THE EBRD AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY
141. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
is engaged in a range of projects across the region, including,
for example, "upgrading the dry cargo terminal at Turkmenbashi
port," at a cost of around £26 million, "which
will have great significance for a much wider area than Turkmenistan
alone."[322]
As Table 7 illustrates, more money has been committed to projects
in Turkmenistan than in Armenia or Georgia, but a relatively small
proportion of the money committed to projects in Turkmenistan
has actually been disbursed.
TABLE 7
EBRD Outstanding disbursements as at 31
December 1998 (£ million)
| Outstandingdisbursements
| Committed,not yet disbursed
| Total
|
ARMENIA | 31.5
| 8.5 |
40.1 |
AZERBAIJAN | 66.5
| 63.4 |
129.9 |
GEORGIA | 27.0
| 49.0 |
76.0 |
KAZAKHSTAN | 61.5
| 160.0
| 221.5
|
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC | 54.5
| 32.6 |
87.1 |
TAJIKISTAN | 1.4
| 7.3 |
8.7 |
TURKMENISTAN | 18.5
| 64.0 |
82.5 |
UZBEKISTAN | 98.7
| 139.7
| 238.4
|
TOTAL | 359.7
| 524.5
| 884.2
|
Source: Based on EBRD
Annual Report, Table 10, Analysis of operational activity.
Sterling figures based on ECU:£ rate of 0.67475,
average for 1998.
142. The Agreement establishing the Bank describes
its purpose as "to foster the transition towards open market-oriented
economies and the promotion of private and entrepreneurial initiative
in the central and eastern European countries committed to and
applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and
market economies."[323]
As we discuss above, the "principles of multiparty democracy"
and "pluralism" are not widely respected in the region.
In particular, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan fall far short of internationally
recognised standards in these areas, but despite this, the EBRD
has made substantial commitments to these countries. It is apparent
that a decision has been taken at some level in the EBRD to disregard
its commitment to democracy and pluralism. Given the importance
of the issue, we can only assume that this decision has been taken
at the highest level. It is unacceptable for the EBRD to disregard
its commitment to promoting development only in those countries
which apply the principles of multiparty democracy and pluralism.
As the United Kingdom is a major shareholder in the EBRD, and
given the Government's commitment to introducing an ethical dimension
into foreign policy, we recommend that the Government should ensure
that the EBRD lives up to its commitment. The release of further
funds by the EBRD should be made conditional upon improvements
in the respect shown by governments of the region to multiparty
democracy and pluralism.
Parliamentary contacts
143. Throughout the region we were made aware of
the wish for co-operation between the British Parliament and local
parliamentary institutions. Parliament is one of the United Kingdom's
most internationally-recognised institutions, and parliamentary
contacts are therefore an important means by which the United
Kingdom can influence the thinking of politicians in the region.
There are a variety of parliamentary institutions in the area,
ranging from the active Parliament in Georgia which has effectively
caused the resignation of three leading Ministers as a consequence
of impeachment proceedings, to the rather more supine institutions
in the less democratic states.[324]
But all institutions could find benefit from the assistance which
Westminster is able to offer. In terms of help to the political
parties and the development of democratic pluralism in general,
the Westminster Foundation for Democracy is probably best placed
to assist.[325]
Its budget for the area for 1999/2000 is £160,000, out of
a world-wide budget of £4 million.[326]
There are bilateral contacts between Members of Parliament through
the Inter Parliamentary Union, of which all the states except
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are members. Delegations from Georgia
(1997) and Kazakhstan (1997) have been received in the United
Kingdom, and a delegation from the United Kingdom will be visiting
Kazakhstan later in 1999. There are other contacts through a variety
of other organisations. There have also been a limited number
of examples of direct assistance from Westminster staff in helping
the development of parliamentary institutions. We hope that contacts
with the parliaments of the region may be strengthened. We would
welcome a more co-ordinated approach, and we recommend that
the FCO consider how to provide a programme of assistance to the
parliaments of the region.
144. Westminster does not have a monopoly of good
ideas on democratic institutions. Other parliaments have assisted
in the democratic development of the parliaments of the region:
the French National Assembly was involved in a recent programme
with the Georgian parliament, funded by Tacis. Georgia participates
in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as a full
member, and Armenia and Azerbaijan have Special Guest status there.
All the countries are members of the OSCE, and therefore of its
Parliamentary Assembly. These are excellent opportunities for
the dissemination of best practice in terms of how the mature
legislatures of Western Europe are able to hold Ministers to account,
to scrutinise legislation and to contribute to the development
of policy. There is also an opportunity for more pro-active work
by the OSCE in particular to help bring standards of parliamentary
life up to an acceptable norm. There is little sense in improving
an electoral system if the Parliament which is elected seldom
meetsfor example, the Uzbek Parliament meets for only 12
days a year.[327]
We were pleased by Ms Quin's willingness to discuss with OSCE
the steps it might take to develop election monitoring into the
area of monitoring parliamentary standards.[328]
In the case of Member States of the Council of Europe, this is
already within the remit of the Committee on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Member States.[329]
We believe the Government should take steps to encourage the
OSCE to monitor the democratic functioning of parliamentary institutions
in the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
293 Evidence p. 27. Back
294
Evidence p. 28. Back
295
Q92. Back
296
Appendix 31, Evidence p. 198. Back
297
Appendix 31, Evidence p. 198. Back
298
Appendix 10, Evidence p. 146. Back
299
Appendix 10, Evidence p. 145. Back
300
Appendix 31, Evidence p. 198. We set out below at Table 6 the
states' record of ratification of the seven core ILO human rights
conventions. Back
301
Appendix 31, Evidence p. 199. Back
302
Appendix 10, Evidence p. 150. Back
303
First Report, Session 1998-99, HC 100, paragraph 93. Back
304
Government Response to the First Report from the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Session 1998-99, Cm 4229, paragraphs 6-7. Back
305
Evidence, p. 81. Back
306
See below, paragraph 144. Back
307
ODIHR Report of Assessment Mission to the Presidential Election
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 10 January 1999, available at ODIHRwebsite:
www.odihr.org. Back
308
OSCE press release, 11 May 1999. Back
309
The Commission states that: "...the PCAs contain detailed
provisions on trade, the establishment and operation of companies,
capital flows and intellectual property protection, they reinforce
bilateral investment treaties and double tax treaties negotiated
by the Member States and provide an additional level of political
coverage for the activities of European traders and investors.
In addition, sectoral agreements (e.g. on trade in steel, textiles
and nuclear products) may be negotiated and there is provision
for such agreements in service sectors also, notably transport."
Appendix 33, Evidence p. 203. Back
310
Appendix 33, Evidence p. 203. Back
311
See below, paragraph 136. Back
312
Appendix 33, Evidence p. 202. Back
313
Appendix 33, Evidence p. 204. Back
314
See above, paragraph 114. Back
315
See above, paragraph 113. Back
316
Q237. Back
317
Appendix 33, Evidence p. 203. Back
318
Q227. Back
319
Q236. Back
320
Q228. Back
321
Q64. Back
322
EBRD Activities in Turkmenistan, available on EBRD website:
www.ebrd.org/english/opera/country/turkact.htm. Back
323
Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 1991, Article 1. Back
324
See Q61. Back
325
See above, paragraph 124. Back
326
Appendix 35, Evidence pp. 223-224. Back
327
Evidence p. 91. Back
328
QQ229-30. Back
329
See above, paragraph 70. Back