Select Committee on Social Security Minutes of Evidence


Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from Professor Ian Walker (CS 48)

  1.  At the Social Security Select Committee session on 14 September I promised to deliver some estimates of the impact of the child support disregard in the Income Support (IS) system.

  2.  In particular the Committee expressed an interest in knowing the effect of the size of the IS disregard on work incentives. We could generate results on any aspect of behaviour for more or less any scenario required but I present below what seem like good ones to focus minds.

  3.  The results for caring mothers are as follows (and supersede the ones reported in the notes CS 43 that were delivered on the day):

Per centPer cent Per cent  Child poverty
NWPTFT E(h)Net income (£) per cent
Compliance = 40 per cent
Pre-reform (no IS disregard)
47.926.026.2 13.8216.322.7
Post reform with £10 disregard
45.831.322.4 13.4217.422.2
Post reform with £15 disregard
46.431.322.4 13.3217.322.1
Compliance = 80 per cent
Pre-reform (no IS disregard)
45.13025 14228.517.9
Post reform with £10 disregard
42.237.320.5 13.6230.417.9
Post reform with £15 disregard
43.636.120.3 13.3229.817.4

  4.  NW = not working, PT = part time work, FT = full time work, E(h) is the expected hours of work per week (which you could think of a summary measure of labour supply and is basically the weighted average of PT and FT). Net income is the caring parents net income including CS and is "equivalised" using the HBAI method where a couple=1. The child poverty rate is the rate amongst "first" families including those repartnered mothers using the 1/2mean income (not allowing any deduction for housing costs) rule.

  5.  Pre reform assumes that WFTC has happened and the WFTC take-up rate is 90 per cent. In each case the post reform scenarios assume that WFTC has happened, take up is 90 per cent, the WFTC disregard is infinite (ie all CS is ignored), and the Housing Benefit CS disregard is also infinite (the DSS/CSA evidence suggested that this would remain at £15 but our information is that this is likely to be set the same as WFTC—ie a full CS disregard).

  6.  The interpretation is as follows:

    —  The reform with £10 IS disregard (holding compliance at 40 per cent) increases labour market participation but decreases FT work and the net effect is that overall labour supply would fall (from 13.8 to 13.4), net income rises a little and poverty rate falls a little.

    —  The £15 disregard tends to reduce participation a little relative to the £10 case, and overall labour supply falls further to 13.3.

  But if compliance rises the effects would look different:

    —  at 80 per cent compliance the £10 case would have a labour market participation rate of 57.8 (compared to 52.2 per cent) so about 12.5 per cent of non-workers now work—this is close to 100,000 mothers!

    —  The higher disregard mutes this effect a little—the labour market participation rate is now 56.4 per cent—so about 8 per cent of nonworkers will want to work—say about 60,000. The poverty rate is a little lower because the extra £5 is enough to lift a few more mothers and their children (about another 10,000) out of poverty. But life is full of tradeoffs!

  7.  Pre reform assumes that WFTC has happened and the WFTC take-up rate is 90 per cent. In each case the post reform scenarios assume that WFTC has happened, take up is 90 per cent, the WFTC disregard is infinite (ie all CS is ignored), and the Housing Benefit CS disregard is also infinite (the DSS/CSA evidence suggested that this would remain at £15 but our information is that this is likely to be set the same as WFTC—ie a full CS disregard). You should let me know if the Committee would like anything further. The work is being written up right now and will appear in Fiscal Studies in December—we aim to present it to a seminar, where DSS people will be present, on Thursday 30 September.

  8.  Finally, I understand that DSS/CSA are commissioning data collection and research analysis in the near future so maybe we will learn "what works" and how well in the not too distant future.

23 September 1999


 
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