APPENDIX 12
Memorandum submitted by Oxfam GB
1. INTRODUCTION:
OXFAM'S
INTEREST IN
ARMS POLICY
Oxfam GB works to relieve poverty, distress
and suffering in over 70 countries in four continents. Much of
this work is in direct response to armed conflicts and their consequent
human suffering: civilian deaths, injuries, the destruction of
livelihoods, and the millions of displaced people and refugees
forced from their homes.
The prolific transfer of arms, particularly
small arms and light weapons, into the regions where Oxfam works
has exacerbrated many conflicts. The ready availability of arms
has led to persistent violence against civilians, has prevented
the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance, and undermined
opportunities for long-term development.
Poorly controlled arms flows therefore both
exacerbate the suffering which Oxfam exists to relieveand
are an obstacle to that relief. Oxfam therefore welcomes the Government's
commitment to tighten up controls on arms flowsand the
opportunity to comment on this White Paper. It has also welcomed
discussion with officials at the DTI and other departments.
2. FROM WHITE
PAPER TO
LEGISLATION
Some of the issues addressed in the White Paper
fall outside Oxfam's direct experience. We have therefore limited
our comments to those areas where we believe that a strengthening
of the law over arms export controls could have material benefit
in reducing the humanitarian suffering associated with the transfer
of arms to sensitive destinations. We make further recommendations
beyond those already contained in the White Paper. This should
not be interpreted as being critical of the broad thrust of the
White Paper, but an attempt to concentrate on areas where we believe
it could be improved.
Oxfam recognises that the UK is not always a
major supplier of arms to sensitive destinations. But it is a
key player in the international arms marketcurrently the
second largest supplier of arms to the developing world according
to the US Congressional Research Service. We believe that legislation
stemming from this White Paper will present an opportunity to
place the UK's own house in order, and also to set an example
of best practice to othersa firm foundation for the development
of more restrictive international export controls.
2.1 Parliamentary Scrutiny:
Transparency is a central pre-requisite of a
responsible and restrictive arms export policy. The combination
of low-quality information held in Government records, and a lack
of openess to Parliament, has led in the past to the inadequate
scrutiny of arms saleswhich in turn has led to ill-judged
exports to countries where armed conflicts, human rights violations
or continuing poverty have raised grave concerns. For example,
government records indicate that over recent years, the UK has
licensed sales of small arms and ammunition to 42 countries where
Oxfam works. Nineteen recipients of UK arms were classified by
the IMF as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). In Africa, 71
per cent of countries in recipt of UK arms were suffering either
political violence, low or high intensity conflict.
2.1 (a) Annual reporting process:
Through the legislation flowing from the White
Paper, it should become a statutory obligation for the present
and future Governments to publish detailed annual reports on strategic
exportsand for these to be put before relevant Parliamentary
bodies. Without this, there is a greater risk that a future Government
may reverse the moves towards greater transparency which the forthcoming
annual report on strategic exports is likely to represent.
Future annual reports should contain a level
of detail which allows for effective parliamentary scrutiny. A
minimum would include:
detailed breakdowns of the types
of equipment exported;
the numbers of all items exported
to individual countries;
their prospective end-user;
a breakdown of export licenses refused.
Without this level of detail, it will not be
possible to differentiate between, for example, small-scale exports
of sporting guns or larger orders of assault rifles or sub-machine
guns to military or police end-users. At present, the Government
is unable to demonstrate that it is fulfilling its own stated
aims for strategic exports.
This level of detail will also be required to
make the annual reporting of the EU Code of Conduct on arms transfers
an effective exercise. We recommend that the UK leads the way
in the EU by proposing a public annual reporting on the Code meeting
the above details.
2.1 (b) Pre-notification to committee
The Government's greater transparency in reporting
on past strategic exports, particularly if developed to the level
of detail above, will be extremely important. It should not however
be seen as an alternative to transparency in the process of deciding
upon export licences. The prior notification of proposed licences
to an effective Parliamentary body would reduce the risks of unwise
licence approvals, potentially negative humanitarian consequences
and political damage to the Government when they are discovered.
Different forms of prior notification in the
United States and Sweden have not hampered their defence industries'
ability to compete on the international arms market. Indeed their
governments have the same concerns which have been put forward
in the UK as a reason for not permitting greater Parliamentary
scrutiny.
To protect the commercial confidentiality of
proposed licence applications, a Parliamentary committee could
meet in closed session. The information on weapons types and numbers
to be exported and the prospective end-use or end-user could be
disclosed without revealing individual company details. We propose
that the committee would not have the power to veto sales, but
could recommend whether the sale should proceed or not.
To ensure that both the committee and the DTI
had manageable tasks, we would suggest that the Government would
not have to submit every proposed export licence to it. Instead,
it could consider deals worth over £5 million and those involving
more than 50 specified items. This latter requirement would ensure
that relatively low value items such as small arms and ammunition,
which are often the tools of violence, would be scrutinised. It
would also be possible, either as an additional or alternative
criterion, to submit to the committee proposed sales to a list
of sensitive destinations. Though the Government is opposed to
total bans on sales to any country which is not under an embargo,
such a list of sensitive destinations for this specific purpose
would not conflict with this policy.
2.2 The Purpose of Export Controls
The legislation flowing from the White Paper
should take account of the EU Code of Conduct agreed by the General
Affairs Council on 8 Juneno doubt after most of the White
Paper was drafted. Where the Government has already committed
itself, in the Code, to more detailed criteria than those included
in the White Paper, these should be used in the legislation, in
order to maintain the Government's consistency.
(This is not to say that Oxfam concurs with
every aspect of the Code which we believe should be strengthened,
but we do believe that it is a step in the right direction which
should be consistently applied. For a more detailed analysis of
proposals to strengthen the EU Code of Conduct, please refer to
the paper submitted by the UK Arms Working Group of which Oxfam
is a member.)
2.3 Arms Brokering and Trafficking
The White Paper's proposal to curb the activites
of arms brokers is particularly welcome. Over recent years, we
have witnessed the horrific consequences of the inadequate regulation
of this section of the arms market, particularly in the Great
Lakes region of Central Africa, where arms brokers continue to
operate with impunity. We agree with the Government that it is
wrong in principle for UK brokers to undermine embargoes enacted
in legislation. The question not answered by the White Paper is
how best to prevent this.
In the legislation flowing from the White Paper,
the Government should make it a criminal offence to broker weapons
to any embargoed destination. The current practice of using Orders
in Council to enact each individual embargo on a case by case
basis has been seen to fail to prevent brokering both in this
year's scandal around arms to Sierra Leone and in the 1994 brokering
of arms by MilTec to the genocidal regime of the former government
of Rwanda. No prosecutions took place in either case. Clear legislation
that all brokering to embargoed destinations is a criminal offence
would demonstrate that the Government has learned the lessons
of the past.
All brokering should be brought within the scope
of strategic export controls, as currently happens in Germany.
There are many countries, which are not subject to an arms embargo
to which it is still essential to judge whether or not brokered
weapons to these destinations could be used to violate human rights,
fuel external aggression or divert resources from development.
It is therefore illogical to permit unregulated brokering. The
Government should consider requiring arms brokers to register
their activites as currently happens in the US, and to require
brokering deals to be licenced with criminal penalties for failure
to do so.
2.4 End-Use Controls and monitoring
The legislation stemming from the White Paper
will provide an opportunity to ensure that effective end-use controls
are implemented in the UK. All end-use and/or end-user information
should be clearly specified in the license application. Export
licences should only be granted if the end-user agrees to the
UK Government having the right to conduct follow up monitoring.
It is of course impractical for UK diplomatic missions to monitor
every strategic export. Nevertheless, a level of checks on random
exports, or those to sensitive destinations, should be instituted
to rebuild confidence that UK end-user certificates are reliable
safeguards agains abuse. End-use certicates should become legally
binding agreements which become void if another use or user is
proved.
Moreover, legislation should specify that copies
of end-user certificates must accompany airway bills, cargo manifests
or any other shipping information relevant to the transfer of
arms and strategic goods. It should also be an offence in law
for shipping and handling agents to proceed with transhipment
without ensuring the necessary documentation is correct and that
it has been approved by appropriate authorities. To better regulate
the activities of arms brokers, it is hoped that this legislation
can be applied extra-territorially to include all UK nationals
and UK based or registered companies.
At the same time, the Government should, as
the White Paper says, seek to establish a common international
system of end-use regulation in appropriate international fora
with the utmost urgency.
3. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to help reduce the human suffering
associated with unregulated or poorly regulated exports of arms,
Oxfam recommends that legislation stemming from the White Paper
should include the following points:
1. A statutory requirement to produce detailed
annual reports on types, numbers and end-use of all arms exports;
2. the pre-notification of sensitive exports
to a parliamentary committee;
3. the purpose of export controls to include
the EU Code of Conduct;
4. it should be declared a crime in law to
broker arms to any embargoed destination;
5. all other arms brokering deals to be subject
to UK export controls, including their compulsory registration;
6. end-use certificates and the right to
conduct follow up monitoring to be a legally binding agreement;
7. handling and shipping agents to be required
to ensure that end-use documentation is verified by appropriate
authorities at all stages of transhipment.
September 1998
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