(i) Most of the
police forces visited by the National Audit Office had taken initiatives
to ensure that handgun owners and dealers understood the surrender
arrangements. They secured the co-operation of the majority of
handgun owners, and the surrenders went smoothly with no major
incidents (paragraph 21).
(ii) Most forces' estimates of the numbers
of handguns legally held before the surrender began were not reliable
- actual surrendered handguns came within ten per cent of
estimate in only 16 out of the 51 police forces. Sixteen of the
26 police forces visited by the National Audit Office considered
that all relevant handguns had been surrendered and the remainder
were following up cases with 35 owners, three-quarters of which
had been resolved by September 1998. The Home Office told us that
it was confident that individual forces had accounted for all
the handguns held by certificate-holders in their area, although
it seemed to have drawn its assurance largely from the work of
the National Audit Office. We consider that the Home Office should
have explored with forces the scope for reconciling their estimates
with actual handguns surrendered as the surrenders progressed
in order to show whether all legally held handguns had been surrendered
or otherwise accounted for (paragraph 22).
(iii) The same records that gave unreliable
estimates of handguns are still being used for recording firearms
that remain legal. We are concerned about the slow progress on
the central register of firearm and shotgun certificates, which
was proposed in the 1997 Firearms (Amendment) Act. Whilst we understand
the need to set the priority for the register against other developments
of the Police National Computer, we are disappointed that the
work on implementing the register is not more advanced. We note
that the development of the computer application to support the
register will only be starting during this financial year. The
Home Office should ensure that this work is undertaken in parallel
with other developments where possible, rather than waiting until
they are complete (paragraph 23).
(iv) The Home Office did not develop a timely
strategy for the receipt, storage and disposal of ammunition.
The Home Office told us that serious work on the scheme was restarted
after the General Election and it then consulted with the Health
and Safety Executive about the disposal of ammunition. We do not
agree that work need have been inhibited by the General Election,
since the broad policy had cross-party support (paragraph 24).
(v) The police had expected most ammunition
to be used up, but close to the start of the surrender it became
clear that substantial quantities would be handed in. We consider
that the Home Office should have had contingency plans which would
have avoided the need for police forces to employ contractors
at short notice to dispose of the large quantities of ammunition
building up. Although the National Audit Office found no evidence
that surrendered ammunition had been resubmitted for compensation
or sold on, they were unable to gain assurance that forces' arrangements
for disposal would ensure the destruction of all ammunition. For
example, few of the forces visited had arranged formal contracts
and they had only specified orally the means of destruction to
be used (paragraph 25).
