Select Committee on Social Security Report


APPENDIX 15

Memorandum submitted by Child Poverty Action Group (CB 16)

SUMMARY

  1. We welcome the opportunity to submit evidence on child benefit to the Select Committee.

  2. This submission covers the following issues:

    —  taxation of child benefit

    —  adequacy of child benefit

  3. We strongly support and welcome the Government's stated commitment to child benefit and the recognition of it's importance in providing support for families with children. We particularly welcome the commitment to increase the value of the benefit in real terms.

  We welcome the Government's commitment to keep child benefit "universal" where it is already so.[77] It should be noted, however, that child benefit is universal only in a broad sense. Not all parents or carers of dependent children are eligible. Asylum seekers, for example, are excluded. We are concerned about the Government's proposals to abolish child benefit for dependent 16- and 17-year-olds. Abolishing the benefit and replacing it with an education maintenance amounts to a back-door means-testing of child benefit for this age group. We are preparing a response on this issue.

  We have thought long and hard about the arguments for taxing child benefit. It is tempting to concede the argument simply in response to the carrot of an increase in child benefit. However, we believe that the case for taxing child benefit is weak; some of the strengths of universal child benefit will be undermined. The main arguments in support of taxation are political—put simply (but not too crudely): it is easier to "sell" the case for an increase in child benefit if less is paid to the "better off".

  The case for increasing child benefit is strong. Obviously there are choices to be made as to how any increase is funded, but taxing the benefit will not, of itself, fund a significant increase—unless taxation is so broad, that it risks undermining the very basis upon which child benefit operates (i.e., it is not means-tested), and on which it has worked so well.

  4. In the process of formulating a policy position on child benefit, CPAG has applied the following principles:

    —  The extra costs of children should be shared by both the state and parents. Support for all children is an investment IN the future;

    —  Policies should prevent child poverty, and where it exists, seek to alleviate it. A universal, non-means-tested payment for children helps achieve this;

    —  Poverty and unemployment traps should be minimised;

    —  Child benefit has value in being designated money for the child;

    —  Cash payments are especially important for poor families and for those on insecure or fluctuating incomes;

    —  Reliability during changes in circumstances is an important feature of child benefit;

    —  Child benefit is a recognition that society values children and has a collective interest and concern for their well being.

BACKGROUND

  5. The proportion of children living in households with incomes of less than half the average (after housing costs), increased from 10 per cent in 1979 to 32 per cent in 1994-95.[78]

  6. Some 7 million families and 12.5 million children receive child benefit every year at a cost of £6.5 billion a year.[79] People receiving child benefit are more likely to be in the bottom three quintiles of equivalent income than the top two. Only 2 per cent, after housing costs, have equivalent income of £500 or more a week. Child benefit represents nearly a third of the net income of lone parents on the bottom decile and over a quarter of the net incomes of couples with two and three or more children on the bottom decile.[80]

  Examining household incomes in each decile, Ditch et al,[81] found that families with children have lower average incomes than other working age couples without children; lone parents and couples with four or more children have the lowest incomes and are more likely to receive income support; and younger children are more likely to be in the lowest income households than other children.

Political Context and the 1998 Budget Changes

  7. The present government has placed on record a commitment to maintaining child benefit as a "universal" benefit. In his 1998 Budget speech, Gordon Brown stated that:

    "Giving a child the best start in life takes more than money, but it cannot be done without money. Child benefit remains the fairest and most efficient and cost-effective way of recognising the extra costs and responsibilities borne by all parents. Raising it allows us to do more for mothers who choose to be at home, working at home bringing up children. To underline the view that child benefit is society's support for, and investment in, the upbringing of children, child benefit should and will remain universal where it is already universal, and it should be paid, as now, directly to the mother. Thus, future support for children will be built around universal child benefit and I am convinced of the case for raising its level." [our emphasis]

  8. However, the Chancellor indicated that the tax-exempt status of child benefit paid to higher-rate taxpayers was being looked at "to help ensure a fairer redistribution of resources".[82] The Welfare Reform Green Paper includes as a success measure `an increase in support from the tax and benefits systems going to families with children.'[83]

  From April 1999, child benefit (and the family premium in income support, housing benefit and council tax benefit) will increase by £2.50 per week for the eldest child, over and above statutory indexation. The increase in child benefit was funded by reducing the rate of relief on the married couples allowance from 15 per cent to 10 per cent[84] from April 1999, re-balancing reliefs to those families with children.

  9. In his Budget speech, Gordon Brown reaffirmed the Beveridge principle, quoting the 1944 report "that nothing should be done to remove from parents the responsibility of maintaining their children and that it is in the national interest to help parents to discharge that responsibility properly." He stated that "our benefits system provides less help for children when families need it most—in the early years"

  10. The personal allowance in income support, housing benefit and council tax benefit is £8.05 a week less for a child under 11 than for a child over 11. The Chancellor commented that this `distinction does not reflect the high costs of the early years, and takes no account of the costs to mothers of staying at home when their children are young, or of the extra costs of childcare if mothers work, so it is time to do more for children under 11.'[85] From November 1998, the personal allowances in income support and other means-tested benefits for children aged under 11 will be increased by £2.50 per week.

  11. Arguments for taxation of child benefit and "affluence-testing" have been floated as ways to `better target' child better. A recent survey of Labour MPs carried out by the Financial Times, showed a majority in favour of taxing child benefit of two to one, and by almost 3 to 1 if child benefit was increased.[86]

Origins and Strengths of Child benefit

  12. Child benefit remains the primary means by which the state shares in the cost of children. As the then Minister, Barbara Castle, commented at Second Reading of the Child Benefit Bill:

    It achieves a long overdue merger between child tax allowances and family allowances into a new universal, non-means-tested, tax-free cash benefit for all children, including the first, payable to the mother. In this way it ensures that the nation's provision for family support is concentrated first and foremost where it is needed most—on the poorest families; and that it goes to the person responsible for caring for the children and managing the budget for their food, clothing and their necessities . . . we all know how vitally important the family allowance has been . . . to many a hard-pressed mother, coming, as it does, into her hands in the middle of the week just as her shopping money, probably inadequate in the first place, is running low . . .. This Bill, transferring as it does, the child tax relief from her husband's pay packet to her purse in the form of a cash allowance covering the first child is a further recognition of the importance of the job she is doing for society.[87]

Child benefit as a universal benefit

  13. Child benefit has been described as a "universal" benefit, as it is payable without regard to parental income or proof of special need. Joan Brown has commented that

    "This universality gives it something in common with the health and education programmes in that it represents a State investment in all children, rather than the selective provision for certain categories of children".[88]

  14. Child benefit redistributes income across the life-cycle. Because the eligibility criteria are unrelated to socio-economic status and income, the claiming process is non-stigmatising. Child benefit has a take-up rate of virtually 100 per cent.[89]

  It is relatively inexpensive to administer, largely due to its relative simplicity. The current administrative cost of child benefit now is 2.2 per cent of benefit spending.[90]

  However, it should be emphasised that child benefit is not completely universal. Not all parents who contribute to the care of children are eligible - the benefit is paid to the primary carer (the `priority claim' rule). There are complex residence and presence rules, which can exclude those who would otherwise have been entitled to child benefit.

The rights of the child

  15. Article 27 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child holds that it is the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for her or his physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. This places the needs of the child in relation to standards, which are considered acceptable within that society.

The `priority claim' rule

  16. In the Green Paper, Children first: a new approach to child support, the Government says it wants to encourage the sharing of care between both parents. In practice, the social security system makes this difficult.

  17. Child benefit is designed to be payable to only one parent with care of the child; the non-resident parent is not usually eligible to receive the benefit. The child allowances in means tested benefits also go to the child benefit recipient. This means the non resident parent will often not get additional benefit payments to help with their contribution to the costs of children, even if they have the children to stay with them for, say, a week at a time in the school holidays. This can make shared care arrangements difficult.

  18. Consideration needs to be given to changing these rules to ensure that payment can be made to the parent with primary responsibility for a child in a week in question.

TAXATION OF CHILD BENEFIT

Is affluence testing the same as taxation?

  19. Baroness Hollis of Heigham, has stated that affluence testing is a way to "target benefits without getting into some of the traps associated with means-testing" and "allow[s] us to reduce benefits to those who already have high incomes and are well able to support themselves."[91] She went on to equate affluence testing with taxation, stating that "the difference between affluence testing and means testing could be the difference between means testing and taxation".[92]

  20. However, it is possible that taxation and withdrawal of benefit for people with other income are different, although the effects are probably the same. Making child benefit taxable would entail dropping it into an existing system of thresholds and withdrawal rates; affluence-testing could entail using the tax system (solely or with the benefits system) to withdraw benefit at whatever rate is decided (e.g., in Canada this is proposed to be 2.5 per cent—way below the 40 per cent suggested here).

Options for taxation

  21. When child benefit replaced family allowances and child tax allowances, it was expected that child benefit would be regarded as a new form of tax allowance and treated accordingly. Instead it was designated as public expenditure on social security by the Treasury and its tax origins set aside.[93]

  22. Taxing child benefit was mooted in the late 1980s. Then, Joan Brown[94] argued that the expenditure gained by withdrawal of benefit from this group would be relatively small and that child benefit is the only recognition for the extra costs incurred by those with children compared to those without. Once introduced for higher rate taxpayers, the danger would be that the cut-off line could be drawn lower and lower. There could be pressure to reintroduce the former child tax allowances as a response to the unfairness generated by taxing income received for a child within a tax system that takes no account of dependent children.[95]

The Commission on Social Justice

  The most recent detailed work on taxation of child benefit was undertaken for the Commission on Social Justice (CSJ) (1994). The CSJ believed that child benefit was the fairest and most efficient way to recognise the responsibilities borne by all parents, as well as helping parents move into work. The Commission recommended that child benefit should be payable at the same rate for all children rather than current higher rate for the eldest (as the latter discriminates against larger families at greater risk of poverty).

  23. On the basis that child benefit represented as little as one sixth of the direct costs of raising a child, the Commission proposed that its level be raised, to be paid for by the phasing out of the married couple's tax allowance (MCA) for couples under 55. There were differences of opinion within the Commission as to whether the revenue raised should be used solely for an increase in child benefit or for half to be put into nursery education. The Commission suggested taxation of child benefit where either mother or father was paying tax at the higher rate.

  24. Holly Sutherland's[96] analysis of the proposals indicated that taxing child benefit at the higher rate on a joint basis, assuming abolition of married couples allowance (MCA) and additional personal allowance (APA) gave an enhanced level of child benefit at £10.90 plus £1.95 for each child. Calculations assumed that the mother was taxed in the first instance, but if her income was not high enough to pay tax on all her child benefit at 40 per cent, then the remainder would be transferred to the husband and treated as his income. Overall 16 per cent of families (with and without children) gain and 3 per cent lose. The calculations do not take account of additional administration costs.

  25. The simulations assumed that only married couples living together would be taxed jointly. However as there might be a nightmare scenario of tax transferring from mother to stepfather to absent father etc in the search for a higher rate taxpayer, Sutherland concluded that it would be very cumbersome and complex to administer in a way that would be seen to be fair. Even with full compliance it would only allow child benefit to be increased by a quarter of the amount the abolition of MCA/APA would generate.

Institute for Fiscal Studies

  26. Earlier simulations of child benefit taxation were carried out by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) in 1989.[97] Higher child benefit for older children tended to favour two-earner couples relative to single-earner couples. The latter did better out of increases of child benefit for younger children (under 10s). Taxation of child benefit was thought likely to bring more working mothers into the tax system, thus reducing the financial returns from employment. The effect of making child benefit taxable for the mother was to increase the marginal withdrawal rate of spouses by 2.5 per cent, mainly wives in two-earner couples, since the earner in single-earner couples is normally the man. In 1989, more than half a million married women were thought likely to be brought into tax, worsening the incentives for married women already in the labour force. Taxing the father would raise more revenue and reduce the disincentive to the second earner.

Latest Information

  Information from Parliamentary Questions suggests that more people could be affected by taxation, and there might be a higher tax yield than envisaged when the issue was considered by the Commission on Social Justice.[98]

  27. Some 120,000 individuals receiving child benefit are paying tax at the higher rate, and 855,000 individuals receiving child benefit where their partners are higher rate taxpayers.[99] 5.5 million people who are working lone parents or people with a higher income in a couple would pay a tax increase of more than £90 per year; 800,000 would pay over £400 a year.[100]

  28. Some 350,000 higher rate taxpayers have children under five; 435,000 have children aged between five to 10; 420,000 have 10- to 16-year olds and 110,000 have a child over age 17.[101]

Arguments AGAINST taxation

    —  There would be relatively little revenue gain but potentially huge administrative problems and increased administrative cost;

    —  The tax system is not sufficiently progressive to avoid a disproportionate effect on low income families;

    —  Families with children will be taxed more heavily to provide support for other families with children;

    —  Taxation would act as a significant work disincentive if child benefit was taxed as well as earnings when starting work;

    —  Impact of taxation on family types needs to be carefully considered, e.g., if people are to be taxed on each child, there is no relationship between overall `affluence' and family size or outgoings

Limited financial returns?

  29. Institute for Fiscal Studies modelling for CPAG show that with the most extensive option for taxation, child benefit would be increased by £3.30 a week for the eldest child. This would be an important increase for poor families, but the effect of taxation would also be to reduce the incomes of families on average incomes[102] and undermine the basis for child benefit as a payment to meet the costs of children.

An "administrative nightmare"?

  30. Sutherland's simulations assumed that only married couples living together would be taxed jointly. However as there might be a nightmare scenario of tax transferring from mother to stepfather to absent father, etc., in the search for a higher rate taxpayer, Sutherland concluded that it would be very cumbersome and complex to administer in a way that would be seen to be fair.

Child benefit and the "better off"

  31. What, if any, is the problem with child benefit being paid to even the "better-off"? There is a view that child benefit often goes to people who do not "need" it. However, research shows that even professional and managerial classes see child benefit as a payment for the child. Even the better off have little margin to play with. In addition, women in better-off households do not always have an income of their own.

  32. Bradshaw and Stimson[103] conclude that child benefit is a vital contribution to family finances and in the main tends to be spent directly or indirectly on children's needs: "There is a moral sense that it should be spent on the children' even if at times it has to be used to meet the needs of the moment". Child benefit is perceived as earmarked for children, in practice it is used to provide for children's needs directly, such as nappies, clothing, and school expenses.

THE CASE FOR INCREASING CHILD BENEFIT

  33. The Chancellor has stated that he is in favour of further increases in the real value of child benefit. How much should child benefit be increased to? In following the Beveridge principle, it in unlikely that the Chancellor envisages an increase in child benefit that covers all of the costs of a child. The following questions need consideration:

    —  What are the costs of children?

    —  What proportion should the state provide?

    —  Should this be the same for all children, including children of different ages?

    —  Should future increases apply to all children or just the eldest child in each family?

    —  What is the effect of increasing child benefit in a particular way on the labour market participation of women?

Meeting the costs of a child

  34. An Asda supermarket report estimated that the costs of a child from conception to age five could be as much as £50,000, though an average budget would put it at £20,000.[104]

  35. More recently Middleton[105] estimated that a child reaching his or her seventeenth birthday would have cost around £50,000 for "regular" items of spending, and that child benefit meets approximately one fifth of average spending on a child.

  36. There are direct costs of a child (that may vary by age, gender and health) and in addition there are indirect or opportunity costs associated with lost earnings. The higher rate of benefit for the eldest child in part reflects this "opportunity foregone". Comparisons for cost purposes tend to consider the costs of parents in relation to an adult or couple without children (i.e., the additional costs of a child).[106]

Direct costs

  37. Using the budget standards approach, two budgets were drawn up in 1993 specifically on the costs of a child (a "modest-but-adequate" budget and a "`low-cost" budget[107]). For a child aged under 11, the costs were £43.99 a week using the low-cost budget, and £59.20 a week using the modest-but-adequate budget.

  38. To update the costs, these figures have been uprated by the RPI (April 1993 to January 1998). In 1998, the low-cost budget would be £50.87 and the modest-but-adequate budget £68.35 for a child under 11.

Indirect costs

  39. Less than 10 per cent of the costs of childcare are met by employers and central or local government. UK parents face the highest childcare bills in Europe.[108] A family with two children, one pre-school and one at school needing after school and holiday care have costs of almost £6,000 per annum.

  40. The childcare tax credit announced in the budget to be introduced as part of the new WFTC in October 1999 will cover 70 per cent of the cost of approved childcare, up to a maximum of £70 a week for families with one child and £105 for families with two or more children. A couple with two children and an income below £17,000 a year (or £330 a week) could get the full 70 per cent of eligible costs covered.

  41. The credit is intended to "make a reasonable contribution to a family's childcare costs" and will reach further up the income scale than FC, i.e., a couple with two children on £23,400 a year could receive £45 a week.[109]

Child benefit to meet 70 per cent of the cost of a child?

  42. If 70 per cent of childcare costs can be met by the state (up to a maximum) as a "reasonable" contribution towards the costs of childcare, perhaps a similar formula should apply to the more direct costs of a child?

  43. Child benefit currently meets only around a fifth or a quarter of the reasonable costs of a child—this is too low. If child benefit were increased to meet 70 per cent of the cost of a child, as measured against the two budget standards, child benefit would increase to £35.60 a week (low cost budget, excluding childcare) or £47.84 a week (modest-but-adequate budget).

  44. If Middleton's estimate of the total cost of a child—£50,000—is divided by 17, the annual cost would be £2,941 per year per child, or £56 per week. A weekly child benefit of 70 per cent this amount would be £39.20.

  45. Taking an extremely conservative view of what should constitute the costs of a child, by excluding transport (which may be dealt with elsewhere) and housing (as costs are so variable), the low cost budget for a child (at 1993 prices) is £24.95 a week. Uprated by the RPI this would be £28.85 a week in 1998. If child benefit was increased to cover 70 per cent of the "conservative" costs of a child, the benefit would be increased to £20.19 a week for each child.

Uprating of child benefit

  46. The value of child benefit had fallen by 4 per cent in real terms for the eldest child and 22 per cent for subsequent children since 1979.[110] The real value of financial support for children (i.e., child benefit compared with the old family allowances and child tax allowances) for a standard rate tax paying family was worth less in 1995 than 30 years earlier.[111]

  47. When it was introduced child benefit was criticised by some as being too low. The Conservative Government's promise made in 1980 to maintain the benefit in line with inflation was not kept.[112] Child benefit was frozen for three years from April 1987 to April 1990. It was increased in April 1991 for all families through a £1 increase for the eldest child and again in October 1991 by £1, though second and subsequent children only saw an increase of 25p per child.[113] Since April 1992, Child benefit has been uprated by prices.

  48. Had child benefit been increased in full by inflation from 1979 to 1995, child benefit would have been £10.85 for each child in April 1995. (In fact, it was £10.40 for the eldest and £8.45 for subsequent children).

  49. By April 1998 child benefit would have been £12.70 per week per child, at a gross cost of £1.5 billion, and £1.1 billion net.[114] For a two-child family this compares with a total child benefit of £25.40 a week rather than £20.75.

Increasing child benefit for all children or only the eldest?

  50. The reasons for the higher rate for the eldest child need to be re-examined. Should potential increases in child benefit should go to each child, or to both children but keeping the differential, or only to the eldest? The weight of argument appears to be in the direction of increasing payment for each child. However, the impact on one child families, which are more likely to be lone parent families, needs to be considered.

  51. Middleton[115] found that, whilst the higher child benefit rate assumes that a second/subsequent child costs 19 per cent less than the first or eldest child, their research showed that the spending was only 10 per cent less. Child benefit meets 21 per cent of spending on the oldest child and 19 per cent of subsequent children. The percentage of spending varies little from one fifth whether the child is the eldest or subsequent child, or on IS or not.

  52. The Commission on Social Justice recommended that child benefit should be payable at the same rate for all children rather than a higher rate for the eldest as the latter discriminates against larger families who are at greater risk of poverty.

  53. The 1998 Budget changes include an extra £2.50 for the first child, bringing child benefit up to £13.95 and £9.30 a week (before uprating). This will magnify the difference, as child benefit for second and subsequent children will be 34 per cent less than for the eldest.

  54. The impact of both tax and benefit transfers need to be carefully evaluated in any option to increase child benefit. The October 1991 changes were financed by freezing the married couples tax allowance and the additional personal allowance for lone parents, which, as these are only allowable per family and not per child, the increased child benefit for one child families looks less generous.

Effects on women's labour market participation

  55. Ditch[116] argued that although women's labour market participation had increased, this was closely related to the number of children, and the age of the youngest child (the latter being more significant than numbers of children). The percentage of mothers in paid employment has increased from 52 to 62 per cent in ten years, with mothers of under-fives from 32 to 51 per cent.[117]

  56. Children present less of a barrier to employment for women with working partners. The Employment Policy Institute's Employment Audit shows that the employment rate of lone parents with a pre-school age child is 40 percentage points lower than that of a mother with a working partner. The employment rate differential falls when children reach school age but is still substantial. This may reflect the greater ability of dual earners to afford childcare but the differential remains even for childless women, those with working partners having a higher employment rate than a non-working partner.
TABLE 1
Employment rate by age of youngest child

Age
Single Partner working Partner not working
19901997 199019971990 1997
0-1317 41571519
1.9.8 .8.8.3.6
2-2633 55652622
4.7.7 .2.6.8.3
Source: EPI Employment Audit, Issue 7, Spring 1998.[118]

  69. Interestingly the New Deal for lone parents only starts once the youngest child is five, and some MPs appear to favour an increase for younger children as this would:

    "Not only target poverty without a means test, but also give parents of children under five a proper choice about whether to seek employment in the labour market or to stay at home to look after their children". (Malcolm Wicks, MP). [119]

September 1998


77   The Green Paper on welfare reform, "New ambitions for our country: A new contract for welfare." Cm 3805. p. 56. Back

78   HBAI, 1996, Stationery Office. Back

79   Social Security Statistics 1997, Stationery Office. Back

80   Bradshaw, J and Stimson, C, 1997, Using child benefit in the family budget,York, SPRU. Back

81   Ditch, J, et al, 1998, A synthesis of national family policies 1996, European Observatory on National Family Policies, University of York. Back

82   New Ambitions for Britain: Financial Statement and Budget report, March 1998, HM Treasury, HC 620, Stationery Office. Back

83   New ambitions for our country: a new contract for welfare, CM 3805, Stationery Office. Back

84   Chancellor of the Exchequer, Budget Speech, HC Hansard, 17 March 1998, c 1108. Back

85   Chancellor of the Exchequer, Budget Speech, HC Hansard, 17 March 1998, c 1108. Back

86   Financial Times, 5 May 1998. Back

87   HC Hansard, 13 May 1975, col 330-1. Back

88   Brown, J, 1987, see note 8. p. 10. Back

89   Parker, H, 1995, Taxes, benefits and family life; the seven deadly traps, IEA research monograph 50. Back

90   HC Hansard 23 January 1998 col 736w. Back

91   HL Hansard, 13 January 1998, col 936. Back

92   Ibid, col 937. Back

93   Brown, J, 1987, The Future of Family Income Support, London: PSI. Back

94   Ibid. Back

95   Brown, J, 1988, Child Benefit: investing in the future, London: CPAG. Back

96   Sutherland, H, 1994, The Commission on Social Justice's Proposals for Child Benefit: a comment, Microsimulation Unit, Cambridge Univ, MU/RN/8. Back

97   Johnson, P, et al, 1989, Alternative Tax and Benefit Policies for Families with Children, IFS commentary No. 18. Back

98   HC Hansard 28 January 1998, col 265w. This states that when taxed as the father's or lone mother's income, taxation of child benefit would raise £1,200 million a year if taxed at the basic rate and £1,400 million a year taxed at the higher rate. If taxed as the mother's or lone father's income, it would raise £675 million if taxed at the basic rate and £700 million taxed at the higher rate. (Taxation at basic rate in this context means taxed at 20 per cent for taxpayers paying only the lower rate of tax and 23 per cent for other taxpayers. Taxation at the "higher rate" means taxed at the taxpayer's marginal rate). Back

99   HC Hansard 27 January 1998 col 166. Back

100   HC Hansard 28 January 1998, col 265. Back

101   HC Hansard 5 June 1998, col 401. Back

102   For example, based on projections prepared for CPAG by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, families with children in the 4th, 5th and 6th income deciles saw a decrease of between 0.4 and 0.5 per cent when child benefit is taxed at the highest rate. Back

103   Ibid. Back

104   Walsh, 1996, Report written for ADSA on the cost of a child. Back

105   Middleton, S, et al, 1997, Small fortunes: spending on children, childhood poverty, and parental sacrifice, JRF. Back

106   Ditch, J, et al, 1998, A synthesis of national family Policies 1996,, European Observatory on national family Policies, University of York. Back

107   Oldfield, N and Yu, ACS, 1993, see note 39. Back

108   Daycare Trust briefing paper 4, 1997. Back

109   Meeting the Childcare Challenge, Cm 3959, May 1998, Green Paper. Back

110   HC Hansard 20 November 1995, col 32. Back

111   Oppenheim, C, and Harker, L, 1996, Poverty: the facts, London: CPAG. Back

112   Ogus, A, et al, 1995, see note 14. Back

113   Ditch, J, et al, 1998 see note 42. Back

114   HC Hansard 5 June 1998 col 402w. Back

115   Middleton, J, et al 1997 see note 41. Back

116   Ibid. Back

117   Meeting the Childcare Challenge, see note 45. Back

118   EPI Employment Audit, Issue 7, Spring 1998. Back

119   HC Hansard, 6 July, col 724. Back


 
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