Annex
END-USE
CONTROLS IN
BELGIUM
For exports to non-NATO countries, the Belgian
government requires an End-Use Certificate with an explicit assurance
from the importing government that they will not re-export the
equipment without the prior consent of the Belgian government.
These End-use Certificates are sent by the Belgian government
to the importing country's embassy for verification thus allowing
for the discovery of false documentation. Three months after the
goods are exported from Belgium, the Belgian government requires
proof that the goods were delivered including details of the transit
routes and travel plans.
END-USE
CONTROL IN
SWEDEN
Sweden has many forms of end-user certificate
to fit different situations, including a "tailor-made"end-user
statement to suit a particular case if none of the standard forms
fit a given situation. An export licence is not processed until
the requisite EUC is in the physical possession of the Swedish
licensing authority. While Sweden does not refer explicitly to
follow-up provisions in its export licensing, investigations regardingre-export
has taken place with on-site inspections having taken place in
at least one instance.
Sweden has also developed a Customs Information
Systemknown by the Swedish acronym TDSwhich is a
computer system that is used to support customs clearance in connection
with the export and import of goods. One of the main reasons for
introducing the system was to move away from paper documentation
and the associated problems of document retrieval and archive
storage. For example, export declaration can now be taken directly
from TDS, whereas previously they had to be obtained from microfiche
archives. More importantly from a control perspective, TDS (among
other things) can alert officers to potential illegal exports
and identify known proliferators. It cost about £35 million
to introduce, and was phased in over a number of years, beginning
with exports in 1992 (each exporting company has a unique registration
number), imports in 1993-94 and a post-export control system in
1995. Work is currently in progress to build risk profiles within
the system. There are 35 customs officers who act as contact points
and specialists for TDS within the customs regions.
END-USE
CONTROLS IN
GERMANY
In the 1980s there were several investigations
into the violation of German export regulations. As a result of
these investigations, a number of administrative improvements
and legislative amendments were made in Germany at the beginning
of the 1990s. The main changes in relation to end-use controls
were as follows:
The "catch-all" clause
A "catch-all" clause was introduced
in 1990 for exports under the Foreign Trade Act. Although thecatch-all
in relation to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons (and the
missiles capable of carrying such weapons) later became subject
to Article 4 of the EC Regulation on Dual-Use Goods, the legislative
provision for the catch-all in relation to conventional weapons
remains unchanged and a unique feature of the German model. Under
this provision, exports of goods not on the Export List require
a licence when they were used as supplies for conventional weapons
or armaments production plants to 13 sensitive K-list countries
(previously the 30 country H-list) and the exporter has prior
knowledge of this intended use. In effect, this requires companies
to ensure that all proposed exports to these destinations are
for civilian use only.
Principles for examining the reliability of exporters
Established in 1991, these principles effectively
make the granting of an export licence to certain destinations
(around 34 specified countries as at the end of 1997) dependent
on the reliability of the exporting company. Specific personnel
and organisational requirements in the respective companies must
be fulfilled as proof of reliability. Companies, for example,
must appoint a "Person Responsible for Exports" (Ausfuhrverantwortlicher)
and obtain a certificate of reliability from the Federal Export
Office. The named company officialwho must be a person
at executive board or managing director levelis also responsible
for assessing end-use, and can later be held accountable for any
foreseeable diversion. Interestingly, the reaction from industry
has been overwhelmingly favourable, as this particular requirement
has provided an opportunity for German companies to display a
new "clean image" to the wider world. Thus, many individual
German companies have responded by introducing their own internal
guidelines and export control systems which exceed the minimum
requirements.
End-use certificates
The German system of end-use certification is
based on a combination of International End-Use Certificates (for
destinations where governments issues such declarations) and private
declarations made by importing firms (for all other destinations).
An End-Use Certificate (certified by either the importing government
or private company) is normally required, unless:
the export value is below certain
deminimus limits (DM 10,000 for armaments and defence-related
items listed in Section A of the Export List and DM 20,000 for
most dual-use goods listed in Section C);
it is a temporary export; or
it is a government contract.
The End-Use Certificate contains a declaration
by the consignee or end-user on the final destination and use
of the goods. Standard texts are provided by the Federal Export
Office, and the declaration usually includes a commitment by the
end-user not to re-export the goods without prior written permission
from the Federal Export Office (although the exact content of
each Certificate will differ accordingly to country of destination,
end-user and type of goods). The validity of the end-use declaration
may also be checked with the recipient country's embassy in Germany.
Monitoring
In the early 1990s, the German Government strengthened
its preventive monitoring options in a number of ways. The most
significant change was a substantially strengthening in the export
control function of the Customs Investigation Service, commonly
known by its German abbreviation, ZKA. In 1988, for example, the
ZKA employed 94 staff in total, whereas in 1994 the ZKA employed
around 370 personnel, including 150 investigators on export controls.
It also coordinates the activities of around 2,600 customs officials
throughout Germany. One consequence of this expansion in resources
has been an increase in the number of investigations from 405
in 1989 to 1,051 in 1991.
The ZKA's export control function has also been
enhanced by the introduction of computer systems, better coordination
with the Federal Export Office and the introduction of intrusive
surveillance powers. Both the Federal Export Office and the ZKA
have introduced computer systems to detect unlawful exports. The
Federal Export Office operates two databases, one for information
about licence applications and processing, and the other containing
intelligence information on illegal procurement activities. In
addition, the ZKA introduced its own separate export data collection
system called Kontrolle Bei Der Ausfuhr (KOBRA) on1 April 1991.
The system has many innovative, computerised tracking and monitoring
features and is based at the ZKA's headquarters in Cologne. It
is an on-line system available to most customs offices throughout
Germany, which centralises in a single data base all documents
filed at individual offices, and signals whether or not a stated
end user for a given product is known to be involved in weapons
development. It also compares export documents against checklistscompiled
by the ZKAof suspect end users, countries and particular
products associated with those countries known weapons development
programmes. The product coverage of KOBRA is extensive. In addition
to arms and munitions, it includes all chemical products, all
related written materials and plans, all steel and metal products,
machinery and transport equipment, electromechanical and electronic
products, fine mechanics and optical devices. In 1990 and 1991
these product categories amounted to 71.6 and 71.1 per cent of
all German exports, respectively.
While KOBRA does have some data recognition
problems, it nonetheless recognised as a useful tool for showing
the larger proliferation picture and in particular for tracking
the acquisition patterns of certain countries (although, of course,
it is unable to track Germany technology acquired within the Single
European Market and subsequently exported from the EU by another
Member Statethis would require the development of an EU-wide
system).
20 November 1998
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