Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report


HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

British contribution to development of civil society

THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS)

125. In all these countries the transition from societies heavily regulated by the state to open, pluralist societies working to uphold democratic principles has been difficult. The development of effective non-governmental organisations which can operate outside the confines of the state is one indicator of an open civil society. In Central Asia, however, INTRAC told us that "early hopes for the rapid emergence of democratic institutions, including active civil society organisations, at a central, regional and local level have not been realised" and that the state has tended to impose centralised forms of control.[293] There are significant challenges to the functioning of civil society in Central Asia in particular. NGOs are often repressed by governments or face being co-opted into the state establishment. In Turkmenistan we heard that the government was not in principle prepared to tolerate the activities of organisations which describe themselves as "non-governmental." Communications are difficult, funding is poor and tax and NGO legislation, much of which is "anachronistic and inchoate and often applied in an indiscriminate and uneven manner", acts to hinder NGO development.[294] NGOs have also suffered from a lack of coherence in and between bilateral and multilateral programmes, and shortfalls and delays in funding. Some programmes have also lacked credibility, which has discouraged local participation.

126. Jonathan Goodhand of INTRAC told us that the development of the NGO sector in the region had been driven by the resources available in particular sectors rather than the identified needs of a particular society: "if there is a lot of funding for environmental NGOs, you will suddenly find a lot of environmental NGOs sprouting."[295] He rejected the view that local NGOs would build civil society by themselves, and advocated "hard-headed" engagement. The development of a properly-functioning civil society is of crucial importance to the internal stability of the states of the region, and as such the Government should take an active role in promoting its growth. We have discussed above the practical measures the Government is taking to promote human rights and good governance in the region. We recommend that the Government review its funding and assistance to all organisations seeking to promote a properly-functioning civil society, where there is freedom of expression and freedom of the media, in the states of the region.

THE ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS

127. Trade union activity in the region was inevitably affected by the break up of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of traditional state-union links. However, trade unions have been the only mass institutions of the Soviet period to survive the collapse of the Soviet state.[296] Labour and Society International told us that the trade union organisations in some states (Armenia and Turkmenistan, for example) were unreformed, but in other states of the region they played an active role in civil society:

    "They are the main lobby for veterans, pensioners, the disabled, the unemployed. In the more open states . . . they call for social and economic policies which would protect the most vulnerable groups. They are the lobby for the poor."[297]

The Trades Union Congress told us that unions are "prepared and able to play a vital role in the transition process."[298] Where active, they play a role in the monitoring of human rights, labour rights and corruption.[299] The states of the region are all members of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), but their record of ratification of ILO conventions is variable: Azerbaijan has ratified fifty conventions and Kazakhstan only two.[300] Ratifications of such conventions is by no means an indication of adherence to basic standards: as we have noted above, trade unions are forbidden from organising in the oil industry in Azerbaijan.

128. The influence of trade unions in many areas of the region may be seen as a positive force in the development of civil society and the alleviation of the consequences of transition to market economies. Labour and Society International believed the United Kingdom should recognise the role unions could play "in helping the development of robust civil societies and democracy in the region, and should give training and assistance to help unions adapt to rapid change.[301] It also believed that the United Kingdom should work through multilateral agencies to ensure full inclusion of trades unions in planning and restructuring. The TUC believed that it was important to show that the United Kingdom recognises and understands the role of trade unions in market economies. British Embassies in the region could constructively seek contact with national trade union organisations to provide assistance and support and to share information.[302] We expect that the Government's contacts with civil society in the region should include the fullest support possible for the activities of free trades unions and their work in the process of transition.

The role of multilateral organisations

UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION

129. We regard the ratification of the core United Nations human rights instruments and the core conventions of the International Labour Organisation as a prerequisite of membership of the international community. Details of signatures and ratifications of these instruments by the states of the region to date are contained in Tables 5 and 6. We recommended in our Report on Foreign Policy and Human Rights that the Government should take every opportunity to encourage ratification of the core UN and ILO human rights instruments by those states not yet party, and that United Kingdom embassies should treat this as a major obligation.[303] The Government has told us that it takes "every appropriate opportunity" to encourage accession to these treaties and that it works with countries to improve their institutional framework for the promotion and protection of human rights.[304]


TABLE 5

Ratification of core UN human rights instruments
   
ICCPR
ICESCR
CEDAW
CRC
CERD
CAT
OP1
OP2
ARMENIA
23.9.93
13.12.93
13.10.93
22.7.93
23.7.93
13.10.93
23.9.93
-
AZERBAIJAN
13.11.92
13.11.92
9.8.95
12.9.92
15.9.96
15.9.96
-
22.4.99
GEORGIA
3.8.94
3.8.94
25.11.94
2.7.94
12.6.99+
25.11.94
3.8.94
22.6.99
KAZAKHSTAN
-
-
25.8.98
11.9.94
25.9.98
25.9.98
-
-
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
7.1.95
7.10.94
11.3.97
6.11.94
5.10.97
5.10.97
7.1.94
-
TAJIKISTAN
4.4.99
4.4.99
25.11.93
25.11.93
10.2.95
10.2.95
4.4.99
-
TURKMENISTAN
1.8.97
1.8.97
30.5.97
19.10.93
29.10.94
25.7.99
1.8.97
-
UZBEKISTAN
28.12.95
28.12.95
18.8.95
29.7.94
28.10.95
28.10.95
28.12.95
-


@TABLE100%@
*Source: HC 100 (1998-99), Annex II, pp. lxxii-xcvi, updated from UNHCHR website: www.unhchr.ch.
Dates given are those of entry into force: + indicates that the Convention is not yet in force
ICCPRInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCRInternational Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights
CEDAWConvention on the Elimination of Discrimination towards Women
CERDConvention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
CRCConvention on the Rights of the Child
CATConvention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
OP1Optional Protocol to ICCPR, on the right of individual petition to the UN Human Rights Committee
OP2Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, on the abolition of the death penalty




TABLE 6

Ratification of core ILO human rights conventions
  
No.29
No.87
No.98
No. 100
No.105
No. 111
No. 138
ARMENIA
-
-
-
29.7.94
-
29.7.94
-
AZERBAIJAN
19.5.92
19.5.92
19.5.92
19.5.92
-
19.5.92
19.5.92
GEORGIA
22.6.97
-
22.6.97
22.6.97
23.9.96
22.6.97
23.9.96
KAZAKHSTAN
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
31.3.92
31.3.92
31.3.92
31.3.92
18.2.99
31.3.92
31.3.92
TAJIKISTAN
26.11.93
26.11.93
26.11.93
26.11.93
-
26.11.93
26.11.93
TURKMENISTAN
15.5.97
15.5.97
15.5.97
15.5.97
15.5.97
15.5.97
-
UZBEKISTAN
13.7.92
-
13.7.92
13.7.92
15.12.97
13.7.92
-


@TABLE100%@
* Source: HC 100 (1998-99), Annex III, pp. xcvii-c, updated from ILO web-site www.ilo.org.
No. 29Convention on Forced Labour, 1930
No. 87Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948
No. 98Convention on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949
No. 100Convention on Equal Remuneration, 1951
No. 105Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957
No. 111Convention on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958
No. 138Convention on Minimum Age, 1973




130. Simply to ratify human rights instruments is not sufficient: even though a state's ratification of a convention may establish its provisions in national law, these provisions still have to be given effect in practice. In this regard other states have a crucial role to play in encouraging the states of the region to give full effect to their treaty commitments. The role of the UN bodies established to monitor the implementation of the provisions of specific treaties is also vital. We note above Armenia's submission of a report on its implementation of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to the UN Committee on Human Rights for review. Engagement in this kind of dialogue with the international community is an important step towards raising human rights standards in the region as a whole. We recommend that the Government press the states of the region to comply fully with their obligations under those UN and ILO human rights instruments to which they are party. The monitoring of governments' compliance with these obligations should be a core responsibility of embassies in the region.

OSCE

131. The election monitoring programme of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE undertakes valuable work in the region. An ODIHR mission observed the presidential elections in Kazakhstan in January 1999 and the parliamentary elections in Armenia on 30 May. The presence of international election monitors is highly prized by most of the states of the region. Participation by the international community confers legitimacy upon electoral arrangements, even though the conclusions drawn by observation teams may not necessarily be palatable to host governments. The Government encourages "close adherence" to the standards of democratic reform and good governance promoted by the OSCE, and provides observers for ODIHR monitoring missions.[305] We discuss below[306] the manner in which the OSCE might work to ensure the democratic functioning of institutions elected through a democratic process.

132. Refusals by the international community to provide election monitors cause deep embarrassment. ODIHR refused to send a full assessment team to the presidential elections in Kazakhstan, and criticised the conduct of the elections as falling "far short" of OSCE standards.[307] As a result the Kazakh authorities requested OSCE assistance in the drafting of a new law under which the parliamentary elections would be held in October.[308] However, ODIHR was not given an opportunity to comment on the law before it was adopted by the Kazakh parliament in April. ODIHR has made public its views on the serious deficiencies of the new law, and has met with the Kazakh government to suggest improvements. It has still not decided whether to send monitors to the October elections. We understand that a similar process of negotiation over electoral laws is taking place with the Uzbek authorities prior to the parliamentary elections in December. The Turkmen authorities have not yet issued an invitation to the OSCE, or to other international organisations, to observe their forthcoming elections. The open and forthright manner in which ODIHR approaches its dealings with the governments of the region is a powerful instrument in the development of truly democratic institutions. We applaud the work of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE in its promotion of standards of democracy throughout the region. We expect that the Government will continue to give ODIHR its fullest support.

EU PARTNERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS

133. As we discuss above, the EU has Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs) with all states of the region bar Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. PCAs confer substantial economic and commercial advantages upon signatories,[309] and therefore represent an important source of potential leverage with the governments concerned. They incorporate standard statements, known as "essential elements" clauses, which base the Agreement upon "respect for democracy, human rights and the principles of the market economy."[310] The principles of human rights and democracy are those laid down in the core documents of the CSCE (now OSCE), namely the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris of 1990.

134. There are two points at which pressure may be exerted upon countries which aspire to PCAs with the EU. The first is before signature and ratification of the Agreements. The second is as part of a dialogue established by the PCA[311]. With regard to the first method, the EU continues to have "serious political concerns over the respect of human rights and democratic principles in almost all the NIS [Newly Independent States]."[312] As there are now PCAs in operation with all the states of the region bar Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, it appears that the importance of the essential elements of the PCAs were not insisted upon with great rigour at the time of signature and ratification of the Agreements. The General Affairs Council did require "explanatory talks" to be held with both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan before the opening of negotiations on their PCAs.[313] But in the case of Uzbekistan, these talks do not appear to have produced any significant results. A PCA has been signed and ratified, but, as we found during our visit and as we demonstrate above,[314] the respect for human and political rights in Uzbekistan remains lamentable.

135. The human rights and political situation in Turkmenistan is the worst in the region. We were not convinced, on the evidence of our visit to Turkmenistan, that the Turkmen government had any intention of improving the human rights situation in the country, even in the long term.[315] Prospects for democratic development appear to be extremely poor. Under these circumstances, we find it surprising that the EU even considered signing a PCA, the essential elements of which appear unlikely to be honoured save by lip-service. However, the Agreement remains to be ratified by the Parliaments of the Member States, including the United Kingdom. Ms Pringle told us that there was "no immediate prospect" of the Agreement coming into force.[316] Under the Ponsonby Rule the Agreement will be laid before the House for twenty-one days before ratification. We recommend that the Government should not seek to ratify any Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the Republic of Turkmenistan without clear evidence of improvement in the observance of human rights.

136. Pressure may also be exerted upon a country which already has a PCA with the EU once the Agreement has been signed and ratified, within a framework agreed by both sides. According to the European Commission, this is the EU's primary means of using its leverage:

    "the prospects for the further development of political and economic relations depends on a number of factors e.g.......the willingness of the NIS to reflect representations made by the EU, through the PCA mechanism, in their policies, notably as regards the 'essential elements.'"

The Commission informed us that if the essential elements "are breached (i.e. presumably to the extent that the PCA is effectively rendered inoperable) [sic] the PCAs may be suspended."[317] This statement appears to indicate that no firm benchmarks exist to assess the observance of the standards enshrined in the essential elements. Certainly, none of the PCAs has been suspended, despite the poor performance of Uzbekistan in particular.

137. Another method of exerting continuous pressure—less dramatic than suspension of the PCA but still effective—is to make aid conditional on human rights and political performance. Total EU assistance to the region from 1992 to 1998 is given in Table 2 above. The EU has given less aid to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. We trust that this reflects their poor human and political rights records, but this has not been said in terms by the EU. A clear statement to this effect by the EU would increase the leverage exerted by its aid programmes.

138. The British Government informed us that it supports the EU's general approach to the PCAs. Ms Quin told us that the "the PCAs were seen as a base on which to build and that it was more important to get an agreement for the inclusion of these areas in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement so that the principle of human rights dialogue was established, than getting specific changes from specific countries at the time of the agreement."[318] Once the Agreements had been signed, individual countries could raise matters of concern within the Council, leading to investigations "which can lead to the suspension of all or part of an Agreement."[319] If the rationale for signing the Agreement in the first place was to obtain a human rights lever, then there is a strong obligation upon the Government to use that lever when clear breaches of the essential elements clauses take place. We were informed during our visit to Uzbekistan that the Uzbek Government was in direct breach of the essential elements of its PCA over restrictions it had imposed upon internet access. We were encouraged to hear from Ms Pringle that a démarche had been made by the EU within the framework of the PCA to Uzbekistan on this question, but were less encouraged to hear that this collective action came as a surprise to the Uzbek Government, because "there has been some reluctance and reservation in the past [to work collectively on human rights issues], not by the UK but by other partners."[320]

139. Referring explicitly to the PCAs, Mr Cecil Ballantine of Amnesty International said that in the field of human rights promotion in the region the "real difficulty" occurred when

    "legislative or treaty arrangements are made . . . which on the face of things do provide for human rights monitoring, they do provide for standards in human rights and they raise certain expectations. Those of us who are concerned on the ground with the way these things operate find that in fact a great deal of pressure has to be brought from ourselves and other NGOs before even the most basic principles are included as part of the infrastructure of the diplomatic and governmental machineries in these areas."[321]

Overall, we share Mr Ballantine's scepticism about the EU and the Government's approach to the PCAs. While the climate for dialogue may change now that the majority of the PCAs have entered into force, we see little evidence so far that specific changes in the human rights situation have been secured in those countries with the poorest human rights performance.

140. There is a risk, in the absence of specific targets for improvement, that the commercial interests of the EU will over-ride human rights considerations, and that the dialogues within the PCA frameworks will be an excuse for inaction. While the United Kingdom may be concerned about "getting out ahead" of its EU partners in its insistence on human rights standards, we believe that this is an area in which the Government can usefully take a lead. The PCAs are mixed agreements, and thus the United Kingdom may seek to enforce their conditions bilaterally as well as through the European Council. We recommend that the Government work both bilaterally and with its European partners to ensure that the human rights elements of the EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) are fully respected, and that pressure on those countries in the region with poor human rights records is maintained through the mechanisms established by the PCAs, to the extent that states which consistently fail to meet their obligations should have their PCAs suspended. We also recommend that the Government should ask its European partners to take a stronger position in future on securing actual progress on human rights before EU Partnership and Co-operation Agreements are entered into.

THE EBRD AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY

141. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is engaged in a range of projects across the region, including, for example, "upgrading the dry cargo terminal at Turkmenbashi port," at a cost of around £26 million, "which will have great significance for a much wider area than Turkmenistan alone."[322] As Table 7 illustrates, more money has been committed to projects in Turkmenistan than in Armenia or Georgia, but a relatively small proportion of the money committed to projects in Turkmenistan has actually been disbursed.

TABLE 7

EBRD Outstanding disbursements as at 31 December 1998 (£ million)
   
Outstandingdisbursements
Committed,not yet disbursed
Total
ARMENIA
31.5
8.5
40.1
AZERBAIJAN
66.5
63.4
129.9
GEORGIA
27.0
49.0
76.0
KAZAKHSTAN
61.5
160.0
221.5
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
54.5
32.6
87.1
TAJIKISTAN
1.4
7.3
8.7
TURKMENISTAN
18.5
64.0
82.5
UZBEKISTAN
98.7
139.7
238.4
TOTAL
359.7
524.5
884.2

Source: Based on EBRD Annual Report, Table 10, Analysis of operational activity.

Sterling figures based on ECU:£ rate of 0.67475, average for 1998.

142. The Agreement establishing the Bank describes its purpose as "to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and the promotion of private and entrepreneurial initiative in the central and eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economies."[323] As we discuss above, the "principles of multiparty democracy" and "pluralism" are not widely respected in the region. In particular, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan fall far short of internationally recognised standards in these areas, but despite this, the EBRD has made substantial commitments to these countries. It is apparent that a decision has been taken at some level in the EBRD to disregard its commitment to democracy and pluralism. Given the importance of the issue, we can only assume that this decision has been taken at the highest level. It is unacceptable for the EBRD to disregard its commitment to promoting development only in those countries which apply the principles of multiparty democracy and pluralism. As the United Kingdom is a major shareholder in the EBRD, and given the Government's commitment to introducing an ethical dimension into foreign policy, we recommend that the Government should ensure that the EBRD lives up to its commitment. The release of further funds by the EBRD should be made conditional upon improvements in the respect shown by governments of the region to multiparty democracy and pluralism.

Parliamentary contacts

143. Throughout the region we were made aware of the wish for co-operation between the British Parliament and local parliamentary institutions. Parliament is one of the United Kingdom's most internationally-recognised institutions, and parliamentary contacts are therefore an important means by which the United Kingdom can influence the thinking of politicians in the region. There are a variety of parliamentary institutions in the area, ranging from the active Parliament in Georgia which has effectively caused the resignation of three leading Ministers as a consequence of impeachment proceedings, to the rather more supine institutions in the less democratic states.[324] But all institutions could find benefit from the assistance which Westminster is able to offer. In terms of help to the political parties and the development of democratic pluralism in general, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy is probably best placed to assist.[325] Its budget for the area for 1999/2000 is £160,000, out of a world-wide budget of £4 million.[326] There are bilateral contacts between Members of Parliament through the Inter Parliamentary Union, of which all the states except Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are members. Delegations from Georgia (1997) and Kazakhstan (1997) have been received in the United Kingdom, and a delegation from the United Kingdom will be visiting Kazakhstan later in 1999. There are other contacts through a variety of other organisations. There have also been a limited number of examples of direct assistance from Westminster staff in helping the development of parliamentary institutions. We hope that contacts with the parliaments of the region may be strengthened. We would welcome a more co-ordinated approach, and we recommend that the FCO consider how to provide a programme of assistance to the parliaments of the region.

144. Westminster does not have a monopoly of good ideas on democratic institutions. Other parliaments have assisted in the democratic development of the parliaments of the region: the French National Assembly was involved in a recent programme with the Georgian parliament, funded by Tacis. Georgia participates in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as a full member, and Armenia and Azerbaijan have Special Guest status there. All the countries are members of the OSCE, and therefore of its Parliamentary Assembly. These are excellent opportunities for the dissemination of best practice in terms of how the mature legislatures of Western Europe are able to hold Ministers to account, to scrutinise legislation and to contribute to the development of policy. There is also an opportunity for more pro-active work by the OSCE in particular to help bring standards of parliamentary life up to an acceptable norm. There is little sense in improving an electoral system if the Parliament which is elected seldom meets—for example, the Uzbek Parliament meets for only 12 days a year.[327] We were pleased by Ms Quin's willingness to discuss with OSCE the steps it might take to develop election monitoring into the area of monitoring parliamentary standards.[328] In the case of Member States of the Council of Europe, this is already within the remit of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States.[329] We believe the Government should take steps to encourage the OSCE to monitor the democratic functioning of parliamentary institutions in the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.


293   Evidence p. 27. Back

294   Evidence p. 28. Back

295   Q92. Back

296   Appendix 31, Evidence p. 198. Back

297   Appendix 31, Evidence p. 198. Back

298   Appendix 10, Evidence p. 146. Back

299   Appendix 10, Evidence p. 145. Back

300   Appendix 31, Evidence p. 198. We set out below at Table 6 the states' record of ratification of the seven core ILO human rights conventions.  Back

301   Appendix 31, Evidence p. 199. Back

302   Appendix 10, Evidence p. 150. Back

303   First Report, Session 1998-99, HC 100, paragraph 93. Back

304   Government Response to the First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1998-99, Cm 4229, paragraphs 6-7. Back

305   Evidence, p. 81. Back

306   See below, paragraph 144. Back

307   ODIHR Report of Assessment Mission to the Presidential Election of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 10 January 1999, available at ODIHRwebsite: www.odihr.org. Back

308   OSCE press release, 11 May 1999. Back

309   The Commission states that: "...the PCAs contain detailed provisions on trade, the establishment and operation of companies, capital flows and intellectual property protection, they reinforce bilateral investment treaties and double tax treaties negotiated by the Member States and provide an additional level of political coverage for the activities of European traders and investors. In addition, sectoral agreements (e.g. on trade in steel, textiles and nuclear products) may be negotiated and there is provision for such agreements in service sectors also, notably transport." Appendix 33, Evidence p. 203. Back

310   Appendix 33, Evidence p. 203. Back

311   See below, paragraph 136. Back

312   Appendix 33, Evidence p. 202. Back

313   Appendix 33, Evidence p. 204. Back

314   See above, paragraph 114. Back

315   See above, paragraph 113. Back

316   Q237. Back

317   Appendix 33, Evidence p. 203. Back

318   Q227. Back

319   Q236. Back

320   Q228. Back

321   Q64. Back

322   EBRD Activities in Turkmenistan, available on EBRD website: www.ebrd.org/english/opera/country/turkact.htm. Back

323   Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1991, Article 1. Back

324   See Q61. Back

325   See above, paragraph 124. Back

326   Appendix 35, Evidence pp. 223-224. Back

327   Evidence p. 91. Back

328   QQ229-30. Back

329   See above, paragraph 70. Back


 
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