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Fraud
Mr. Field: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what steps his Department has taken to encourage local authorities to prevent fraud from entering the benefit system. [107669]
Mr. Rooker: We are committed to taking tough action to combat Housing Benefit fraud. We have made an additional £100 million available to enable all LAs to implement the Verification Framework by 2001. The Framework forms a platform for the secure and accurate administration by defining the evidence which should be gathered to support a claim, and for the frequency of subsequent checks. As of 28 January 2000, 226 LAs have received funding to implement the Framework.
We have reformed the anti-fraud financial incentive scheme for local authorities to ensure they can be rewarded for detecting and prosecuting cases of fraud. We want all LAs to implement the Verification Framework so we have built additional incentives into the scheme to encourage them to do so. Every LA that adopts the Framework can qualify for extra subsidy payments.
We have invited all local authorities to participate in the Royal Mail "do not redirect" initiative which prevents benefit claimants from using Royal Mail's postal redirection arrangements to make false claims to benefit from multiple addresses. Already, well over 200 local authorities are operating this scheme and many more are preparing to implement it.
We have made £4 million available to install computer terminals in local authorities which provide access to the Department's benefit systems. We are now looking to extend this initiative to include exchanging information electronically between local authorities and the Department, providing further scope to prevent fraud and error occurring in the first place. The electronic transfer of data is being successfully piloted with 20 LAs and we plan to roll this service out nationally from February 2000.
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We have announced on 24 January that we are setting up a National Benefits Intelligence Unit to help crack down on benefit fraud. The unit will draw on the expertise of fraud investigators in the Department, as well as intelligence from local authorities and other agencies.
Finally, we have arranged a programme of visits by the Benefits Fraud Inspectorate to the top 30 spending councils to drive-up standards of benefit administration and counter fraud performance. This programme of visits is due to be completed by September 2000.
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security (1) for each quarter since BASIS was formed how many fraud cases compiled by BASIS's National Intelligence Unit (a) were forwarded to the police investigation and (b) resulted in a prosecution; [107444]
Mr. Rooker:
This is a matter for Peter Mathison, the Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency. He will write to my right hon. Friend.
Letter from Peter Mathison to Mr. Frank Field, dated 28 January 2000:
31 Jan 2000 : Column: 471W
Mr. Burstow:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security (1) if he will make a statement on the reasons for the recent overpayment of benefit into recipients' bank and building society accounts; [107543]
Angela Eagle:
The administration of benefit payments is a matter for Peter Mathison, the Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency. He will write to the hon. Member.
Letter from Peter Mathison to Mr. Paul Burstow, dated 28 January 2000:
Mr. Sanders:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security (1) how much benefit was overpaid due to a processing error notified to recipients in a letter from the Benefits Agency Central Recovery Group Manager dated 23 January; and if he will make a statement; [107533]
(3) how many people were contacted about benefit overpayments by the Central Recovery Group Manager of the Benefits Agency in letters to recipients in January. [107534]
Angela Eagle:
The administration of benefit payments is a matter for Mr. Peter Mathison, the Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency. He will write to the hon. Member.
31 Jan 2000 : Column: 472W
(2) what were the responsibilities and achievements of BASIS's Business Development Team for each of the last five years. [107445]
The Secretary of State has asked me to reply to your recent Parliamentary Questions asking for each quarter since BASIS was formed how many fraud cases compiled by BASIS's National Intelligence Unit (a) were forwarded to the police investigation and (b) resulted in a prosecution, and what were the responsibilities and achievements of BASIS's Business Development Team for each of the last five years.
The Benefit Agency Security Investigation Service (BASIS) exists to counter the threat of organised and serious fraudulent attacks on the benefit system. The team's priority is to prevent and deter fraud. It is part of the Security Branch whose role is to promote the development and provision of secure and accurate services in the Benefits Agency.
The National Intelligence Unit (NIU) provides intelligence for BASIS in the Security Branch and links with other risk management teams. It does not refer investigations to the Police because all intelligence and information is referred to either BASIS Operational Teams or relevant BA sections.
The NIU exists to support the Benefits Agency through; gathering and analysing information; referring the gathered intelligence to the appropriate BASIS investigation team, via the Analyst Unit; it also acts as a multi agency link to other Government Departments.
BASIS does not refer cases of benefit fraud to the police for investigation. If during an investigation the need to involve the police arises the team will contact them and appraise them of the situation. At this point a joint operation may be conducted. BASIS officers would concentrate on benefit fraud whilst the police may look at other linked criminal activity.
There are no figures kept for prosecutions resulting from joint operations. However, in 1998-1999 BASIS prosecuted 666 cases of benefit fraud with a 96% successful conviction rate.
The BASIS Business Development Team (BDT) was established in March 1999 with the appointment of a Business Development Manager. The BDT is a small team which exists to support BASIS in improving its business processes and to support the team in meeting the objectives of the Agency and Department.
The most notable achievements of the BDT in the eleven months of its existence are improvements in processes such as expenditure and performance accountability, internal security assurance, communication, management checks, industrial relations, training & development, planning and reporting. Work on BASIS terms and conditions and a review of the Guidance Manual has improved clarity around individual entitlement. The current recruitment drive has brought in 50 new staff to date. The IT strategy for this year is
on course to upgrade our capability throughout the Section and other equipment is being standardised and renewed. Moreover, the work of the BDT has allowed the Operational and BASIS National Intelligence Unit managers to apply a greater focus on the core business of investigation, detection, deterrence and prevention of organised and serious fraud against the benefits system.
I hope this is helpful.
(2) what estimate he has made of the extra costs incurred in recovering the overpayment of benefits paid direct into beneficiaries' accounts; and if he will make a statement. [107542]
The Secretary of State has asked me to respond to your recent questions asking if he will make a statement on the reasons for the recent overpayment of benefit into recipients' bank and building society accounts, and also, what estimate he has made of the extra costs which will be incurred in recovering the benefit overpaid.
The problem was caused by an incomplete file being erroneously passed to the Bankers Automated Credit Service for payment on 17 January, compounded by the correct file being reprocessed for payment on 18 January.
On 17 January 112,000 customers correctly received a payment into their bank accounts, while 60,000 customers did not receive the payment which was due. The following day, the same 112,000 customers received a duplicate payment into their accounts, while the 60,000 customers received their payment a day late. The value of the duplicate payments amount to £10.5 million.
Customers were notified of the problem by letter on 24 January and given details of how to repay the duplicate payment. Dedicated phone lines were set up to receive phone calls from those customers who needed to talk to somebody about how to pay the money back. Customers can also contact their local benefit offices for advice.
No estimate is yet available as to the extra costs incurred in recovering the overpaid benefit.
I hope this is helpful.
(2) what steps he will take to recover overpaid benefit due to a processing error notified to recipients in January from those people who are unable to pay it back immediately; and if he will make a statement; [107535]
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