meaningless, not only that but no record has been kept
of those that have in fact led to changes.8
As stated just two years ago9 "The CAA,
along with airworthiness authorities elsewhere, has the unenviable
task of explaining to the media why it is not always possible
to produce the `instant fix' called for. It can be extremely difficult
to get across to the media why we have to be so careful before
we introduce changes, perhaps because of this a rather defensive
attitude may have been adopted. In general, although of course
we must heed Murphy in that `every solution breeds new problems',
I would suggest that the CAA, rather than being on the defensive,
should be seen to be striving to overcome the problems often associated
with new safety features in order to introduce them as soon as
Since writing the above, and in particular since
the events that caused it to be written, there have been many
changes at the CAA which may render criticism of the CAA's actions,
or lack of actions, less appropriate than then. However in the
past it is believed that in some areas the CAA has fallen well
short of the standard that the industry and the travelling public
expect. To some extent this may be due to the CAA's own charter
which makes the CAA responsible for both the safety of passengers
and for the economic regulation of British aviation, thus the
CAA may sometimes face something of a dilemma when trying to decide
"what is best". What is best for the passenger may not
seem to be what is best for the aviation industry. My view is
that passenger safety should come first but to make real improvements
in air safety without financially penalising the UK industry requires
that improvements are made internationally and not just locally.
This means carrying Europe with us and then the USA, if this is
done then all other countries will follow. This too is recognised
by the CAA and improvements are supposedly being sought through
various international bodies and joint committees.
For the CAA to take a lead in these matters
first requires that it gets its own house in order. It is hoped
that appropriate changes have already occurred or are in progress
but for the problem that has existed in the past to be understood
it has been considered necessary to quote some examples7
and that some be repeated here. The Transport Committee's report
on Aircraft Cabin safety1 and the Government's response10
provides two examples, another is taken from an AAIB report11
and the final one from my personal experience.
In view of these examples the present Committee
may care to note that following the Government's response in 1991
there was not, so far as I am aware, an opportunity for the Committee
to meet and consider this. My personal view is that, if this was
the case, it would have been better if the Committee could have
met, discussed the responses and either resolved differences prior
to publication or been able to note any differences. If appropriate
the present Committee may care to review the procedures relevant
to the current enquiry.
5.1 Guidelines concerning fuel tank integrity
Initially in response to concerns expressed
following the B737 fire at Manchester Airport in 1985 the House
of Commons Transport Committee took evidence on aspects of Aircraft
Cabin Safety from many sources near the end of 1989 and throughout
much of 1990. During this period the Kegworth accident, also to
a B737 and highly relevant to cabin safety, occurred. Although
these two accidents were central to much of the discussion the
Committee took a much wider view of cabin safety; many other relevant
accidents from around the world were discussed and the recommendations
were intended to be general and not to relate only to these two
One general point made by the Committee was
A post-impact fire is most unlikely to occur
without there first being an external fuel fire. Even without
a cabin fire, an external fuel fire may penetrate the cabin and
generate sufficient heat and fumes to kill passengers. To combat
this danger, the likelihood of fuel being spilled needs to be
reduced and its properties altered to reduce the likelihood of
it catching fire.
Design regulations require that, in an impact,
wing engines and undercarriages should break off without rupturing
the fuel tanks. Despite this, ruptures have occurred which suggest
a lack of compliance with regulations. We believe that closer
monitoring of this aspect of crashworthiness is called for and
suggest that additional guidelines concerning compliance with
the appropriate regulations would benefit both the manufacturers
and the certificating authority. We recommend that additional
guidelines be formulated to ensure the structural integrity of
the aircraft during "emergency alighting" conditions.
Particular attention should be given to minimising damage to the
fuel tanks and to the passenger's cabin caused by, or as a result
of, undercarriage collapse.
The Government response (supplied by the CAA)10
to this totally missed the point that the Committee had made no
comment, adverse or otherwise, concerning the actual requirements,
only that not all aircraft appeared to comply with them. Furthermore
the context was general and the recommendation was not made in
connection with any particular accident. Nevertheless the response
The existing requirements have been reviewed
and are considered satisfactory. From the reported evidence of
the Kegworth accident it is noted that the landing gear attachment
failed as intended. The engine pylon also failed in such a way
as to satisfactorily prevent damage to the fuel tanks.
If this was not a deliberate attempt to avoid
the points being raised it was certainly totally unhelpful and
not in the spirit of sensible and constructive discussion necessary
when dealing with safety issues. Because of such negative replies
and the time it takes to get them, many people give up trying
to get any sense out of government departments. This may be of
no great concern in some areas but given the unforgiving nature
of heavier than air flight the "aviation safety system"
must do better than this.
5.2 Airport safety centres
Some years ago it was suggested that the time
that many passengers at present tend to waste in the departure
lounges could be put to good use if, under supervision, they were
encouraged to inspect and use various safety items that are to
be found in the aircraft cabin. This could be achieved by having
in the lounge a mock-up of a small section of aircraft cabin fitted
with appropriate equipment. In addition to seats and seat belts,
life jackets, oxygen masks, etc., the mock-up could be fitted
with doors and hatches typical of those likely to be encountered
in several aircraft types. An important point being that the mock-up
could be "general purpose" and not representative of
only one aircraft type.
The House of Commons report1 contained the following
paragraph, the last sentence which was in bold type was repeated,
omitting only the word "therefore", in the final list
We believe that this suggestion deserves serious
consideration. In the longer term design differences between aircraft
could be reduced. A cabin mock-up could prove useful not only
to the passenger but to airlines and the airworthiness authorities
by helping them to establish exactly what difficulties the passengers
have in following the instructions provided. We therefore recommend
that research should be undertaken to establish whether a small
cabin mock-up, installed in the airport departure lounge and enabling
passengers to actually use safety equipment, could be of overall
benefit to the travelling public and to the industry as a whole.
This idea, although it has subsequently been
shown to improve passengers' awareness and performance,12 has
not yet found favour. This may in part be due to the totally negative
response from the government,10 namely:
The Authority believes that it would be impracticable
to provide training that represented the vast range of cabin configurations
that passengers might encounter. Inappropriate demonstrations
could be dangerously misleading.
This response suggests that the recommendation
had actually been to introduce such Centres without any proper
study, whereas even a superficial reading shows this not to have
been the case; the difficulties, even dangers, had been recognised
and the actual wording carefully chosen to reflect this. Thus
the response was either excessively careless or missed the point
Of course members of the CAA and of other such
agencies have every right to offer an opinion, usually of course
an expert opinion, and it might turn out that it would indeed
prove to be impracticable to provide training in this way. Nevertheless
to totally disregard the careful deliberations of Members of Parliament,
all regular travellers by air and advised by two experienced members
of the aviation industry, one an ex-Chief Inspector of Accidents
with the AAIB, is hard to excuse.
5.3 Communication between firemen
Another potentially important point relevant
to the discussion of safety recommendations concerned the problems
firemen have in communicating with each other while fighting an
aircraft fire. Within the analysis section of the Manchester report11
it was stated:
It is evident that poor communications were
a major handicap throughout the period of firefighting activity.
In particular, there was no means for the officer in charge to
contact RFF personnel outside his immediate vicinity, preventing
him from re-directing resources to provide a more unified effort
should he have considered that necessary, and no means for him
to obtain feedback on the progress of, or to process requests
from, individual teams. This was illustrated graphically by the
variety of individual instructions issued and actions taken during
attempts to obtain water from the hydrants, all of which were
carried out in isolation and without the individuals concerned
being aware of the actions of others.
It is considered that the lack of a helmet
mounted communications system is a serious handicap which limits
the potential effectiveness of both the aerodrome RFF services
and the local authority fire services which attend. It is considered
necessary that a requirement for suitable communication systems
be introduced as part of the licensing requirements for all major
airports, and that these requirements include provision for communication
on the same system by (at least) the officer in charge of any
local authority fire service having standing arrangements to attend
aircraft emergencies at such aerodromes. It is further considered
necessary that the recruitment and training of airport fire officers
be amended to facilitate a more command orientated approach
This was emphasised as one of the "findings"
The potential for an officer in charge of
airport firefighting crews to mange resources effectively is
compromised by a lack of helmet-mounted communication (emphasis
The resulting safety recommendation followed:
A requirement should be introduced for an
effective communication system for Rescue and Fire Fighting personnel
as part of the licensing requirements for all major airports.
That requirement should include provision for communication on
the same system by the officer in charge of the units deployed
by any local authority fire service having standing arrangements
to attend such airports.
Nobody reading these paragraphs can be left
in any doubt that what the AAIB thought was lacking was communication
between the officer in charge and his firefighting crews, not
between appliances and the fire station. Thus the response from
the CAA must have been disappointing and perplexing:
The Authority accepts this recommendation.
CAP 168 . . . already calls for an effective communication system
between the Aerodrome Fire Service appliances and a suitable ground
station preferably the control tower. Also, where more than one
aerodrome fire appliance has radio equipment there should be two-way
communications between these appliances.
A new edition of CAP 168, due out in October
1990 will require that at Aerodrome RFF category 5-9 radio facilities
to enable the Airport Fire Service to communicate with responding
Local Authority Fire Services are provided. Consultation has taken
place . . .
There was no mention or acknowledgement of the
safety issue actually raised in the accident report at all! When
the matter was raised with the CAA the reply made it clear that
their policy was to deal strictly with the recommendations without
putting them into the context to be found in earlier sections.
At the same time it was made clear that, nevertheless, they were
pursuing the question of helmet mounted radios, which makes one
wonder why they didn't accept the spirit of the recommendation
in the first place. This appeared to be evidence of "points
scoring" going beyond that consistent with a healthy approach
More recently practicable helmet-mounted communications
systems have come into service at some airports but their cost
probably prohibits their wider use. However as with much equipment
of this nature the development of better and less expensive models
depends on the potential market size. If all fire services were
called upon to use them then the cost would come tumbling down!
This is an example of a subject that should be re-opened for discussion.
5.4 Evacuation trials at Cranfield
Following the 1985 Manchester accident the CAA
sponsored Cranfield to conduct a series of evacuation trials to
help evaluate the effects on evacuation rates of different widths
of passageway through bulkheads and different seating arrangements
by overwing, Type III exits since both of these had caused concern
to the AAIB, to the Manchester fire service and to the passengers
themselves. A disturbing and at the time surprising feature revealed
at the start of the first Cranfield trials, while the AAIB's investigation
into the accident was still in progress, was the reluctance by
one of the leading members of the CAA to allow the AAIB investigators
dealing with evacuation issues to witness the trials. It was as
if the AAIB were the nuisance and not the accident! This, it was
felt, went beyond the healthy rivalry that may occur between two
such independent agencies. Fortunately this reluctance was overcome
and the trials helped everyone, including the AAIB, to understand
a great deal about what probably went on in the cabin at Manchester.
Survivors of the Manchester accident who witnessed evacuations
from a position at the back of the cabin, confirmed that in their
opinion the real evacuation had been very similar.
My worry was that if senior CAA personnel were
quite open in expressing their reluctance to co-operate with the
AAIB then they presumably could not see that such behaviour was
not in the best interests of improving safety, particularly as
they might well encourage such behaviour in their junior colleagues.
It is believed that relations between the AAIB and the CAA are
now, over 10 years later, distinctly better but this should not
be left to chance.
5.5 Civil Aviation Safety Advisor
It has also been pointed out9 that
until a few years ago the Department of Transport had maintained
the post of "Civil Aviation Safety Advisor" in order
to provide a link between Her Majesty's Government and the day
to day operation of air transport. For reasons of which I am ignorant
this post appears now to be either vacant or to have been lost.
An important duty incumbent upon the holder of this post had been
to draft replies to parliamentary questions that relate to safety
issues and to provide other relevant information to the Government
spokesperson, for example to the Secretary of State for Transport.
This good, practical system has been complicated by the fact that
civil aircraft safety and air transport safety are the responsibility
of the CAA; it has therefore often been the practice for the answers
to parliamentary questions to be prefaced with a remark to that
An element relevant to this point has been that
the Civil Aviation Safety Advisor has, for as long as I can remember,
been an ex-member of the CAA. Thus, it being extremely difficult
to totally dissociate oneself from past affiliations, this may
have led to answers being biased to give the view of the CAA rather
than that of the Department of Transport, which of course contains
the AAIB. Should a Member require only the view of the
CAA then of course he or she can write directly to the CAA; this
surely is not what is intended when a question is put to
the Secretary of State. It is therefore suggested that the Government
reinstate the post of Civil Aviation Safety Advisor and appoint
a person who can convince the selection panel of his or her independence
of mind. Any suitable candidate would know the responsibilities
and workings of both the CAA and the AAIB and would appreciate
the need for and the value of their independent rôles (no
suitable candidate could truthfully claim to have been totally
independent of both!). He or she should also be aware of the problems
of the manufacturing and air transport industry but have no financial
interests in either. Having such a person in what I believe to
be a very important position should, as far as is possible, ensure
that answers to parliamentary questions are properly balanced,
perhaps more so than they have sometimes appeared to have been
in the past. After all the government is elected by the public
and in this, as in other matters, government should, above all
else, have the interests of the public at heart.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
Despite attempts to reduce the number
of CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) accidents little impression
has so far been made, particularly outside Europe and North America.
This problem should remain high on the safety agenda.
The number of fatalities per year
has only risen slightly over the past two decades, showing a slight
improvement in accident rates. However the forecast increase in
traffic means that we must make more than a "slight"
improvement over the next decade, this will not be easy and will
require close international co-operation.
Cabin safety remains a major concern
still requiring urgent international attention. Little has been
changed on aircraft since the 1985 Manchester accident despite
considerable research and, in some cases, strong CAA backing.
Previous proposals should be reconsidered.
The cost of introducing safety improvements
should be quoted in terms of the extra cost of a single ticket
rather than the usually enormous total cost per fleet.
Safety recommendations made by investigating
agencies should, when appropriate, be considered internationally.
The present charter of the CAA may
sometimes cause members to face something of a dilemma when trying
to decide "what is best" since the CAA is responsible
for both the safety of passengers and for the economic regulation
of British aviation. This situation should be reviewed.
In the past the CAA has, in its responses
to safety recommendations, on some occasions missed the point
behind them. Whatever the reasons for this in the past, steps
should be taken to prevent it from happening again.
It is recommended that the Government's
responses to such recommendations as the Transport Committee may
make following the present enquiry are studied with care and,
if not already provided, there should be the opportunity for further
discussion of the responses before publication.
1. "Aircraft Cabin Safety", House
of Commons Transport Committee, Session 1990-91, First Report,
2. "Airport safety: a study of accidents
and available approach-and-landing aids", Ratan Katwan et
al, Flight Safety Foundation, Flight Safety Digest, March
1996 and reprinted February 1999.
3. "Minutes of evidence by the UK Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA) to the House of Commons Transport Committee,
"Aircraft Cabin Safety", Session 1990-91, HMSO, 1990.
4. "United Airlines Flight 232 McDonnell
Douglas DC-10-10 Sioux Gateway Airport Sioux City, Iowa July 19,
1989", National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Aircraft
Accident Report NTSB/AAR-90/06, 1990.
5. "International cabin water spray research
management groupconclusions of research programme",
Civil Aviation Authority, CAA Paper 93012, 1993.
6. "Progress Report 1997: CAA and DoT Responses
to Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) Safety Recommendations",
CAP 674, CAA, July 1997.
7. "Airworthiness requirements: accidents
investigation and safety recommendations", A F Taylor, ISASI
'98 seminar, Barcelona, October 1998.
8. Answer by Ms Glenda Jackson to question 37856
by Mr Brake, Hansard for 8 April 1998.
9. "Up in the air", A F Taylor, PACTS
conference, "Transport Safety: What do we want from an incoming
government?", May 1997.
10. "Government observations on the First
Report of (Transport) Committee, Session 1990-91 (Aircraft Cabin
safety)", Second Special Report, House of Commons Transport
Committee, HMSO, 1991.
11. "Report on the accident to Boeing 737-236
series 1, G-BGJL at Manchester International Airport on 22 August
1985", AAIB, Air Accident Report No. 8/88, 1989.
12. "The contribution of Airport Safety
Centres to passengers' attitudes and performance", B A Mitchell,
Cranfield University MSc thesis, 1992.
Cranfield Aviation Safety Centre
Figure 1: Fatalities in Aviation Accidents
|10 year moving averagefatalities
|5 year moving average||1,951
|3 year moving average||1,688
|10 year moving averagefatalities
|5 year moving average||1,399
|3 year moving average||1,337
Figure 2: Number of fatal accidents
|10 year moving averagefatal accidents
|5 year moving average||60
|3 year moving average||54
|10 year moving averagefatal accidents
|5 year moving average||44
|3 year moving average||49