APPENDIX 11
Response from Committee of Vice Chancellors
and Principals of the Universities of the UK on the consultation
on the DTI Strategic Export Controls White Paper
INTRODUCTION
1. CVCP acknowledges the need for effective
controls on weapons development and proliferation. However, the
indiscriminate extension of powers to cover "intangible exports",
especially in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of the white paper, poses
an unacceptable threat to the operation and standing of UK higher
education.
2. CVCP is concerned that the white paper
strays beyond its intended remit and, if taken as the basis for
legislation, will severely damage the international research capability
of UK higher education and undermine the achievements of universities
in attracting international students to the UK. The white paper's
proposals have the capacity to do real damage to the integrity
of UK higher education.
3. The proposals will also inhibit trade,
particularly in those areas of "dual-use" technologies
where the UK has a substantial share of the world market. They
will discourage inward investment, since companies will resist
investment in R&D if there is any prospect that the free flow
of discoveries to subsidiaries in other countries will be impeded.
GENERAL
4. The White Paper fails to appreciate the
character of advances in communications technology and the part
they play in the way university teaching and research is carried
out. It is simply impractical to police the continuous stream
of information and ideas that characterises the global communications
system in the way envisaged in the white paper. Moreover, even
if possible, controls over the transfer of information by electronic
means would involve draconian and burdensome surveillance systems
inimical to academic and indeed democratic principles.
5. The wording of the sections 3.1 and 3.2
is wide-ranging and imprecise. CVCP is concerned that almost everything
that goes on in universities could fall under the heading of "intangible
exports". Many of the means for chemical agents, for example,
are available in the open literature of any university library.
Journals and research findings are increasingly disseminated electronically.
Overseas students figure prominently in postgraduate programmes.
The proposed control of "intangible exports" would catch
our universities' everyday practice.
6. The white paper fails to distinguish
between weapons technology and the basic scientific work that
underpins it. Members of the international science community need
to be able to exchange ideas freely by any means, including the
internet, and members of universities who are not UK citizens
should be able to collaborate freely with their British colleagues
and teachers.
7. CVCP has no objection to the control
of weapons of mass destruction, but the white paper addresses
topics that have nothing to do with such weapons, and it fails
to acknowledge that almost any advanced technology has a potential
weapons application. In this respect the white paper fails to
meet a central conclusion of the Scott Inquiry, namely that future
export controls must meet precise objectives that are fully and
openly stated.
DRAFTING CONCERNS
8. The wording of section 3.2 is ambiguous
and contrary to the tradition of academic freedom. Under these
proposals, export licences would it seems have to be obtained
for degree courses taught to international students and every
transfer of routine scientific research by e-mail or the web.
9. Section 3.1.4 is drafted so loosely that
it places an unacceptable barrier in the path of routine academic
procedure in relation to the transfer of knowledge. The dissemination
in good faith of research findings as part of standard academic
practice is not explicitly exempted from this clause. While it
is possible that an end-user may abuse such findings and apply
them to the creation of weaponry, it is entirely inappropriate
for government to assume a legislative capacity that would enable
it to control research and indeed basic courses in science. Any
decision by the executive to restrict courses which a university
believes to have no strategic or military significance should
be open to challenge in an independent forum, preferably through
the judicial system.
10. Under the enforcement of such imprecise
provisions as contained in 3.1 and 3.2:
the international publication or
transfer of academic research in any medium could be deemed an
offence;
universities would have to acquire
export licences for every research project or degree course that
involved the participation of international students either directly
or through distance learning programmes, a bureaucratic imposition
that would be administratively and financially untenable. As a
result UK higher education would become insular and deprived of
the financial rewards of providing internationally attractive
study/research programmes;
international academic collaboration
in many disciplines would be severely impaired, and bona fide
research by individuals or consortia would be subject to the
additional red tape of obtaining regulatory licences for basic
academic work;
the government would be given the
arbitrary power to determine the relevance or otherwise of the
curriculum of university science courses (eg on what topics could
be covered if there were non-UK citizens in the class), an interference
with control of their own affairs power inconsistent with academic
freedom and university autonomy;
the recruitment of international
students would be severely affected, although the value of such
recruitment to the UK economy is great, as is the contribution
of overseas students to research carried out in UK universities.
11. CVCP believes that any export controls
must meet precise and discernible objectives. The current wording
of sections 3.1 and 3.2 (either intentionally or through inappropriate
phraseology) would inhibit the exercise of academic freedom, the
delivery of teaching and the conduct of research.
RECOMMENDED
ACTION
12. CVCP urges the DTI to give further consideration
to the proposals and their adverse impact on everyday academic
activity. We recommend that:
any extension of control beyond technologies
tenuously or directly relating to the construction of weapons
of mass destruction should include specific exclusions;
sections 3.1 and 3.2 should be redrafted
to ensure that routine academic practice is explicitly exempted
and the scope of legislation is limited to areas of specific concern;
a distinction is drawn between actions
knowingly taken and those which may inadvertently breach it;
any new offence should allow a defence
that the export in question was of material already in the public
domain;
consideration is given to the use
of controls via contractual terms between research sponsor and
contractor (as is currently the case with defence technology funded
by institutions such as DERA).
SUPPORT
13. CVCP would be prepared to arrange a
meeting with DTI officials and give advice on the redrafting of
the relevant sections of the white paper. Such support would aim
at striking an appropriate balance between the Government's security
concerns and the need to recognise the importance of academic
freedom and the international character of university teaching
and research.
19 October 1998
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