House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report

DELIVERING THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVES

Ministerial visits

163. The FCO acknowledges that "support from the British government, in the form of lobbying either at post or occasionally by Ministers, is vital."[383] During our visits we were made well aware of the importance of high level contacts to bolster the efforts made by posts on the ground. These contacts can arise both through outward visits by Ministers from the United Kingdom, and through the receiving of Ministers here. Business people operating in the area believed that British business would benefit from more attention from Ministers. British Aerospace gave evidence[384] about the importance of visibility by senior members of the Government, and Mr Adams of Monument Oil and Gas told us:

385

Mr Chapman of BG said that he did not think that "ministerial involvement is in step with the pace and magnitude of investments which one is considering; and I think other countries are doing better."[386] The CBI wrote of the "need for Cabinet-level support and an increased programme of visits in both directions".[387] Shell, however, praised the "strong support" which British Ministers, including the Prime Minister, had given them.[388] As British Invisibles put it, "companies are looking for door opening and networking. Participation by an HMG Minister, whether on a mission or hosting a function in the UK, can be very helpful".[389]

TABLE 9

Numbers of Ministerial visits from the UK to the region since 1 May 1997

Country	FCO Minister		Non-FCO Ministers		TOTAL
	1 May 1997-30 June 1999	Planned	1 May 1997-30 June 1999	Planned
ARMENIA	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	1
AZERBAIJAN	1	Nil	3	1	5
GEORGIA	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	1
KAZAKHSTAN	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	1
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	1
TAJIKISTAN	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	1
TURKMENISTAN	1	Nil	Nil	Nil	1
UZBEKISTAN	Nil	1	Nil	Nil	1
TOTAL	5	2	3	1	12

Source: FCO, Evidence p. 213.

164. As far as outgoing visits are concerned, we were asked often ourselves to try to ensure that senior British Ministers visited the region. It was not only FCO Ministers who were in demand, but agriculture, defence and trade ministers also. President Nazarbaev told us that he hoped that the Prime Minister would lead a trade delegation to Kazakhstan, and the Azerbaijan Government has invited Mr Blair to Azerbaijan.[390] Since 1 May 1997, there have been just eight ministerial visits, and three more are planned. Table 9 gives details. None of these visits have been by a Minister of Cabinet level, though Ms Quin told us that the Foreign Secretary hoped to visit the region "in the near future."[391] We recommend a more extensive programme of co-ordinated ministerial visits to the region.

165. Ministers are not the only important visitors. Visits by members of the Royal Family also do a great deal to promote links between the region and the United Kingdom, and can dramatically increase the visibility of the United Kingdom and therefore produce a climate conducive to British business and diplomacy. For example, the visit of the Prince of Wales to Uzbekistan in 1996 had clearly had this effect.[392] British Aerospace described the importance to US business of a visit to Kazakhstan of Hillary Clinton.[393]

166. By contrast with outgoing ministerial visits, there have been a much larger number of visits to the United Kingdom by ministers from the region. Visits at President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister level since independence are set out in Table 10. We were again made aware during our visits that the opportunity for senior statesmen to meet their counterparts in London was much appreciated. We note in this context the importance of ensuring that inward visits do not give rise to unnecessary difficulty. We were told in evidence of the problems caused when the ministerial host for an official dinner for a Head of State from the region was downgraded at the last moment.[394] The former Ambassador, Sir Derek Thomas, commented that "everyone on the British side understands the constraints. Foreigners, for obvious reasons, do not. Insulting a visiting President may be fine if it's intentional. But if not it is careless and can be damaging." He also told us that it was "extremely difficult" to persuade ministers to meet senior visitors from Central Asia, and that the visitors "....go home comparing their treatment here with what they have had, for instance, in France or in Germany or even in the United States where they get seen in Washington by the Vice President, on occasions by the President."[395] Visiting Ministers' sensitivities in matters of this regard must be respected. However, incoming visits are not opportunities for the visitors alone: it will also be important for visits by Heads of State from the region, and their Ministers, to be used as opportunities to advance British foreign policy aims, both in the promotion of trade and in the advancement of human rights.

167. One of the problems which can affect both the level at which ministers are received in the United Kingdom and the ability of ministers to travel to the region is that of ministerial overstretch. Although we hope that the Foreign Secretary may be able to visit the region in the reasonably near future, the principal responsibility will devolve upon the Minister of State. Ms Quin told us that "despite having the European Union portfolio... I have been able to raise the profile of these particular countries within the Department."[396] Nevertheless, the region will always come out very much second-best in a Ministerial portfolio which includes the European Union, whatever the personal qualities of the Minister. It has been stressed to us that personal contacts in the region matter a great deal, as does a continuity of approach.

TABLE 10

Official visits by Heads of State and senior Ministers from the region to the UK since independence

Country	President	Prime Minister(or equivalent)	Foreign Minister	Totals
ARMENIA	2	1	2	5
AZERBAIJAN	4	1	2	7
GEORGIA	1	1	1	3
KAZAKHSTAN	3	2	2	7
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	1	1	1	3
TAJIKISTAN	Nil	1	Nil	1
TURKMENISTAN	2	Nil	1	3
UZBEKISTAN	1	1	4	6
TOTALS	14	8	13	35

Source: FCO, Evidence pp. 82-3, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91 and 92, updated by FCO.

The British Council

168. The Committee has frequently made clear its high regard for the work of the British Council, and its belief in the cost-effectiveness of the informal diplomacy which the Council provides.[397] The new demands placed upon the Council in the region following the break-up of the Soviet Union coincided with a time of financial stringency. This has obliged the Council to set up new operations in the South Caucasus and Central Asia with "no significant additional resources,"[398] instead needing to divert funds from budgets which were hard-pressed elsewhere. This has meant shoestring budgets, and an almost universal failure to meet the potential demand. Even the most generous budget, for Azerbaijan, was regarded as "extremely limited" and in need of significant enhancement by the Anglo Azeri Society.[399] Human rights NGOs, such as LINKS and INTRAC, spoke of a lack of resources resulting in a disappointing British Council presence,[400] and it was instructive to note that the experienced former diplomat Sir Derek Thomas said that he had "no experience of and no perception of" the Council in the region[401]—though there was praise for the work of the Council from the British Consultants Bureau and other commercial organisations like the Independent Power Corporation.[402] Table 11 shows the budget of the Council in 1998-99 in each country, together with the amount of the budget which is met from the Council's grant-in-aid.

TABLE 11

Country budgets of the British Council (£ sterling)

Country	Total Budget	Total grant-in-aid
ARMENIA	10,000	10,000
AZERBAIJAN	556,000	169,000
GEORGIA	85,000	46,000
KAZAKHSTAN	366,000	262,000
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC	40,000	40,000
TAJIKISTAN	Nil	Nil
TURKMENISTAN	15,000	15,000
UZBEKISTAN	429,000	345,000
TOTAL	1,501,000	887,000

Source: The British Council, Evidence p. 121.

169. The British Council identified four programme areas through which it operates in the region. The first of these is to "promote wider and more effective learning of the English language."[403] It was largely through English language training that operations began in the area, and there is an enormous desire to improve English-language skills among the potential opinion-formers of the region.[404] In some countries, such as Azerbaijan, there are major British commercial clients who use the Council to train their workforce and which pay the Council the commercial rate for the job. Elsewhere, English language training is met from British public funds, as in the training of military personnel in Turkmenistan and the South Caucasus.[405] We have no doubt that the English language is a vital asset which British policy should exploit in the region. Those who learn English in a British environment are more likely to be sympathetic to doing business with the United Kingdom, to taking further courses of study in the United Kingdom and to understanding the political culture of the United Kingdom. Oil company witnesses described the "spin-off" and "incredible story of success" of the English language programme run by the Council in Azerbaijan.[406] We were able to see for ourselves the excellent, purpose-built British Council offices in Baku and were impressed with the range of classes and services which they are able to offer there. This could happen elsewhere. Throughout the region, we were made aware of a demand for English language training which the Council could help to fulfil. If they do not meet the demand, other providers will, but other providers may well not be British, and certainly will not have the Council's wider goals. This will be a lost opportunity for British diplomacy.

170. The English language can be seen as the gateway into the other programmes of the Council. These are demonstrating that the United Kingdom is a committed partner in tackling economic and democratic reform agendas; raising awareness of the United Kingdom's creativity, cultural diversity and recent achievements, and promoting the United Kingdom as a leading provider of educational opportunity.[407] In all these fields, much good work has been done. For example, we heard in Kazakhstan of a very successful training course for parliamentary journalists in September 1998, attended by 23 leading Kazakh political journalists. The British Council described a number of other schemes to us—these range from the 91 young professionals from all countries in the region (except Tajikistan) who have been given short-term placements with leading British financial and business sector firms under the Chancellor's Financial Sector Scheme, to a Scottish Festival in Kazakhstan and the administration of British accountancy examinations for over 100 Armenian candidates each year.[408] Again, however, we were made aware of the potential for more work to be done in all these fields. For example, senior Georgian politicians contrasted unfavourably the United Kingdom and Germany in terms of what was done to promote relations in the cultural field.

171. It is instructive to take the concrete examples of Uzbekistan and of Georgia. The Council's budget in Uzbekistan is comparatively large for the region. However, it can be contrasted adversely with the German Goethe-Institut, which we understand to be spending at least £800,000, let alone the US Information service with its $3.5 million budget. The strain on the Council's budget has meant that a joint BBC-British Council project for distance learning of English—which would be welcomed greatly by the Uzbek Government—may not be implemented. This could be a major opportunity lost.

172. The total budget of the Council in Georgia is £95,000 (of which £10,000 is for the Armenian operation). £56,000 of this is grant-in-aid. The council operates in cramped premises on the first floor of a central university building in Tbilisi. There are no lavatory or kitchen facilities. On our visit, the reading room was full, and all the computer terminals were in use. Most of the effort of the committed staff (which includes one English language development officer) is directed towards English language training. For an extra £25,000 we were told that the Council could develop a proper arts programme, give more logistical support to the English language projects, reverse a cut in its library and information budget and make vital improvements in its premises. In terms of the totality of British Council expenditure, let alone the Votes for which the FCO is responsible, this is a very small beer indeed. A senior government source in Georgia warned us of the consequences of a low profile British Council presence—there was little knowledge of the United Kingdom in the country and English language training resulted in an orientation towards the USA.

173. The low budget of the Georgian operation contrasts favourably with other countries in the region. In particular, we single out the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia and Turkmenistan. In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, an information centre was opened in 1997 but closed in March 1999. The centre had comprised one small room, two shelves of books and one member of staff. Although the Council remains active in a number of DFID projects in the Kyrgyz Republic,[409] it is most disappointing that the Council is not able to have a physical presence in the country which has probably made the greatest progress in Central Asia on human rights, freedom of the media and the development of democracy and where the United Kingdom has no Embassy. We understand that the Council's presence in the Kyrgyz Republic is likely to be reviewed at the end of 1999.

174. In Armenia, there has never been a permanent British Council presence, and a derisory £10,000 budget is administered from Tbilisi. We were told by Armenian Government representatives from the President down that a British Council operation was needed and would be greatly appreciated. We were also made well aware of the fact that the United Kingdom was outflanked by France and Germany, let alone the USA, in terms of cultural diplomacy in Armenia. This is particularly regrettable because of the strong sense of linkage between Armenia and the United Kingdom, and the clear awareness among Armenians of British literature and science.[410]

175. In Kazakhstan, the British Council does not at present have any representation in Astana. As Astana develops as the Kazakh political capital, it may well be desirable for the Council to be represented there as well as in Almaty, which is likely to remain the commercial capital for the foreseeable future.

176. In Turkmenistan, we visited the English Language Centre at the Institute of World Languages. The British Embassy had assisted with funding to set up the Centre, together with British companies such as Monument and Laing, and continued to support it. It was well-used and there is obviously demand for English language teaching. English is the third official language of Turkmenistan, although this is largely symbolic at present, and there is certainly scope for a British Council presence in Turkmenistan focussing on language training.

177. We raised with Ms Quin the case for the British Council to have a presence in both Bishkek and Yerevan. She emphasised that decisions about location were matters for the British Council, but she acknowledged that regular meetings were held with the Council.[411] In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, she pointed out that the budget would, in fact, rise despite the closure of the information centre.[412] In the case of Armenia, she accepted the desirability of a British Council presence, and promised that the government "will certainly signal our belief that opening an office and increasing activity in Armenia would be very beneficial."[413] More generally, Ms Pringle told us that the Council were "reviewing their coverage of the whole region right now... they recognise that they would like to be better represented."[414] We have no doubt that the local staff of the Council are eager to take up the opportunities which are ripe for development throughout the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Their problem is one of resources: as the Council points out, "no additional funds were given to the Council for investment in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia by the FCO", and they contrast this with the non-recurrent grant contribution made available in 1990 to establish high-profile English language teaching programmes in Central Europe.[415] The FCO is the principal funder of the British Council, and the Council's priorities are set under the guidance of the FCO. As the FCO itself put it, "the British Council support our interests in the region."[416] The FCO should not will the ends if it is not prepared to provide the means.

178. The Committee was very impressed by the work of the local staff of the British Council in the region. There is much more that could be done. We believe that the South Caucasus and Central Asia are areas which should receive a substantial enhancement of British Council activity. In particular, we believe that there should be a permanent presence in Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Turkmenistan. Such a permanent presence is a resource base on which the Council (and, ultimately, the United Kingdom as a whole) can build. In the absence of an Embassy in Bishkek, a British Council presence in the Kyrgyz Republic is particularly desirable. In the countries of the region where the British Council budget is larger, there should be a willingness to devote resources to any project which is likely to bring the short and long-term dividends which the area so clearly has to offer. If this is not done, opportunities which are likely never to recur will be lost. We recommend that the British Council open offices in Yerevan, Bishkek and Astana, and give consideration to enhancing the work of the English Language Centre in Turkmenistan. In our earlier Report on FCO Resources we recommended an increase in British Council funding.[417] We now recommend that increased funding should include the revenue and capital funding necessary to enable the Council to establish a properly-resourced and permanent presence in Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Turkmenistan.

The BBC World Service

179. The BBC World Service has made a substantial investment in broadcasting to the countries of the region. Each country receives a dedicated broadcasting service, ranging from thirty minutes daily in Turkmenistan to just under four hours daily to Georgia.[418] The World Service broadcasts throughout Central Asia and the South Caucasus on short wave (SW). It currently has arrangements to rebroadcast its programming on medium wave (MW) in Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and on FM in Yerevan, Baku, Tbilisi and Bishkek.[419] Between thirty minutes and two hours of programming is broadcast daily in the Turkic languages of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Azeri and Uzbek, as well as programming for Tajikistan in Persian. In addition to its general broadcasts to the region on short wave in English and Russian, the World Service also provides specially-produced Russian programming and rebroadcasts English programmes on local frequencies. It is able to facilitate contacts between the United Kingdom and the region, and to provide links with other institutions which serve to promote good governance, democratic development and civil society.[420]

180. Our witnesses universally welcomed the involvement of the World Service in the region. Mr Hyman praised the "bold initiative" it had taken to broadcast to the region in many of the local languages of the region in addition to Russian and English.[421] Dr Herzig told us that the broadcasts of the World Service had a particular impact in areas where press freedom was limited or where it was economically difficult to develop an independent media: "many in the region praise the quality and impartiality of the Central Asia service."[422] Mr Sammut said that the World Service had made an "excellent contribution to the flow of information" throughout the South Caucasus, and praised its use of rebroadcasting facilities on medium-wave with local partners.[423] Mr Adams, of Monument Oil and Gas, said that the World Service was "one of the most important things that we do internationally"; President Aliev of Azerbaijan and President Shevardnadze of Georgia were known to listen to it.[424]

181. The World Service does not yet broadcast in Georgian or Armenian. We understand that the decision not to introduce Georgian or Armenian services was made on the assumption that most opinion-formers in those countries speak Russian and have sufficient access to the World Service's broadcasts to the South Caucasus in that language. However, we heard from a number of our witnesses that the use of the Georgian and Armenian languages is on the increase and that Russian is not the language of communication it once was. In the Georgian case this stems from a decision in 1989 to discontinue the teaching of Russian in schools. Dr Herzig and Mr Sammut both told us of the need to expand the language services to include Georgian, and Dr Herzig additionally recommended a further expansion to cover Armenian.[425] We fully recognise the case for this, not least because of the unwelcome message which the World Service risks sending to the region in continuing to broadcast solely in the Russian language.

182. While in principle the decision to provide programming in national languages is to be applauded, we are concerned that in the case of some languages the decision may need reassessment in the light of the development of these languages. Despite the Kazakhstan Government's attempts to promote the usage of spoken Kazakh, we understand that the language of opinion-formers is principally Russian, whereas Kazakh is principally spoken in rural areas where the World Service has little broadcasting reach. If services are to be established in Georgian and Armenian, it is arguable that savings could be made in a reassessment of the World Service's broadcasting needs in other national languages. We believe that in principle the BBC World Service should seek to ensure that World Service programming reaches as wide an audience as possible. To that end we recommend that the World Service establish services in Georgian and Armenian.

183. The quality of the World Service's programming is evident by the attention—not always favourable—paid by governments to its broadcasts. In Uzbekistan a rebroadcasting arrangement with the Ministry of Communications to broadcast World Service programming on a small medium-wave transmitter network was terminated in December 1998, ostensibly because the network was required by the state broadcaster for a new programming strand.[426] World Service programming is now restricted to short-wave transmission, which is far less accessible to the population at large. Nevertheless, many Uzbeks did manage to seek out the World Service reporting of the February bombings in Tashkent.[427] We understand the matter has been repeatedly raised by the Government, and we ourselves raised it with the Uzbek Government when we visited. We recommend that the Government continue to press the Government of Uzbekistan to reinstate BBC World Service access to medium wave transmitting facilities.

184. We were encouraged to note the positive contacts between the World Service and a number of embassies in the region. The World Service told us that the Ambassador in Uzbekistan had worked to support and protect BBC staff in Tashkent and to lobby the Uzbek Government on the rebroadcasting issue. However, we are disturbed to note that there have been few contacts between the World Service and the British Embassies in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Armenia.[428] There is realistically little chance of the World Service being able to operate freely in Turkmenistan. The World Service told us that the licensing environment for radio was unstable in Kazakhstan and that it was difficult to find good rebroadcasting partners. We believe the British Embassy in Almaty could actively assist here.

185. We believe that it is important that World Service programming be as widely received as possible. We recommend that the Government work with the World Service to seek to lift broadcasting restrictions where they exist. We also recommend that the World Service seek to work as closely as possible with Embassies throughout the region in order to secure adequate rebroadcasting facilities.

BBC Monitoring

186. BBC World Service Monitoring has established two information-gathering bureaux in the region: the Central Asia unit, based in Tashkent, was opened in 1994 and the Caucasus unit, based in Baku, in 1997.[429] During our visits we were able to view the work of the Central Asia unit and to meet the director of the Caucasus unit. Both units gather and translate information from public media sources, including the press, news agencies, television, radio and, where available, the Internet. In addition to monitoring media output in the five Central Asian republics, the Central Asia unit also covers relevant media output from Iran. Since April 1998 it has taken on responsibility for monitoring the Afghan media, and scans Taleban and opposition radio broadcasts. The information gathered by regional units is translated and collated before being fed to BBC Monitoring's offices at Caversham Park. From there it is made available to the service's main subscribers, the BBC and the FCO. The material is also accessible via the Parliamentary Intranet and the House of Commons Library. A number of UK-based businesses operating in the region also subscribe. We applaud the timely decision to open BBC World Service monitoring bureaux in Baku and Tashkent. We believe these bureaux are invaluable in providing detailed information from the local media to the Government, the House and the BBC.

383 Evidence p. 80, paragraph 12. Back

384 Appendix 23, Evidence p. 180. Back

385 Q122. Back

386 Q119. Back

387 Appendix 27, Evidence p. 189. Back

388 Appendix 26, Evidence p. 187. Back

389 Appendix 25, Evidence p. 183. Back

390 Appendix 20, Evidence p. 176. Back

391 Q256. Back

392 See Appendix 30, Evidence p. 195. Back

393 Appendix 23, Evidence p. 180. Back

394 Evidence p. 68. Back