SPANISH PRESSURE ON GIBRALTAR
17. We turn now to examine a number of the areas
in which Spain has exerted pressure on Gibraltar in recent months,
beginning with the fishing dispute which came to a head earlier
this year, and which the Gibraltar Government regards as the source
of the current tension.
18. In 1991 the Gibraltar Legislature passed comprehensive
legislation on the protection of wildlife and nature conservation.
This was entitled the Nature Protection Ordinance.
Article 10 of the Ordinance made it an offence to use a number
of methods for killing or taking wild animals. Under this Article,
it is unlawful to use any "seine or gill net, any pot or
device for raking of sea-bed." Thus, in Gibraltarian waters,
the principal commercial fishing methods are illegal. Gibraltar
itself has no commercial fishing industry and the protection of
its fish stocks is a matter of nature conservation rather than
anything to do with the Common Fisheries Policy of the EU.
Spanish fishing vessels had traditionally fished in moderation
in Gibraltarian waters. After the passing of the 1991 Ordinance,
this fishing was allowed to continue by the Royal Gibraltar Police
(RGP), who sensibly did not apply a policy of zero tolerancethough
there was a willingness by the Spanish vessels to respect the
orders of the Gibraltarian authorities.
19. Beginning in late 1997, and coming to a head
in March 1998, Spanish fishermen entered Gibraltarian waters in
increasing numbers and in larger boats. The RGP recorded 520 occasions
on which Spanish fishing boats entered Gibraltarian waters in
with 141 of them occurring in December alone. This compares with
56 incursions in the whole of 1997. Spanish fishermen also refused
to leave when requested to do so, and refused to recognise the
authority of the RGP.
Their motivation might in part have been because of overfishing
elsewhere, but was also assumed by many in Gibraltar to be a deliberate
statement of the Spanish position on sovereignty. As we have already
mentioned, this position has always been that, under the Treaty
of Utrecht, Gibraltar has no territorial waters.
The view that the fishing incursions were part of an official
Spanish stand on sovereignty is corroborated by evidence which
the RGP have that some of those present on the boats were Spanish
officials, and by the presence of Spanish Guardia Civil and Customs
vessels and helicopters to protect the Spanish boats.
20. A vivid picture of the extent of Spanish incursions
at their worst was given to us by the RGP during our visit. Between
10 and 15 trawlers were involved at any one time, and dangerous
incidents, such as the striking of a RGP launch by a Spanish Customs
helicopter, occurred. Indeed, the RGP was not able to cope by
itself, and, through the Governor, requested the deployment of
the Royal Navy in aid of the civil power. In the event, this deployment
did not occur.
21. Both British officials and Mr Caruana had attempted
to negotiate an end to the incidents. The Chief Minister held
meetings with fishermen's representatives in March and September
1998 "in an attempt to persuade them to return to the status
Similar discussions took place between British and Spanish officials.
On 5 October 1998, the Foreign Secretary discussed the issue with
Señor Matutes in the margins of a meeting at Luxembourg.
An oral agreement was reached. The British and Spanish accounts
differ as to what that oral agreement was. This lack of clarity,
and the subsequent misunderstandings, illustrate the danger of
reaching oral agreements in international disputes. Ms Quin, in
a letter to Mr Caruana,
made it clear that the British Government believed that the agreement
was to return to the situation which had existed before 1998,
and that there had been "no question of HMG negotiating or
reaching an agreement to break or change the laws of Gibraltar."
On the other hand, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
a note on 3 November which claimed that, under certain conditions,
"el compromiso, entendimiento o acuerdo hispano-britanico
alcanzado permite la pesca en las aguas en litigio" (our
translation and emphasis: "the compromise, understanding
or agreement reached between Spain and Britain permits
fishing in the disputed waters"). This version of the agreement,
with the implication that the Nature Protection Ordinance was
being abrogated, was unacceptable to the Gibraltarian Government.
22. When the Gibraltar Government and Mr Caruana
made it plain that they did not believe that Gibraltarian law
had been set aside, the Spanish authorities "persistently
and aggressively blamed [the Chief Minister] for ignoring and
for undermining the "understanding" between London and
What Mr Caruana described as the "nuances and ambiguities"
of the discussions had led to misunderstandings on all sides.
Spanish vessels continued their aggressive fishing, culminating
in the arrest of the 14-man crew of the trawler Pirana
on 27 January 1999.
As a result of this arrest, Spanish fishermen blockaded the frontier
on 29/30 January. On 29 January, the FCO issued a press release
emphasising their version of the October agreement, and calling
for the restoration of the 1991-1997 harmony. The press release
said that "further discussion to clear up areas of misunderstanding,
and local dialogue with the fishermen" would be required.
23. To his credit, Mr Caruana immediately embarked
on this dialogue, and an agreement was reached between him and
the Spanish fishermen's representatives on 3 February 1999.
Essentially, the agreement represented a return to the status
quo. The FCO issued a press release to the effect that the agreement
was "very welcome" and that it had the "strong
support of the British Government and of the Governor."
Once again, however, the central Spanish Government represented
the agreement as an attempt by the Government of Gibraltar to
undermine the agreement reached between the Spanish and British
Governments, and questioned the Gibraltarian Government's competence
to reach such an agreement.
This is part of their long-standing policy of withholding recognition
of the Gibraltarian authoritiesa policy which we will refer
to elsewhere. A Spanish media perception of the situation was
clearly expressed in an editorial in El País on
12 February which commented that "the fact that the United
Kingdom is incapable of applying in Gibraltar the agreements it
has reached with Madrid shows either impotence or bad faith."
In early March, the Spanish Government banned fishing in its own
waters in the area and, since it believes that Gibraltar's waters
are its own, as far as Spanish fishermen are concerned , in Gibraltar's
waters. This ban was imposed for two months, and was imposed for
reasons of conservation. This action temporarily removed any problem.
Mr Caruana told us that he did not believe that the problem would
flare up again, and that, if it did, it would not be the Gibraltarian
side which would be to blame.
24. We believe that Mr Caruana has adopted a sensible
policy with regard to the Spanish fishermen. Local compromise
and co-operation is to be applauded and should be developed in
this and other areas. We hope that the Spanish authorities will
not in the future try to upset the agreement which Mr Caruana
has reached. If they do, however, it will be the responsibility
of the British Government to ensure that the RGP has the proper
resources to ensure that it is able to uphold the law. We understand
that the RGP has approached the United Kingdom and Gibraltar Governments
seeking funding for a new fast patrol vessel, to be used both
for fisheries protection and for the interdiction of smuggling.
We return elsewhere to the issue of this vessel and to the use
of the Royal Navy to support the civil power.
25. There is one important constitutional point to
be made in the context of the fishing dispute. The Commissioner
of the RGP has operational responsibility for the RGP and "exercises
normal policing discretion when taking decisions on operational
matters, on the same lines as Chief Constables in the United Kingdom."
Whatever agreement there may be between the British and Spanish
Governments, or between Mr Caruana and the fishermen, it is for
the Commissioner to decide how to enforce the law. It is wrong
to place a Chief Officer in a position where he is asked to enforce
the law in a way which is politically expedient. Ms Quin told
the House that the Government hoped that the agreement would be
"backed up by legislation in the Gibraltar Assembly."
We agree. We understand Mr Caruana's concern that amending the
law might appear to be capitulation to Spanish pressure,
but we do not believe that this is the case. We hope that the
Government of Gibraltar will seek to amend the Nature Protection
Ordinance so that the informal understanding about the extent
to which it is not to be enforced is given proper legal effect.
26. There is one further point to make in relation
to the Nature Protection Ordinance, so far as it applies to fishing
vessels. In the case of the Pirana, 11 crew members were
convicted of illegal fishing under the Ordinance on 14 April 1999.
It is a normal principle of maritime law that it is the master
of a fishing vessel alone who is arrested for fishing offences.
Because the Nature Protection Ordinance was not drafted with commercial
fishing particularly in mind, no such provision was included.
It may be unnecessarily inflammatory for all those engaged in
fishing to be arrested, and we draw to the attention of the Gibraltarian
Government the possibility that the Nature Protection Ordinance
be amended so that, if a fishing boat is involved, it is the master
of the vessel alone who commits an offence under Article 10.
27. The Spanish Government have regularly applied
pressure on Gibraltar by closing the border or restricting severely
traffic across it. This was what happened after 29 January 1999
when the frontier was entirely blocked as part of the fishing
dispute. Statistics presented by the Gibraltar Government demonstrate
that the daily average border delays for motor vehicles during
the first 28 days of January ranged between zero and one hour,
and averaged just over 20 minutes. Between 29 January and 18 April,
average daily delays were never less than 38 minutes, and were
on a number of occasions over three hours. These statistics have
to be read along with a reduction by up to two thirds in the volume
of traffic. Cumulatively, according to the Gibraltar Government,
the average rate of flow has been 52 vehicles every half hour
compared to a pre-January 1999 figure of 150.
The figures demonstrate some easing through March and April, and
occasional days when the delays returned to the normal levels
of before 29 January.
The severe practical inconveniences were brought home to us in
written evidence from a Church of Scotland Minister with congregations
on both sides of the border.
We ourselves witnessed the delays at the border, and can attest
to the unnecessary discomfort imposed upon residents of Gibraltar,
their Spanish neighbours who gain their livelihood in Gibraltar
and the visitors to the area, many of whom come from other EU
countries. The psychological problem of claustrophobia imposed
upon Gibraltarians was also made very clear to us.
28. Both the British and Gibraltarian Governments
told us of evidence of a reduction in the length of border delays
at times when Spanish workers were crossing the border at the
beginning and end of the working day.
Restrictions have now been placed by the Gibraltarian authorities
on motorcycle and scooter access to the border so that their riders
(who are predominantly local workers) are no lessand no
moreinconvenienced than motorists. The delays are desperately
difficult for the 4000 or so Spanish workers who cross the border.
The British Government drew our attention to the consequent deep
level of local disquiet in Spain, with protests about border delays
having been made to Madrid,
and trade union leaders in Gibraltar told us of the opposition
of their Spanish counterparts to the use of the border as a weapon.
According to a report in El País,
the Spanish union leader Señor Valentín Galcerán
(who represents Spanish workers in Gibraltar) told Señor
Matutes that he feared "total ruin" for the cross-border
work force, who were being used as soldiers in a battle for which
they had not volunteered. Another report
described a demonstration in the Spanish border town of La Linea
against the hardening of controls. Around 5000 people, including
local political leaders took part in this demonstration. This
is hardly surprising, since, according to El País,
"it is calculated that 5000 Spanish families gain their daily
bread on the Rock."
29. Spain is entitled to check the immigration status
of persons arriving from Gibraltar because the United Kingdom
and Gibraltar are outside the Schengen free movement area. In
a letter written by a senior Spanish official,
this is regarded not just as a right, but as an obligation under
EU law. The opt-out Protocol agreed at the time of the Amsterdam
which gives the United Kingdom its border controls, gives reciprocal
rights to other EU countries to exercise identical controls on
persons arriving from the United Kingdom or its external territories,
including Gibraltar. This Protocol only came into force with the
rest of the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May 1999. Opposition politicians
in Gibraltar suggested to us that frontier restrictions imposed
before this date were challengeable under Article 7A of the Treaty
Establishing the European Union. However, the British Government
told us that they did not "consider that the entry into force
of the Protocol will affect [HMG's] ability to challenge Spanish
border control delays."
In any event, the form of passport check between Spain and Gibraltar
should be a "light" one,
no more onerous than that imposed upon those arriving on a British
flight in Malaga or a British ferry in Santander. We return to
Schengen issues later.
30. Spain also has the right in European Union law
to impose a Customs check on persons entering Spain from Gibraltar
because Gibraltar is outside the Community Customs territory.
Again, this is viewed by Spain as not just a right but an obligation
under EU law.
Yet unlike other external borders of the European Union, no red
and green channels are operated at the Spanish/Gibraltarian border,
with every car subject to examination and one channel alone open.
Indeed the Gibraltar Government told us that the restrictions
placed on traffic across the border were not applied by Spain
to traffic arriving from Morocco, either by sea at Algeciras or
by land in Ceuta, though Morocco is outside the European Union
31. The British Government has complained to the
Spanish Government that the frontier delays are "excessive
and unjustifiable." Ms Quin described them as "intolerable."
The Prime Minister has told his Spanish counterpart that the delays
are "unacceptable and unjustifiable".
The Government has also "pressed the European Commission
on the need to remind Spain of her EU obligations for free movement
Ms Quin told us that the Commission has said that "it will
look into the matters" and that they had sought the opinion
She was unwilling, however, to set a deadline for the Commission
to reply. Mr Caruana told us that he had not been able to discern
any action from the Commission, though he referred us to a letter
from the Head of DG XV which promised that they intended to contact
the Spanish authorities in response to complaints from those delayed
at the border.
In reply to supplementary questions from the Committee, the Government
has drawn attention to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227
of the Treaty of Amsterdam which would allow the Spanish Government
to be taken to the European Court of Justice for the obstruction
of free movement across the Gibraltar/Spain border. Essentially
Article 226 procedure gives the European Commission the power
of initiative, while the much more rarely used Article 227 permits
one Member State to act against another.
32. We were made aware of a common feeling in Gibraltar
that the European Commission appeared to be unwilling to mount
a defence of Gibraltarians' EU rights, preferring instead to regard
the matter as one for bilateral resolution between the United
Kingdom and Spain. Ms Quin agreed that the Commission is "often
hesitant" to act in what it sees as a dispute between Member
Although it is the Government's policy to await the outcome of
its representations to the European Commission before it considers
legal action against Spain,
this wait cannot continue. We conclude that the present system
of border controls is unacceptable and wholly inappropriate between
two parts of the EU. The Spanish authorities should immediately
normalise the border regime which they impose. In any event, we
recommend that the British Government should not hesitate to invoke
the procedures allowed under the Treaty of Amsterdam to ensure
that the right of free movement of EU citizens, whether Gibraltarians
or others, is respected. If the Commission is unwilling to take
swift action itself, the British Government should invoke Article
227 against Spain.
33. Our hope that Spain might normalise the border
regime is founded on an expectation that Spain will want to comply
with the letter of EU law, and to act in a manner which is compatible
with EU obligations. However, we also believe that a pragmatic
and non-inflammatory attitude towards the border is likely to
lead to a more trusting attitude towards Spain by Gibraltarians.
Union leaders in Gibraltar, for example, told us that if Spain
had lifted border restrictions after Franco, there might now be
a warmer attitude to Spain in Gibraltar. As it was, what was happening
at the border was simply alienating Gibraltarians further, especially
young people. When the frontier was open, linksincluding
personal links, such as intermarriageincreased. As Ms Quin
commented, "Spanish aspirations to have sovereignty over
Gibraltar could only be realised if the people of Gibraltar wish
that to happen... measures that make the life of Gibraltarians
more difficult are hardly likely to endear them to that approach."
34. The border restrictions which Gibraltar imposes
on those arriving from Spain are entirely in-keeping with Gibraltar's
EU obligations, and we would not wish to see them made commensurate
with those imposed on those travelling in the opposite direction.
There is, however, one change which we believe that the Gibraltarian
authorities might consider. The border fence was originally erected
by the British. Its dismantlement could be a powerful indication
of the British and Gibraltarian attitude towards borders within
the European Union.
35. Gibraltar airport is adjacent to the border with
Spain, and it is common ground that important economic benefits
both to Gibraltar and to the adjacent parts of Spain would flow
from its development.
The precedent of Basel/Mulhouse airport, where passengers can
travel directly to and from either Switzerland or France, demonstrates
a way in which airports at borders can operate to the benefit
of both countries concerned. Instead, however, the airport and
air services have become a tangle of disagreement between London,
Madrid and Gibraltar.
36. The airport is built on the isthmus between the
mainland and the Rock. This is territory which Spain has never
conceded as belonging legitimately to the United Kingdom.
Spain's traditional position has therefore been that Spanish passengers
landing in Gibraltar should not have to pass through United Kingdom
controls, and that flights to Gibraltar from within Spain should
be regarded as domestic flights. Any concessions in these areas
can easily be represented in Gibraltar as a weakening of the British
position on sovereignty.
37. According to the Gibraltarian Government, Spain
first used the EC as a lever against Gibraltar in the context
of the airport.
This was in 1987, when Spain threatened to block the first measure
under the Air Liberalisation Regime. In an attempt to head this
off, the British and Spanish Governments negotiated, as part of
the Brussels Process, a joint declaration on the use of the airport.
Although the declaration specifically said that it was without
prejudice to Spanish and British positions about sovereignty,
it provided for Spanish authorisation of flights from Spain to
Gibraltar and for direct transit to and from a Spanish terminal
for passengers travelling from or to Spain. The declaration was
therefore unacceptable to Mr Bossano, the Leader of the Gibraltar
Socialist Labour Party, who fought and won the 1988 Gibraltarian
elections on this basis. We understand that Mr Bossano remains
opposed to the declaration. Mr Caruana also told us that the 1987
declaration is unacceptable
and this has been the unanimous view of the Gibraltar House of
Assembly since 1988.
The 1987 declaration could only be implemented through Gibraltarian
legislation, and it has therefore never entered into force since
"HMG have made it clear that they cannot implement the joint
declaration against Gibraltar's will."
38. Although subsequent EU legislation has rendered
parts of the 1987 declaration obsolete, the Spanish Government
has insisted that the declaration should be honoured before any
progress can be made.
For this reason, it has used air issues as a bargaining counter.
In several cases, it has threatened to veto EC air services legislation
unless Gibraltar is excluded (or, more properly, unless application
to Gibraltar is suspended).
According to the Gibraltar Government, this policy was initially
limited to measures dealing with access of air services to Gibraltar
airport, but "since 1995, Spain has sought Gibraltar's systematic
exclusion from all directives and regulations howsoever related
to the airport or aviation."
The Gibraltarian Government listed a number of aviation-related
measures where the Spanish have insisted on the exclusion of Gibraltar,
on some of which the British Government had conceded to Spain
because "the interests of Gibraltar are outweighed by the
interests of the UK or the EU as a whole,"
while in others the British Government has refused to accept that
Gibraltar should be excluded. We return later
to a discussion of the appropriate British policy on the exclusion
of Gibraltar from EU legislation, but we note the FCO's refusal
"to accept Spanish demands for the automatic exclusion of
Gibraltar from EU aviation legislation."
39. The FCO drew our attention to even more severe
measures being threatened by Spanish Ministers in the airport
context. Both Señor Matutes and the Spanish Labour Minister,
Señor Pimentel, have suggested that they are contemplating
the banning of civil overflights of Spain by aircraft coming from
or going to Gibraltar.
Military overflights have been banned since 1967a
measure in itself hardly in-keeping with Spain's membership of
NATObut the banning of civil overflights would be a clear
breach of international treaty obligations and, as the FCO put
it, an "extraordinary and unprecedented" act for one
EU state to take against another.
We raised this matter with Ms Quin, who told us that the Government
"would very strongly condemn any such approach" and
"contest it very firmly."
We believe that if Spain were to act in such an unwarranted
manner, proportionate reciprocal measures should be considered
against Spanish aviation interests.
40. The British Government would like "all parties
to look afresh at the [airport] issue in the hope of finding a
way forward which is acceptable to all sides."
Ms Quin referred to the airport as "an area of potential."
We share this view. The ratchetting up of the dispute does nothing
for the people of the area. On the contrary, agreed joint use
of the airport would bring advantages to the whole region, not
just in terms of economic prosperity but in the normalisation
of relations more generally. This point was made to us by the
Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce.
Mr Caruana told us that his Government was "interested in
pursuing ways in which the airport can be commercially exploited
to a greater extent to the benefit both of Gibraltar and the Spanish
hinterland". He did not favour a solution which would allow
two terminals, one on the Spanish side and one on the Gibraltarian
side, because of the implications for sovereignty. However, nor
did he expect Spain to make any concessions in its territorial
claim to the land on which the airport is built. In his words,
"the airport has the potential to provide a breakthrough
in co-operation matters".
So far as the future is concerned, the Gibraltarian side must
be reassured that no concession is made on sovereignty, but they
must recognise that Spain is equally unlikely to abandon its view
that it has legal title to the territory on which the airport
is built. Spain must be forcefully reminded that Gibraltar cannot
in a discriminatory manner be denied its EU rights in the aviation
field, and for them to use aviation as a club with which to beat
Gibraltar has adverse consequences for their own citizens in the
41. The airport is owned by the Royal Air Force and
this gives the British Government a particularly important role
in promoting a new airport agreement. We were assured by the Commander
of British Forces in Gibraltar that this Ministry of Defence (MoD)
interest did not stand in the way of a new airport agreement providing
for joint use between Gibraltar and Spain. We would also welcome
positive measures by the MoD to develop the airport. We heard
suggestions in Gibraltar that charges imposed by the MoD are discouraging
development at present. Mr Caruana described the landing changes
as "disproportionately high".
We took this matter up with the Commander of the British Forces
in Gibraltar, who explained that the MoD was obliged to recover
the costs of supporting commercial operations by the carriers
who fly into Gibraltar, but did not impose higher charges than
those in, for example, Jersey and Guernsey. Reductions were also
offered to encourage new carriers. We believe that lower charges
in Gibraltar might encourage more carriers to use the airport
facilities. They would thereby bring more revenue to the MoD to
the mutual benefit of the MoD and Gibraltar. We conclude that
there is great potential in the development of the airport in
a way which would assist both Spain and Gibraltar. This is an
area where real progress can be made. We recommend that the British
Government take advantage of its ownership of the airport to facilitate
a new agreement for the joint use of Gibraltar airport.
42. As well as imposing restrictions at the border
and in respect of air communications, Spain does not permit any
sea ferry crossing from Spain to Gibraltar. As one of our witnesses
put it, "routes from Algeciras, Sotogrande and Puerto Banus
would benefit everyone."
Commercial considerations alone should determine which transport
links are to exist inside the European Union. Sea ferry crossings
to Gibraltar should be allowed if the business is available to
make them viablethough this depends on no excessive restrictions
on transit being put in place by Spain. We understand that the
then British Government referred this issue to the European Commission
in 1991, but that the Commission rejected the British argument
on the grounds that the Spanish Government was entitled to place
restrictions on its own nationals.
If a cross-border element were to be involved, then a case could
be taken to the European Court of Justice, but we understand that
there is, at present, no potential non-Spanish operator. We
recommend that the Government give the fullest legal support to
any Gibraltarian (or other non-Spanish) operator who wishes to
re-establish a ferry crossing between Gibraltar and Spain.
21 Ev. p. 32, para. 1. Back
Ordinance No.11 of 1991. Back
Ev. p. 4, para. 35. Back
Ev. p. 32, para. 2. Back
HC Deb 19 January 1999 c. 437 Back
Ev. p. 5, para. 37; p. 32, para. 3. Back
HMG para. 2-Spain made this point in a Declaration it made when
in 1984 it ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Back
Ev. p. 33, para. 5. Back
Ev. p. 32, para. 4. Back
Ev. p. 5, para. 38. Back
The full text of this letter is reproduced in Ev. pp. 49-50, Appendix
Ev. p. 33, para. 8. Back
The case against the fishermen was decided on 14 April 1999. Back
Ev. p. 51, Appendix 3. Back
Ev. pp. 52-3, Appendix 4. Back
Ev. p. 53, Appendix 5. Back
Ev. p. 33, para. 11. Back
See para. 96. Back
Ev. p. 13, para. 10. Back
HC Deb 11 February 1999 c. 469. Back
Ev. pp. 33-34 and 53-60, paras. 13-16 and Appendix 6. Back
Ev. p. 97 (Appendix 15). Back
Ev. p. 5, para. 44; p. 34, para. 16. Back
We understand that the official figures of less than 2000 may
be an underestimate. Back
Ev. p. 5, para. 46. Back
20 February 1999. Back
4 March 1999. Back
Ev. p. 78. Back
Protocol on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 7A of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom
and to Ireland. Back
Ev. p. 11, para. 3. Back
Ev. p. 5, para. 43. Back
See paras. 78ff. Back
Ev. p. 78. Back
Ev. p. 34, para. 17. Back
HC Deb 15 March col. 441. Back
Ev. p. 5, para. 45. Back
QQ16, 20-21. Back
HC Deb 22 February c. 196. Back
Ev. p. 2, para. 8. Back
Ev. p. 44, para. 97.1. Back
Reproduced in Appendix 2 to the Report. Back
Footnote to Q224. Back
Ev. p. 4, para. 31. Back
Ev. p. 4, para. 32; p. 44, para. 97.1. Back
Ev. p. 43, para. 97.4. Back
Ev. p. 43, para. 97.7. Back
See para. 72. Back
Ev. p. 6, para. 51. Back
Ev. p. 6, para. 58. Back
HC Deb 26 March 1988 c. 433. Back
Ev. p. 7, para. 59. Back
QQ51 and 57. Back
Ev. p. 4, para. 32. Back
Ev. p. 104 (Appendix 22). Back
Ev. p. 108, para. 12. Back
Ev. p. 112. Back