APPENDIX 12
Memorandum submitted by Jonathan Cohen,
Conciliation Resources
1. The dominant images of the Caucasus and
Central Asia in recent years have been conflict, social and economic
disarray and the prospect that the extraction and export of oil
might transform the regions prospects. This memorandum will focus
on the way in which peace and conflict relate to questions of
democratisation and development and how these issues should inform
the pursuit of British interest in the regions concerned. The
focus will be primarily the three countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia, where I have more extensive field experience in initiatives
related to the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the
processes of democratisation. My experience of the Central Asian
states does, however, suggest that although each country has a
specific set of circumstances to confront (as they do in the Transcaucasus
as well) a number of the insights are equally pertinent to Central
Asia. In general it can be commented that although Central Asia
has not suffered the consequences of open warfare (apart from
in Tajikistan), the states face as many if not more challenges
in regard to state and national building compared to the Transcaucasus.
2. In order to assess the FCO's role in
promoting British interests in and relations with the countries
of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, it is necessary to commence
by defining what these interests are and how they should be balanced
with each other. Four broad umbrella areas of interest have to
date been of paramount importance, not just to British policy
in the region, but for Western policy in general:
— the formation of democratic political
institutions as the long-term guarantor of stability and prosperity:
this encompasses the establishment of the rule of law, human rights,
representative and accountable structures of government, a free
media and a healthy civil society;
— the promotion of market economic
reform;
— co-operation and greater integration
of these countries into the Euro-Atlantic and international communities,
as a means to enhance their sovereignty vis-a"-vis Russia,
although at the same time not wanting to jeopardise Russia's integration
into an international co-operation framework; and
— the advancement of responsible security
policies, including on weapons non-proliferation, anti-terrorism,
drug trafficking and in relation to restricting the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism (particularly in Central Asia).
3. This categorisation of interests indicates
an external view of the needs of the area, whereas it is likely
that through a recognition of the interests of the countries themselves,
in terms of state-building proceses, economic insecurities and
social development, the interests of external states will best
be secured. A balance has to be achieved in which the interests
of the States themselves are respected, in which the international
community operates in as consistent a fashion as possible and
the termporary advantage in economic and security terms (that
often distorts the pursuit of longer-term goals of democratistion
and just and sustainable development) is avoided. It is particularly
important that the international community does not resort to
slogans advocating democratisation, human rights, and transparent
elections only to subordinate these to "strategic goals"
be they in regard to the extraction and transportation of oil,
or the containment of Russia.
4. In order to pursue British interest it
is necessary not only to define them further but also to support
a diverse means of engagement. Persistent instability in the region
is unlikely to lead to British military engagement, however it
could demand substantial humanitarian assistance and threaten
further conflict on the borders of Russia, Turkey, Iran and China.
In this light British policy must be oriented to engagement which
will diminish the likelihood of such threats. The FCO requires
the capacity to address these countries in a comprehensive fashion.
Enhancing the presence of British diplomats in the Caspian region
is one necesssary step. However, if British interests are perceived
as the promotion of long-term regional stability and prosperity
through democratisation and economic development, they will have
to be pursued through a wider range of means: the rigorous action
and accountability of international fora in which the UK participates,
such as the OSCE, the EU and various UN agencies; the business
community; and supporting the work of British agencies and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) active in relief, rehabilitation, development,
the promotion of civil society organisations and peacebuilding
activities.
5. This memorandum explores issues relating
to conflict and democratisation, on the basis that the unresolved
conflicts in the region are one of the most serious challenges
to democratisation and economic development. At the same time,
prescient support for democratisation processes can make an important
contribution to the transformation of existing conflicts and the
prevention of potential conflicts in the regions concerned.
6. The societies of the region are only
partially coming to terms with the notion that democracy in multiethnic
societies means participation in decision making by diverse groups,
airing of different views, and potentially greater levels of overt
conflict. Ways in which difference (ethnic or otherwise) is handled
in societies undergoing transition has a significant impact on
whether or not more democratic processes can be consolidated or
subsumed to a persistent authoritarianism. Therefore in supporting
the development of the rule of law it is important that attention
should be paid to developing and institutionalising effective
ways to co-operatively resolve serious difference. This also necessitates
support for institutions and processes, not individual leaders.
7. In Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, state
building has been occurring concurrent with a process of nation
building. The needs of the latter (particularly in Azerbaijan
and Georgia where the very diversity of ethnic affiliations and
identity groups has been a major cause of the current fractured
statehood) have in many ways complicated the coherence of the
former. In terms of establishing a monopoly of the use of force,
generally regarded as a prerequisite for the defence of the realm,
Azerbaijan and Georgia have clearly been deficient. The new states
have not been able to control and administer their given territory—in
addition to the challenges posed to territorial integrity by the
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, the extent
of criminality has also, at times, questioned the reach of state
control. Question marks still loom over the degree to which democratisation
is entrenched: legislatures remain relatively weak and the imposition
and adjudication of law fragile. Governance remains bedevilled
by corruption and malpractice.
Elections have been held for central political
institutions and in some cases for local government, although
they have been flawed. Tampering, as well as outright manipulation,
has ocurred and central authorities have at times been implicated.
Nevertheless, elections and parliamentary processes have generated
a degree of pluralistic political debate and new transparency
within societies.
8. The so-called separatist entities (Abkhazia,
Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia) have entrenched their positions,
working to establish the trappings of statehood, such as parliaments
and presidents—in some cases elected through the ballot
box—flags and anthems. Despite de facto political
sovereignty in no case has there been any de jure recognition
from the international community, which shows no inclination to
change in this matter. The political proceses within each entity
are more restrictive: solidarity has played an important part
in their ability to survive to date, but at the same time this
presents a dilemma for future development. Pluralism, democratisation
and the development of civil societies have been relegated as
lesser goals than survival and political consolidation, however
at some state greater emphasis will have to be given to the type
of societies that are being built, not just to the need to survive.
Despite the appearance of more authoritarian regimes it would
be mistaken to assume that there is no political debate within
these smaller societies. Rather, debate occurs in a more circumscribed
fashion and with the participants aware of the sensitivity of
exposing chinks in their armour to their antagonists.
9. Economic indicators show a development
crisis throughout the region, despite the development of a new
economic elite: radical deindustrialisation, military expenditures
occupying an ever larger share of shrinking budgets, labour productivity
decreasing, unemployment growing, consumption shrinking and swathes
of the population living below the poverty line. In rural areas
monetary economies hardly function. Other indicators are reduced
life expectancy and birth rates. The establishment of currencies,
though still relatively weak, has been considerably more successful
than the ability of states to raise taxes. Indeed the degree of
tax evasion has imposed major contraints on the exercise of economic
policy. The hold of mafia type organisations on business practices
reflects on the market less as a civilising mechanism than as
one generating inequality and quick, but not always clean, wealth.
Certainly the wealth generation that has occurred has not yet
been transferred into reinvestment in the productive capacities
of any of the countries. In the war-torn regions economic reconstruction
has occurred at different rates. The most advanced being Nagorno-Karabakh,
where the existence of a secure border with Armenia, the largesse
of a wealthy diaspora, and the expropriation of as much material
as can be carried from occupied territories in Azerbaijan, has
contributed to renovation of much of the economy. In South Ossetia
links to North Ossetia provide an important outlet, while trade
with Georgia is in fact both a sign of the relative progress in
the peace process as well as a confidence-building measure encouraging
further progress. Abkhazia has faced the most severe economic
challenge: trade restrictions imposed through the CIS, are seen
as sanctions and a blockade from Abkhazia's perspective. While
there is trade with Turkey across the Black Sea, with Russia across
the river Psou and even with Georgia across the Inguri, there
is little productive industry in Abkhazia and much of the agricultural
bounty of what was a supremely fertile region, has gone to waste.
The trade that does exist is either of a subsistence kind or controlled
by mafia-type organisations. The Georgian government sees the
sanctions as the most effective form of leverage it holds against
the Abkhazians, however the effect seems rather more to drive
the Abkhazians further towards Russia (which is far from being
a reliable ally or an economically stable partner for Abkhazia).
The long-term viability of the economies of the conflict-ridden
zones remains questionable, and certainly they are far more distant
from prospects of substantial external investment than those areas
which are more stable or under the sovereignty of internationally
recognised states. Furthermore, isolation in economic as well
as political terms, generates a siege mentality and a degree of
self-reliance that reduces the propensity not only to compromise
but to any form of contact with the antagonists.
10. One of the most active arenas of development
in the Transcaucasian states has been civil society. Although
an ill-defined notion, much emphasis has been placed on its development
by Western donors, perceiving the promotion of civic notions as
being an antidote to ethnic nationalism and a glue to bind together
democratisation. NGOs tend to attract able and bright young people
because they are seen to be realtively "clean". Those
engaged in this field provide good role models and their commitment
to change is respected, therefore acting to attract fresh recruits.
In contrast political actors are all too often seen to be compromised
either by incompetent decision-making or corruption (real or perceived).
Indeed it can be argued that NGOs possess a considerable degree
of moral authority in these circumstances. In Georgia (where the
NGO sector is most developed), a good example is presented of
a vibrant independent sector able to meet some needs not met through
official channels, either because of the dearth of resources,
policy or political constraints. It is already apparent that the
NGO community there has begun to engage in a dialogue with parliamentary
and governmental representatives—providing commentaries
on draft laws and participating in a Consultation Board on NGO
matters with the State Chancellery (although this is at present
regarded as a rather rudimentary body). Such activities indicate
a growing awareness of the roles NGOs can play. There is however
a danger that this authority can give some individuals/organisations
an inflated sense of themselves and their role: despite the proliferation
of NGOs and the extensive sphere of their activities, a number
of caveats still limit their influence in society:
— the development of NGOs is, to varying
degrees throughout the region, stifled by government bureaucracy,
in particular the imposition of excessive registration fees and
burdensome tax policies, although in some countries more active
political obstruction persists (this applies more in Central Asia
than in the Caucasus) since NGOs are considered as oppositional;
— the burgeoning activity of NGOs has
primarily been confined to cities ( and mainly capitals), only
in some instances are activities spreading beyond cities, to towns
and rarely to rural communities.
— NGOs tend to perpetuate their own
constituency: it is important to strengthen this constituency
and give it more credibility, but only few reach beyond this constituency
to work with dispossessed and marginalised groups;
— Perhaps the most significant problem
for NGOs is the extent to which they are not yet rooted in their
own societies: NGOs are sustained due to external financial support
and are dependent on this support. This leaves them vulnerable
to the vagaries of international donors;
— An additional point of vulnerability
relates to the fragility of democratic institutions in general:
those institutions and mechanisms supporting participatory democracy
and the rule of law, despite considerable progress in recent years,
have not yet consolidated democracy in terms of the creation of
a free and open political space. Should there be political reversals,
it is questionable to what extent civil society is entrenched
and able to resist.
11. It is necessary to remain cautious about
the strength of civil society vis-a"-vis the states in the
region, but for the long-term health of political communities,
civil society and the state need to relate not in opposition to
one another but in a partnership which encourages self-reflection
and critical assessments. The international community can play
a role in assisting in this development through financial support,
training programmes (for NGO representatives as well as for officials),
the provisionof scholarships and lobbying to ensure more equitable
legislation and in creating frameworks within which legislation
can be implemented.
12. The past couple of years have also witnessed
the emergence of civil society voices in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh
and South Ossetia, although they are more marginalised and fragile.
It would be a mistake to automatically assume that such civil
society actors are more compromise orientated than political leaders.
Although civil society actors undoubtedly have a peace-building
role to play it is not a straightforward one: in many cases, since
the cease-fires, the space for cross-community peacebuilding has
diminished, marginalised by comprehensive but exclusive official
processes. While civil society roles in cross-conflict initiatives
could be enhanced there is also a crucial role for such actors
to play within their own communities. The experience of Conciliation
Resources, in its work in Abkhazia (in collaboration with United
Nations Volunteers) has primarily focused on assisting the development
of local NGOs, which are gradually grappling with the severe socio-economic
and political consequences of the conflict. The development of
the capacities of civil society actors and their influence on
political life is part of a need to bridge the gap between politics
and important social constituencies in order to broaden discussion
about options within societies confronted by unresolved conflicts.
A major problem is that in both Abkhazia and Georgia, in the process
of conflict resolution, societies and politicians appear divorced
from one another. On the one hand there is little public information
on or understanding of the progress and constraints on negotiations
processes. On the other hand political leaders have not been inclined
to mobilise support for compromises. Furthermore, actors in both
Abkhazia and Georgia base their judgements of the other party
on minimal information and contact, in the post-conflict period.
In this context it is important that the activities of NGO third
parties (such as the Free University, Brussels, the Berghof Centre,
Berlin and International Alert, London) are supported (politically
and financially) since they can contribute a great deal to the
official mediation process facilitated by the UN (Abkhazia) and
the OSCE (Nagorno Karabakh and South Ossetia—in the latter
case there has already been much progress as a result of initiatives
by organisations such as Links and the Conflict Management Group).
13. Conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno Karabakh, which escalated during the Soviet Union's
demise and the immediate post-Soviet era have yet to be resolved.
Furthermore, potential flashpoints for future conflicts exist
throughout the region (the Fergana Valley, intersecting Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan being the most sensitive). These conflicts
should not be reduced to the notion that they are merely ethnic
in character: they were a function of elites and societies grappling
with changing power constellations and access to resources in
the context of a disintegrating empire and were very much political
conflicts over power. Recognising the broader issues behind the
conflicts helps to understand the failure to resolve them to date
as well as the fact that democracy and development in the region
are as yet but a weak insurance against further conflict. Cease-fires
have now held for several years in these conflicts, but unstable
stalemates persist with only limited progress in attempts to negotiate
political settlements. None of the parties to these conflicts
seem inclined towards a renewal of outright war but it would be
premature to say that all have categorically ruled out the prospect
of resolution through military engagement. Constituencies exist,
particularly within the countries more disaffected with the status
quo (Azerbaijan and Georgia), advocating recourse to military
options, but it is hard to envisage that these could be decisive.
14. The role of the Russian Federation remains
critical. Russia's role in the generation and evolution of the
conflicts was complex. Multiple actors and centres of power within
the Russian Federation ensured that Russia frequently managed
to support both protagonists in conflicts. Since brokering cease-fires
in all three conflicts there has been a decline in Russia's capacity
to influence events as the states assert their independence and
become involved in an ever more complex web of bilateral and multilateral
international relations. Furthermore, the resource base for Russia's
own policy is diminishing and the political and economic perils
of Russia's transition experience appear further to limit Russia's
scope for engagement. The distrust which Russia's roles have generated
over time will in itself be an important legacy for how the Transcaucasian
states choose to engage with Russia in the future. Nevertheless,
Russia remains the regional hegemon and will continue to be a
key player with an ability to sabotage if not to resolve the peace
processes, its multiple actors pursuing agendas that are not always
clear or consistent but at times constructive and at times not.
British policy must recognise this contradictory role. Furthermore,
it is critical not to look at the Transcaucasus in isolation from
the North Caucasus, located in the Russian Federation. Chechnia
has been the most significant beacon of instability there, but
it is not alone. Regional stability will require all stakeholders
to be engaged, not leaving some languishing in isolation.
15. Mediating the conflicts has not been
the domain of the Russian Federation alone, and frequently the
lack of co-ordination if not competition between mediators has
been destructive. Despite the attempts of the OSCE to mediate
over Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia; the UN in Abkhazia; considerable
bilateral contact at high levels in the Georgian-South Ossetian
and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts; and the role of second track
initiatives by a range of international NGOs (sometime collaborating
with local NGOs), there has not been substantive progress towards
political settlements. Exchanges of draft proposals and counter-proposals
have rarely been able to address the fundamentals separating parties.
There has been little meaningful trading of benefits and concessions
and as a result the irreconcilability in the public positions
of the parties has not been dented. A question that has to be
addressed is the extent to which the variety of interventions,
or initiatives from internal actors, have engaged with a sufficient
breadth of social constituencies. The societies themselves are
fragmented and therefore bringing the diversity of interests to
the table is both difficult (and maybe not always desireable).
But this makes it necessary for political and civil society actors
(within and outside the societies) to consider the relationships
between negotiations processes and the interests of the communities
that those at the negotiating tables purport to represent, otherwise
any settlement will have a limited duration. the existence of
vested interests (political and economic actors that have benefited
from the conflicts), the lack of trust, the psychological heritage
of separation that is accumulating, and the lack of sufficiently
strong or motivated peace constituencies within societies, make
it difficult to turn war fatigue into peace hunger.
16. The lack of progress on the path towards
settlement leaves the current situation unstable. In addition
to this political uncertainty socio-economic ramifications of
the conflicts that will afflict Caucasian societies for many years
to come, even if political accords can be reached. Throughout
the Transcaucasus over a million people have been displaced as
a result of the conflicts, out of a total population of about
16 million. A cycle of alienation, isolation and marginalisation
scars the lives of whole generations, not just those displaced,
but those living in areas where the social infrastructure has
been unable to cope with the influx of displaced and those living
in areas that are politically isolated. This blight comes not
only at a time in which violence has devastated societies, but
the social fabric has been overwhelmed by the ongoing transition
from communism to democracy and free market capitalism. Tens,
if not hundreds, of thousands of people, far from being integrated
into society are being excluded from progress and displaced people
are prime (though not exclusive) victims of delinquency, unemployment,
criminality, alcoholism and drug related problems.
17. The mass return of displaced people
is not feasible at present due to security concerns and economic
factors and the absence of political agreements. Demands for repatriation
are inextricably linked to prospects for conflict resolution,
but the reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-affected areas
can only be limited without political normalisation. Integrating
displaced within Azerbaijan and Georgia is highly political since
it could intimate that these people will not be returning to their
homes from whence they were displaced. Yet not integrating them
risks their marginalisation in refugee camps and often their exclusion
from elementary social provision in terms of health care and educational
opportunities, as well as from political life. International humanitarian
assistance has been essential in providing a safety net. Agencies
have had to negotiate the dilemma posed by encouraging development
but not advocating integration in a way that could be intepreted
as hindering any prospective return. But such assistance will
not continue in perpetuity. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance
in the isolated separatist entities has been proportionately less
than in the areas receiving displaced despite the fact that the
zones of conflict themselves suffer from extensive social problems.
This isolation also has an impact upon the preparedness of leaders
to engage politically.
18. Resolving conflicts in the Transcaucasus
is not only about mediation or negotiation processes. To talk
in terms of long-term sustainable peace it is necessary to think
about economic development, social justice and democratisation.
If and when peace treaties are signed, with concomitant reconfigurations
of political structures and relationships, the extent to which
populations, which in turn have been mobilised and rendered passive,
will be receptive to likely compromises will be questionable.
Undoubtedly, the political climate throughout the region, including
within the unrecognised entities, has been sobered by the experience
of the past decade, but there have been few signs of statesmanship
or the promotion of reconciliation within societies, let alone
with regard to the so-called enemies. Each region has changed
since the inception of the conflicts, yet none is democracy sufficiently
entrenched to allow the creativity of leadership that might overcome
the ongoing political impasse.
19. A number of challenges will have to
be addressed and preconceptions confronted if the Transcaucasus
is to experience the evolution of coherent political communities,
not characterised by cycles of violent conflict. The reframing
will have to commence with a recognition that resolution is complicated
by conflicting perceptions of political principles, above all
territorial integrity and self-determination. The international
community's predilection for territorial integrity presents the
prospect that the parties that effectively won the wars (particularly
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh) will lose the peace. Either the
international community will have to change its position in regard
to the inviolability of borders, (at present it is regarded that
these can be changed only through non-violent processes or with
mutual consent), or Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia
will persist in their current unrecognised limbo disinclined to
compromises that will circumvent this dilemma, but perpetuating
instability. Whether it is possible to reconceptualise and reinvigorate
perceptions of political relationships in such a way that parties
can be convinced that they have not lost what they fought for
or that security priorities are not compromised, is questionable.
But this will be critical to the achievement of non-violent settlements
that are neither fragile nor short-lived.
20. There is deep fear of federal-type solutions
to the conflicts and yet, with different approaches and commitment,
both Georgia and Azerbaijan have begun to reflect on these as
possible solutions. To an extent this is a case of closing the
barn door after the horse has bolted—federal solutions that
might have interested the "separatist" parties prior
to the outbreak of violent conflicts are now less attractive.
Nor do such proposals address the psychological inheritance of
the wars: generations are coming of age without having known Georgian
or Azeri rule (despite the fact that this was a very different
type of rule, more Soviet than anything else, prior to the conflicts)
and therefore with little inclination to affect compromises that
could reintroduce such political relationships. Indeed the knowledge
of what this rule might constitute is sparse and characterised
by perceptions of undemocratic practices (particularly acute regarding
Azerbaijan) and a continuation of ethnically prejudicial approaches.
In order to overcome this conumdrum a great deal of debate will
be needed—among political elites but also among the broad
populace—about what is really meant by confederal, federal
or autonomous relations, and concerning the political communities
that people aspire to compose. This will have to assume very functional
if not technical aspects about the content of new relationships
in terms of taxation, representation, accountability, economic
activity and development, policing and many other areas. There
is a tremendous need to rethink structures of governance at central
and local levels (and this applies to all states in the region,
regardless of unresolved conflicts). Given the incompetence and
corruption—sometimes perceived and sometimes real—of
so much of the governance in the region this will be no easy task.
Assurances that more nebulous issues, such as identity, and fragile
issues such as security, can be guaranteed, will also prove arduous.
21. The application of power-sharing mechanisms
needs to be tied into the negotiations process so that the parties
are able to become confident that such mechanisms can be used
in their interests, providing guarantees that make them feel secure
rather than threatened. This is of particular importance because
the geography of demographic composition in Georgia and Azerbaijan,
where the existance of compact ethnic communities contiguous with
borders in Javakheti and the Lezgin and Talysh regions, (let alone
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) presents potential
threats to territorial integrity and any steps to devolve power
could precipitate this.
22. Guarantees also need to be found in
regard to issues of human and minority rights, indeed a comprehensive
human rights framework could give parties the confidence to move
towards settlements. These are areas, which in theory tie the
newly emerging states of the Caucasus into a closer web of relations
within Western states, particularly through the OSCE and prospectively
the Council of Europe. To date, however, international standards
have been observed as much in their breach as their application.
If progess towards peace is to be attained the international community
has to ensure that standards do not slip. This is linked to the
question of reinvigorating notions of multi-ethnic and culturally
diverse societies, although it is hard to envisage this ideal
being realised in Nagorno-Karabakh or parts of Abkhazia (particularly
the Ochamchira region), where one can not envisage a comfortable
political cohabitation of Armenians and Azeris or Abkhazians and
Georgians in the near future. Nevertheless, promoting a policy
orientation of inclusiveness as opposed to ethnic exclusivity
(with attendant discrimination) will be an important means to
foster long-term stability and security and convince minorities
of the credibility of new approaches and guarantees. The dilemma
is that States in the region are not being consolidated from an
inclusive perspective that could enable minorities to feel that
their own cultural identity is not being jeopardised while at
the same time promoting the notion of citizenship and national
identity as something distinct from the ethnic identity of the
titular nation.
23. Such a recognition, and the fact that
many communities live completely beyond one another's orbit, poses
difficult questions about prospects for reconciliation, which
will be a component of political settlement in the long run. This
relates to attitudes to justice and the extent to which justice
and reconciliation are requirements for the achievement of political
settlements. Reconciliation is a process comprising activities,
attitudes, mechanisms and the search for new horizons in terms
of interaction between communities and their mutual understanding:
it is a political and a personal process. Politicians assume a
great deal of responsibility in this context: they can choose
to hide behind "public opinion" or they can seek to
influence it. Equally, the media can be instrumental in how it
chooses to depict the "other". It is noticeable that
in the Transcaucasus political leaders have not been inclined
to promote political reconciliation in a sustained way: whether
this is a question of conviction or because they are attempting
to balance competing internal constituencies is difficult to discern.
Nevertheless, this means that political discourse is not receptive
to reconciliation, and this will have an impact on the way in
which societies are able to accept settlements if and when they
are negotiated. Undoubtedly, this impedes the search for durable
resolutions. Part of the reason for this lies in the relationship
of reconciliation to justice and vengeance. The interest of victims
is often in vengeance rather than justice. Justice can best come
within a coherent framework concerning legal procedures and the
exercise of authority. The societies do not deliver this prospect
at present. Attention to justice also promotes the question as
to whether the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and there
were plenty in the Caucasian wars of the 1990s, will be held to
account. If so who will foot the bill and will justice not threaten
the possibility of peaceful resolutions given that many people
who remain important to the resolutions could easily be implicated?
Political debates in the region rarely address such issues.
24. The above reflections indicate how difficult
the search for sustainable peace will be and the likelihood that
it will be a long-term process. Those few civil actors striving
for peaceful solutions require more support and the majority of
the regions' population is grappling with economic hardship rather
than political change. Political debate is often influenced by
expectations that peace and development can be delivered by external
factors—by NATO, Russia, the United States or oil. Undoubtedly
oil is one factor that will lubricate change: inevitably it will
bring more benefits to some than to others. The economic development
that it brings in its wake could be used to mesh together a regional
interdependence that makes conflict resolution worthwhile for
enough actors. But oil and the attendant development and wealth
could also bring as much conflict as harmony. Furthermore, while
it gives the Caucasus a new strategic relevance, this is not as
great as many in the region might think, especially at current
oil prices. The West will continue to be preoccupied with the
Balkans and the Middle East, among other regions, above the Caucasus.
It seems that a future that will encompass settlements to the
unresolved conflicts will therefore require actors in the region
to assume greater responsibility, encouraging the West to play
a role, but not expecting this to be decisive or equitable.
25. Politicians and people need to engage
more thoroughly with: the democratisation of their own societies
(as a real incentive to neighbours and minorities to believe that
they can live together); economic co-operation as an area of dialogue
as well as development; and a reconceptualisation of fundamental
political relationships. Such processes will require time—one
of the factors that has most undermined progress in the past six
years has been the expectation (whether believed or simply used
as political rhetoric) that problems can be resolved quickly.
Turning aside from this might mean that painful realities have
to be faced, especially by displaced populations, but it also
might give political leaders and peace activists the space to
address the issues underlying the conflicts and thus look to the
challenges of the future more creatively. International support—political
and financial, governmental and non-governmental—will be
imperative to sustain regional actors in this process.
March 1999
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