Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220 - 234)

TUESDAY 20 APRIL 1999

THE HON PETER CARUANA, QC, MR ERNEST MONTADO and MR ALBERT POGGIO, MBE

  220.  The airport has achieved a particular significance. I want to check with you how you see we can make progress building on that agreement?
  (Mr Caruana)  Yes. The one sentence that I was going to add just before answering your question was the principal confidence building measure now required is the frontier, in other words to come to Gibraltar, which already opens its economy and moots with us other confidence building measures when Madrid is in effect pursuing a frontier regime calculated to bring our economy to its knees is not starting at a starting point.

  221.  Come back to the question.
  (Mr Caruana)  All that said, the 1987 airport agreement is not acceptable in Gibraltar because it brings into question ownership and control over the airport, in other words it raises sovereignty issues.

  222.  But it was acceptable to the then government in 1987?
  (Mr Caruana)  It was not acceptable, it was accepted under some pressure and reluctantly but it was certainly not acceptable in the sense that they found it unobjectionable.

  223.  But it was accepted.
  (Mr Caruana)  It was acquiesced to. By the previous government presumably you mean Sir Joshua Hassan's last government not the immediate predecessor.

  224.  By Sir Joshua.
  (Mr Caruana)  Yes. It is not acceptable now and has not been acceptable in Gibraltar since. Indeed the British Government did not force it on Gibraltar, the British Government in effect gave Gibraltar the option in terms which we found unfair but did not force the airport agreement on Gibraltar. Our position on the airport agreement as a Government now, certainly whether or not it was acceptable to some previous government, is not really the issue. I think our position at the moment is—and it is in our manifesto again and I have made many public statements to this effect both in and outside Spain—that the Government of Gibraltar is interested in pursuing ways in which the airport can be commercially exploited to a greater extent to the benefit both of Gibraltar and the Spanish hinterland. In other words, we are very happy to do a commercially orientated arrangement for the enhanced use of the airport that makes it valuable as an economic asset, not just to Gibraltar but to the Spanish hinterland as well.[2]

  225.  Back to the question, do you see a position at which it will be acceptable to the citizens of Gibraltar that those arriving at the airport step out on one side in Gibraltar and on the other side into Spain?
  (Mr Caruana)  I think it might be acceptable if it were achieved in ways which placed no question mark whatsoever over the fact that the airport was situated on British sovereign territory. Therefore the issue is not so much whether people pass under a tunnel or not but the terms and circumstances in which they pass under that tunnel. It is possible, quite easily I would have thought, to contrive of a situation in which that happens without it putting into question British sovereignty, jurisdiction and control over the airport and the territory on which it is built. That said, I ought to just also mention to you that the Government of Gibraltar also objects to what is sometimes called the Two Terminal Solution. In other words, one thing might be access into Spain through a tunnel, having passed through a terminal that is situated in Gibraltar, even if it is without Customs and Immigration control, as happens in Basle Airport for example, and another thing would be questions that raise doubt on this being a British sovereign airport. Yes, the answer to your question is it is not inconceivable but it would have to be done in a politically, which means sovereignty, safe way for Gibraltar and there are other objections, there are other issues which would need to be saved, the fact that we would not want one terminal on the Spanish side and another terminal on the Gibraltar side with a shared runway. What we would like is an airport in Gibraltar, exploited at a commercial level and with any number of facilities, perhaps of the sort that you have mentioned, provided they are achieved in a politically safe manner, which allows the airport to be used as an economic asset for the benefit of the whole region and not just Gibraltar.

  226.  That practical economically beneficial response could also involve Spain, of course, not abandoning its own claim to the airport?
  (Mr Caruana)  Absolutely. Our approach to the unblocking of the airport impasse would be based on the status quo being maintained. The maintenance of the status quo includes the fact that Spain has a sovereignty claim to the territory, a claim with which we do not agree but so long as we are not being made to make political concessions, nor do we expect Spain to make political concessions either, we would like to find a way of achieving this which leaves everybody's political interests saved whilst allowing the asset to be at a more commercial level exploited to greater value.

Mr Illsley

  227.  Is not the sovereignty of the airport to some extent established by the fact that it is owned by the Ministry of Defence? There is a military aspect here because of the strategic position of Gibraltar, especially at the present time where ships are being refitted and any ship travelling through the Gulf can be refitted by air from a direct flight from here to Gibraltar. Does that not give you any reassurance as to the sovereignty of the airport?
  (Mr Caruana)  Not in itself. There are different views expressed at different times about the continuing importance of that airport to the RAF. I think now it would be argued that it is important, in another moment in time perhaps the argument might change. The issue of the sovereignty of the territory on which the airport is built is not questioned by anybody except Spain. It is not in dispute as far as Britain is concerned, it is not in dispute as far as Gibraltar is concerned. What we have is a Spanish claim to the sovereignty of the place. We would be very happy to pursue an airport, I agree with what the essence of the Chairman's question is, the airport has the potential to provide a breakthrough in co-operation matters. We would want to be very careful that it was not used for that purpose in a way which prejudiced enduring British sovereignty and control over the airport.

Chairman

  228.  That is understood.
  (Mr Caruana)  Certainly the fact that it is a British military facility adds to the physical manifestations of that British sovereignty.

  229.  And as a reassurance to you.
  (Mr Caruana)  And as a reassurance but by itself would not be sufficient if there were political question marks here.

Mr Mackinlay

  230.  The airport, a commercial question, it is owned by the Ministry of Defence and its charges, Ministry of Defence charges, are disproportionately high, are they not, therefore dissuading probably other carriers to come in for tourism. Would you amplify on that?
  (Mr Caruana)  Yes, indeed. We have a situation where the Ministry of Defence pays for the running of the airfield, obviously we pay for the running of the terminal services, terminal building and all services within the terminal, but the Ministry of Defence pays for the airfield facilities, the maintenance of the strip itself, the safety measures, the air traffic control, the Met Office, all that sort of thing is paid for by the RAF, Ministry of Defence, as part of their defence budget for Gibraltar. The civilian airliners that use Gibraltar pay the Ministry of Defence landing charges, as they would any other airport operator. Those landing charges are disproportionately high compared with nearby airports and this is not a disincentive because there is still business to be done but it makes the economics of operating a service to Gibraltar much more difficult than to other airports in the facility. This is very much an issue which the commercial airlines are raising constantly with the Ministry of Defence, the extent to which the airport charges are disproportionate, too expensive, render some of their services unviable, particularly the ones not at peak periods and not at peak seasons. We ourselves engage the Ministry of Defence in dialogue on that basis to see the extent to which it might not suit the Ministry of Defence, even as a revenue raising measure, to lower the charges in the hope of getting more revenue from increased volumes, albeit that each operator is paying less per flight.

  231.  Let us have no ambiguity about that, your view is that there is probably a case for the Ministry of Defence to have a net increase in their return if they contemplate lowering the charges?
  (Mr Caruana)  I believe that it would be possible to achieve that situation indeed.

Mr Wilshire

  232.  Chief Minister, very, very briefly as a footnote, on the day that we were with you the White Paper was published on Britain's remaining dependent territories. Clearly at that stage none of us had a chance to digest it. I just wonder as a separate issue whether now you have had a chance to digest it there are any issues raised in that which concern you not in relation to what we have been talking to you about this morning but assuming the status quo were to continue is there anything you would like to tell us about your reactions to the White Paper?
  (Mr Caruana)  Yes, thank you for that opportunity, Mr Wilshire. We are of course preparing a response to the White Paper which we will submit to the Foreign Secretary in due course and I will be very happy to send it to the Committee and all of its Members.

Chairman

  233.  Thank you.
  (Mr Caruana)  In terms of the sections of the report that relate to good governance and the financial services centre, I think that the position of Gibraltar is that we match already, and in many cases we exceed, the requirements or the agenda as set out in the White Paper. There are aspects of the White Paper which are very disappointing. It speaks of modernisation of the partnership, it talks of modernisation of the relationship and then it really only enumerates things that the United Kingdom wishes to see done. I do not see that it is not right that the United Kingdom should wish to see those things done but we will be arguing with the Foreign Office and with the Foreign Secretary that part of that modernisation of the partnership, as well as being an opportunity for the United Kingdom to see some of the things done differently from how they had been done in the territory in the past, is a legitimate agenda for a British Government, but the other side of that coin is indeed our constitutional modernisation agenda where if there is going to be a genuine modern partnership the United Kingdom has got to be willing in our case to listen to our constitutional reform and constitutional modernisation provisions. Obviously it is disappointing that again there has been a repetition of the statement that the United Kingdom does not think that integration is a preferable option to any of the dependent territories. Speaking only for myself I have already said that it is regrettable and disappointing that as an option it has once again been declined. For the rest of the document, we are concerned about aspects of it. So that, for example, the whole area of tax issues I think is misplaced here. The fact that the United Kingdom has an agenda within the European Union or within the OECD to eliminate what it calls harmful tax practices, in other words offshore financial service centre practices, I believe it is inappropriate to use a document of this sort to further that agenda which has got very little to do with the interests of the overseas territories and indeed that agenda operates against the economic interests of many of the overseas territories. There is a curious provision in the White Paper where it talks about the borrowing powers of Section 5(15). The document rightly talks about the need for HMG to make sure that there is a ceiling on borrowing so that dependent territories do not go off and borrow more than they can afford, and indeed we do not have that problem in Gibraltar, it is different from the position in all the other dependent territories. We have had a Borrowing Powers Ordinance for many, many years now which has capped our borrowing powers. I think they are capped at £100 million. So we have already got that. Then it goes on to say at paragraph 5(15)—and I do not want to get anecdotal—"In general borrowing should only be considered for discrete capital investment projects. It should be restricted to investments which have a calculable and reasonably certain financial and economic rate of return" and then it goes on and it says: "... and in principle projects with social objectives and no financial return should be financed from recurrent budget surpluses". If that means what I think it means in the English language, that dependent territory governments, even if they can afford the repayments cannot borrow to build a school or to build a new hospital because those are social projects without an economic return, then I think this is a classical case of "do as I say and not as I do".

  234.  Chief Minister, you have given us a flavour of that response. Mr Wilshire gave you the opportunity to do that. I would like to give you, finally, another opportunity, this time in terms of the opinion in Spain. We know that all Spanish parties assert the sovereignty of Spain over Gibraltar but there are different tendencies. Mr Matutes has been somewhat hawkish. Sr Estrella has been rather more reconciliatory. He has visited Gibraltar, he has published a document suggesting that the issue of sovereignty be frozen, rather as we dealt with Argentina and the Falklands, and that we should seek to make progress for the mutual benefit of Gibraltar and of the hinterland as far as possible. What can you tell us about your response to Sr Estrella?
  (Mr Caruana)  I think that his approach has much to commend it. Indeed, it is entirely compatible with our approach which is "Look, sovereignty is an intractable problem, there isn't going to be any progress on it. Let's freeze it, let's leave it on one side. Let's engage in dialogue, let's engage in bridge-building and let's see what can or cannot be achieved leaving sovereignty to one side." I believe that that is an enlightened, constructive approach. I believe that the official Spanish policy towards Gibraltar is predicated on the belief that they think that if they put enough pressure on the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom will ultimately cave in. I suspect that in Madrid they have the view that one day a British Government is going to get out of bed and say, "Enough is enough, let's do a sovereignty deal", because there is no other explanation for pursuing a policy which is calculated increasingly to put distance between the Gibraltarians and the Spaniards; their policies are counterproductive in their effect. Unless Spain believes that she can make the United Kingdom hand Gibraltar to Spain, contrary to the wishes of the people of Gibraltar, there would seem to me to be no alternative but to engage in a more constructive policy of dialogue and bridge-building and trying to eliminate the tensions which have historically characterised the relations, so that future generations can address this issue in whatever new light and new spirit is then prevailing.

Chairman:  Chief Minister, that is a helpful, constructive, indeed enlightened reply. We thank you for that and for your evidence.

  


2   Note from Mr Montado: I have first hand knowledge of Sir Joshua's stance over the Airport Agreement having taken up my current post some months before the Agreement was negotiated and signed. Sir Joshua was not a party to the final negotiations over the Agreement. When the Agreement was signed and announced in December 1987 he took the view that it needed to be clarified and studied. He welcomed the fact that the Agreement itself stated that it could only be implemented if the Gibraltar House of Assembly passed the necessary legislation to give it effect (namely changes relating to Customs and immigration controls). Sir Joshua resigned as Chief Minister shortly after for reasons unrelated to that Agreement and a General Election was held in March 1988 when a new Administration took office. Shortly after that, the House of Assembly (with Sir Joshua's party by then in Opposition) unanimously passed a motion rejecting the Airport Agreement. The House of Assembly has been unanimous in maintaining that position since 1988. Back


 
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