House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Sixth Report

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

CONFLICT PREVENTION

25. It is important to begin discussion of conflict prevention with a word of caution. John Borton said, "In looking at the international community's response to conflict and instability, we think it would be helpful to see it as a community grappling with complex issues produced by the end of the Cold War and the changing nature of conflict, where no one has any clear answers or solutions at this stage".[29] Ed Cairns from Oxfam warned, "we should all be humble about what we can achieve by improving the performance of development aid and economic policies in this area. Only 15 per cent of the internal conflicts in the 20^th century have been resolved peacefully". He looked forward to improvements but stressed, "we are not looking for a future without wars and without enormous humanitarian suffering".[30] We do not argue in this Report that violent conflict is always wrong. We do argue that it is resorted to so frequently, unjustifiably and harmfully as a result of factors which can be mitigated and minimised. The measures we are about to discuss will not end all conflict. They do, however, have the potential to make the world a safer place.

Increase and improve development assistance

26. As was mentioned above, there is considerable consensus on the various factors causing violent conflict. In discussing how the international community can prevent violent conflict occurring it is useful to begin with the distinction made by Saferworld in their evidence to the Committee. They distinguish between "operational prevention (measures applicable in the face of immediate risk); and structural prevention (measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not recur)".[31] To discuss conflict prevention at the "structural level" is in one sense simply to discuss development itself. If conflict and poverty are profoundly related then it is clear that an anti-poverty development strategy will reduce the risks of conflict. Much of the evidence received therefore advocated similar policies to those contained in the Government's Development White Paper. Saferworld, for instance, called for "strategies for pro-poor economic growth ... investment in education, health care and other basic social services, and ... the creation of employment opportunities".[32] Oxfam made a similar point, "Investing in aid for social development, if targeted to reduce inequalities, is investing in stability. This means focusing aid where it has a real impact for the many. In both post-conflict situations and those vulnerable to conflict, priorities for aid should promote growth with equity and include investment in basic education, health, spreading the ownership of assets (by land reform, providing access to micro-finance, and breaking monopolies), and developing small-scale agriculture and labour-intensive industry".[33]

27. Effective development assistance must combine the right policies with adequate resources. However pro-poor the approach, if funds are insufficient no real change will take place. If we accept the fact that the best conflict prevention is sustainable development we must in this Report point out the depressing statistics which show a serious decline in levels of official development assistance (ODA) in recent years. The latest figures from the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD reveal that in 1998 total OECD ODA as a percentage of GNP is a mere 0.23 per cent and the average country effort only 0.40 per cent. Saferworld told the Committee "Meeting the OECD poverty eradication targets will involve an increase in aid budgets, as well as a change in the focus of aid spending".[34] International Alert also called for the committing of adequate resources, "The social programmes to be put in place need adequate funding to be effective and contribute to sustainable development and a durable peace in conflict-torn societies".[35] Both these NGOs mention the 20:20 compact "which calls for developed countries to allocate at least 20 per cent of their overseas aid, and less developed countries 20 per cent of their government budgets, to spending on basic social needs".[36]

28. It is of course the case that increased levels of spending in themselves do not necessarily achieve sustainable development. We discuss below how to make aid "better". But such discussion should not obscure the need for an increase in funding. Martin Honeywell from International Alert said, "In general terms ... from our experience and in the countries we work in, there is a lot more work that could be done (if more money was available) than is presently being done".[37] Eugenia Piza-Lopez from International Alert pointed to "the destruction that is caused during wars ... the infrastructure is destroyed in a country. Roads are destroyed. Water systems are destroyed. Schools and hospitals are destroyed. Now, the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure perhaps is not the most critical part of the process to build peace, but it is an extremely important one".[38] She also referred to the need to pay for the rehabilitation of the social sectors after conflict. Tim Hancock from Saferworld mentioned the necessary post-conflict expenditure on demobilisation and security sector reform.[39]

29. Development assistance must be planned and delivered over the medium to long term. Eugenia Piza-Lopez spoke of the "consistent input for developing the human capital that is needed, not in the next two years but in the next ten years".[40] Tim Hancock said, "over the past decade or so, we have seen a reduction in levels of aid spending, at the same time we have seen an increase in humanitarian assistance as a proportion of ODA, so the net effect has been quite a dramatic cut in the longer-term development assistance which we feel is essential to long-term peace building, and we need to make progress to redress that balance".[41] Such longer term assistance is essential to the development of the social sectors and will ultimately be much cheaper than repeated short-term humanitarian expenditure on conflict. Indeed, we wonder whether the decline in ODA over the past few years has been one cause of the increase in violent conflict and the resulting need for more humanitarian relief.

30. The United Kingdom provides 0.27 per cent of GNP in ODA and will by 2002 be spending 0.3 per cent of GNP. We have previously congratulated the Government on this increase in expenditure whilst at the same time pointing out that we are still a long way from the 0.7 per cent UN target. We have recommended that the Government present a timetable for progress towards the 0.7 per cent target and that by the end of the Parliament they reach the EU average effort of 0.37 per cent. We include below a table showing expenditure on ODA by OECD countries. The Government has reaffirmed its commitment to the 0.7 per cent target but there appears to be no realistic prospect of the United Kingdom reaching it in the foreseeable future. The target was originally agreed in 1970 when there were very different views current on what constituted effective development assistance and what the needs of the poorest actually were. If there is to be a realistic momentum for increased levels of ODA there should be a reassessment of what increases are necessary to meet the international development targets. We recommend that the Government provide the Committee with its assessment of what increases in ODA are necessary globally in order to reach the international development targets, how each donor's contribution to such increases can be agreed, and what further increase in the United Kingdom's ODA will be necessary beyond 2002.

31. Our concern that United Kingdom increase its expenditure on development assistance is a vote of confidence in the direction, policy and focus of DFID. The commitment to the eradication of poverty is an essential touchstone for any intervention which aims to reduce the risks of conflict. It is necessary of course that poverty-focussed expenditure is mirrored by other donors. We have commented in a previous Report on the need for a greater proportion of EDF funds and budgetised aid from the European Community to be spent on the social sectors. The United Kingdom Government has also committed itself "to play a leading role in efforts to agree multilateral untying of development assistance".[42] The untying of aid will certainly contribute to a more rational and poverty-centred distribution of aid resources. To this end the Government is supporting the OECD initiative to untie all bilateral assistance to least developed countries. We welcome moves to untie development assistance to least developed countries and support the Government in its efforts internationally to achieve greater poverty-focus to development activity. This is itself an important contribution to conflict prevention.

Conflict Impact Assessments

32. We have stated above that it is not merely poverty which causes conflict, but rather the structure of poverty, the inequalities in a society, a sudden decline in living conditions, or a fear of such an event. It is clear therefore that to look simply at country statistics in the round, without any further analysis, will not be enough to reduce risks of conflict. A number of witnesses called for conflict impact assessments to be carried out before the provision of development assistance. International Alert stated, "Every intervention, be it trade, investment or aid can contribute to prolonging and enhancing conflict, or lessen it. There is no such thing as neutral aid. It is all political, if not in motivation then certainly in impact. Development aid should aim at promoting stability and long-term peace. Understanding the impact of interventions in order to ensure they meet conflict prevention objectives is essential".[43] They recommended that DFID pilot such assessments in five countries.[44] This Committee in its Second Report of last session on the Development White Paper had recommended that "the Government introduce conflict impact assessments of its policy towards vulnerable countries and promote such an approach in multilateral institutions".[45] DFID told the Committee that they were "actively considering how to develop a working methodology for conflict impact assessments to ensure that explicit consideration is given to the effects of development projects on the local dynamics of conflict".[46]

33. It is important to note that conflict impact assessments would be relevant to many policies for which DFID is not the lead department. There would have to be a commitment to such assessments by the whole of Whitehall. Oxfam recommended that DFID "encourage other Whitehall Departments, including DTI, the Treasury, MoD, MAFF and the FCO, to undertake conflict impact assessments on appropriate areas of their own work and ensure that the analysis of one department can be used to help another evaluate the impact of its decisions".[47] Oxfam also pointed out that multilateral organisations, businesses and NGOs should also "test all their policies for their effect on increasing or reducing the risks of war".[48]

34. DFID, the Canadian Government and DGVIII of the European Union have all committed themselves in principle to the development of conflict impact assessments but it was emphasised that the process was at a very early stage.[49] Clare Short said, "We are working on trying to work out what the conflict impact assessment will look like. There is preliminary work in the Department and we are intending to pilot it. It is complex again. It is not like an environmental impact assessment where you just say: 'Will this thing be damaging for the environment?', it requires much more delicacy about which groups there are and is there any tension and trying to look positively at using development to undermine causes of tension".[50] Dr Mukesh Kapila from DFID admitted that he had not as yet seen any examples of conflict impact assessments being carried out and that there was some scepticism amongst member states of the European Union as to their value.[51] More recently DFID says in its policy statement 'Conflict reduction and humanitarian assistance', "We are starting to conduct conflict appraisals when preparing our country assistance programmes. These include analysis of population groups that are affected and the causes, triggers, intensity and trends of open or latent conflicts, as well as identifying the interventions that are most feasible or likely to make a difference".[52] We welcome the initial work by DFID on conflict impact assessments, request that the Government response include an account of progress in this work, including difficulties encountered, and recommend that the Government press for such work to be incorporated into the development analysis of the various multilateral agencies to which it contributes.

35. Conflict impact assessments would examine assistance in the context of patterns of marginalisation and exclusion within the country. An example would be education. Martin Honeywell made the point that, for example, in the Great Lakes education was provided to some groups and not others. Any conflict impact assessment would have to take this into account.[53] The same principle could be applied to analysis of health provision, or indeed participation in economic growth. When visiting the World Bank we were told, for example, that the impressive rates of growth recently recorded in Mozambique were very unevenly enjoyed when comparing the north and south of the country. We recommend that DFID provide details in both its country strategy papers and its Departmental Report of how interventions in the economic and social sectors of developing countries have taken account of excluded and marginalised groups and have attempted to remedy such exclusion.

Trade policy and the Lomé Convention

36. A conflict-sensitive approach must also be applied to trade policy. The example has already been cited of the disastrous effect on Rwanda of the abolition of the International Coffee Agreement. A similar concern has been raised about the social effects of any end to the Banana Protocol of the Lomé Convention.[54] All trade policy decisions must assess the impact on vulnerable economies and societies before introducing any significant alteration of terms of trade, and agree packages of assistance, where necessary, to help the developing country economy diversify and adjust to the new circumstances.

37. DFID explained in its memorandum that the United Kingdom Government "is committed to an open, fair and sustainable multilateral trading system" but wants the benefits of that system to be more widely shared - "if developing countries are excluded from these benefits their economic circumstances will further deteriorate, social tensions will increase, and the risks of conflict will be heightened".[55] DFID was working to assist developing countries in their representation in international trade negotiations. This would involve both technical assistance to developing countries "to build capacity to formulate and negotiate trade policy" and "encouraging developed countries to commit to delivering early tangible benefits from future liberalisation, especially in the sectors of importance to developing countries such as agriculture".[56] Oxfam's memorandum argues that "An international trading regime more sensitive to the risks of war could offer the least developed countries - often those most at risk - various trading preferences including zero tariffs and more flexible rules of origin. The World Trade Organisation's 1997 Plan of Action to promote trade capacity-building and favourable market access for the least developed countries is therefore to be welcomed".[57]

38. There thus appear to be two points made with regard to the relationship between trade and conflict. The more general point is that encouraging developing countries to benefit from trade and trade liberalisation will improve standards of living and thus reduce the risk of conflict. It is an extension of the fact that sustainable development is the best conflict prevention. A second and more specific point is that trade policy must be sensitive to both short and long term adverse effects on particular developing countries of trade policy proposals. Developing countries are often ill-equipped to sustain such shocks without considerable pressure on the social fabric.

39. The renegotiation of the Lomé Convention is just such an instance where we would look to see conflict-sensitivity informing the European Union's proposals for trade reform. In our Fourth Report of last session on The Renegotiation of the Lomé Convention we said that "Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction must be taken into account wherever relevant in all aspects of development thinking, including trade policy. They must therefore be included in the priorities and provisions of the Lomé Convention".[58] Many of our recommendations in that Report related to how the Convention might be used to enhance trade development and simplify rules of origin for developing countries. Our main concern, however, was the proposal from the Commission that African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries negotiate "regional economic partnership agreements" with the EU which would lead ultimately to Free Trade Areas (FTAs). There were various criticisms made of this proposal in evidence, including the claim that the economies of the ACP were not sufficiently developed to withstand the arrival of duty-free imports from the EU and that the EU would not be willing to open up its market to ACP products, in particular those 'sensitive' products currently protected by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The choice presented, however, to the ACP countries was either acceptance of the FTA route or graduation to the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which would in effect mean a significant increase in tariffs for ACP countries.

40. The Committee recommended that there be more emphasis on improving significantly the terms of the GSP for ACP countries so as to minimise the economic shock to vulnerable economies. The EU's negotiating mandate includes a commitment that the new regime should at least maintain current market access for ACP countries. We are therefore concerned to learn that the FTA option remains the main proposal put to the ACP countries by the EU.[59] This is despite the fact that independent studies commissioned by the EU questioned whether they would be of benefit to developing country economies. This is not only the example of the EU seeming to be more concerned in its trade policy for the protection of internal interests than for developing countries and their vulnerability to conflict. There have been similar criticisms of the recent agreement between the EU and South Africa and the agricultural protectionism evident in the EU's position.

41. The trade proposals put forward by the Commission for the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention demonstrate how far the EU has to go in terms of integrating conflict sensitivity into its trade policy. It is disgraceful that independent studies of the proposal were commissioned only just before the deadline for the agreement of the mandate. We are well aware that the EU has to balance domestic interests with those of the developing world. There can be no excuse, however, for failing to consider the impact of such far-reaching proposals on conflict in developing countries. We recommend that the EU make it mandatory for all trade policy proposals to include an assessment of their impact on poverty and conflict in relevant developing countries. We also recommend that in negotiations on the Lomé Convention the EU give much greater weight to an enhanced Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) as an alternative to the Free Trade Area proposal.

Policy coherence and consistency

42. The EU example is simply one instance of the need for coherence in policy across government departments and among states and donors. The need for such coherence and consistency of policy was a constant theme in the evidence we received. International Alert told the Committee that attempts to persuade governments to engage in peaceful conflict resolution had in the past "been made difficult by the lack of consistency in policy on the part of the international community. Too often bilateral arrangements have conflicted with strategies being pursued on a multilateral level, thus negating the impact of both. It is essential that all the different strands of foreign policy; trade, development assistance, arms negotiations, etc, are integrated at an international level and are applied coherently and consistently by all parties".[60] The policy agenda to achieve this was described as one of "structural stability".[61] Oxfam stated with regard to conflict prevention that "In this area of policy more than any other, a consistent approach is needed across government departments, bilateral donors, multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations and the private sector".[62]

43. Structural stability was also advocated by Glenys Kinnock who with reference to the EU spoke of her concern at the EU's "responses to the prevention of conflict and post-conflict situation" and "the whole issue of coherence and consistency in our policies. It is not just CFSP[63], it relates to our agricultural policies, it relates to fisheries policies, defence policies, arms policies; a whole range of issues impact upon the European Union's ability to respond properly and consistently to crisis".[64] We have already cited the Lomé negotiations as an example of the EU's failure to apply conflict-sensitive policy. We should note that that failure was made by the same EU which had agreed a Common Position on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa (June 1997) and Council Resolution on Coherence (June 1997).[65] Furthermore, the Treaty of the European Union commits the EU to such policy consistency.[66] This emphasis on policy consistency is of course not exclusively relevant to conflict prevention. It is simply good development. The dangers of conflict, however, with all the consequences in loss of life and damage to prospects for development, make such consistency all the more urgent and crucial.

44. It is not only the EU that must strive for coherence but the United Kingdom Government. In our Report last session on the Development White Paper we stated that "There are other government departments [in addition to DFID] whose mission statements and objectives should also make reference to the Government's commitment to international development and the elimination of poverty ... we recommend that the departmental reports of other government departments ... all include a section on how their policies and activities have promoted international development and the elimination of poverty".[67] In our recent Report on the 1999 Annual Report of DFID we criticised a number of Whitehall departments for failing to consider developing countries in their policy formulations and documents.[68] Taking as an example the DTI Strategic Framework for 1999-2000, we can see no reference to the needs of developing countries in the consideration of trade policy and of how to bring such countries and the billions in them into productive and vigorous trading relationships with the rest of the world. Similarly, reading the DTI's Annual Report for 1999, there is no section on development. There is a chapter on "cross-cutting themes" but it concentrates on environmental issues only. This is a disappointment. Clare Short emphasised to the Committee that the Development White Paper was a Government document, not only a DFID document. We expect then to see DTI's commitment to the Development White Paper made explicit both in its Strategic Framework and in its Annual Reports. These are not issues which should be left for DFID alone to advocate. The development of the poorer countries of the world will be good for United Kingdom trade, and it would be good to see evidence that DTI recognises this and has it as a priority. We criticise the omission from DTI's Annual Report and Strategic Framework of adequate discussion of development. We recommend that DTI remedy this omission and demonstrate the policy coherence which is meant to exist within Whitehall. We will continue to examine the documents and actions of other government departments to ensure that the development is genuinely considered as a cross-cutting issue throughout Government.

Institutional reform and support

45. One aspect of development assistance emphasised in evidence on conflict prevention was institutional reform and human rights. We have cited above the evidence which points to human rights abuses and the institutional weakness of such bodies as the judiciary and the police to be important factors increasing the risk of conflict. Such strengthening of institutions is not only vital to the prevention of conflict but clearly central to any post-conflict reconstruction. Thus International Alert recommended that "Development assistance in post-conflict reconstruction should encourage capacity building for state structures and support competent, accountable and participatory political structures and administration. Democracy should be promoted by re-establishing impartial media and criminal justice institutions, by promoting a commitment to the rule of law, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, increased access and equity is also integral and should ensure that women are part of the decision-making process and that they have an equitable share of resources and land. This can lead to increased food and human security".[69]

46. Saferworld and Glenys Kinnock both argued that the Lomé Convention should be used by EU governments "to increase their support for the establishment of transparent, accountable and inclusive public institutions, in which human rights, particularly the rights of minorities, are safeguarded".[70] The political and economic leverage of the EU can certainly have an important influence for good. A significant number of ACP countries are affected by conflict and if the Lomé Convention put the good governance and structural stability agenda at the centre of its policy and funding commitments there would be significant benefits for reductions in conflict and thus of poverty. We recommend that the Lomé Convention increase its commitment to conflict prevention through an increase both in funding and programmes dedicated to good governance, democracy, human rights and institutional reform.

47. The emphasis on good governance as an essential element of conflict prevention accords with the focus of DFID. DFID made clear in its Development White Paper that it would only pursue development partnerships with those governments which "pursue policies which promote responsive and accountable government, recognising that governments have obligations to all their people; promote the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights; and which encourage transparency and bear down on corruption in the conduct of both the public service and the business sector".[71] Furthermore, the paragraphs in the White Paper on "Promoting Political Stability, Social Cohesion and Responding Effectively to Conflict" set out an impressive list of objectives, including to "spread the values of civil liberties and democracy, rule of law and good governance, and foster the growth of a vibrant and secure civil society".[72] In their memorandum to the Committee DFID informed us that they are "funding programmes to improve the access of poor people to legal and judicial services, to facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes and to develop mechanisms that honour basic human rights".[73] We welcome this commitment from DFID to institution-building. Such work should of course be supported by all relevant government and government-funded activity. We would draw attention to the work of the British Council in particular and request information on how the British Council is engaged in conflict prevention through institution-building.

48. One example of intervention to support human rights and peace-building is support for impartial media. Oxfam told the Committee that "Local media, such as Rwanda's Radio Amohoro and both radio and television stations in the former Yugoslavia, have played dangerous roles in fomenting ethnic hatred. Conversely, local and international media can play a positive role in promoting the need for peace and to disarm, as well as humanitarian services such as the reuniting of relatives - as through the BBC World Service's Somalia and Afghan services. In a number of conflicts, the BBC World Service's local language broadcasts are almost universally listened to. Imaginative support for local media, and through the BBC World Service, can be important parts of a conflict resolution strategy".[74] A recent example of DFID's work in this area has been the provision of £78,000 during the Kosovo crisis for the International Centre for Humanitarian Reporting, which was used both for radio programmes and for the distribution of radios. Their memorandum states that "As part of fostering an independent and pluralistic media, we have supported a range of media projects such as funding training for independent journalists in Bosnia and BBC radio programming in Afghanistan".[75] We welcome DFID's support for the establishment of an impartial and fair media in conflict-prone countries. We would encourage this work and ask that the Government response to this Report give further details of such support and set out how DFID and the FCO are cooperating with the BBC World Service in providing conflict-sensitive and peace-building broadcasts to the developing world. We also urge DFID to support the restoration of training, education and exchange schemes for journalists.

Early warnings of conflict

49. In discussions of conflict prevention there is often mention of "early warnings" of conflict as possible triggers for preventive action by the international community. This debate is clearly linked to our previous consideration of the causes of conflict and the need for conflict impact assessments. Attention to early warnings is part of what Saferworld called "operational prevention", that is "measures applicable in the face of an immediate crisis".[76] Evidence mentioned various warnings of imminent conflict. Oxfam spoke of "short-term triggers" including "sudden widening of inequalities between social, ethnic or territorial groups", "increasingly uncertain economic prospects", "weakening capacity of the state to maintain law and order" and "escalation of inter-communal tension by the actions of individual leaders and political groupings - actions including the use of media and the committing of conspicuous atrocities to incite fear and hatred".[77]

50. Dr Joanna Spear identified within the military and arms context "key processes and events which indicate that internal conflict is becoming likely".[78] These include patterns of arms purchases, the way in which weapons are deployed, and in particular the rise of militias - their formation, training, arming and actions.[79]

51. The Secretary of State did not believe that "there are any early warning systems like those the world is trying to organise for the risks of humanitarian disasters, food shortages or hurricanes or whatever, because of course the causes of conflict are intensely political or played out in very political ways ... I think there just has to be much greater sensitivity by all observers and everyone engaged in development in looking out for causes of conflict, the preliminaries of conflict and just being more sensitive to try to act to prevent them".[80] It is certainly the case that conflict involves ultimately the decisions of individual human beings, which are not wholly predictable. There are, however, significant risk factors and warnings which should alert the international community to the need for intervention or assistance. Richard Manning from DFID acknowledged that the UK Government through its posts and DFID offices had "to look more carefully, and we are trying to look more carefully, at areas where conflict is a growing issue but has perhaps yet not fully come to the surface".[81]

52. There is of course a question as to whether the international community is always interested in heeding such warnings. The example of Rwanda shows how the world can ignore obvious signals of impending violence when it is convenient to do so. Whilst Kosovo was close to home, and more accessible to journalists, there are as we said above conflicts of far greater severity raging in many parts of Africa. Even with regard to Kosovo, international action was belated. Jane Sharp from the Centre for Defence Studies, speaking to the Committee before the final escalation of the conflict in Kosovo, pointed out that "there was massive warning, and the tragedy about Kosovo is that in 1991 when Lord Carrington and Hans van den Broek set up the first conference looking at the former Yugoslavia in The Hague in September 1991, they had on the programme the future of the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo and our esteemed friend, Mr Milosevic, said that was too intrusive into Serbian affairs and so as a concession to Milosevic that was taken off the agenda at the Conference and the same thing happened at Dayton".[82] Jane Sharp thought that "in most conflicts we are not short of early warning - we are very short of political will - and I think that sometimes, particularly in the United Kingdom, you have staff in British Embassies overseas who could be monitoring human rights abuses, but in fact invest a lot of time pursuing arms contracts".[83]

53. Some of the evidence we received called for more effective and coordinated systems of early warning for the international community. International Alert argued that "Support should be offered for the development of early warning systems in order to provide decision-makers with timely and reliable information concerning areas of potential conflict".[84] Dr Joanna Spear wrote in the context of discussion of the arms trade, "Work on developing an Early Warning System is related to the development of the UN Arms Register and regional light weapons registers ... However, the Early Warning System could be expected to also draw on other sources of information, from NGOs, UN personnel, academic studies and national intelligence sources".[85]

54. We accept the Secretary of State's point that early warning systems cannot be mechanistic. There are, however, circumstances such as increasing violence, arms flows, inflammatory media attacks on minorities, which suggest imminent conflict. It could well be clear signals and possibly assistance from the international community which would then make the difference between war and peace. Mikael Barfod from ECHO gave examples of effective interventions, "One was in Albania last year where the military force was put in, the Operation Alba, with the aim to secure logistics for the distribution of humanitarian aid. Everybody knows that it was not really meant as a humanitarian action but it was meant to stabilise the situation, to provide calm. The uniforms had a psychological effect which was extremely important, and the crisis was averted in fact, we think, largely because of this operation".[86]

55. There is a Humanitarian Early Warning System within the UN but it does not appear to have a very high profile. There is also of course the UN's Department of Political Affairs, which has conflict prevention as one of its main tasks. Funds have also been set aside within the EU for an early warning unit, but the unit has yet to be established. We recommend that the Government in its response provide the Committee with an assessment of the current effectiveness of early warning mechanisms within the UN and EU, and how they can be improved.

56. Conflict prevention must be at the heart of the work of the UN. Any effective early warning system should be international and the UN is therefore the obvious focus for such information. There needs to be agreement on warning signals both of longer-term risks and of imminent dangers; agreed information routes to the UN from member states, the EU, regional organisations, NGOs, business and civil society; clear policy on the dissemination of early warning and those circumstances in which the issue automatically appears on the agenda of the Security Council. There is no shortage of information on the risks of conflict. We need effective mechanisms to formalise such international information flows and ensure official and high-level attention. This may well not be enough in every instance to prevent conflict. We do, however, consider that such action can reduce the incidence of conflict and at the very least ensure adequate preparation by relevant international agencies. We recommend that the United Kingdom Government press for such a strengthening of the UN's early warning capacity.

The IMF and the World Bank

57. Many of the conflict prevention issues so far discussed are of great relevance to the work of the IMF and the World Bank which between them can exert considerable influence in developing countries. We used the opportunity of a visit to Washington at the end of 1998 to explore conflict prevention issues with these two organisations. The evidence we have received was quite critical of the role played by the Bretton Woods institutions. At the heart of the discussion was the claim that the IMF and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank did not take adequate account of the risks of conflict in devising their Structural Adjustment Programmes for developing countries. Eugenia Piza-Lopez gave the example of the effects of public sector restructuring on Mozambique.[87] The programme proposed "a major reduction in the number of state employees...some people say it might affect up to 40,000 employees".[88] She pointed out that this was on top of the many ex-combatants who had yet to find work and an economy without as yet any vibrant private sector able to guarantee employment. She questioned the pace and phasing of such reforms, warning of further tensions which could arise if they were implemented. Dr Owen Greene said that "There is absolutely no doubt ... the structural adjustment programmes, even softened around the edges, are going to cause dislocation. So obviously there is a question of going softer on them and changing the framework, but the other one is really building other elements into the programme which help protect society from its worst impacts".[89]

58. It is clear that the IMF and the World Bank should be sensitive to the risks of conflict in devising assistance and conditions for developing countries. Dr Owen Greene said, "above all one can make a conflict impact assessment, and we strongly enforce the call for these, but one has to recognise that mostly one will not often know, before you get stuck into it, exactly how it is working. These are typically on-going programmes and I think absolutely the key is to build in institutionally systems for constant feed-back and the capacity to adjust those programmes".[90] Barrie Ireton claimed that in relation to economic reform programmes "there has been considerable advance recently in undertaking poverty assessments" but there was not as yet specific consideration given to conflict.[91] The World Bank had, however, recently instituted a Post-Conflict Unit "to try and influence the sector programmes and the country operating departments in the design of the programmes".[92]

59. Central to any conflict-sensitivity must be consideration of the human rights and governance in a country. We requested memoranda from the IMF and the World Bank to find out their policies to Rwanda in the years leading up to the genocide of 1994. Both memoranda make the point that in the early 1990s their involvement was prematurely terminated as a result of a deteriorating economic situation and the continuing war. The IMF memorandum concentrates on the economic record of the Rwandan Government and this is of course to be expected. IMF support was discontinued in 1992 but the Fund welcomed Rwandan Government proposals for reform which could "facilitate the resumption of Fund support under a revised adjustment programme". The Fund noted that success in reform would be "conditioned upon a rapid return to peace".[93] The World Bank told us that their strategy "recognised the fragile and potentially explosive situation of the country in the early 90s".[94] They "supported reversing the faltering economy and reducing poverty to facilitate the peace process and foster national reconciliation".[95] What is striking is the fact that the memoranda make no criticism of the Government's policy towards the Tutsi minority during this period. The end of the war is discussed a as a prerequisite for the resumption of economic growth. Throughout the period, even when programmes were suspended, the IMF and the World Bank continued to talk with the Rwandan Government about conditions for the resumption of the programmes.[96] We are entitled to ask what protests were made to the Rwandan Government by the IMF or the World Bank about the discrimination against and intimidation of Tutsis during these years. As two of the most powerful international institutions in contact with the Rwandan Government their concerns if expressed early enough might have proved important interventions. Neither organisation recognised the direct link between growing social tension, human rights abuses and the subsequent destruction of the entire economic infrastructure.

60. It should of course be noted that both the IMF and the World Bank have an obligation under their statutes not to act politically. It was, however, pointed out to us when we were in Washington that the definition of what constitutes political activity changes over time. It was once the case that involvement with demining was considered controversial. Now it is basic development and the World Bank is to participate. Similarly, corruption is now considered to be a legitimate area for the IMF and the World Bank to discuss - this was previously not the case. We were not reassured as to the human rights commitments of the World Bank and the IMF during our visit at the end of last year to Washington. One IMF official told us that conflict prevention was not the job of the IMF. There was also the sense that the Post-Conflict Unit of the World Bank had too restricted a remit and it was necessary for it to be extended to encompass conflict prevention. More generally, in discussions on both Rwanda and Indonesia, it was made clear that the IMF in particular was most unwilling to involve itself in human rights discussions with developing countries. This is despite the fact that Michel Camdessus admitted to the Committee that good governance was essential to economic progress and sustainability. When we probed how committed IMF officials were to good governance, it quickly became apparent that by good governance they meant primarily economic good governance, for example, transparent and well-regulated financial markets, rather than human rights and participative democracy.

61. Clare Short assured the Committee that "the Bank and the Fund are moving in the way that we would like to see with respecting all human rights for everybody".[97] She referred to the recent review of the IMF's enhanced structural adjustment facility which was "quite critical of the way in which social programmes were protected or not protected and there has been a big move in the IMF to work closely with the Bank and to take more account of protecting health care, education for the poorest and so on".[98] She added that "one cannot use Bank and Fund programmes as a very crude instrument. This is sometimes of such import for a country, the willingness or unwillingness of the Bank and the Fund to engage. It is an enormous power and the delicacy of the judgements is very serious. To decide to completely pull away from a country has enormous economic consequences, including on people who are not guilty of the bad things their governments might be doing".[99]

62. We acknowledge the progress which has clearly been made in both the Bank and the Fund to include more social and poverty awareness in their programmes. We do not, however, believe that sufficient weight is as yet given by those institutions to human rights. We note that the Bretton Woods Institutions are not even mentioned in the Government's Annual Report on Human Rights for 1999. We must not wait another few years before these two key organisations become conflict-sensitive. Even the evaluation of the ESAF tends to ignore the question of the conflict-sensitivity of the IMF programmes. The World Bank also, which has commendably established a Post-Conflict Unit, needs to entrench at all levels the concept of conflict prevention. We recommend that conflict-impact assessments be undertaken before any introduction of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes; that all World Bank country assistance strategies take explicit account of risks of conflict and how they can be mitigated where relevant; that the IMF and the World Bank provide for the monitoring of programmes to ensure that social, poverty and conflict indicators are continually taken into account; and that programmes are designed so as to be appropriately flexible where necessary. We also recommend that the future Government Annual Reports on Human Rights include an assessment of the human rights record of the IMF and World Bank.

63. We also believe that human rights and good governance are essential not only to conflict prevention but to economic sustainability. No longer can we separate economic and political rights, nor deem them anything less than universal. We accept that for the IMF and the World Bank to cease operation in a country the circumstances must be extreme. There are, however, many steps before that final one. These include care in the initial formulation of programmes, assistance to sectors which will encourage institution-building and good governance, the inclusion of good governance conditions in any SAP, rewards for improvement in governance, frank and transparent dialogue with governments to assist in improvements and reform. We recommend that the United Kingdom Government press the World Bank and the IMF to adopt a detailed conflict-prevention strategy which will include greater sensitivity and engagement with issues of good governance and political and human rights.

29 Q.390 Back

30 Q.251 Back

31 Evidence p.68 Back

32 Evidence p.69 Back

33 Evidence p.103 Back

34 Evidence p.70 Back

35 Evidence p.77 Back

36 Evidence p.70, see also Oxfam evidence Q.251 Back

37 Q.214 Back

38 Q.214 Back

39 Q.214 Back

40 Q.214 Back