APPENDIX 5
Memorandum submitted by Dr John Anderson,
Department of International Relations, University of St Andrews
SECURING STABILITY AND ENCOURAGING LIBERALISATION
IN CENTRAL ASIA
SUMMARY
Broadly speaking I would suggest that Britain
has three broad categories of interests in the five Central Asian
states, two essentially pragmatic in nature and one more idealistic.
The first of these revolve around the question
of economic ties and the potential for British companies to invest
in the region and make the most from the resources of the region.
Most of the discussion here has revolved around energy issues,
and many British companies are already involved in the development
of the oil and gas sector. One might also point to the existence
of an under-employed labour force, already being utilised by German
and South Korean car companies, the possibility of joint ventures
in the agriculture sector, and the possible role of British companies
in developing specialist tourist industries. Most of these issues
will doubtless be presented by more qualified people in other
evidence so I will not discuss this issue here.
The second area on which I would like to focus
relates to the question of regional security. Clearly investment
and economic ties depend to a considerable degree on political
stability and in this section I would like to focus on the threats
to regional security, real and imagined, posed by economic change,
religious extremism, ethnic violence, transnational crime, and
the alienation or displacement of peoples.
The third area relates to the issue of liberalisation.
Whilst full blooded democratisation may be an unrealistic goal
for the foreseeable future, this does not excuse Western governments
from making efforts to soften the region's authoritarian regimes
and promote further liberalisation in those with more open political
orders.
1. ENSURING REGIONAL
STABILITY
Most sources see threats to regional security
coming from a number of sources:
Firstly, one might point to the consequences
of economic changes since the collapse of communism. To varying
degrees all of these countries have experienced a severe economic
downturn with production dropping in most sectors, and the living
standards of all but a minority slashed dramatically. And to some
degree the countries that have been more sympathetic to Western
visions of marketisation have seen the sharpest drops in well
being. Kyrgyzstan, for example, saw GDP drop every year until
1996 when there were some signs of macro-economic stabilisation.
In real terms, however, both agricultural and industrial output
is currently running at about 50 per cent of its 1990 level—though
this is not as low in all sectors of the economy. Though the official
rate of decline is lower in neighbouring Uzbekistan, whose authoritarian
leadership has carried out very little reform, here as elsewhere
most of the population have seen their real incomes drop over
recent years. All of these problems have been exacerbated by other
developments: the growth in levels of corruption and the perception
that a small minority is doing well out of the changes: the inability
of these states to collect all the revenue owed to them; the closure
or "downsizing" of such industries as do exist leading
to unemployment and social deprivation. Though the popular reaction
to some of these problems has been more muted than might have
been expected, in countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
which allow some form of protest there have been demonstrations
and strikes by the "victims" of reform. And in terms
of regional stability fears have been expressed that economic
impoverishment may fuel some of the other threats isolated below.
According to some Central Asian leaders a major
threat to regional stability is posed by Islamic fundamentalism
or religious extremism. When the five states acquired independence
at the end of 1991 this fear was prevalent amongst both Western
and regional commentators, and was reinforced by the civil war
that broke out in Tajikistan during 1992. Though the causes of
that conflict were more complex, it was used in particular by
President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan to justify the repression
of both secular and religious opponents in his own country. During
the mid-1990s the anti-Islamic rhetoric was softened, only to
resurface again from 1997 onwards. Commentators have pointed to
the activities of religious radicals in the Fergana Valley region
of Central Asia, in particular its Uzbek and Kyrgyz parts, and
argued that they pose an increasing danger. Official sources make
much of the occasional discovery of foreign missionaries from
Islamicist organisations in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia who they
argue are leading Central Asian youth astray. In consequence the
last two years have seen frequent meetings of regional security
officials and government ministers responsible for religious affairs
who have sought to develop common strategies in tackling Islamicist
organisations. Though such groups do exist their number is probably
exaggerated and there is little evidence that they pose a real
threat to regional stability at present. And though they have
been blamed for the bomb attack on Karimov in February of this
year, the allegations so far remain unproven. At the same time
this claim has been used to justify repressive attacks on religious
organisations throughout Central Asia, with four of the republic
drafting or adopting more restrictive legislation regulating all
aspects of religious life. Amongst the victims of this turn have
been not only Muslims who dissent from official policies, but
also religious minorities and ethnic communities such as the Uighurs
who are often accused of both separatism and religious extremism.
A third concern arises from the issue of ethnic
and political violence. This in part relates to the question of
borders, with the Soviet division of the region not always coinciding
with ethnic boundaries. For example, in Kyrgyzstan over fourteen
per cent of the population is Uzbek and most of these are located
on territory adjacent to Uzbekistan, whilst across the border
live perhaps 150,000 Kyrgyz. Indeed, at the time of writing this
issue has emerged again with Kyrgyz parliamentarians claiming
that over recent months Uzbekistan has been quietly shifting its
borders and acquiring territory in the south of their country
that was Kyrgyz throughout the post-war years. Alongside divisions
amongst the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, there are the
problems stemming from the presence at the time of independence
of over 12 million Russian speakers brought to the region as a
result of Russian and Soviet conquests and now trying to redefine
their role in the new Central Asia. For many of the latter emigration
has been the response, but for those remaining the situation is
complicated by nation building processes which often appear to
favour the indigenous population in terms of political, economic
and educational advancement. In practice these ethnic issues have
led to less violence than many anticipated in the early 1990s,
but there remain potential flash-points. And in many of these
cases the treatment of minorities ties into the international
relations of the region. In dealing with Slavs the views of Russia
cannot be ignored, whilst China has expressed concerns about the
ability of Uighur nationalists to organise in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
A fourth threat to regional security comes from
the rise of transnational crime, in particular that associated
with the narcotics business. In large part this has its origins
in the Afghan conflict from which derived a regional trade in
both drugs and weapons, and was further exacerbated by the civil
war in Tajikistan. At the same time the trade builds on natural
crops already present in parts of the region, whose farmers have
for many years cultivated cannabis and wild poppies in isolated
valleys. Kyrgyzstan briefly considered legalising production in
the early 1990s, but since then its police and those of its neighbours
have sought to stem the flow of drugs through their country en
route to Russia and Europe. This task has been rendered more problematic
by the impoverishment of the population that has led many to seek
easy money by transporting drugs and made officials prone to corruption.
Equally, influential individuals in most of these countries have
made fortunes out of their involvement in the drug trade.
Finally, one might point to the dangers posed
by the movement of peoples. War in Afghanistan and Tajikistan
have created numerous refugees within the region, whilst impoverishment
within individual countries has increased a trend for people to
move from the rural areas to the cities. The former trend has
imposed additional strains on the receiving states who have to
find housing, employment and education for the incoming refugees.
At the same time both external and internal refugees have often
revealed the limitations of both official and public tolerance.
Settlers from Tajikistan in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan
have been accused of taking homes and jobs from the titular nationalities,
and blamed for rising crime or drug trafficking. Again one should
not overstate the danger posed by this movement. Refugees are
gradually beginning to return to Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and
should some form of peace be maintained in these countries the
recent trickle of refugees to the rest of Central Asia should
not turn into a flood.
Clearly the ability of Western states to help
Central Asia deal with these problems is limited, though they
have an interest in ensuring stability. For this reason small
scale aid to meet specific, often technical, problems is probably
all that is feasible. Short-term economic aid can limit the worst
excesses of marketisation so as to prevent impoverished peoples
turning to radical political alternatives, assuming such really
exist. Western bankers or financial organisations quick to offer
economic remedies could tie investment to welfare by ensuring
some form of retraining or support for those who lose out from
restructuring. Specialist advice on the detection of contraband
might be made available. For example, do European drug agencies
have a solution to the typical Central Asian situation where sniffer
dogs cannot detect drugs half the year round because temperatures
on most of the opium trail are far below zero. Whilst these are
to some extent issues where practical help can be secured through
international agencies, it might also be argued that political
support is also required and this is dealt with below.
ENCOURAGING
LIBERALISATION
Though the rhetoric of democratisation is evident
in the publications of many international organisations dealing
with the region, the underlying assumption of most is that most
are a long way from making series steps in this direction. Here
it is important to be aware of the differing political orders
that co-exist within Central Asia. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
are highly authoritarian states, the former characterised by a
personality cult that contrasts radically with the actual achievements
of its leader. And in Uzbekistan Islam Karimov has used the Islamic
bogey to justify his repression of all opposition. In regard to
both of these states an ethical foreign policy should clearly
focus on a critique of human rights abuses and press for change,
whilst recognising the limitations of Western rhetoric on these
matters. Softening of the regimes appears the best we can hope
for in the short term. In Tajikistan, the emphasis is on rebuilding
both economically, politically and psychologically. Again the
pressure should be for liberalisation, with both regime and Islamic
dominated opposition needing to be reminded of the virtues of
pluralism. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there is some degree
of social pluralism but no real opportunity to overthrow the government
through the ballot box. In these cases the emphasis should be
on encouraging steps to maintain and extend such liberalisation
as has taken place, and to halt the current trend to more restrictive
political practices.
Yest whilst it is easy to offer pious declarations
about human rights and democratisation it is difficult to find
practical ways of making a difference. The general assumption
that in some sense these countries are "not ready" for
democracy has some validity, if all too often used an excuse by
both Central Asia leaders and realists in the West. Two areas
where some difference might be made relate to the question of
civic education and the rule of law, areas with no immediate financial
benefits for Britain but areas where investment may reap benefits
for both the West and the citizens of Central Asia.
In the area of civil education the aim should
be to provide educational and practical measures that reinforce
pluralistic values whilst not seeking to impose Western models
of development in an inappropriate context. Providing politicians
with information and training in party formation, public debate,
administrative skills and so forth can be a two way process rooted
in shared experience. Encouraging NGOs and even the GONGOs (Government
Organised Non-Governmental Organisations) which are typical of
the region can be valuable, again if this is a process taking
into account local sensibilities. A practical example of such
activity might be the various attempts to create shelters for
women subject to domestic violence in Kyrgyzstan. Sensitive to
the charge that Western feminist agendas are being imposed, activists
involved in these projects have tried to tie in their work to
local customs relating to respect for women and given their activities
a specifically Kyrgyz gloss. And whilst many of these programmes
focus on the capital cities and the political elite, it is important
to ensure that civic education is extended to the countryside
and through the educational system. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
there are civic organisations that are carrying out such work
or are capable of doing so, but most need further financial support.
Even in the authoritarian countries it may be possible to promote
such activities through official organisations which though committed
to the retention of centralised political control, are also keen
to be seen utilising civil society discourse. Though the impact
may be unintentional, such activities may also give the first
post-Soviet generation an awareness of alternative ways of managing
political life.
Perhaps even more important, Western or British
agencies could provide support for the rule of law in all spheres.
This might entail sharing the experience of different societies
in creating law-governed states, but it also means finding ways
or reconciling proper regulatory frameworks with the traditions
and customs of the region. In many respects this may be the most
important sphere because a proper rule of law relates has consequences
not just to the sphere of politics and society, but also to the
creation of a reformed economic system, whichever model of development
is preferred. A recent survey of "experts" in Kyrgyzstan
revealed that whilst most believed that human rights provisions
were adequate in the country, only 10 per cent thought that there
existed true equality before the law. Without the evolution of
proper legal systems where courts and judges act independently
of political elites in interpreting the law, the position of the
Central Asian citizen seeking justice and the foreign investor
doing business must remain insecure. So here again the role of
European nations must probably primarily of offering expertise
and demonstrating the experience of other states in developing
the functioning of law governed. This might entail bringing Central
Asian judges and lawyers to Britain, but probably just as importantly
it entails the education of politicians and powerful economic
actors in respect for the law as it is they as much as the court
systems which are at fault here.
In pursuing economic and political programmes
in Central Asia two things are of central importance. Firstly,
sensitivity to the local context, something lacking in many Western
interventions in the region. And secondly, it is important to
find the "right" people with whom "to do business"
in the region. Here it is essential to find people from the region
to brief the committee, people like the Kyrgyz ambassador to London
Roza Otunbaeva who are capable of promoting their countries' interests
and yet standing back and place the region's needs in a wider
context. And I would also suggest if our interests are in part
ethical and idealistic then we should not neglect those countries
that lack rich energy resources such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
March 1999
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