House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Sixth Report

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

ARMS PROLIFERATION

138. The Government published its first Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls, relating to the period between May and December 1997, on 25 March 1999. Following the publication of the Report, the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees agreed to undertake a joint inquiry into the report. The Committees' inquiry has since been extended to include the 1998 Annual Report which is expected to be published in the Summer. Our extended comments on Government arms export policy will be reserved for our forthcoming Report on Strategic Export Controls. We confine ourselves here to more general observations on the main points made to us. We were told in evidence that "Britain remains on some counts, the second largest arms exporter in the world. This illustrates the fact that the problem of international arms sales is not the lack of commitments made to restrict them but rather the general failure of will (on behalf of both the UK and the international community) to implement existing commitments with any degree of vigour".[217] We must state at the outset that determined and principled control of arms exports is a litmus test of this Government's concern to prevent conflict and inject an ethical dimension into foreign policy.

Excessive Military Expenditure

139. One reason for arms control as a strategy in the prevention of conflict is the claim that excessive expenditure on arms diverts the scarce resources of a developing country away from the more productive expenditure on the social sectors which can produce sustainable peace. Saferworld state, "One obvious developmental cost is the diversion of resources from longer-term development that occurs when less developed countries spend excessively on the purchase of imported military equipment. While less developed countries are, of course, entitled to self-defence, the amounts spent on the military by many poorer countries may exceed what is required for this purpose".[218] Saferworld pointed out that "UNICEF has estimated that an additional $40 billion a year could ensure access for all the world's people to basic social services such as health care, education and safe water ... As UNICEF put it in the 1997 State of the World's Children Report, "Two-thirds of this amount could be found by developing countries if they realigned their own budget priorities. Redirecting just one quarter of the developing world's military expenditure - or $30 billion of $125 billion - for example, could provide enough additional resources to reach most of the goals for the year 2000".[219] The lack of proportion between the expenditure of developing countries on arms and their expenditure on the social sectors is a scandal, and one in which many developed arms-exporting countries are implicated.[220]

140. DFID said in their memorandum, "Excessive and inappropriate military expenditure in poor countries is destabilising and needs to be addressed more effectively. While military expenditure in many developing countries have fallen, overall levels of spending remain a matter of concern. DFID is involved in the OECD, and with the International Financial Institutions, in seeking ways to integrate stronger analyses of military spending into bilateral and multilateral country assessments, country development policies and programmes. Such analyses need to consider the real threats to human security and therefore to identify legitimate defence needs, and affordable means to provide them".[221]

141. Glenys Kinnock also stressed that "Lower levels of military spending on the part of developing countries could yield a real dividend in both development and security terms ... in too many cases high levels of defence spending are draining resources away from more pressing development priorities. For example, the Government of Sudan - a country with an average life expectancy of only 36 years - spends 53 times as much on its military as it does on the provision of health care".[222] She mentioned the UN proposal for a '20:20 compact' endorsed by governments at the UN Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995, "This calls for developed countries to allocate at least 20 per cent of their overseas aid, and less developed countries 20 per cent of their government budgets, to spending on basic needs".[223] She considered this compact complementary to the DFID emphasis on the OECD international development targets and recommended that "All EU governments should seek to meet this objective at the earliest opportunity".[224]

142. In addition to the positive formula of the 20:20 compact, some have also recommended a formula to be applied in considering whether a country's military spending is excessive. The UK NGO Code Working Group recommend that "There should be a presumption that arms exports will be denied to countries which spend more on the military than on health and education combined".[225] Clare Short, however, emphasised that "there is no formula ... Each country is a one off. The military threat is very variable. Countries need to have a proper assessment of what they need a military for, what size of military they need, what is the threat in their country, how high or low it is, and that varies".[226] We have already discussed the need to take account of the security requirements of a country in any strategy for post-conflict reconstruction. We therefore agree with the position of the Secretary of State. There can be no prima facie calculation of what is excessive military spending. It has to be decided on a case by case basis, taking account of the threats to the security of the country. Account should also be taken, however, of the insecurity resulting from social neglect, and we would certainly expect Governments to demonstrate a significant commitment to the social sectors if they also wished their military budgeting to be taken seriously.

143. We had evidence of the dangers of easy formulae during our visit to the United Nations in New York when we heard Uganda criticised by senior officials for engaging in war in former Zaire immediately it had received debt relief under the HIPC initiative. The implication was that the Ugandan Government had misused funds released through the initiative for military purposes instead of poverty alleviation. We also had the sense of a lack of sympathy in the United Nations for the security concerns of the current Rwandan Government. It must, however, be accepted that sometimes military action is itself a necessary step to avoid further impoverishment. Clare Short commented, "No one wants war; no one wants military spending, but one has to make reasonable judgements. There is no such thing as perfect governments or perfect situations, especially in the poorest countries. They are often very complex and difficult situations. If you take the case of Rwanda and Uganda, both of which have internal conflict, both of which are involved in conflicts on their borders and in the war in The Congo ... it is right that there is discussion of the scale of military expenditure, whether it is rising and whether that is proper, but it is that kind of delicacy of judgement, rather than an absolute, I think, that is appropriate".[227]

144. Having visited both Uganda and Rwanda, and having seen the devastation and trauma caused by ongoing conflict, we have considerable sympathy with the concerns of both Governments to maintain security. Such security is a necessary precondition for development. We are disappointed by some of the critical comments we heard within the United Nations and recommend that the United Kingdom Government continue to argue for understanding of the security priorities of Uganda and Rwanda within the international community, along with advocacy for their developmental needs.

145. The Secretary of State went on to tell the Committee that she had had talks with "our own Chief of Staff about the possibility of working together on this because if a military person will go and say 'You do not need all that military spending', they are more likely to believe them than if I go and say, 'You do not need all that military spending', but there is a delicacy here and we have to get it right. If defence attachés are involved in arms selling, we cannot have them involved in this work".[228] These comments highlight the importance of coherence in Government policy. We agree with the Secretary of State that advice on appropriate levels of expenditure carries more weight when coming from defence experts. There has to be consistency of advice to developing countries. A defence attaché attempting to sell British arms to a government which did not need them would be acting contrary to government policy. We recommend that the Inter-Departmental Working Group on Conflict agree policies on the security requirements of particular developing countries. Such agreed policies should prevent any United Kingdom official from pursuing unnecessary and harmful arms purchases. We request information from the Inter-Departmental Working Group on Conflict on their work to date and conclusions reached.

146. This consistency is necessary not only within the United Kingdom Government but also among the governments of the developed world. It would certainly be easier for certain departments within Whitehall to act in the best interests of a developing country if they knew that, say, competitors in the arms trade were abiding by the same assessment of the security needs of the country concerned. It may well not be appropriate or practicable to agree formally within the international community an assessment of the levels of appropriate military spending for each developing country. There is, however, a need for more shared assessment and discussion of the legitimate security needs of poor countries. We welcome the work being done in the OECD and the International Financial Institutions on the shared analysis of military spending. We recommend that the OECD, IMF and World Bank make the securing of shared assessments of the security needs of developing countries a priority so as to ensure that competition in strategic arms exports does not lead to profit for the exporter taking precedence over the stability and development of the developing world.

147. A further government initiative to discourage excessive military expenditure in developing countries has been the Mauritius Mandate of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which introduced from September 1997 a two-year moratorium on the provision of export guarantees for "unproductive expenditure", which includes expenditure on arms exports, and challenged other bilateral donors to pursue similar policies. In our report on Debt Relief and the Cologne G8 Summit we noted that only limited progress had been made in securing an international agreement and recommended that the Government extend its own moratorium indefinitely.[229] We reiterate our recommendation made in a previous Report that the Government extend indefinitely its moratorium on the use of export credits for unproductive expenditure and urge the Government to exert further pressure for the adoption internationally of such a commitment.

148. We note, however, the evidence from Dr Neil Cooper and Dr Michael Pugh who point out that "arms exports continue to be heavily promoted and subsidised by the Government. We find it ironic that in an administration supposedly committed to an ethical arms policy DESO's[230] branch office in Indonesia has more staff and a higher budget (£190,000 in 1997-98 compared to £125,000 in 1996-97) than the FCO's Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit. If government funding is a reflection of priorities there is little evidence to support the view that Britain has adopted a more restrictive approach to arms sales to conflict-prone areas".[231] We recommend that the Government state in their response how the activities of DESO are compatible with stated policy on conflict prevention and arms control.

Export licence applications

149. A number of important initiatives have been established recently to achieve greater coherence in arms export policy - including the involvement of DFID in the consideration of certain export licence applications (ELAs) and the introduction of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. DFID's memorandum to the Committee stated that the Department's "interest in Export Licence Applications is broadly twofold. Our main interest is to ensure that the proposed purchase does not seriously undermine the economy of the recipient country, taking into account its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF/World Bank sponsored economic reform programmes. We also have an interest to ensure that the equipment is not used for purposes of internal repression or external aggression. We have focussed our efforts on examining applications to poor countries. Where any application causes DFID concern, this is taken up with the FCO, DTI and MoD".[232]

150. Barrie Ireton told that Committee that "given the large number of licences that may be applied for around the world, DFID clearly concentrates its limited administrative resources on those areas where we know something and where we are active in terms of our own development assistance programmes".[233] Clare Short stressed that previously the Overseas Development Administration did not have the right to examine ELAs. At that time, before ODA became a separate department as DFID, the FCO would consider the likelihood of the use of arms for internal repression or external aggression, "Our complete value added, the issue that was not there before, was would such a big arms contract use up resources that ought to be used for health or education or development of their people".[234] DFID had produced a list of countries for which it wished to see all ELAs and could express an opinion on whether these ELAs should be granted. They did not, however, have a right of veto, the final decision resting with the lead department, the DTI.[235]

151. DFID sent the Committee a supplementary memorandum listing those countries for which the Department automatically saw all ELAs - they number 83. It also listed a further 42 countries where the department only wished to see ELAs on request. The memorandum also provided useful information on the 17 ELAs where, by December 1998, the Department had raised objections.[236] We congratulate the Secretary of State on her openness in providing the Committee with detailed information on those export licence applications queried by DFID, and consider this to be an important precedent for Government transparency in arms export policy and practice. We note that two ELAs to Eritrea and two ELAs to Indonesia were issued despite the concerns raised by DFID. Events have in our view amply justified the objections of DFID. We criticise the DTI for issuing ELAs to Eritrea and Indonesia against the advice of DFID. It is clear that the DTI has yet to take on board effectively the human rights and conflict concerns which are at the heart of development policy.

152. The Government in its White Paper "Strategic Export Controls" stated that it was "committed to greater transparency in the field of strategic exports and will report annually on the state of strategic export controls and their application".[237] The first such annual report was published, somewhat belatedly, on 25 March 1999. We were concerned to note that despite the important consultative role played by DFID in the consideration of ELAs the annual report is signed off by the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Trade and Industry, but not by the Secretary of State for International Development. We consider that all departments involved in the scrutiny of ELAs should be responsible for the Annual Report on Strategic Exports. To exclude DFID is to suggest that its voice and the developmental perspective on conflict are somehow marginal or secondary. This is unacceptable. We recommend that future annual reports on strategic exports are also signed off by the Secretary of State for International Development.

The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

153. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was agreed on 8 June 1998. The DFID memorandum points out that "EU member states are amongst the world's leading arms exporters with about 35 per cent of the world market (with the UK alone accounting for around 60 per cent of EU arms exports)". The EU Code aims "to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency".[238] The Committee received a number of submissions which considered either the draft of the Code, or later the final agreed version. Member states have agreed to a number of criteria in the issuing if arms export licences. Licences should be refused if the export would be in contravention of an international commitment, such as sanctions, if there is a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression, if the export would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate tensions or conflicts in the country of destination, if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the export aggressively against another state. Furthermore, member states will "take into account" in issuing licences the national security of the member states of the EU and that of friendly and allied countries, the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable circumstances, and the compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the country.

154. The member states will assess export licence applications on a case-by-case basis in line with these criteria, informing the other member states of any licence application which is rejected. If another member state wishes to grant a licence for "an essentially identical transaction" within three years of that refusal the member state must first consult with the member state that had issued the denial. If, after consultation, it is decided to proceed with the granting of a licence the member state must notify the member state which had issued the denial with a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

155. The UK NGO Code Working Group made a number of criticisms of the provisions of the Code. There is no timeframe for the giving of notice on the denial of a licence. The Working Group claimed that "If denials are not issued quickly, member states may unwillingly grant a licence which another has refused".[239] There is also no obligation to inform other countries of those licences that have been granted. This was, according to the Working Group, "a serious omission - regimes which abuse human rights will presumably apply for arms to the country most likely to grant the licence".[240] They also recommended that the consultation on the issuing of a licence denied by another member state should be multilateral within the EU, not just between the two member states concerned. Only thus could a common picture of export policy in the EU be established.[241]

156. Glenys Kinnock, whilst acknowledging that the Code was "very limited" in its scope, emphasised that "it is a very, very important first step".[242] The French Government was responsible for the watering down of the provisions of the Code. She also criticised the fact that discussions between member states under the provisions of the Code were not multilateral. She also pointed out that the Code merely requires the exercise of caution in the export of arms "to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established..".[243]

157. One crucial component of the prevention of conflict in developing countries is control in the flow of arms. For such significant exporters of arms as the member states of the European Union to agree criteria and consultation mechanisms to promote consistency in such exports is a welcome advance. Criteria in decision on the licence such as internal repression, human rights abuses, vulnerability to armed conflict, regional security, and the sustainable development of the country concerned are all important components of a conflict prevention strategy. We agree, however, with the criticisms made of the transparency of the process in its current form. We welcome the introduction of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as an important first step in the harmonisation of international arms export policy. We recommend, however, that it be further improved, in particular that there be a publicly available annual report produced by the Presidency on the operation of the Code which lists for all member states the number of licences refused, for which countries and for what category of equipment, the reason for refusal, and any instance when, after consultation between member states, a licence was nevertheless issued despite a previous refusal from another member state.

Arms Brokers

158. An important development in the arms trade has been the operation of arms brokers. The UK NGO Code Working Group claim that "Many arms deals organised by companies or individuals in the EU involve the transfer of arms and security equipment and services from third countries (such as in Eastern Europe) without the goods or services touching EU soil".[244] Save The Children also argued for a "transparent register of arms traders and brokers operating from the EU".[245] Richard Manning told us that the United Kingdom does "impose controls on trafficking and brokering under a piece of legislation going back to 1946 where it is necessary to implement a binding UN decision. The DTI White Paper on Strategic Export Controls contains proposals to extend such controls to countries subject to other forms of embargo whether as a result of non-binding decisions of the UN or decisions of the European Union, or the UK Government or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. As I understand it, it is proposing also to control the trafficking of, and brokering of deals involving certain types of equipment, the export from the UK of which has been banned because of evidence that goods of the same type have been used in torture".[246]

159. The Government clearly accepts the principle that arms brokering should be controlled in the context of agreed international commitments and sanctions. It would be reasonable for the control of arms brokers to be extended to their activities in brokering arms flows to countries where there are risks of human rights abuses or which are vulnerable to conflict. There is ultimately little difference in either responsibility or effect between exporting arms directly and arranging such exports from a third country. Therefore, we recommend that the Government introduce a register of arms brokers in the United Kingdom and that their activities be controlled by legislation so as to ensure that they do not broker the sale of arms to countries to which the Government would refuse an export licence. We also recommend that the Government press for such regulation of arms brokers across the European Union.

Diversion/End-Use Controls

160. It is clear that in such a market initiatives such as the EU Code on Arms Exports cannot in themselves be enough to tackle arms proliferation. Evidence suggested a number of other measures which can be effective in the control of arms supply. One problem is the selling-on of arms supplied in good faith. Dr Owen Greene said, "One of the key issues, particularly in a number of areas where Britain puts most of its development aid, the arms imports are not properly in the control of the governments themselves. We are exporting to countries where the arms are subsequently diverted to other sources and we have inadequate mechanisms through inadequate monitoring of end-use and so on, to prevent that from happening ... A lot of the prevention of flows is simply improving the capacity of the countries which are receiving them themselves to control their own arms imports".[247] He gave the example of Singapore as a major entrepot for weapons which are subsequently disbursed. Perhaps more common was the use of weapons to reequip armies and then the selling-on of the replaced weapons to third parties.[248]

161. Dr Owen Greene accepted that it was not possible to "control everything that happens to the arms ... after they leave these shores, but what one can do is establish systems with partners which allow one to trace reliably what happens, so that when there are problems you can track back. Quite often you track back and you find either grotesque corruption or illicit trafficking".[249] Dr Joanna Spear acknowledged that light weapons transfers were often commercial, rather than government to government, and involved a large number of small-scale transactions, "However, neither of these reasons indicate that managing the trade in light weapons is impossible, only that it requires more effort than national governments have yet devoted to it".[250]

162. The UK NGO Code Working Group also warned about the diversion of arms exports to conflict-sensitive countries and pointed out that "At the moment all 15 member states [of the EU] operate different end-use systems and there is little to prevent irresponsible end-users from using arms for proscribed purposes such as serious human rights violations ... Similarly such exports can be diverted to countries in regions of instability, and to governments and armed groups which abuse human rights, again without allowing existing contracts to be cancelled".[251] We support the recommendation of the UK NGO Code Working Group that EU countries should agree a common system of end-use controls and that member states should require all recipients to allow follow-up checks on the use made of such exports.[252] We also recommend that at the EU level a body be set up to track weapons transfers, reporting back to the member states. It is vital that export licences be granted or refused on the basis of adequate intelligence. If there is a reasonable risk of diversion then the export licence should be refused.

163. In our current inquiry into the future of sanctions we took evidence from Ambassador Robert Fowler, Canadian Ambassador to the UN and Chair of the UN Sanctions Committee on Angola. He said of the arms supplies to UNITA forces, "Savimbi has earned between US$3 and US$4 billion from his diamond marketing over the past eight years. That buys an awful lot of military equipment. His part of Angola is landlocked. It is not easy to get 50-tonne tanks into that part of Angola, yet he does that. We might usefully concentrate on how he does that".[253] There is here clearly a failure of political will to enforce sanctions and this had led to continuation of conflict on a significant scale. Nothing could more obviously demonstrate the need for a genuine political commitment to end-use controls.

Small arms

164. Whilst export controls are important to prevent further flows of weapons to regions affected by conflict, they will do little to tackle existing stocks of weapons or illegal transfers. In addressing these issues, much of the attention of the international community has focussed on small arms. The control of small arms poses a number of unique problems. They have a relatively long 'shelf life', require few spares and relatively little expertise to use. Their size makes them relatively easy to smuggle and, as a result of numerous low intensity conflicts during the cold-war, they are widely dispersed throughout the globe.

165. The problem of controlling small arms differs from that of major conventional weapons in that much of the conflict which plagues developing countries is not the result of direct exports of new equipment from arms exporters. It is rather the circulation and selling on of small arms, often from existing stockpiles. Dr Joanna Spear summarised, "the current and past state of the international arms market has determined that light weapons are plentiful, fairly cheap, generally robust, available through a variety of legitimate and illegitimate sources and therefore not easily subject to supplier leverage".[254]

166. Dr Joanna Spear thought that "we are a long way from being able to eliminate these types of weapons at the moment because we have both over-capacity in the small arms market, that there are a lot on the market that are very cheap, but more importantly what we have is a lot of states emptying their arsenals and selling these weapons second hand on the market".[255] A particular problem area was the Former Soviet Union where liberalisation of the arms market in the successor states, with minimal regulation, had allowed "individual firms to strike deals and for a black market to develop".[256] As a result of this change in the global arms market, according to Dr Joanna Spear, arms were being sold to groups other than legitimate governments and to states engaged in conflict — both instances where supplier states would not traditionally become involved.[257]

167. We note the fact that much of the light weapon supply originates in the stockpiles of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Oxfam point out in their memorandum, "Given that some of the applicants for EU membership from central and eastern Europe, particularly the Czech Republic, are reported to be among the main centres for the illegal arms trade, the EU should also make it an absolute condition of membership that these governments demonstrate their determination to curb the illicit trafficking of weapons. Their ability to do this may of course depend in turn on EU support".[258] The Council of Europe could also prove to be a useful forum in which to push for effective controls over the exports of light weapons. For DFID to advocate such a course of action, it is of course necessary that the United Kingdom itself be an example and ensure proper controls over any light weapons within the United Kingdom. We recommend that pressure be applied by the United Kingdom both within the EU and within the Council of Europe to ensure that remaining stockpiles of light weapons in member states and applicants are properly controlled and monitored. We request information from the Government on what is done to ensure that small arms presently in the United Kingdom do not end up in conflict-sensitive countries.

EU initiatives

168. On 26 June 1997, the EU Member States adopted Dutch proposals for a Programme for Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms which has particular relevance for the trafficking of light weapons. The Programme sets out measures to: strengthen collective efforts to clamp down on the illicit trafficking of arms; to improve the capacity of developing countries' police and customs authorities; and to reduce the number of weapons in circulation through weapons collection, buy-back and destruction programmes. To date, the Programme has focussed on Southern Africa and a regional action programme aimed at implementing the Programme was endorsed by EU and SADC Foreign Ministers in November 1998.

169. In December 1998, EU Member States also agreed a Joint Action on the European Union's Contribution to Combatting the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Under the Joint Action, the EU, and the UK in particular, have supported a programme in Albania which has sought to jointly encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons and to improve social infrastructure in the region. The EU is currently discussing the implementation of a similar initiative with Cambodia.

170. The EU Development Council in May 1999 also agreed a Resolution on Combatting the Excessive and Uncontrolled Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons as Part of the EU's Emergency Aid, Reconstruction and Development Programmes. The Resolution signifies an acknowledgement that EU Member States are prepared to use development aid for security assistance.

171. We welcome moves made by the EU to address the problems associated with the widespread accumulation and use of light weapons. We urge the Government, in concert with other EU Member States, to continue to seek means by which the stated policy might be put into practice.

Buy-back programmes

172. In addition to control of arms flows, there have been various initiatives to remove arms from circulation after conflict, often linked to demobilisation programmes. There have, for instance, been buy-back programmes encouraging ex-combatants to hand in their weapons. Dr Joanna Spear cited Mozambique as a country where such a programme had seen some success, about 160,000 being handed in.[259] She agreed with Dr Karen von Hippel that "if there is a level of government structure, some sense of organisation within the territory, then it is possible to actually institute certain measures to disarm and demobilise, even though there has not been a full settlement, but if you are in a situation where there really is what we might call state collapse, then the chances of that sort of thing being successful are very limited because disarmament, demobilisation become possible when there is enough of a sense of security that you feel able to trust what is going on".[260] International Alert recommended that DFID "help governments to pursue effective and comprehensive destruction programmes of light weapons".[261]

173. Oxfam referred to the EU's Programme for Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (June 1997) which aimed to support countries "in their efforts to suppress the trade, including through law enforcement, tighter border controls and programmes to buy back weapons from combatants".[262] They did warn that buy back schemes were open to abuse, only a small proportion of arms being handed in or funds received being used to buy further arms and ammunition. They concluded that "Strict restrictions on the time and location of buy back schemes are therefore vital ... It is also important to restrict buy back to where money is really necessary to take arms out of circulation. Unnecessary payments can slow down, rather than speed up disarmament, as former combatants hold out for money".[263]

174. We consider that buy back schemes could well be useful if carefully regulated. There may be alternatives to the giving of cash, other incentives in terms of social provision, or the placing of funds in accounts in trust, which will provide security or future benefit without simply providing more cash for the purchase of arms. We recommend that DFID investigate the possibilities of support for carefully regulated buy back schemes in post-conflict situations, that they look for opportunities to provide assistance to national and regional authorities in their tasks of policing borders and halting the illegal flows of arms in conflict-sensitive areas.

217 Evidence p.321 Back

218 Evidence p.71 Back

219 Evidence p.71 Back

220 See Evidence from Federation of African Peoples Organisation pp.327-331 Back

221 Evidence p.3 Back

222 Evidence p.160 Back

223 Evidence p.160 Back

224 Evidence p.160 Back

225 Evidence p.286 Back

226 Q.613 Back

227 Q.606 Back

228 Q.613 Back