Ethnic tensions
44. A number of factors are contributing to the development
of ethnic tensions in the South Caucasus and Central Asia beyond
the areas of conflict we have outlined above. Dr Neil Melvin drew
our attention to the large diaspora populations of Uzbeks, Kyrgyz
and Kazakhs settled as minorities in other Central Asia states.[87]
According to Dr John Anderson, 14 per cent, or 615,000, of the
population of the Kyrgyz Republic is Uzbek, while 150,000 Kyrgyz
are settled in Uzbekistan.[88]
There are also large Uzbek minorities in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
In addition to the Central Asian minority populations, significant
numbers of Russians have stayed on in the region since 1991. In
Kazakhstan 32 per cent of the population is Russian, in the Kyrgyz
Republic 22 per cent, in Tajikistan 10 per cent, in Turkmenistan
7 per cent and in Uzbekistan 8 per cent.[89]
Some of the populations deported from the Caucasus to Central
Asia in the 1930s faced difficulties following perestroika
and after independence: for instance, the Meskhetians forcibly
settled in the Uzbek SSR during the Second World War were forced
to flee to Azerbaijan and Russia following persecution in 1989,
and most have still not been allowed to return to their homelands
in Georgia. A sizeable community of Germans, deported from the
Volga region by Stalin, remains in Kazakhstan.
45. While the ethnic issues in Central Asia have
not yet caused the general instability which was predicted after
independence, the fact remains that if the situation is not carefully
managed it could provide fuel for further conflict in the region.[90]
Dr Melvin told us that "some of the worst ethnic-based conflict
of the perestroika period" had occurred in Central Asia in
1989 and 1990.[91]
In 1989 ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks slaughtered each other in and
around the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh. Uzbekistan is now alleged
to be seeking to destabilise the Uzbek population in the south
of the Kyrgyz Republic, and to be moving sections of its borders
into Kyrgyz territory.[92]
Different states have different approaches to their specific minority
issues. Kazakhstan, with its large Russian population, has shown
sensitivity to minority issues, as the Kazakh Government cannot
afford to ignore the view of Russia on the situation of the Russian
minority. However, we note the tendency of a number of states
to develop concepts of nationality which are based upon ethnic
definitions, as national languages are promoted and ethnically-based
national histories are developed. Should these policies lead to
the marginalisation of minorities, there is a danger that they
may look for support beyond that state: this would pose a clear
threat to regional stability and might ultimately threaten the
territorial integrity of the Central Asian republics. Any further
decline in the unsteady economic situation in the region could
also exacerbate ethnic tensions, as quarrels may erupt over the
allocation of ever more scarce resources.
Political and religious extremism
46. Political extremism and religious extremism are
not, of course, analogous, and no automatic correlation can be
made between the two. However, there is a perception in Central
Asia in particular that a threat exists to regional stability
from politically-extreme and terrorist organisations, and an automatic
tendency to link such threats to the activity of extreme religious
organisations. This tendency is not particularly recent: Dr Melvin
wrote that movements deriving their political radicalism from
the teachings of Islam had been operating underground in the Soviet
republics since the mid-1980s, to the horror of the Soviet authorities
who had sought to eliminate such threats to Communist rule.[93]
This fear of the destabilisation of the state is used in justification
of the repressive religious and security policies of several states.
Chief among these is Uzbekistan, which has used the example of
the Tajik rebellion in 1992, when opposition forces had support
from politically-extreme religious groups, as a warning of the
dangers of so-called "fundamentalism". Other states
also have security concerns. The secular and largely Moslem state
of Azerbaijan has close links with the large community of Azeris
in north-west Iran, and fears the spread of extremist influences:
it, too, has banned Islamist parties.[94]
47. The extent of extremist activity in Central Asia
is difficult to assess. However, restrictions on worship and other
religious activities have been imposed in all the Central Asian
states save the Kyrgyz Republic.[95]
The socially conservative, ethnically-divided, overpopulated and
remote Fergana Valley is believed to be a regional centre for
extremism, and the government of Uzbekistan had moved to treat
it accordingly.[96]
Isolated incidents of extremist proselytising from bases in Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia have also been taken as evidence of plots against
the Uzbek state. A general crackdown on all forms of unregistered
religious activity took place after the bombings in Tashkent in
February 1999, which killed sixteen and injured over one hundred:
this has been followed by a number of public trials of alleged
terrorists.[97]
Dr Herzig told us that there was evidence of a number of extremist
groups "dotted about", but that the existence of a thriving
Moslem religion should not be taken as evidence of incipient political
extremism. However, attempts to subject religious organisations
to strict political control, as in Uzbekistan, have driven even
the moderate religious opposition underground, creating stability
in the short term but storing up difficulties.[98]
45 Appendix 33, Evidence p. 205. Back
46
Evidence p. 3, para. 4.2. Back
47
For accounts of the conflict, see Appendix 28, Evidence pp. 189-192;
Appendix 14, Evidence pp. 163-167. Back
48
Appendix 20, Evidence p. 175. Back
49
HL Deb 21 June 1999 cc. 648ff. Back
50
Evidence p. 84. Back
51
Though the United Kingdom has seconded personnel to the OSCE's
Mission in Nagorno-Karabakh; Q229. Back
52
See Appendix 20, Evidence p. 176. Back
53
This is an idea which Russia has also put forward in Moldova and
Abkhazia, perhaps with an eye on its own problems in Chechnya.
Back
54
See HL Deb 21 June 1999 cc. 648ff. Back
55
Appendix 33, Evidence p. 204. Back
56
QQ8, 35, 223. Back
57
Appendix 14, Evidence p. 164. Back
58
Appendix 14, Evidence p. 164-though Shushi was predominantly an
Armenian town in the 1920s-see Appendix 11, Evidence p. 152. Back
59
See paragraph 76. Back
60
Summary of Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group
for the Republic of Armenia, and Azerbaijan-Draft Country
Assistance Strategy: Preliminary Strategic Statement, World
Bank, 8 March 1999. Back
61
Evidence p. 23. Back
62
For a discussion of pipeline policy see below, paragraphs 98-101. Back
63
Q136. Back
64
Appendix 14, Evidence p. 164. Back
65
Appendix 20, Evidence p. 175. Back
66
See Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy, p. 713; Appendix
17, Evidence p. 170. Back
67
Appendix 14, Evidence p. 165. Back
68
Evidence p. 25. Back
69
Q222. Back
70
Evidence p. 85. Back
71
Russians form 16 per cent of the population. There are a number
of other small groups. Back
72
Evidence p. 85. Back
73
Press Conference, 29 January 1999, UN Press Briefings. Back
74
Evidence p. 24. Back
75
Evidence p. 85. Back
76
Appendix 12, Evidence p. 159, para. 9. Back
77
Evidence p. 81. Back
78
Appendix 7, Evidence p. 130. Back
79
See, for example, Appendix 12, Evidence p. 160, para. 12. Back
80
Nelson Gold operates in the north of Tajikistan: Evidence p. 90. Back
81
QQ39-40 and Evidence p. 89, para. 3. Back
82
Appendix 5, Evidence p. 123. Back
83
UNHCR Global Appeal 1999: available on UNHCR website at www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/ga99/tjk.htm. Back
84
Appendix 5, Evidence p. 123. Back
85
Evidence p. 89, para. 7. Back
86
Evidence p. 89, para. 7. Back
87
Appendix 7, Evidence p. 129. Back
88
The FCO estimate is 130,000: Evidence p. 87. Back
89
Evidence pp. 86-91. Back
90
Appendix 5, Evidence p. 123. Back
91
Appendix 7, Evidence p. 129. Back
92
Appendix 7, Evidence p. 129; Appendix 5, Evidence p. 123. Back
93
Appendix 7, Evidence p. 128. Back
94
Islamist parties aim to establish a theocratic state. Back
95
Appendix 5, Evidence p. 122. Back
96
Evidence p. 92. Back
97
We refer to this further at paragraph 114 below. Back
98
Q40. Back