INTRODUCTION
1. There is a worrying discrepancy between the
significant resources already made available to Kosovo and the
neglect of conflicts in other less strategically important parts
of the world. This is not to resent the funds committed to Kosovo,
merely to demand that the conflicts of the developing world, and
sub-Saharan Africa in particular, receive as much international
attention, compassion, generosity and political resolve (paragraph
6).
2. We welcome the initiatives within DFID to give
explicit consideration to conflict issues. These include the creation
within DFID of the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
(CHAD) and the publication of strategy papers such as 'Conflict
Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance'. We also welcome the establishment
within Whitehall of the Inter-Departmental Working Group on Conflict
(paragraph 8).
CONFLICT PREVENTION
3. We do not argue in this Report that violent
conflict is always wrong. We do argue that it is resorted to so
frequently, unjustifiably and harmfully as a result of factors
which can be mitigated and minimised. The measures we are about
to discuss will not end all conflict. They do, however, have the
potential to make the world a safer place (paragraph 25).
4. We recommend that the Government provide the
Committee with its assessment of what increases in ODA are necessary
globally in order to reach the international development targets,
how each donor's contribution to such increases can be agreed,
and what further increase in the United Kingdom's ODA will be
necessary beyond 2002 (paragraph 30).
5. We welcome moves to untie development assistance
to least developed countries and support the Government in its
efforts internationally to achieve greater poverty-focus to development
activity. This is itself an important contribution to conflict
prevention (paragraph 31).
6. We welcome the initial work by DFID on conflict
impact assessments, request that the Government response include
an account of progress in this work, including difficulties encountered,
and recommend that the Government press for such work to be incorporated
into the development analysis of the various multilateral agencies
to which it contributes (paragraph 34).
7. We recommend that DFID provide details in both
its country strategy papers and its Departmental Report of how
interventions in the economic and social sectors of developing
countries have taken account of excluded and marginalised groups
and have attempted to remedy such exclusion (paragraph 35).
8. All trade policy decisions must assess the
impact on vulnerable economies and societies before introducing
any significant alteration of terms of trade, and agree packages
of assistance, where necessary, to help the developing country
economy diversify and adjust to the new circumstances (paragraph
36).
9. The trade proposals put forward by the Commission
for the renegotiation of the Lomé Convention demonstrate
how far the EU has to go in terms of integrating conflict sensitivity
into its trade policy. It is disgraceful that independent studies
of the proposal were commissioned only just before the deadline
for the agreement of the mandate. We are well aware that the EU
has to balance domestic interests with those of the developing
world. There can be no excuse, however, for failing to consider
the impact of such far-reaching proposals on conflict in developing
countries. We recommend that the EU make it mandatory for all
trade policy proposals to include an assessment of their impact
on poverty and conflict in relevant developing countries (paragraph
41).
10. We also recommend that in negotiations on
the Lomé Convention the EU give much greater weight to
an enhanced Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) as an alternative
to the Free Trade Area proposal (paragraph 41).
11. We criticise the omission from DTI's Annual
Report and Strategic Framework of adequate discussion of development.
We recommend that DTI remedy this omission and demonstrate the
policy coherence which is meant to exist within Whitehall. We
will continue to examine the documents and actions of other government
departments to ensure that the development is genuinely considered
as a cross-cutting issue throughout Government (paragraph 44).
12. We recommend that the Lomé Convention
increase its commitment to conflict prevention through an increase
both in funding and programmes dedicated to good governance, democracy,
human rights and institutional reform (paragraph 46).
13. We welcome this commitment from DFID to institution-building.
Such work should of course be supported by all relevant government
and government-funded activity. We would draw attention to the
work of the British Council in particular and request information
on how the British Council is engaged in conflict prevention through
institution-building (paragraph 47).
14. We welcome DFID's support for the establishment
of an impartial and fair media in conflict-prone countries. We
would encourage this work and ask that the Government response
to this Report give further details of such support and set out
how DFID and the FCO are cooperating with the BBC World Service
in providing conflict-sensitive and peace-building broadcasts
to the developing world. We also urge DFID to support the restoration
of training, education and exchange schemes for journalists (paragraph
48).
15. Jane Sharp thought that "in most conflicts
we are not short of early warning - we are very short of political
will - and I think that sometimes, particularly in the United
Kingdom, you have staff in British Embassies overseas who could
be monitoring human rights abuses, but in fact invest a lot of
time pursuing arms contracts" (paragraph 52).
16. We accept the Secretary of State's point that
early warning systems cannot be mechanistic. There are, however,
circumstances such as increasing violence, arms flows, inflammatory
media attacks on minorities, which suggest imminent conflict.
It could well be clear signals and possibly assistance from the
international community which would then make the difference between
war and peace (paragraph 54).
17. We recommend that the Government in its response
provide the Committee with an assessment of the current effectiveness
of early warning mechanisms within the UN and EU, and how they
can be improved (paragraph 55).
18. Conflict prevention must be at the heart of
the work of the UN. Any effective early warning system should
be international and the UN is therefore the obvious focus for
such information. There needs to be agreement on warning signals
both of longer-term risks and of imminent dangers; agreed information
routes to the UN from member states, the EU, regional organisations,
NGOs, business and civil society; clear policy on the dissemination
of early warning and those circumstances in which the issue automatically
appears on the agenda of the Security Council. There is no shortage
of information on the risks of conflict. We need effective mechanisms
to formalise such international information flows and ensure official
and high-level attention. This may well not be enough in every
instance to prevent conflict. We do, however, consider that such
action can reduce the incidence of conflict and at the very least
ensure adequate preparation by relevant international agencies.
We recommend that the United Kingdom Government press for such
a strengthening of the UN's early warning capacity (paragraph
56).
19. We are entitled to ask what protests were
made to the Rwandan Government by the IMF or the World Bank about
the discrimination against and intimidation of Tutsis during these
years. As two of the most powerful international institutions
in contact with the Rwandan Government their concerns if expressed
early enough might have proved important interventions. Neither
organisation recognised the direct link between growing social
tension, human rights abuses and the subsequent destruction of
the entire economic infrastructure (paragraph 59).
20. We recommend that conflict-impact assessments
be undertaken before any introduction of IMF and World Bank structural
adjustment programmes; that all World Bank country assistance
strategies take explicit account of risks of conflict and how
they can be mitigated where relevant; that the IMF and the World
Bank provide for the monitoring of programmes to ensure that social,
poverty and conflict indicators are continually taken into account;
and that programmes are designed so as to be appropriately flexible
where necessary. We also recommend that the future Government
Annual Reports on Human Rights include an assessment of the human
rights record of the IMF and World Bank (paragraph 62).
21. We also believe that human rights and good
governance are essential not only to conflict prevention but to
economic sustainability. No longer can we separate economic and
political rights, nor deem them anything less than universal.
We accept that for the IMF and the World Bank to cease operation
in a country the circumstances must be extreme. There are, however,
many steps before that final one. These include care in the initial
formulation of programmes, assistance to sectors which will encourage
institution-building and good governance, the inclusion of good
governance conditions in any SAP, rewards for improvement in governance,
frank and transparent dialogue with governments to assist in improvements
and reform. We recommend that the United Kingdom Government press
the World Bank and the IMF to adopt a detailed conflict-prevention
strategy which will include greater sensitivity and engagement
with issues of good governance and political and human rights
(paragraph 63).
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
22. Donors must accept that demobilisation is
not only vitally important but also risky. Demobilisation and
reintegration require sophisticated and detailed information about
the particular context. They also require prompt and sustained
commitment, both political and financial, from donors. We welcome
DFID's willingness to engage in this work and recommend that they
use their influence in multilateral institutions to encourage
the commitment of funds and expertise at an early date to such
programmes. It is essential that DFID coordinate with MoD in such
work and advice on demobilisation. MoD has important expertise
in this area (paragraph 70).
23. The increasing use of children is one of the
most deplorable aspects of modern conflict (paragraph 73).
24. Given the importance of cultural sensitivity,
we consider that the reintegration of child soldiers should, wherever
possible, be locally organised and run, with international support
and funds as appropriate. There is otherwise a great danger of
imposing unhelpful and alien cultural preconceptions (paragraph
73).
25. There is an important role for NGOs in engaging
with warring factions in a discussion of humanitarian law and
the unacceptability of the use of children in conflict (paragraph
74).
26. We consider there is an important opportunity
to influence those in conflict through NGOs and others engaging
with communities abroad which are known to have an influence with
the factions. A clear message sent to such communities on the
need to end the use of child soldiers could have a real impact.
It is of course important that the United Kingdom lead by example
and ensure that no soldier under the age of eighteen is deployed
in a conflict situation, be it in a warzone or peacekeeping operation
(paragraph 74).
27. There is no mention in DFID's policy statement
on 'Poverty and the security sector' of training of the judiciary
and though this form of institutional support might not strictly
be part of the security sector it would be interesting to learn
how DFID sees the interface between security sector and judiciary
reform (paragraph 76).
28. We welcome the proposal for cooperation between
DFID, the FCO and the MoD on security sector reform and trust
that they will pursue the same objectives in their activities.
In particular, any such assistance, from whichever department,
must be wholly consistent with human rights and the developmental
good of the relevant country. (Paragraph 77).
29. DFID state in their paper on security sector
reform, "We can only work where there are legitimate civilian
authorities with the capacity to control the security forces,
who recognise the need for reform and want our assistance and
are ready to play an active part in the process". We agree
wholeheartedly with this. Support in the past for, say, reform
of the Indonesian police force, has always been unlikely to succeed
while their masters abuse human rights with impunity. We encourage
the Government to be stringent in their requirement that these
conditions are met. On no account should ineffective training
from United Kingdom Government departments provide spurious legitimacy
or merit to corrupt, undemocratic regimes (paragraph 78).
30. It is vital that the international community
have as a priority in post-conflict situations the provision of
justice. There must be the necessary and prompt funding for courts,
judges, court staff, police training and legal processes. Only
thus can it be evident that there is an alternative to violence
for the resolution of disputes. We recommend that DFID continue
and expand its support for this aspect of post-conflict reconstruction.
There should be no embarrassment at funds being spent, for example,
on the provision of prisons where necessary, or on the provision
and training of lawyers and police. We are concerned at the lack
of an adequate police force in Kosovo, which is impeding reconciliation
and reconstruction (Paragraph 81).
31. We are disappointed that the legislation to
allow the United Kingdom to ratify the Statute of the International
Criminal Court has not yet been introduced in Parliament and we
recommend that it be included in the legislative programme of
the next session (paragraph 84).
32. We consider the development of truth commissions
to be an important and innovative contribution to post-conflict
reconstruction. Each post-conflict situation is different and
such a commission would not be appropriate on every occasion.
We recommend, however, that DFID consider positively opportunities
to support the establishment and functioning of truth commissions.
There must be certain pre-conditions for DFID support - we do
not consider general or 'blanket' amnesties to be acceptable;
there must be consistency between the operation of the truth commission
and international responsibilities in relation to the International
Criminal Court; truth commissions will in general be more effective
and thus more worthy of support if the result of a genuinely democratic
and inclusive decision-making process. We emphasise that Truth
Commissions do not remove the necessity of prosecution for serious
war crimes, genocide and human rights abuses (paragraph 91).
33. There appears to be a consensus at least that
coordination amongst donors is not done well and should be done
better, and that such coordination is at a premium in post-conflict
situations. We welcome the UNDAF initiative and recommend that
it be applied as soon as possible in post-conflict countries.
There must also be coordination between the UNDAF process and
the work of the Bretton Woods Institutions and other bilateral
and multilateral donors. All donors should make it a requirement
of their own post-conflict strategies that there be a detailed
account of how their activities will be coordinated with others.
In every post-conflict situation there should be a prompt and
high-level international conference of donors to agree an analysis
of the situation and an overall approach (paragraph 96).
34. Barbara Kelly, speaking of the need for a
longer-term financial commitment to Rwanda, explained that "the
thing that drew us to a closer involvement with the Bank and the
Fund on Rwanda was, in fact, the publication of the ESAF programme
which identified a rather modest budgetary forecast for the next
three years, with a relatively small increase on education and
health expenditure ... This concerned us because ... Rwanda's
needs are enormous and as a post-conflict country they need to
do things quickly, both to bind the work they are doing on reconciliation
and to alleviate the dire poverty" (paragraph 99).
35. We congratulate the Government on the initiative
they have taken to ensure some stability and predictability of
funding for Rwanda. We are convinced that the success of this
initiative can be a model for post-conflict reconstruction in
other countries. We consider such longer-term funding commitments,
under clear and transparent conditions, to be the best way to
entrench good practice in post-conflict administrations (paragraph
101).
36. We recommend that in all post-conflict situations
there be meetings between donors, the IMF and the World Bank to
agree a coordinated and longer-term funding strategy for the country
concerned which will ensure the funds necessary for post-conflict
reconstruction and adequate spending on the social sectors (paragraph
102).
37. The prime responsibility of the international
community in a post-conflict situation is to ensure that the legitimate
government is adequately funded for its task of capacity building
and social sector support. Funding for NGO strategies should aim
at the strengthening of local and national government capacity
rather than an effective privatisation and fragmenting of social
provision (paragraph 103).
38. We recommend that DFID provide assistance
to the Rwandan Government for its secondary and tertiary education
systems. This is an essential element in the provision of education
for all. Moreover, if equitably administered it might well be
the means of furthering reconciliation between the communities
in the country (paragraph 109).
CONFLICT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
.
39 All business activity in developing countries
must be conflict-sensitive (paragraph 111).
40. We recommend that the DTI and FCO in their
advice to British business on developing countries include as
a matter of course information on risks of conflict and actual
conflict in the country, with advice on how employment, investment
and social policies can minimise social tensions. We also recommend
that the DTI country papers include such information (paragraph
112).
41. We recommend that DFID discuss with representatives
of the private sector the inclusion in Codes of Conduct of advice
on practice in conflict situations (paragraph 113).
42. We recommend that the Government bring in
legislation in the next session of Parliament to criminalise the
bribery of foreign public officials and cease the tax deductibility
of such bribes. We also expect all businesses dealing with the
developing world to have in place clear and regularly monitored
anti-corruption standards (paragraph 115).
43. It is unacceptable for competition to be used
as a reason for the private sector failing to use its influence
in the development of a country. More work needs to be done on
core standards for business in developing countries, with agreements,
particularly amongst the extractive industries, as to how their
influence can be collectively exercised to promote social development
and a productive use of the revenues they generate (paragraph
118).
44. We recommend that DFID and the Prince of Wales
Business Leaders Forum promote agreements in this area (paragraph
118).
45. The Trade and Industry Committee has recently
produced a Report on ethical trading and we echo their welcome
of the Ethical Trading Initiative. The ethical trade and fair
trade movements are an essential component of any move to make
private sector practice in developing countries conflict-sensitive
(paragraph 119).
46. As a first step to effective international
control of war economies, we recommend that the WTO establish
a research unit with the necessary funding and powers to investigate
the origins of products and the mechanisms of war economies. This
should provide the necessary basis for action to reduce the funding
of conflict, through measures such as 'smart' sanctions and ethical
trading initiatives (paragraph 122).
47. We consider that donors and development agencies
should attempt to reach a common position on the principles use
of private security firms in developing countries. Prior to the
crisis which led to the NATO bombing campaign, the United States
had decided to use a private security firm as its contribution
to an OSCE monitoring force in Bosnia. The proposed use of private
security firms by a state to fulfil its international obligations
is a particularly radical development in the deployment of such
companies (and one we deplore) (paragraph 126).
48. We support the recommendations of the Foreign
Affairs Committee which call for the United Kingdom Government
to pursue both unilateral and multilateral measures to bring the
activities of non-governmental military companies under some form
of legislative control. Any Green Paper should consider what regulation
might be necessary not only for mercenaries but for all other
aspects of private security operations. It should consider how
to ensure that these goods and services conform to ethical standards
and assist the prevention and resolution of conflict rather than
its increase (paragraph 129).
49. The provision by BP of equipment to the Colombian
army brigade is regrettable, given that they had been accused
of human rights abuses (paragraph 136).
50. We recommend that any Code of Practice adopted
by the private sector on operation in conflict-sensitive areas
include a commitment from industry not to purchase or provide
arms, security equipment or advice for state security forces.
Relationships with any government in this area should involve
simply payment of tax, clear expression of appropriate security
requirements, discussion of how the industry and government might
work as partners to invest revenue equitably back into the country
and region, and representations to government on human rights
abuses (paragraph 137).
ARMS PROLIFERATION
51. Determined and principled control of arms
exports is a litmus test of this Government's concern to prevent
conflict and inject an ethical dimension into foreign policy (paragraph
138).
52. The lack of proportion between the expenditure
of developing countries on arms and their expenditure on the social
sectors is a scandal, and one in which many developed arms-exporting
countries are implicated (paragraph 139).
53. There can be no prima facie calculation of
what is excessive military spending. It has to be decided on a
case by case basis, taking account of the threats to the security
of the country (paragraph 142).
54. Account should also be taken, however, of
the insecurity resulting from social neglect, and we would certainly
expect Governments to demonstrate a significant commitment to
the social sectors if they also wished their military budgeting
to be taken seriously (paragraph 142).
55. Having visited both Uganda and Rwanda, and
having seen the devastation and trauma caused by ongoing conflict,
we have considerable sympathy with the concerns of both Governments
to maintain security. Such security is a necessary precondition
for development. We are disappointed by some of the critical comments
we heard within the United Nations and recommend that the United
Kingdom Government continue to argue for understanding of the
security priorities of Uganda and Rwanda within the international
community, along with advocacy for their developmental needs (paragraph
144).
56. We recommend that the Inter-Departmental Working
Group on Conflict agree policies on the security requirements
of particular developing countries (paragraph 145).
57. Such agreed policies should prevent any United
Kingdom official from pursuing unnecessary and harmful arms purchases.
We request information from the Inter-Departmental Working Group
on Conflict on their work to date and conclusions reached (paragraph
145).
58. There is, however, a need for more shared
assessment and discussion of the legitimate security needs of
poor countries. We welcome the work being done in the OECD and
the International Financial Institutions on the shared analysis
of military spending. We recommend that the OECD, IMF and World
Bank make the securing of shared assessments of the security needs
of developing countries a priority so as to ensure that competition
in strategic arms exports does not lead to profit for the exporter
taking precedence over the stability and development of the developing
world (paragraph 146).
59. We reiterate our recommendation made in a
previous Report that the Government extend indefinitely its moratorium
on the use of export credits for unproductive expenditure and
urge the Government to exert further pressure for the adoption
internationally of such a commitment (paragraph 147).
60. We recommend that the Government state in
their response how the activities of DESO are compatible with
stated policy on conflict prevention and arms control (paragraph
148).
61. We congratulate the Secretary of State on
her openness in providing the Committee with detailed information
on those export licence applications queried by DFID, and consider
this to be an important precedent for Government transparency
in arms export policy and practice (paragraph 151).
62. We criticise the DTI for issuing ELAs to Eritrea
and Indonesia against the advice of DFID. It is clear that the
DTI has yet to take on board effectively the human rights and
conflict concerns which are at the heart of development policy
(paragraph 151).
63. We consider that all departments involved
in the scrutiny of ELAs should be responsible for the Annual Report
on Strategic Exports. To exclude DFID is to suggest that its voice
and the developmental perspective on conflict are somehow marginal
or secondary. This is unacceptable. We recommend that future annual
reports on strategic exports are also signed off by the Secretary
of State for International Development (paragraph 152).
64. We welcome the introduction of the EU Code
of Conduct on Arms Exports as an important first step in the harmonisation
of international arms export policy. We recommend, however, that
it be further improved, in particular that there be a publicly
available annual report produced by the Presidency on the operation
of the Code which lists for all member states the number of licences
refused, for which countries and for what category of equipment,
the reason for refusal, and any instance when, after consultation
between member states, a licence was nevertheless issued despite
a previous refusal from another member state (paragraph 157).
65. We recommend that the Government introduce
a register of arms brokers in the United Kingdom and that their
activities be controlled by legislation so as to ensure that they
do not broker the sale of arms to countries to which the Government
would refuse an export licence. We also recommend that the Government
press for such regulation of arms brokers across the European
Union (paragraph 159).
66. We support the recommendation of the UK NGO
Code Working Group that EU countries should agree a common system
of end-use controls and that member states should require all
recipients to allow follow-up checks on the use made of such exports.
We also recommend that at the EU level a body be set up to track
weapons transfers, reporting back to the member states. It is
vital that export licences be granted or refused on the basis
of adequate intelligence. If there is a reasonable risk of diversion
then the export licence should be refused (paragraph 162).
67. We recommend that pressure be applied by the
United Kingdom both within the EU and within the Council of Europe
to ensure that remaining stockpiles of light weapons in member
states and applicants are properly controlled and monitored. We
request information from the Government on what is done to ensure
that small arms presently in the United Kingdom do not end up
in conflict-sensitive countries (paragraph 167).
68. We welcome moves made by the EU to address
the problems associated with the widespread accumulation and use
of light weapons. We urge the Government, in concert with other
EU Member States, to continue to seek means by which the stated
policy might be put into practice (paragraph 171).
69. We recommend that DFID investigate the possibilities
of support for carefully regulated buy back schemes in post-conflict
situations, that they look for opportunities to provide assistance
to national and regional authorities in their tasks of policing
borders and halting the illegal flows of arms in conflict-sensitive
areas (paragraph 174).
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
70. Once a crisis appears imminent, we agree that
the political and military response of the international community
is of absolute importance. Humanitarian action should never be
used as a substitute for political action. This has happened far
too often in the past. Humanitarian organisations, be they NGOs,
bilateral development ministries or multilateral agencies of the
EU or UN, should always demand a political strategy to accompany
humanitarian intervention (paragraph 182).
71. There has been a traditional emphasis on the
impartiality, independence and neutrality of humanitarian assistance.
We consider such principles to remain important and welcome the
recommitment to impartiality in DFID's new humanitarian principles.
The dilemma facing all donors is how to reconcile the principle
of neutrality with the acknowledgment that humanitarian assistance
always changes the nature of a conflict, becoming a further factor
in the webs of cause and effect, of strategy and counter-strategy
(Paragraph 186).
72. We recommend that the Department in its response
define both humanitarian assistance and development assistance,
distinguishing between the two, and listing the criteria it uses
in deciding in any given instance whether the aid proposed qualifies
as humanitarian or developmental (paragraph 188).
73. We welcome the publication by DFID of its
principles for a new humanitarianism. They should be seen as the
beginning of an international discussion of humanitarian principles,
not the conclusion of debate. Efforts should be made to get such
principles adopted internationally and to achieve coordination
between principles for donors and codes of conduct for NGOs in
complex emergencies (paragraph 192).
74. Whilst ultimately all donors and NGOs have
a responsibility to come to their own judgement of a crisis and
how best to respond, the problems encountered in the case of Sierra
Leone underscore the need for transparency of analysis and discussion
among donors and NGOs (paragraph 192).
75. We agree with Actionaid that it would have
been better to provide humanitarian relief to Sierra Leone (paragraph
192).
76. We question the wisdom of supporting President
Kabbah's government-in-exile from DFID funds, given the responsibility
DFID had at that time to decide on humanitarian relief within
Sierra Leone. It would have been better to use funds from the
FCO. This might have removed the impression of partisanship in
DFID's humanitarian judgements (paragraph 193).
77. We welcome the work being done on the agreement
of humanitarian principles and minimum standards for NGOs working
in conflict situations and congratulate DFID for its support in
this area. In particular, we consider that there needs to be further
effort to ensure that a NGO Code is agreed internationally which
can enjoy both the adherence of all reputable NGOs and the support
of the donor community. The intention should be to move to a system
where no NGO which has not signed up to such principles is funded
or supported in attempts at humanitarian action (paragraph 200).
CONCLUSION
78. The end of the Cold War has brought immense
challenges to the security of peoples and nations. The prevalence
of conflict in poor regions of the world can no longer be seen
as merely a strategic issue, or even as simply a moral issue -
though it is both those things. It is also, and as importantly,
a developmental issue. Unless we can devise approaches to prevent
conflict, development activity will again and again be wasted,
undermined or reversed. Conversely, as this Report makes clear,
it is only in sustainable development that real solutions to endemic
conflict can be found. There is now a considerable body of shared
analysis and wisdom on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.
We point in this Report to some of the ways that politicians should
act to learn and apply those lessons. To do so requires a degree
of commitment and coordination not previously attempted. Not to
do so is to miss the opportunity to make the lives of millions
immeasurably safer and better (paragraph 202).
