IV THE FOOD STANDARDS
AGENCY AND MAFF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
42. Under the existing arrangements, four Executive
Agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food have
separate responsibilities for administering policy on the registration
and approval of pesticides; the registration and approval of veterinary
medicines; the enforcement of meat hygiene; and the enforcement
of dairy hygiene. These Executive Agencies are, respectively,
the Pesticides Safety Directorate (advice to Ministers on the
approval of new products is made by the Advisory Committee on
Pesticides, (ACP)); the Veterinary Medicines Directorate (the
Veterinary Products Committee (VPC) advises Ministers on the safety,
quality and efficacy of new veterinary medicinal products); the
Meat Hygiene Service; and the Farming and Rural Conservation Agency.
The draft Bill sets out a number of proposals which modify these
arrangements, as follows.
The Pesticides Safety Directorate and the Veterinary
Medicines Directorate
43. In essence, the draft Bill proposes that both
the PSD and the VMD remain MAFF Executive Agencies, whilst granting
certain powers to the Food Standards Agency to intervene in the
registration and approvals process applying to pesticides and
veterinary medicines. Under Schedule 2, paragraph 8(2), the Agency
has the right to nominate a representative to the Advisory Committee
on Pesticides. Ms Jill Wordley from the Joint Food Standards and
Safety Group assured us that this power would give the Agency
"an effective veto" over the pesticides approval process
should such action be deemed necessary, as any decision taken
by the ACP has to be made on an unanimity rather than a majority
basis.[75]
The Agency is similarly empowered under Schedule 2, paragraph
9(6) to appoint a nominee to the Veterinary Products Committee.
44. It is also expected that the Agency will exercise
its right under paragraph 9 of Part II of Schedule 2 to the draft
Bill to appoint advisers on food safety issues to both the ACP
and the VPC.[76]
Furthermore, the PSD will be required to consult with the Agency
on pesticides registration; the approval and suspension of pesticides
products; and on the criteria under which the approvals process
proceeds.[77]
The draft Bill places an analogous responsibility on MAFF to consult
with the Agency on matters relating to the regulation of veterinary
products, and for the Ministry to make available to the Agency
all relevant information pertaining to veterinary medicines.[78]
Under Clause 10, the Agency can also place any advice made to
the Government on pesticides and veterinary medicines in the public
domain if it deems it necessary.
45. Generally, we are satisfied with the draft Bill's
provisions relating to the PSD and the VMD. While the Ministry
retains overall responsibility for the regulation of pesticides
and veterinary products and for the enforcement of legislation
concerning their use, there are clear organisational divisions
in these responsibilities consequent on the VMD and the PSD having
the status of Executive Agencies. We are not completely satisfied
that the draft Bill provides the Agency with sufficient scope
to intervene in the pesticides and veterinary medicines regulatory
process. The PSD and VMD should be required to submit a food safety
impact study to the Agency for approval as part of the regulatory
process. We remain concerned that the Agency has no direct role
in monitoring the impact of pesticides and veterinary medicines
after their introduction.
The Meat Hygiene Service and the Farming and Rural
Conservation Agency
46. Part I of Schedule 2 and paragraph 5 of Schedule
3 to the draft Bill allow for the transfer of statutory responsibility
for meat and dairy hygiene, currently exercised by the Minister
for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food under the Food Safety Act
1990, to the Agency, and grant the Agency powers as an enforcement
body under Section 6 of this Act. As there appears to be no provision
in the existing text for modifying or extending MAFF's statutory
responsibilities in this area, the Agency will in effect assume
responsibility for the Ministry's Executive Agency discharging
enforcement duties, the Meat Hygiene Service. However, based on
the contents of the draft Bill, it is unclear to us precisely
what the Government's intentions are regarding the MHS. Responding
to a recent parliamentary question, the Minister for Food Safety
suggested that the Farming and Rural Conservation Agency, which
currently has responsibility for enforcing dairy hygiene regulations,
will retain this duty, but henceforth will be answerable to the
Food Standards Agency in this particular area rather than to MAFF.[79]
The Farming and Rural Conservation Agency discharges a range of
other agricultural duties, and in all other respects it would
appear that the FRCA will remain a MAFF Executive Agency.
47. We have a number of reservations on the proposed
arrangements for the MHS, as set out in the draft Bill. First,
we are concerned that the Agency will hold responsibility for
both regulatory and enforcement functions in the sphere of meat
hygiene, at a time when significant administrative reorganisation
is being undertaken which permits these duties to be separated.
Secondly, we consider that there is the possibility that the public
perception of the Agency as an impartial meat hygiene standards
regulator will be compromised, as under the draft Bill's provisions
it is likely that the MHS will be incorporated into the Agency,
becoming its single most important component. This, we foresee,
will be particularly significant when the first food pathogen
outbreak emerges which is directly linked to a lapse in meat hygiene
standards. Thirdly we are unsatisfied with the draft Bill's failure
to identify clear and independent monitoring and auditing systems
for the Agency's own activities in this regard We examine these
issues in the following paragraphs.
48. The transfer of responsibility for the MHS from
MAFF to the Agency raises once again the question of whether a
single organisational structure should exercise responsibility
for policy regulation and policy enforcement. While this question
has some similarities to that posed by MAFF's retaining overall
responsibility for the VMD and the PSD, the draft Bill does not
specify the precise organisational status which the MHS will have
in relation to the Agency. We would prefer much greater clarity
in the final Bill on the organisational relationship between the
Agency and the MHS. For example, will the MHS enjoy status similar
to that of a Departmental Executive Agency, or will it be incorporated
within the Agency, as the draft Bill seems to suggest? We are
concerned that the MHS's incorporation into the Agency could undermine
its public image as an independent and impartial arbiter of meat
hygiene standards, particularly when the size of the MHS relative
to the rest of the Agency is taken into account. At present, the
Meat Hygiene Service employs some 1,700 staff, chiefly meat inspectors,
and has an annual budget of £53 million.[80]
In comparison, it is unlikely that the Agency will have more than
around 450 staff in total.[81]
49. On the grounds of public accountability and in
the interests of transparency of policy making, our view is that,
ideally, organisations should not be placed in the invidious position
of having dual responsibility for formulating policy and enforcing
it. Mr Keith Cull of LACOTS (Local Authority Co-ordinating body
on Food and Trading Standards) concurred with our opinion in commenting
to us that "personally I have always thought that one model
for an agency is to be the standard setter and monitor...with
all its powers in the Bill to take action where [enforcement bodies
do] not deliver is the right sort of relationship to have".[82]
Our opinion is that the creation of a new Agency provides a perfect
opportunity to disentangle regulatory and enforcement responsibilities,
thereby establishing a greater degree of public accountability
in policy making than has hitherto been possible. If responsibility
for the formulation and enforcement of meat hygiene is not clearly
defined and separated within the Agency, our fear is that a serious
food pathogen outbreak arising from meat would not only tarnish
the MHS's reputation, but might also have serious repercussions
for the Agency.
Monitoring and enforcement of the FSA's own activities
50. In assessing the likely problems which might
confront the Agency if the MHS is incorporated into it, we paid
particular attention in our deliberations to the surveillance
procedures which the Agency would have at its disposal for monitoring
its own activities, including those carried out by the MHS. Ms
Jill Wordley of the Joint Food Standards and Safety Group told
us that powers provided under Clause 14, subsection (5), would
require the Agency to be fully accountable for its own actions,
chiefly through their declaration as part of its Annual Report
to Parliament.[83]
However, the wording of this clause makes no mention of the mechanisms
which will be used to monitor the Agency's own activities. Furthermore,
in our opinion this clause should reflect the need for monitoring
to be executed in a genuinely objective and impartial manner,
and should specify which body will have responsibility for this
duty. Our view is that such activities should be discharged by
an independent audit body. Only then will the public be reassured
that the Agency's monitoring and auditing systems aim to drive
up meat hygiene standards across the industry, rather than colluding
in maintaining existing standards. We feel that on balance
the best interests of the public would be served by retaining
the management of the MHS outside the Agency. If the Government
does not accept this recommendation, then the onus is on the Government
to establish a structure which clearly separates these powers
within the Agency. The Agency should also be subjected to
independent review two years after its establishment, with the
aim of assessing the practicality of working arrangements between
the Agency and the MHS, the effectiveness of the Agency in raising
meat hygiene standards, and the objectivity with which these standards
are enforced by the MHS.
75 Q.488. Back
76 See
Explanatory notes, Part II, para 8, subpara 2. Back
77 Part
II, para 9, subpara 5. Back
78 Part
II, para 8; Clause 27, subsections (1) and (3). Back
79 HC
Deb, 8 February 1999, c.101. Back
80 HC
Deb. 24 February 1999, c.334. Back
81 Q.759. Back
82 Q.916. Back
83 Q.838. Back
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