Select Committee on Home Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 40 - 59)

TUESDAY 2 MARCH 1999

MR DAVID BICKFORD, CB

  40. So where has the difference come, then? It is what one is suspected of doing?
  (Mr Bickford) If you look at the definition of "subversion" in the Security Service Act, if you fell within that definition then you would be someone who might be investigated, but you would definitely have to fall within that definition.

  41. This is what I am exactly trying to establish. It is not merely the membership of an organisation, but that may lead to an interest?
  (Mr Bickford) That may lead to an interest.

  42. But it has got to then be—
  (Mr Bickford) Yes.

Mr Winnick

  43. There was a television programme a few years back made with the active assistance of a former MI5 officer. That did not give the impression of that impartiality which all of us would like to see, where genuinely subversive elements would in fact be targeted, namely those who want to undermine and destroy our democratic system. That programme caused quite a number of alarm bells to ring, certainly amongst people like myself. Perhaps you remember the programme.
  (Mr Bickford) Yes, I do.

  Mr Winnick: Do you think there was any substance to that lady's allegations?

Chairman

  44. Who are we speaking about? Cathy Massiter?
  (Mr Bickford) Yes.

Mr Winnick

  45. No-one has questioned her integrity as far as I know and she made some pretty sharp criticisms of the way in which CND was being targeted, tittle-tattle about private lives of leading CND people, Bruce Kent and others, which did not seem to me to be really the task of MI5.
  (Mr Bickford) Of course not. I agree. I must say that I did not really see the substance in Kathy Massiter's allegations actually being evident within the Security Service at the time.

Chairman

  46. We are talking about slightly different periods here, are we not? She was gone by the time you arrived by several years.
  (Mr Bickford) Yes, but I obviously had access to the information. I came in 1987, so allegations before that are something that I would not like to deal with here because I might mislead you. What I am giving to you is my understanding when I joined.

  Mr Winnick: That is a very fair response.

Mr Howarth

  47. Can we move on to the whole question of the need for secrecy? In your paper in December you said that a re-assessment of what really needs to be protected is essential. You do accept that there are certain areas where secrecy has to continue to apply, for example in defence, foreign policy, intelligence, law enforcement and commercial confidence. It is axiomatic that the Security Service does have a greater requirement for secrecy than other Government Departments. Can you give us an indication of where you think the line ought to be drawn in the new circumstances?
  (Mr Bickford) I think that the threats that one sees at the moment really come from organised crime and that includes terrorism and what the Americans like to call super terrorism, terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. I tend to globalise all this as organised crime for the sake of simplicity.

  48. Are you including international terrorism in that?
  (Mr Bickford) Yes, I am.

  49. Why?
  (Mr Bickford) Because terrorism can be dealt with on a number of levels. One of the levels at which it is dealt with probably more often than most is by way of prosecution and evidentiary proceedings through the courts. You can disrupt terrorists but they come back. You can obviously use military action against terrorists, but that does not necessarily dissuade them from continuing terrorist activity, so at the end of the day your safety net is to prosecute terrorists and hopefully take them out of activity for a number of years while they are sent to jail. The evidentiary proceedings for the Security and Intelligence Services are in my view going to become more and more pressing. They have been in relation to terrorism as we have seen over the last eight years and the number of major terrorist trials at which the intelligence agencies have given evidence. Therefore, secrecy in that respect is going to be reduced because at trial evidence of intelligence operations is going to be given. You may even use an informant. Certainly in relation to organised crime, non-terrorist organised crime, the use of informants is standard, in the United States for instance. In the United Kingdom we will reach that position as well. Informants are an essential element in building a case against the senior elements of organised crime. Eavesdropping evidence is becoming more common at trial and telephone intercept is at present barred from being given as evidence but it is going to become essential that telephone intercept is given as evidence in the future, so another layer of secrecy goes. The other problems for secrecy really lie in relation to the Internet and the explosion of information exchange. If you go on to the Internet now you can come across all sorts of people who belonged to the intelligence agencies at one stage or another, particularly America, particularly Russia, and you can gather information from them about the activities of a state or a particular business and you can gather quite a lot of information that you could not gather before. It was not accessible.

  50. Surely the information available on the Internet is only what people choose to put there?
  (Mr Bickford) Yes, of course.

  51. Our enemies are unlikely to be providing us with extensive secret information on the Internet.
  (Mr Bickford) I think what I am saying is that you can access the individuals much more easily to gather your intelligence. If you look at the United Kingdom there are a number of private intelligence firms at the moment that are expanding to gather intelligence to assist British business or to protect British businessmen when they are abroad. Those private firms have to gather their information from sources abroad and those sources have to be sources that have good access, and so that information exchange is increasing. I think it will increase in relation to the United Kingdom and, as organised crime is soon to become as it were more out of control, because it is admitted to be out of control at the moment by the United States authorities and by the British authorities, the British public is going to demand more and more information about the depredations of organised crime so as to satisfy themselves that the necessary measures are being taken. I see these two attacks on secrecy as gradually diminishing the extent of secrecy as it stands at the moment.

  52. You referred to the agents as playing a vital role and that is something that we have also heard from our visit. The protection of the identity of those individuals must be absolutely crucial, must it not?
  (Mr Bickford) Yes.

  53. So that has got to be a whole area of secrecy. How do we reconcile this increasing requirement to produce evidence before the courts in a way that the courts will accept it and yet at the same time protect agents who are putting their lives at risk for their country?
  (Mr Bickford) That is an extremely important question. That is one of the roles of the legal advisers. The legal advisers operate very closely with the operational officers in these operations and one of their roles is to determine what evidence is going to be required at trial not only by the prosecution but also by the defence because under our system quite rightly the defence must have access to any information that may assist it. If you have an agent involved, the operation has to be conducted with a view to protecting the agent's identity. That means that when a matter comes to trial the agent's participation in any part of that operation has absolutely no relevance to the trial at all.

  54. How can that be?
  (Mr Bickford) That would be going into operational detail. I am prohibited from doing that at the moment.

  55. But are you satisfied that the agent's identity can be protected under the present system?
  (Mr Bickford) Yes indeed. What happens at the end of the day is this, that all the information that the intelligence agencies have gathered, all the files, all the telephone intercepts, all the eavesdropping, actually go to the trial judge. The intelligence agencies and the prosecution are in conversation with the judge ex parte, that is, without the defence being present, explaining what evidence they are actually going to put at the trial and what evidence they want to keep secret. They are also explaining the reasons for keeping the evidence secret, that there is nothing relevant in that secret evidence to the defence. The trial judge goes through that evidence and he then determines whether or not the intelligence agencies have got it right or whether he agrees with them. The trial then proceeds with the evidence that can be passed on tot he defence, keeping the secret, non-relevant evidence away from the trial.

  56. That is a huge responsibility resting on the shoulders of the trial judge, is it not?
  (Mr Bickford) Yes indeed. This is a provision that in fact we have borrowed from the Americans. The Americans have the Classified Information Procedures Act which deals with this particular issue, because they also recognise that there is a problem. They introduced these provisions. We poached them and in fact we extended them because the American provisions only relate to national security and we have now extended them across the board. The responsibility has to rest somewhere. In France, for instance, the examining judge in terrorism cases has that responsibility, but in fact it is a better system because, whereas in the UK the intelligence agencies are going to the judge just before trial, in other words they have been through the whole operation and the lawyers and the intelligence operative officers believe they have got the balance right, in France the intelligence agencies and their lawyers are in constant discussion with the examining judge as the operation progresses and the examining judge determines on the spot whether something is relevant or not and what can go into evidence to the ultimate trial. More importantly, the examining judge determines the balance of rights at that stage as well, which again is something that can only be determined after a United Kingdom agency operation has been completed.

  57. There is a tremendous amount I would like to ask you, Mr Bickford, but we must press on. Can you say to what extent the position vis-a-vis the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service differs? Do you think that one can be more open than the other, the Security Service having responsibility for matters within the United Kingdom, and the SIS with espionage overseas? Do you think that one can be more open than the other?
  (Mr Bickford) I think that is probably right because the Secret Intelligence Service obviously has the foreign role and that must relate to sensitive information in terms of foreign relations, so obviously they cannot be as open as the Security Service.

  58. You have seen the extent to which the Security Service is now open. We have got this wonderful glossy brochure here. There is a lot of information but not figures attached to it.
  (Mr Bickford) It has improved over the years.

  59. This obviously is a sea change from the Cold War years. Do you think that they are taking a risk, given that Russia could still revert to totalitarianism, or do you think that the Security Service could be even more open than they are in this?
  (Mr Bickford) I think that they can be even more open than they are in that. I go back to the problems of organised crime and the increasing demand that we are going to see from the public about the protections that are being given. The public see the problems at the level of street crime and narcotics trafficking, in children with drugs and so on, but above all that of course you have the organisations that drive the narcotics into this country, that launder the money. In relation to that, for instance, the UN has calculated that there is about $500 billion worth of narcotics trafficking going on worldwide at the moment. I think there is going to be a general push towards the intelligence agencies becoming more open about that sort of work. What are they doing about it? How do they get involved in defeating organised crime? What are the problems of organised crime? What are the problems of terrorism and super terrorism and what are they doing to defeat that? I see that there will be a demand for more openness in that respect in the future.


 
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