Memorandum submitted by the National Council
for One Parent Families (NCOPF) (CS 30)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE FORMULA
The Government is right to make a last attempt
to continue with an administrative system of child maintenance,
since lone parents' experiences of the courts were not positive.
We welcome the move to a simpler, more transparent formula.
PAYMENT LEVELS
The average maintenance payment will fall to
£30.50 a week for employed non-resident parents, from the
current average of £38.23. Many lone parents will be better
off because of the introduction of disregards but others, particularly
those earning enough to be clear of benefits, will suffer reductions
in maintenance levels, though all should gain through knowing
how much child maintenance they are due to receive and through
a speedier assessment and collection service.
DISREGARDS
We welcome the introduction of a disregard for
lone parents on Income Support, though we would like to see the
initial level set at £15 per week rather than the £10
proposed. It is also vital that the level be reviewed regularly
to that it least maintains its value.
DELIVERY
The fact that average maintenance assessments
will fall makes improved delivery absolutely crucial. Unless compliance
rates improve significantly, a considerable number of lone parents
will lose out as a result of these reforms. Regularity and reliability
of payment through an efficient collection and enforcement system
must thus be central objectives of the system. We welcome the
announcement that the CSA will finally introduce regular statements
of account for parents but there are many other steps which will
be needed to ensure adequate delivery.
GOOD CAUSE
We regret that co-operation with the CSA will
still be a requirement for those claiming Income Support, though
we are pleased at the retention of the concept of "good cause"
for not co-operating. It is disappointing that the benefit penalty
is to be retained at its current punitive level for those lone
parents on Income Support who fail to co-operate with the CSA.
We are also concerned about the impact of moving to a system wherein
a lone parent applying for Income Support must opt-out of child
support rather than opt-in as at present. Our recommendation would
be that a lone parent be allowed to opt out at any time, albeit
at the risk of a benefit penalty.
DECISION-MAKING
AND APPEALS
Some of the procedural changes have potentially
serious consequences for child support cases. In particular, child
support cases should always be heard with a full, three-person
tribunal and wing members should be drawn from other members of
the public including lone parents if possible. Tribunals should
have at least one member of the same sex as the appellant.
THE CSA IN
THE INTERIM
Improvements in CSA performance are needed before
the new scheme starts operations in the year 2001 and the agency
needs to be properly resourced to achieve this. Funding needs
to keep with up with the agency's fast-rising caseload if the
benefit of any additional money is to be felt.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Since 1918, the National Council
for One Parent Families (NCOPF) has been a unique national
centre of expertise on lone parenthood. Throughout our history,
the organisation has been dedicated to campaigning for equality
of opportunity for one parent families and tackling the exclusion,
poverty and prejudice they so often face.
1.2 There are currently about 1.7 million
lone parents in the UK today who care for approaching 3 million
children.[1]
It is estimated that by the turn of the century, at any one point
in time, nearly a quarter of children will live with just one
of their parents and between a third and a half will experience
life in a one parent family before they reach adulthood. One parent
families represent 21 per cent of all families and 91 per cent
of them are headed by women;[2]
THE PRINCIPLES
Before considering the detail of the proposals,
it is worth taking a moment to review the principles of any system
of child support. In our view, any new scheme should:
— put the interests of children at
the centre of the scheme and ensure that emotional relationships
or other arrangements between parents are not aggravated or damaged
in the process;
— be centred on a non-confrontational
administrative system which minimises the degree of discretion
involved and pays child maintenance at a decent level;
— tie-in with other systems of mediation
and support in relationship breakdown and the remaining powers
of the courts;
— improve the income of children living
in one parent families who make an application;
— provide both incentives to co-operate
and to stay in paid work;
— retain exemptions for those unable
to co-operate and protect those lone parents and children who
fear contact with a non-resident parent;
— not apply penalties to those families
who do not wish to make a child maintenance application;
— ensure a minimum income standard
is maintained whether maintenance is received or not;
— guarantee payment of child maintenance
to the parent with care, with the key transaction between the
state and the non-resident parent;
— in the absence of a payment guarantee,
it must at minimum provide regular and reliable payments for the
parent with care through efficient and effective collection methods,
rates of compliance and speed of delivery to the parent with care;
and
— provide a strong system of review
and appeal in the absence of any significant degree of discretion.
3. THE CONTEXT
3.1 The chequered history of the Child Support
Agency has ensured that its critics are great in number. It is
important to appreciate, however, that these now include many
lone parents, or Parents with Care (PWCs) as well as non-resident
parents (NRPs). Many lone parents had good reason to support the
introduction of the CSA but their experiences of the problems
caused by its intervention in their lives have made many of them
positively antipathetic to the agency. The starting point for
these reforms is thus one where even those who might have been
expected to be naturally supportive of the CSA—since they
would benefit from its work—are not so. The challenge for
these reforms is thus to establish a new regime of child support
that can both deliver the money where it is needed and also regain
the confidence of parents. If this cannot be done, it is hard
to envisage a future for an administrative system of child support
in this country. Truly, the CSA is drinking in the last-chance
saloon.
3.2 Our priority throughout the consultations
relating to these reforms has been to seek consensus as far as
possible amongst stakeholders. No government agency will be successful
in attaining widespread enforcement of a measure that is felt
to be unfair or illegitimate. Unless the credibility of the system
itself and the agency that administers it can be re-established,
the reforms will fail, no matter how sensible. Our response has
thus been based on finding a system which will be readily comprehensible
and acceptable to as many parents as possible.
3.3 We think the Government right to make
one last attempt to continue with an administrative system of
child maintenance. Lone parents' experience was that the court
system was expensive, inefficient and emotionally damaging. Under
present legal aid arrangements it seems unlikely that lone parents
would receive the financial support necessary to challenge unfair
court decisions and in this climate the decision to continue with
an administrative system is the right one. We are also keen that
the new system should continue to minimise the degree of discretion
involved in decision-making about child maintenance. We appreciate
that certain escape valves may be necessary, but believe that
too much discretion would undermine the system.
3.4 In our view, it would be sensible to
re-launch the scheme with a new name to try to overcome the legacy
of the past. It remains our strong preference that the Agency
be completely re-engineered, renamed and relocated as a "next
steps" agency within the Inland Revenue (IR). This change
would have obvious advantages in terms of credibility, collection
and enforcement.
4. THE NEW
FORMULA
4.1 We welcome the proposal to introduce
a simpler formula. This is a direct response to the problems faced
by the CSA in administering the existing system and holds the
promise of a more transparent system, understandable to all. We
hope as a result that parents will understand their obligations
more easily and this will form the starting point for any other
negotiations that may be taking place. The simplified formula
will mean rough justice for some but if change is essential, and
we think it is, we are prepared to live with the consequences
of a far simplified formula.
4.2 We are aware that this could mean lower
amounts of maintenance for some parents with care as well as less
protection for low income NRPs. However, on the positive side,
lone parents will gain through knowing how much child maintenance
they are due to receive and through a speedier assessment and
collection service. The simplified formula will also make it easier
to split or offset assessments where shared care or split residence
is involved, or where there is more than one NRP.
5. THE LEVEL
OF PAYMENTS
5.1 Under the proposed formula, the average
payment will fall to £30.50 a week for employed NRPs.[3]
The current average is £38.23.[4]
However, government sources suggest that some three-quarters of
mothers will be better off as will 70 per cent of fathers who
currently pay. PWCs will be better off because of the introduction
of the child maintenance disregards on Income Support (IS) and
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) and fathers due to reduced
assessments.
5.2 The CSA Quarterly Statistics show, however,
that there has been a reduction in the recorded proportion of
the cumulative caseload represented by Income Support cases. On
this basis, fewer lone parents will stand to gain as they will
not be getting the £10 disregard and presumably more of the
remainder are exposed to losses under the proposed formula. About
half the remainder were predicted to gain from the 100 per cent
disregard in WFTC (minus HB/CTB losses)[5]
and if the CSA succeed in improving compliance rates, the rest
should all gain by receiving more of the formula assessment. Losses
will be phased-in at £2.50, £5 or £10 pa depending
on the income of the NRP.
5.3 A longer term picture therefore emerges
where for the eighteen months leading up to April 2001 those on
WFTC may gain considerably through the 100 per cent disregard
(unless on HB/CTB). Then at the point of change, many existing
cases face gradual child maintenance reductions. The Government's
view is that they will still gain from improved compliance rates.
This may indeed be so, but it strengthens still further the need
to take every possible step to increase compliance.
5.4 One of the effects of the new, simplified
formula will be the creation of hardship for NRPs with incomes
close to benefit levels. This could perhaps be addressed by disregarding
some income (possibly certain benefit income) or by further gearing
the formula at the lower end to produce lower assessments. Another
option is to re-introduce protection for working NRPs by disregarding
maintenance paid in the calculation of Housing Benefit, Council
Tax Benefit and WFTC to the extent that they will not be pushed
below IS levels. Our preference is for these problems to be addressed
in the benefit system as far as possible.
6. MAXIMUM AND
MINIMUM PAYMENTS
6.1 Maximum and minimum payments are also
an issue. We agree with the decision not to impose a maximum payment,
on the grounds that children are entitled to share in the wealth
of both parents and it makes no sense to restrict this in higher
income cases. There are likely to be few such cases in any event.
The proposal that there should be a minimum payment of £5
per week with very few exemptions causes more problems. In view
of our opposition to the benefit penalty, it would be inconsistent
to support other families being pushed below IS levels. We think
these cases should be zero-rated, particularly those on IS in
order to allow continued contact and avoid damage to family relationships,
unless these NRPs can be compensated in some way.
6.2 The question of minimum payments presents
something of a dilemma where lone parents are concerned. PWCs
have no interest in pushing NRPs into poverty nor in expecting
unsustainable levels of child maintenance. Indeed, PWCs rely on
co-operation and support and good relations with the NRP to such
an extent that many have avoided contact with the CSA altogether
rather than damage good contact arrangements. On the one hand
it makes no sense to make it impossible for NRPs to maintain themselves
and maintain a home suitable for child contact. On the other hand,
without a minimum payment, many lone parents on IS will receive
no Child Maintenance Premium. One possibility would be to pay
the £10 premium to parents with care in this situation in
order to guarantee some advantage to applying for child maintenance.
7. SHARED CARE
7.1 If a child spends at least 52 nights
a year with the non-resident parent, it is proposed that liability
be reduced by one-seventh of the weekly rate for each night spent.
However, this would be unfair to lone parents whose costs do not
reduce by one-seventh for each night a child spends away from
home. Furthermore, it will not necessarily be the case that contact
costs the NRPs the full amount deducted, as they will not have
to spend equivalent amounts on clothes, food, fuel and other household
overheads.
7.2 We agree with the observation in the
Green Paper that this raises legitimate questions about what should
be treated as care and what merely contact. However, it is hard
to resolve these questions in a formulaic system without requiring
judgements about the level of care provided. This remains a rough
and ready, if unsatisfactory rule. We note that NRPs with shared
care are the only group exempt from the minimum payment of child
support. Whilst contact with both parents is to be encouraged,
it is important it not be confused with issues of payment.
8. DISREGARDS
AND PREMIA
8.1 We welcome the introduction of a disregard
for PWCs on Income Support. This is a fundamental requirement
to ensure that no lone parent is forced to co-operate with the
CSA while receiving no benefit from so doing. It also goes some
way towards underscoring the government's claim that the reforms
are about the best interests of children. That said, we would
like to see a higher disregard and would suggest that the initial
level should be set at £15 per week rather than the £10
proposed. It is also vital that the level be reviewed regularly
so that it least maintains its value.
8.2 This disregard is referred to by Government
as a "premium" but it is not what is usually understood
by that term. In fact, the measure simply means that up to £10
of maintenance is ignored when calculating entitlement to Income
Support, rather than being an additional payment within IS. The
many PWCs on Income Support whose ex-partners are also on IS (as
demographers will tell you, this is common) will receive only
£5. If the disregard were really a premium, all would receive
the £10 in full. These small amounts will be difficult to
collect and will not have the desired effect if payments stop
and start. One way or another, the amount should be guaranteed
if the NRP fails to pay it. Consideration might also be given
to introducing the premium in advance of the other reforms to
improve co-operation levels and make the Child Support Agency
more popular.
8.3. We strongly welcome the decision to
grant a 100 per cent disregard of child maintenance income in
calculating entitlement to the new Working Families Tax Credit
(WFTC). Welcome, too, is the decision to remove the requirement
to co-operate with the CSA for lone parents in receipt of WFTC.
These measures will create a major work incentive and the government
is to be commended for its action in introducing them. Our one
reservation in this respect is that the 100 per cent disregard
will apply only to WFTC, with the child maintenance disregard
in Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit remaining at £15
for the foreseeable future. This means that lone parents benefiting
from the 100 per cent WFTC disregard who are in receipt of both
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit will lose 85p in the pound
of any gains made (except for the first £15 of child maintenance.)
For many lone parents this will simply wipe out help with rent
and council tax altogether. We would strongly recommend that this
situation be rectified by extending the 100 per cent disregard
for those on WFTC to HB and CTB.
9. GUARANTEED
MAINTENANCE
9.1 There is one major limitation of our
approach to child support which these reforms do not tackle, namely
that the child can only benefit to the extent that the non-resident
parent can and will pay. If the interests of children are truly
to be paramount, it would be far more desirable to move to a system
of Guaranteed Maintenance. Such an approach is often rejected
out of hand on the erroneous assumption that it will be too expensive.
In fact, if the guaranteed level were set below the mean payment
level, there could only be a serious problem if collection rates
remained unacceptably low. In addition to the obvious financial
advantages to lone parents of such a scheme, there are further
major benefits. In particular, under such a guaranteed system,
the child support transaction is between the state and the NRP.
This makes it less disruptive for parents with care, who are no
longer seen as being to blame for pursuing child maintenance and
this would certainly improve levels of co-operation. This should
make the child support system much easier to enforce. In Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, Norway and some other European countries the
separation of child and spousal support has been accompanied by
the introduction of a minimum child support guarantee.
9.2 Even if this is not to be considered
at present, the move to a system of guaranteed maintenance should
be viewed as a key medium-term goal. Whatever decision is made,
in the short term, payment should be guaranteed in certain cases
such as those in which PWCs are lifted off IS due to receipt of
child maintenance. If payments are unreliable, they will otherwise
need to re-claim benefit frequently.
10. DELIVERY
10.1 The fact that average maintenance assessments
will fall makes the question of improved delivery absolutely crucial.
Unless compliance rates improve significantly, there will be a
considerable number of lone parents who will have lost out as
a result of these reforms. Regularity and reliability of payment
through an efficient collection and enforcement system must thus
be central objectives of the system.
10.2 Implementing these reforms will not
be easy for the CSA. Preparation for the task ahead will be vital,
requiring a culture shift within the agency itself. The CSA is
being asked to provide personal localised services, either by
phone or face-to-face, to ensure there remains no need for direct
communication between parents. They are also being asked to provide
a better service for NRPs (such as advice on budgeting and avoiding
debt) and to provide an integrated "welfare service"
with new computer software. We agree with much of what is suggested
but this can only be achieved through substantial improvement
in the telephone services and through publicity and awareness
about any new face to face services. In the immediate future,
there is a problem about getting to see anyone as existing CSA
field offices will have closed down by the end of this calendar
year. Given that most people are familiar with the benefit agency
sites as the main point of local contact with the CSA, it may
take some time for people to understand how to access the new
services.
10.3 We think it right that the new formula
assessment uses net income and ignores any income of the parent
with care. We are pleased at this recognition that "she will,
in any case continue to provide for the children to the extent
that she can afford".[6]
This overcomes one of the problems of the existing formula where
child maintenance reduces as the income of the parent with care
rises creating an in-built work disincentive. This change also
simplifies the formula significantly.
10.4 We are keen to see ever-closer working
links between the DSS and Inland Revenue over child maintenance
assessments. Our preference remains for the agency to be re-located
there, not least because the IR have strong inspection powers
and penalties and are perhaps thus less avoidable than the CSA.
It would also make sense for the information required for a child
support assessment to mirror closely that required for taxation
in order to make avoidance more difficult. Failing that, better
mechanisms are needed for verifying earnings, including a system
for pro-actively spot-checking them, with the capacity and commitment
to investigate further if the agency has any reason to believe
statements given may be false.
10.5 The problem of self-employed NRPs remains.
Much of the difficulty is due to lack of accounts where low income
NRPs are concerned. However, there are also cases of very high-earning
self-employed NRPs who are apparently unable to produce financial
information. Since assessments are to be based on taxable profit,
it is important in these cases for stronger links to be forged
with the Inland Revenue, as well as making close telephone contact
with NRPs (as in a recent CSA pilot).
10.6 We accept that there are legitimate
difficulties around confidentiality and the disclosure of information
held in computer records. One way round this would be to require
NRPs to provide the necessary authority to access this information
on the maintenance enquiry form (MEF) or equivalent. They would
thus be required formally to sanction access to IR records subject
to the usual penalties for non-co-operation. The creation of an
offence of deliberate withholding of information from or misrepresentation
to the CSA may help improve compliance. However, since the agency
under-uses the powers it already has, the mere availability of
additional weapons will not necessarily improve matters. For example,
we would wish to be assured that information given by PWCs will
be investigated by the agency. Currently, PWCs report that such
information is often ignored.
10.7 We welcome the announcement in the
White Paper that the CSA is finally to introduce regular statements
of account for parents. This will be a key step in ensuring that
all those using the CSA are kept informed of the progress of their
cases at all times. It should also reduce the number of long-term
errors.
11. DEPARTURES
11.1 We welcome the approach of the White
Paper, which regards child-focused reasons as being the main reason
for departures from the formula. It will be vital not to allow
too many grounds for departures or there will be danger of undermining
the very nature of the new formula as a simple and transparent
alternative to the current complex model. We assume other forms
of additional maintenance will continue to lie with the courts
as before.
11.2 We welcome the proposal to enable higher
assessments in cases where, for example, the NRP has a lifestyle
inconsistent with his or her declared income or where he or she
has diverted or under-used assets. However, we think that properly
functioning links with the Inland Revenue and greater use of inspection
powers would reduce the need for these provisions to be used often.
Also, tribunals should be allowed to substitute an income level
where it seems on the balance of probabilities that more income
is available than that declared. Powers to order disclosure and
to summon witnesses and evidence may also need to be strengthened.
12. GOOD CAUSE
12.1 We regret that the government feels
the need to continue to make co-operation with the CSA a requirement
for those claiming Income Support, although we are pleased that
they have at least retained the existing concept of "good
cause" for not co-operating with the agency. The poor co-operation
rate currently is the result of a combination of lone parents
who fear the consequences for themselves and their children, together
with those whose experience of the CSA—first or second-hand—has
been so bad that they are unwilling to interact with it at all.
Since in future almost all lone parents will derive some benefit
from the payment of child maintenance, and since the government
is confident of dramatic improvements in CSA performance, it should
be willing to trust to the regime of carrot rather than stick.
After all, the stick has been shown to fail dismally.
12.2 It is disappointing that the benefit
penalty is to be retained at its current punitive level for those
lone parents on IS who fail to co-operate with the CSA. We are
at a loss to see how forcing a family to live on significantly
less than the level of Income Support can be in keeping with the
stated aim of the child support scheme as being in the best interests
of children. At the very least the benefit penalty should be reduced
to its previous level of a 20 per cent benefit cut for 6 months
followed by a 10 per cent cut for a further 12 months. The current
penalty of a 40 per cent cut in benefit for 3 years, renewable
indefinitely is far too harsh.
12.3. We are concerned about the impact
of moving to a system wherein a lone parent applying for Income
Support must opt-out of child support rather than opt-in as at
present. It is not yet clear how long a period of time a claimant
will have in which to decide to opt out, and we are concerned
that too short a time limit not be imposed. There also needs to
be a mechanism for withdrawal from the child support scheme should
the consequences prove detrimental to the family. Our recommendation
would be that a lone parent be allowed to opt out at any time,
albeit at the risk of a benefit penalty.
12.4 Finally, we are deeply concerned about
the range of people who will be assessing whether lone parents
have "good cause" not to co-operate with the CSA. These
interviews are extremely sensitive, requiring the assessor to
probe very distressing issues, asking the lone parents to recount
situations of fear, cruelty, violence or even abuse. In the past,
only trained CSA staff would handle these interviews. Now, under
the Closer Working Initiative, so too are Benefits Agency staff.
Furthermore, under the "ONE" Service pilots, the "ONE"
advisors will presumably also be conducting child support interviews.
We are gravely concerned at the potential consequences of an ever-growing
body of people conducting these interviews, since this increases
the chance of their being managed by staff without adequate training
or experience.
13. REVIEWS AND
APPEALS
13.1 We are concerned about the proposed
move to a three-stage decision-making process, consisting of a
gateway, a stage for discussion and correcting errors and finally
appeal to a tribunal. This reform mirrors the changes introduced
in the Social Security Act 1998 and embodies the new restrictions
on the number of tribunal members, the ability to hear cases in
the absence of appellants and the ability to strike-out cases.
Some of these changes have potentially serious consequences for
child support cases. In particular, the reduction in the number
of tribunal members is of grave concern. Moving to a one-person
tribunal is not only undesirable judicially, but it could readily
mean, for example, a female lone parent having to go before (literally)
a one-man tribunal to give a detailed account of the reasons she
had for having good cause not to co-operate with the CSA. In our
view, child support cases should always be heard with a full,
three-person tribunal and wing members should be drawn from other
members of the public including lone parents if possible. Every
tribunal should also have at least one member of the same sex
as the appellant.
13.2 The time limit of one month in which
to appeal a decision runs from the decision date, so parents must
be given clear advice that they will run out of time (or lose
money) if a dispute is likely to be lengthy. It will be in their
interests to appeal early. Unless they are given additional time
in which to appeal, this will militate against the "mediation
period".
14. THE CHILD
SUPPORT AGENCY
IN THE
INTERIM PERIOD
14.1 Improvements in CSA performance are
needed before the new scheme starts operations in the year 2001.
The agency needs to be properly resourced to achieve this. The
CSA is already embarking on a period of change and re-organisation
under its own Operational Strategic Review as it aims to develop
a more "customer-focused" and "cost-effective"
service over a three to four year period starting with a root
and branch re-structuring of the field operation. This has already
resulted in the closure of many field offices. Basic processing
work is moving to regional Child Support Agency Centres (CSACs)
with the aim that remaining staff will be available for face to
face contact at a wider range of locations, including perhaps
at Citizens Advice Bureaux. It is hard to imagine that such dramatic
changes can be achieved without disruption for service users.
14.2. The CSA has been set very challenging
new targets but, despite rising expectations, its budget has barely
risen in recent years. This is despite £15 million in additional
funding from government given on a "spend to save" basis
(an extra £120 million in maintenance must be collected).
At the same time the CSA plans a 51 per cent increase in caseload
by the year 2002. The live and assessed caseload, currently around
830,000 is due to rise to 1.2 million by the year 2004. If it
is intended that the Child Support Agency should continue, then
it is essential that it be resourced better to enable it to improve
its performance and better its reputation before the new system
comes into place. Otherwise, the new regime will be hog-tied from
the start. The announcement earlier this year of additional funds
for the CSA was welcome, but it is vital that the basic work also
continues to be adequately funded. In particular, unless a commitment
is given to fund the workload of the CSA as it grows year on year
for the next five years, any money allocated for improvements
will simply be swallowed up as the agency keeps running just to
try to stand still.
14.3 Despite improvements in the Agency's
performance, the level of outstanding debt stands at over a billion
pounds with £691 million representing maintenance outstanding
on full assessments.[7]
An estimated 55 per cent of these full assessments are designated
as uncollectable or possibly uncollectable. This year, the Public
Accounts Committee thought it appalling that delays and backlogs
would not be cleared until March 1999 and recommended the setting
of more demanding clearance targets.[8]
Overall, the CSA's performance was described as unacceptable:
"Individual citizens should not suffer because of the mistakes
of public bodies." Not surprisingly, the Committee expressed
scepticism at the ability of the agency to deal with its expected
growth in caseload in the light of budget constraints. Again,
the DSS was urged to look at ways of simplifying the system. It
seems sensible that some attention should be paid to these issues
in advance of 2001.
September 1999
1 Ford R and Millar J, Eds. (1998) Private Lives
and Public Responses: Lone Parenthood and Future Policy, London:
PSI; and Haskey J (1998) One-parent families and their dependent
children in Great Britain, Population Trends 91, Spring 1998,
ONS. Back
2
Living in Britain (1998) Results from the 1996 General Household
Survey, ONS, Table 2.4.2. Back
3
A new contract for welfare: Children's Rights & Parents'
Responsibilities (1999) Cm 4349, DSS, London: The Stationery Office,
p 13. Back
4
CSA Quarterly Summary of Statistics, May 1999, Table 3.3. Back
5
According to DSS there are no plans to change the £15 child
maintenance disregard in HB and CTB - this means lone parents
on HB/CTB will lose 85 per cent of any gains over £15. Back
6
Children First: A New Approach to Child Support (1998) Cm 3992,
London: The Stationery Office, p 47. Back
7
See HC Hansard, Written Answers, 8 April 1998, col 375. Back
8
See HC Committee of Public Accounts, Twenty-First Report,
Session 1997-98, Child Support Agency: Client Funds Account, Session
1996-97. Back
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