House of Commons - Public Accounts

Select Committee on Public Accounts Twentieth Report

HOME OFFICE: HANDGUN SURRENDER AND COMPENSATION

On the design of the schemes and payment of compensation

(vii) The National Audit Office found that the forces visited had put in some controls to ensure that claims were in accordance with the requirements of the schemes and to reduce the risk of fraud. For example, police staff observed the handguns being destroyed. However, the Home Office issued no guidance to forces on controls over the risk of error and fraud. The National Audit Office identified some control failures, for example six forces detected fraudulent claims for ammunition after they had been made, and one of these could not pursue the claimant because the surrendered material had not been labelled with the claimant's details. Irregularities have been under investigation in one force not visited by the National Audit Office (paragraph 45).

(viii) The Home Office made no commitments on the time it would take to process claims, although it had aimed to deal with all claims in 18 months. Internal targets for paying all large-calibre and ex-gratia small-calibre claims for compensation at prescribed rates by the end of March 1998 and claims with valuations by the end of December 1998 were not met. We consider it unsatisfactory that many claimants have had to wait for more than a year for compensation (paragraph 46).

(ix) The Home Office originally estimated that its Firearms Compensation Section would process around 4,000 claims per week, but the section only managed to clear 1,050 claims for compensation at prescribed rates on average per week. The rate dropped later to 415 a week for the more complex claims requiring valuations. Even so, the Home Office did not increase the numbers of staff employed on the section until October 1998, some 15 months after processing began and in the face of its commitment to deal with all claims in 18 months. We consider that the Home Office might have improved its performance in processing claims by acting more promptly to raise staff numbers while volumes of the more straightforward claims were still being processed (paragraph 47).

(x) Difficulties with the computer system contributed to delays in processing claims. It is important that the lessons of this system's implementation are learned, and we are therefore concerned that the proposed post-implementation review has been postponed. In view of the difficulties with the software, the review should include the respective responsibilities of the Home Office and the contractor, and procedures for resolving system failures. The review should now be given appropriate priority so that all the lessons can be drawn quickly and applied to the management of future projects (paragraph 48).

THE SURRENDER AND DESTRUCTION OF HANDGUNS AND AMMUNITION

6. Over 162,000 handguns and 700 tonnes of ammunition were compulsorily surrendered to local police stations between July 1997 and February 1998. The surrender was the main measure in response to the tragic events of 13 March 1996, when Thomas Hamilton walked into Dunblane Primary School armed with four handguns and 743 rounds of ammunition and shot dead 16 children and their teacher, and wounded 10 other children and three other teachers. Under the first Firearms (Amendment) Act of 1997 large-calibre handguns became prohibited from 1 July 1997, with owners having until 30 September 1997 to dispose of them lawfully, and small-calibre handguns became prohibited from 1 February 1998, with disposal by 28 February 1998.[3]

7. As a first step in managing the surrender and compensation schemes, the Home Office and the police needed to contact handgun owners and dealers to ensure that they were aware of the terms of the prohibition and surrender. The Home Office provided booklets for the police to distribute to handgun owners and dealers, explaining the requirements of the legislation and the terms of the compensation. In addition, most of the 26 (out of 51) forces visited by the National Audit Office had undertaken other initiatives to ensure the arrangements were clearly understood. For example, 23 of the 26 forces had used local media to spread information about the schemes, and 12 had arranged meetings for firearms holders and dealers. Although in law owners did not have to surrender their handguns until the final day of the surrender periods, police were able to manage an orderly surrender, with many operating appointment systems to spread the surrenders. The Home Office and the police thus achieved the largest peacetime movement of arms and ammunition with the co-operation of handgun owners and without serious incident.[4]

8. In evidence given to Lord Cullen's enquiry into the Dunblane tragedy, the Home Office and police had estimated in April 1996 that about 200,000 handguns were held legally. In March 1997, three months before the start of the first surrender period, the Association of Chief Police Officers obtained updated estimates from English and Welsh forces of the numbers of handguns expected to be surrendered. The total estimate, including figures for Scottish forces was 187,000 legally-held handguns.[5]

9. The Home Office told us that neither of the forces' estimates of handguns legally held before the surrender was accurate. The first had been done quickly for the Cullen enquiry, before the passing of the 1997 Acts which defined the handguns to be prohibited. It would have included firearms subsequently not prohibited under the legislation. The Home Office did not regard the second estimate as an accurate census using the new definitions in the Acts, but as a scoping exercise to size the scheme and help set provision in the Supply Estimates for compensation. The Home Office had not used the estimate for control purposes.[6]

10. In the event, just over 162,000 handguns were surrendered. The records of individual police forces showed wide discrepancies in many forces between estimates and the actual handguns surrendered, with only 16 out of the 51 forces coming within 10 per cent of their estimate. Even areas with small numbers of surrendered handguns, such as the City of London and Fife, had collected in widely varying numbers compared with their estimate (33 per cent more and 21 per cent fewer respectively). The Home Office agreed that some forces may not have produced good estimates.[7]

11. There is no nationally agreed classification of firearms, and the 1997 Acts' definition of handguns was different from terms used in previous Firearms Acts on which police records were based. All police forces keep records of information contained on firearm certificates, but the ease with which information can be extracted or analysed varies with the different systems used. The systems do not record dealers' stocks, because dealers do not require certificates unless they are the personal owner of the firearm. Dealers must keep a register of their business's transactions to cover at least five years. However, if a firearm was sold to a dealer, exported or destroyed before October 1997 the owner was not required to inform the police, so forces' records on certificates could be out of date. All these factors contributed to the inaccuracy of the estimates of handguns subject to surrender. The Home Office did not ask police forces to check the accuracy of their estimates as the surrenders progressed, and although it would have been possible to have started the exercise with a fresh census of firearms against the definitions in the Acts, the Home Office considered that this would have taken a lot of police time and delayed the start of the schemes.[8]

12. The Home Office's figures show that, in addition to the 162,000 handguns surrendered, at least 25,000 further handguns were otherwise accounted for, suggesting that slightly more handguns have been collected than expected. However, the National Audit Office found that the data underpinning these figures were incomplete and unreliable, so there are no national statistics on how many formerly legally held handguns remain unaccounted for. This, together with the lack of reliable estimates, means that it is not possible to compare on a national basis the estimates of the number of handguns to be surrendered with those actually surrendered or otherwise accounted for.[9]

13. The Home Office could not provide absolute assurance that no handguns had been unlawfully retained, but was reasonably satisfied that individual police forces had ensured that prohibited handguns in their area had either been surrendered or otherwise lawfully disposed of. The Home Office assured us that individual forces had accurate records of firearms held on firearms certificates. They had used these to follow up firearms which were to be surrendered under the terms of the Acts, and had made adequate checks on handguns claimed to have been otherwise lawfully disposed of, for example by owners sending them abroad. Sixteen of the 26 police forces the National Audit Office visited considered that they had satisfied themselves that all relevant handguns had been traced and those prohibited surrendered. The remaining ten had been unable to account for the handguns held by a total of 35 owners by the end of the surrender period, although by September 1998 over three-quarters of these cases had been resolved.[10]

14. The Home Office's view of forces' actions was not based on knowledge of checks undertaken force by force. The Home Office appeared to derive most of its assurance from the results of the National Audit Office's examination, which it valued as a source of information on what had happened on the ground. We were concerned that the Home Office had not done more itself to gain assurance directly, for example by asking forces to maintain records as the surrender progressed to show whether all legally held handguns had been surrendered or otherwise accounted for.[11]

15. The intention of the prohibition under the 1997 firearms legislation was to remove handguns from civilian ownership, and thereby also from the risk of being used in crime. The restrictions were targeted at handguns because of the particular dangers they represent to public safety, since they are portable and easy to conceal. The Home Office explained that there had been some substitution of handguns with other legally held firearms. At the end of 1996 there were 418,300 firearms covered by firearms certificates. By the end of 1997 there were 305,000, a reduction of 113,000 compared with the 162,000 handguns handed in. But in terms of firearms certificates, the reduction is only 6 per cent, so the number of people actively engaged in firearms sports is not much reduced. There was no intention to restrict further the availability of other types of legally held firearm, and the Home Office emphasised that shooters had acquired these firearms legitimately for the purpose of pursuing their sport.[12]

16. The Home Office assured us that the local records covering the 305,000 firearms on firearms certificates which continue to be legally held are accurate. However the central register of firearm and shotgun certificates, which was proposed in the 1997 Firearms (Amendment) Act and had been endorsed earlier in the recommendations in Lord Cullen's October 1996 report, has not yet been implemented.[13]

17. The Home Office told us that the proposed register and related guidance to police forces would address concerns about the quality of information on firearms and provide a clearer picture of the type and number of firearms that are held legally. The register was being taken forward as part of the development of the Police/Home Office Extended Name Index on the Police National Computer, so that the register could be accessed by forces nationwide. A detailed user requirement for the register had been completed, and further work was now required to undertake an impact assessment and to consider the register's priority against other developments such as links to the new Criminal Record Bureau and an enhanced computer facility relating to sex offenders. The Home Office said that work would be done in parallel on different developments if this proved possible, but could not say when the register would be available, although it had been included in the work plan for product developments in 1999-2000.[14]

18. We asked the Home Office about the planning of ammunition disposal and were told that it was only after the General Election that serious work on the scheme restarted. The Home Office and the police had expected that handgun owners would retain their firearms until the last moment and fire off most of their ammunition in order to make most use of their handguns while they lawfully had them. However, it became apparent in May 1997 that much more ammunition would be handed in than had been expected.[15]

19. Police forces were allowed to dispose of ammunition as soon as possible on safety grounds. The Home Office did not seek advice from the Health and Safety Executive on the legal requirements for the storage, transport and destruction of ammunition and its components until 15 May 1997. Before they became aware of the large amounts of ammunition which would be surrendered, police forces had planned to rely on the armed forces to dispose of ammunition under arrangements intended to cover items presenting a danger to the public. However, the Home Office did not consult the Ministry of Defence until June 1997. There was no lack of willingness to assist on the part of the Ministry, but the availability of military personnel qualified to check the safety of quantities ammunition was limited, and any assistance with surrendered material could be provided only as a last resort.[16]

20. The Home Office identified a number of contractors who would be prepared to carry out the task of disposing of ammunition safely, and sent details to forces. It also agreed contracts for the destruction of ammunition with the Defence Evaluation Research Agency and Royal Ordnance, but only as a fall back because the Association of Chief Police Officers did not favour a mandatory central contract. The Home Office did not recommend or require forces to use the contractors it identified, or scrutinise the firms chosen by the police to ensure that they were properly qualified and licensed for the task. Stocks of ammunition quickly began to build up in some forces; for example, Cheshire received around 17,000 rounds of ammunition during the first week of the surrender. Individual forces had to make arrangements at short notice for contractors to dispose of ammunition. The National Audit Office found that few of the forces they visited had entered into formal contracts, and they only specified orally the means of destruction to be used. The rates they paid to contractors to dispose of ammunition varied widely.[17]

Conclusions

21. Most of the police forces visited by the National Audit Office had taken initiatives to ensure that handgun owners and dealers understood the surrender arrangements. They secured the co-operation of the majority of handgun owners, and the surrenders went smoothly with no major incidents.

22. Most forces' estimates of the numbers of handguns legally held before the surrender began were not reliable - actual surrendered handguns came within ten per cent of estimate in only 16 out of the 51 police forces. Sixteen of the 26 police forces visited by the National Audit Office considered that all relevant handguns had been surrendered and the remainder were following up cases with 35 owners, three-quarters of which had been resolved by September 1998. The Home Office told us that it was confident that individual forces had accounted for all the handguns held by certificate-holders in their area, although it seemed to have drawn its assurance largely from the work of the National Audit Office. We consider that the Home Office should have explored with forces the scope for reconciling their estimates with actual handguns surrendered as the surrenders progressed in order to show whether all legally held handguns had been surrendered or otherwise accounted for.

23. The same records that gave unreliable estimates of handguns are still being used for recording firearms that remain legal. We are concerned about the slow progress on the central register of firearm and shotgun certificates, which was proposed in the 1997 Firearms (Amendment) Act. Whilst we understand the need to set the priority for the register against other developments of the Police National Computer, we are disappointed that the work on implementing the register is not more advanced. We note that the development of the computer application to support the register will only be starting during this financial year. The Home Office should ensure that this work is undertaken in parallel with other developments where possible, rather than waiting until they are complete.

24. The Home Office did not develop a timely strategy for the receipt, storage and disposal of ammunition. The Home Office told us that serious work on the scheme was restarted after the General Election and it then consulted with the Health and Safety Executive about the disposal of ammunition. We do not agree that work need have been inhibited by the General Election, since the broad policy had cross-party support.

25. The police had expected most ammunition to be used up, but close to the start of the surrender it became clear that substantial quantities would be handed in. We consider that the Home Office should have had contingency plans which would have avoided the need for police forces to employ contractors at short notice to dispose of the large quantities of ammunition building up. Although the National Audit Office found no evidence that surrendered ammunition had been resubmitted for compensation or sold on, they were unable to gain assurance that forces' arrangements for disposal would ensure the destruction of all ammunition. For example, few of the forces visited had arranged formal contracts and they had only specified orally the means of destruction to be used.

THE DESIGN OF THE SCHEMES AND PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION

26. Compensation was payable to handgun owners and dealers for prohibited firearms surrendered at designated police stations, provided they were legally in possession of the items on or immediately before the dates the prohibitions were announced. The relevant dates were 16 October 1996 for large-calibre handguns and 14 May 1997 for small-calibre handguns. The Acts also gave powers to make payments for ancillary equipment and ammunition owned on or immediately before these dates which were designed or adapted for use with such prohibited firearms, provided they had no practicable use in connection with any other legal firearm.[18]

27. The Home Office drew up the coverage and terms of the compensation schemes and made payments of compensation to claimants. The Home Office told us that it had been necessary to move quickly in order to meet the policy objective of removing handguns from civilian hands as quickly as possible. It had to solve problems as it went along, for example with the claim form which had been adjusted in the light of difficulties experienced by claimants in providing the right information. The Home Office was not convinced that more time spent on perfecting the design of the schemes would have saved time later on making compensation payments. However it accepted the principle that wherever possible there should be sufficient time to plan an exercise carefully, and if this could be afforded, it was time well spent.[19]

28. Claimants could choose one of three options for payment for each item they surrendered. Option A was a flat rate payment, Option B a payment for a specific make of handgun, ammunition or ancillary equipment as shown in lists of values set out in the schemes, and Option C was a payment based on full market value, for which the claimant needed to provide documentary evidence. Claims under Option A or B were more convenient for the claimant and simpler for police forces and the Home Office to process.[20]

29. The Option B lists needed to be comprehensive, but the Home Office did not commission anyone from outside the Department with technical expertise in firearms to help in constructing the Option B lists, and many common models of handguns were not listed. All the police forces visited by the National Audit Office considered that the large number of common makes of handgun missing from the Option B list was the greatest weakness in the scheme. The Home Office accepted with hindsight that the Option B list could have been expanded, and that the omissions had forced claimants to use the more burdensome Option C. The Home Office had taken advice, particularly from the Firearms Industry Compensation Group, as the schemes developed, but had felt that it would be irresponsible to base the initial design of the scheme on advice from those who would have claimed compensation, and thus had a financial interest in the outcome. Values used for checking Option C claims came initially from dealers, from magazines and the trade press, which showed market values. The Home Office was able to gain more confidence in the figures it was using as it developed a relationship with the firearms trade and shooters themselves through their associations.[21]

30. The Home Office had overall responsibility for the arrangements for the surrender of handguns, and drew up the compensation schemes. Local police forces were charged with ensuring all handguns were accounted for, receiving surrendered items, storing them, and arranging their destruction. Claims for compensation were submitted to forces at the time of surrender. The Home Office required them to check that items were eligible and correctly entered before forwarding the claims to the Home Office for final checking and payment. The procedures and controls that police forces put in place locally therefore had a direct bearing on whether the Home Office's surrender policy was efficiently and properly implemented, and on the regularity and propriety of compensation payments.[22]

31. The Home Office had to judge how much guidance chief police officers needed to carry out the policy, without overstepping the mark and essentially telling them how to do their jobs. Its aim had been to have the schemes' priorities clearly laid down centrally, with central lists and consistent information to shooters about the schemes. However, the Association of Chief Police Officers wanted, and the Home Office felt forces should have, operational independence to administer the schemes locally. It felt that the nature of the exercise was in any case well specified, requiring forces to check the firearms that they knew were on certificates, store them safely, liaise with the Home Office's Firearms Compensation Section and, when authorised, ensure that the firearms were destroyed.[23]

32. The National Audit Office found that the forces visited had put in some controls to ensure that claims were in accordance with the requirements of the schemes and to reduce the risk of fraud. For example, where forces transferred handguns to smelters or other contractors for destruction, the handguns were accompanied in transit by armed guards, and police staff observed them being destroyed, although they did not always record the destruction. However, there were some inconsistencies in practice between forces such as the steps taken to reduce the risk of collusion between police staff and claimants. The Home Office considered that such differences were an inevitable consequence of devolving authority and giving police forces operational independence, and that more guidance would not have been wanted by the police and would not have helped.[24]

33. We noted in particular that the Home Office gave no guidance to the police on the local procedures and controls necessary to minimise errors and fraud, because it had felt that this was a basic part of Chief Constables' responsibility. In six of the forces visited by the National Audit Office, fraudulent claims for ammunition were discovered by the force after they had been made. Most of these cases involved the submission of substances falsely described as powder, such as sand or soot. The forces investigated all cases except one, where the claimant could not be identified because the material was not labelled at the time of surrender. Nevertheless, the Home Office felt that it would not have been possible to devise a scheme with zero risk of fraud, that the level of fraud was low for schemes of this kind, and that the National Audit Office's evidence supported this conclusion.[25]

34. The Home Office further pointed out that the Firearms Compensation Section at the Home Office was in daily contact with forces as it processed claims for payments, and undertook checks to ensure that police forces were carrying out procedures. The section had rejected a number of claims which clearly verged on the fraudulent. There was inflation of the Option C claims with attempts by some owners to claim more than was appropriate, and the Home Office was able to adjust for this. However, we noted that in November 1997 South Yorkshire Police, which was not among the forces visited by the National Audit Office, notified the Home Office of irregularities in a number of claims accepted by the force's staff. An investigation began under the supervision of the Police Complaints Authority, and 11 police officers and two civilian employees were suspended. These matters are sub-judice.[26]

35. The Home Office agreed that there were lessons about how to approach the detailed application of schemes requiring work to be done in police forces. It would be using the National Audit Office's findings on the handgun compensation schemes to inform its future discussions with the Association of Chief Police Officers on the appropriate balance between central direction and local administration.[27]

36. The Home Office received over 72,000 claims from some 55,000 claimants. Because of the size and complexity of the schemes, it had not committed to paying claims within a particular time, but had set a target to deal with all claims in 18 months. Option A and B claims were dealt with first in order to make some compensation payments quickly. The Home Office set internal targets for paying large-calibre Option A and B claims by the end of March 1998 and Option C claims by the end of December 1998, but did not achieve them. It did not set a target for paying claims surrendered under the small-calibre scheme in February 1998. As at the end of October 1998, eight months after the end of the second surrender period and over a year after the first, only 45 per cent of claimants had received full settlement of their claim, 45 per cent had received part settlement, and 10 per cent had received no payment at all.[28]

37. The Home Office told us that there were now 5,600 offers with shooters for them to consider, and that once they had replied, they would be paid promptly. This brought the Home Office within its target of dealing with all claims within 18 months, except for 400 claims across all the schemes for which offers had not yet been made. These were the residual cases which had not been resolved because evidence was lacking, the police were investigating the claim, or the claimant had refused to provide bank details. The nature of these cases meant that the Home Office could not set a target date for resolving them, but because there were so few cases, they would be dealt with very quickly once the information necessary to support payment had been provided.[29]

38. Claims from firearms dealers to compensate for their stocks were given priority because of the size of their financial commitment. Of the 2,200 claims received from dealers, 1,900 had received payments totalling £20.3 million by October 1998. Dealers with claims for large quantities of items under Option C could face financial hardship and even bankruptcy while waiting for compensation. The Home Office had therefore made interim payments to dealers who provided evidence of financial hardship, for example a letter from their bank. It did not know why 300 dealers had had to wait beyond October 1998, but thought there might have been a need for further checks. A total of £22 million had now been spent on dealers' compensation.[30]

39. The Home Office had originally projected that staff would be able to process 4,000 claims a week, but reduced this estimate to 2,000 claims a week once they began to arrive and the complexity of the checks required was reassessed. In the event an average of only 1,050 claims a week was achieved for the more straightforward Option A and B claims. Throughput dropped to 415 a week once full-time processing of Option C claims began in June 1998. At one point half of the available staff effort was being spent on dealing with owners' enquiries about the progress of their claims. The Home Office acknowledged that its estimates of the rate of processing had been very ambitious.[31]

40. In February 1997 the Home Office had decided that a complement of 50 staff would be appropriate for its Firearms Compensation Section. The full complement was in post by September 1997. Thereafter staff numbers were gradually increased and stood at 64 in July 1998. However it was not until October 1998 that the Home Office announced a further larger increase, up to a complement of 115, in recognition of the slow progress in processing Option C claims.[32]

41. We were concerned that the compensation section had not been expanded sooner, when the problems with the speed of processing claims had been obvious for some time. The Home Office told us that it had always intended to expand the section relatively slowly, so as to build up a cadre of experienced staff to train the agency staff taken on to handle the volume of claims. Starting with the full number of staff would have been unmanageable, although the Home Office accepted that it could have built up numbers more quickly and achieved a faster throughput.[33]

42. Planning for a computer system to support the processing of claims began in March 1997, and the system was put into operation in time for the start of the first surrenders in July 1997, although faults were still occurring because of problems identified during the system's testing. These significantly hampered processing productivity, with the problems persisting and the system not signed off as fully satisfactory until December 1997, six months after the surrenders began. The Home Office felt that, in retrospect, it might have done better to take another six weeks to plan the computer system, but there had been huge pressures to make payments. The problems were really only solved when the Home Office obtained a pre-released copy of the new version of the software. Overall, the Home Office did not believe that it could have achieved a very significant reduction in the time taken to process claims, but if the computer accounting system had been working, it might have reduced the time claimants had to wait by about six weeks.[34]

43. The Home Office's Efficiency and Consultancy Unit was due to conduct a post-implementation review of the development of the computer system in August 1998. However, this was suspended after some initial work when the project manager working on the review secured promotion to another post and the Unit's other priorities meant that it was not possible to commit other staff to the review. The Home Office nevertheless felt that there were important lessons to be learned from the introduction of the systems, for example about the need for links to central ledgers and audit trails, which took longer than expected to achieve. The post-implementation review would be reinstated shortly, now that the main part of the compensation programme was complete.[35]

Conclusions

44. The Home Office and the police had to set up complex arrangements relatively quickly. Better planning and design of the compensation schemes before they started could however have reduced the problems in implementing the schemes. Some common makes and models of handgun were missing from the lists of specified compensation rates, obliging many handgun owners to provide a valuation, which was more burdensome for the police and the Home Office and resulted in claimants having to wait longer for payment. The Home Office did not commission external technical expertise to help design the schemes, including the lists of specified rates, because of the risk of conflicts of interest. Whilst this risk was an important consideration, with suitable safeguards we consider that the Home Office could have made effective use of external expert advice to improve the design of the schemes.

45. The National Audit Office found that the forces visited had put in some controls to ensure that claims were in accordance with the requirements of the schemes and to reduce the risk of fraud. For example, police staff observed the handguns being destroyed. However, the Home Office issued no guidance to forces on controls over the risk of error and fraud. The National Audit Office identified some control failures, for example six forces detected fraudulent claims for ammunition after they had been made, and one of these could not pursue the claimant because the surrendered material had not been labelled with the claimant's details. Irregularities have been under investigation in one force not visited by the National Audit Office.

46. The Home Office made no commitments on the time it would take to process claims, although it had aimed to deal with all claims in 18 months. Internal targets for paying all large-calibre and ex-gratia small-calibre claims for compensation at prescribed rates by the end of March 1998 and claims with valuations by the end of December 1998 were not met. We consider it unsatisfactory that many claimants have had to wait for more than a year for compensation.

47. The Home Office originally estimated that its Firearms Compensation Section would process around 4,000 claims per week, but the section only managed to clear 1,050 claims for compensation at prescribed rates on average per week. The rate dropped later to 415 a week for the more complex claims requiring valuations. Even so, the Home Office did not increase the numbers of staff employed on the section until October 1998, some 15 months after processing began and in the face of its commitment to deal with all claims in 18 months. We consider that the Home Office might have improved its performance in processing claims by acting more promptly to raise staff numbers while volumes of the more straightforward claims were still being processed.

48. Difficulties with the computer system contributed to delays in processing claims. It is important that the lessons of this system's implementation are learned, and we are therefore concerned that the proposed post-implementation review has been postponed. In view of the difficulties with the software, the review should include the respective responsibilities of the Home Office and the contractor, and procedures for resolving system failures. The review should now be given appropriate priority so that all the lessons can be drawn quickly and applied to the management of future projects.

3 C&AG's Report, paras 1.1-1.2, 3.1 Back

4 C&AG's Report, paras 2.15-2.22, 3.7, 3.25. Evidence Q33 Back

5 ibid, paras 2.36-2.37 and Figure 12 Back

6 Evidence Qs 1, 25, 114, 166, 172 Back

7 C&AG's Report, paras 2.38, 2.40 and Figure 12. Evidence Qs 173-174 Back

8 ibid, paras 2.7-2.12, 2.40. Evidence Qs 12, 40, 87-88, 91 Back

9 C&AG's Report, paras 2.39-2.40 and Appendix 6 Back

10 ibid, para 2.42. Evidence Qs 1, 16-17, 19-20, 87, 93-95 Back

11 Evidence Qs 4, 7, 51, 78, 86, 159, 162-163 Back

12 C&AG's Report, paras 2.44-2.45. Evidence Qs 29, 153 Back

13 ibid, para 2.10, Figure 6 and Appendix 1, item 7. Evidence Q28 Back

14 C&AG's Report, Figure 6. Evidence Qs 31, 41, 43, 99-102, 149, and Appendix 1, pp 24-29 Back