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Mr. Major: I am familiar with the argument that people could go out and buy more Semtex, but one of the aspects of a wholesale decommissioning is that the IRA disarmed is not a sustainable organisation. The disarmament of the IRA amounts to its disbandment. Other fringe groups, such as Continuity IRA--the present IRA is, after all, a fringe group of an earlier body--may return to violence, but once there is wholesale disarmament we will be in a different position, including politically. In that case, no one could doubt that there was no sympathy in any part of any community--as in the past there has been--for the activities of the men of violence. It would be straightforward criminality in
everyone's mind, not just in the minds of democrats such as the right hon. Gentleman and other right hon. and hon. Members, and it could be dealt with in that fashion. Once there is a general level of decommissioning, there would be a complete sea change, even if some people then moved to fringe groups and rearmed themselves.
The question we must face is where we go from the present situation. The Bill establishes the power to adopt direct rule which, sadly, is inevitable and will, barring some extraordinary turn of events, be adopted by the House today and brought into effect over the next few days. Many gloomy words have been said and written about the present impasse and I share the despair that the Bill is necessary and that the promises we thought were made have not been kept. However, even as we despair over that, I hope that we do not carry our despair too far. In our own interests and those of Northern Ireland, we should seek to preserve the gains of recent years, which are substantial.
London and Dublin working together is a sharp change from what happened in the past. The end of the sterile debate of the past is another welcome change. The much greater political engagement across the board that has been brought about is, again, of immeasurable proportions in our understanding, especially when one considers how much distrust and fear have fuelled Northern Irish politics for so long. We need to ensure that the political process continues in some state--albeit, perhaps, abbreviated. Talks should certainly continue, to cement the improved relationship and prevent a return to the political barricades.
Even if this process does, for the time being, falter, as it seems about to do, in parallel with moves to resurrect it the Government are not powerless in the measures that they can take to continue to give hope and optimism to Northern Ireland. Very serious pockets of economic difficulty exist on both sides of the divide, in Unionist and Catholic areas, and they should continue to be tackled vigorously. Often, the grievance that has sustained the paramilitaries has been an economic grievance of people who felt that they were outside the system and believed that they were being represented best by men who were actually representing only their own violent interests. Removing that grievance would deny them the oxygen of support.
In the absence of an Executive, if that is to be a continuing position--which I profoundly hope it is not--the Government might wish to look at the devolution of more powers directly to local government. The concrete achievements of the past decade can certainly be built on.
Mr. Douglas Hogg (Sleaford and North Hykeham):
My right hon. Friend has talked about things that we can do to give a positive sense of movement. Would he also consider the alternative approach of imposing sanctions? I refer to the release of prisoners. It seems hard to continue with that policy while the IRA refuses to disarm in any sense.
Mr. Major:
My right hon. and learned Friend approaches the point that I was about to make, albeit slightly differently. The Secretary of State spoke of confidence building and the role of prisoner release. He may also--I cannot remember--have mentioned the proposed reforms of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. As the
Mr. David Trimble (Upper Bann):
Like the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), I had hoped that it would not be necessary to bring a Bill such as this before the House. Obviously, when we took the risks that we took at the end of November, we hoped that they would wholly succeed. I am disappointed that we are facing the consequences of the failure of the hopes with which we embarked just over two months ago.
Since last March, there has been an effective stalemate in the development of the political process in Northern Ireland and the implementation of the Good Friday agreement on an issue that is not only about guns, but is, at heart, about whether people are genuinely committed to peaceful means and the democratic process. Last March, Mr. Adams, the person returned to serve as the Member for Belfast, West, but who has not done so, coined the phrase that we should "jump together". In subsequent months, we tried many times to explore with him precisely what he meant. In the event, we never achieved absolute clarity on that point.
None the less, towards the end of the Mitchell review, and in light of the discussions and the understandings arrived at during that process, we decided to jump first. That was not an easy decision to make. One of the great, and soundly based, fears of members of my party and of people in Northern Ireland who have seen what has happened over the years was that they would be sucked into a process and strung along again and again. It became clear to me as we approached the decision taken by the Ulster Unionist council on 27 November that we should not achieve a positive decision unless we addressed that fear of being strung along. We would not achieve a positive decision unless some clear floor were placed beneath the process. That we did, in the letters written by me and my ministerial colleagues and in the council's decision to reconvene to take a final decision.
Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North):
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
That resolution to meet again in February did not set a precondition or a deadline. It was simply the decision of a democratic party to meet to consider the situation. We put no precise requirement in front of anyone, and we did not say, "You must do this or that." As a democratic party, we exercised our right to meet and consider the situation.
February was chosen for the simple reason that a clear understanding existed following the Mitchell review that the sequence being put in train would run until January. The existence of that clear understanding was brought into the public domain when, on 12 December, General de Chastelain issued his second report, which, I am happy to say, the Government published within a matter of minutes of receiving it. In that report, General de Chastelain said that he would make a further report in January.
That sequence could not have surprised anyone. It was basically the same as the sequence contained in the Prime Minister's proposals of last July--"The Way Forward". Those proposals were underpinned by exactly the same arrangements and expectations with regard to decommissioning as were contained in the Mitchell review.
Mr. Hogg:
The right hon. Gentleman is better able than most to answer the question that I wish to ask. The IRA has made it plain, in terms, that it has no present intent to decommission. Yet the right hon. Gentleman and many others believe that they were at some stage given undertakings to the contrary. What undertakings were given to him on decommissioning, and by whom?
Mr. Trimble:
I do not know that it would be helpful to explore that question in detail, but I shall do so in general terms. It was clearly said to us that, by jumping first, we would create the best possible circumstances in which to achieve decommissioning. That assurance was given in a statement issued by Sinn Fein, which said that it was committed to achieving it. The IRA issued a statement--in the public domain--accepting the leadership of Sinn Fein. No concrete guarantee was given. None the less, we were told that those were the best circumstances in which to achieve decommissioning.
In turn, we responded by saying that, if we moved first--to create the optimum conditions--we could sustain that for only a limited period. The capacity of the parties to move and to sustain what they were doing was discussed at great length. There was no misunderstanding about that whatever; if we took the initiative, we could sustain it only for a limited period. There was a clear understanding by all the parties that that time would run out by the end of January. On that, there was, and can be, no misunderstanding at all.
It was further expressly agreed--indeed, the proposition was first put by the republicans themselves--that, if we went forward in that way only to see things collapse a few months later, it would be a bad outcome. I took that to be a clear indication of their intent to proceed. In that situation, we knew that we were giving people an opportunity--in their own description, it was the best opportunity--but one that carried a challenge and a test.
I am amazed that, when we reached the end of January, not only had no actual decommissioning occurred, but no concrete gesture had been made at all by the republican
movement. No one can be sure until we see the detail of the de Chastelain report, but, as far as I am aware, nothing of substance was put on the table; that continues to be the case. I was, and continue to be, amazed that, having encouraged us to create the situation, the republican movement made no positive response.
Given the situation that existed at the end of November and the beginning of December, the republicans can have been in no doubt--nor could any reasonable person--that reciprocation formed part of the understandings; that it was expected; and that the failure to reciprocate would carry consequences. We proceeded "to jump first", but we did so on the basis of certain understandings. The failure of events to develop as we had hoped has falsified the basis on which we proceeded, and clearly makes it impossible for us to continue in the false position in which we now find ourselves. It is, therefore, necessary to reconsider and unwind the matter.
The Secretary of State will remember the statements that he made in November, when he made it clear that, in the event of a failure by republicans to reciprocate, the Government would intervene. He knows the extent to which we relied on those assurances at that time. Similar assurances were forthcoming from the Irish Government; the right hon. Gentleman repeated them in his statement to the House last Thursday. The Irish Government know the extent to which we relied on their assurances when we took our decision.
We have reached the end of January and seen no reciprocation, so it is necessary that the assurances given by the British and Irish Governments are put in train. That would have to be done irrespective of the meetings that will take place on Saturday. Indeed, one might argue that the assurances should have been put in train sooner than this; the reason that nothing was done sooner is that the Irish Government are hoping against hope that something will emerge.
In case my comment sounds a little ungracious, I give the Irish Government credit for the massive efforts being made by Ministers and officials to persuade the republicans to do something--even at this last stage. However, I have to add some cautionary words. It is my understanding that the Irish Government are pressing the republican movement to give a commitment to decommission, and to say when it will do so. Those are the questions put by my colleague, the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon), in the House last Thursday. He asked the IRA to say whether it would decommission and when. The Irish Government are pressing for that commitment, but, as the Secretary of State said last Thursday, words are not enough; it is necessary to go beyond words.
Some people in the press are saying that, in the past, the method used by the IRA in similar situations was to dump their arms. It has been suggested that that might be sufficient in the present circumstances. However, may I say to the Secretary of State--in case he is not fully aware of it--that some very misleading impressions have been given about the dumping of arms? The instruction issued by the leadership of the IRA in, I think, 1925 to its members to dump arms was not an instruction to disarm, and no disarmament occurred. Arms were put in dumps, but they were put in them for future use.
I recommend that those who have any doubts about that read, or reread--I am sure that all hon. Members with an interest in such matters have already read it--
Mr. Sean O'Callaghan's book on the subject. It is not necessary to read beyond the first chapter in which he describes how, in the late 1960s at the outset of civil disorder in Northern Ireland, he and a number of friends and relatives gathered together in a barn, got out their spades and shovels and proceeded to dig up the weapons that had been dumped a few decades ago. They discovered that they had not rusted--weapons do not rust if they are carefully stored--and they proceeded to clean them and dispatch them for murderous use in Northern Ireland. Dumping arms is a chimera.
Reality is the only thing that matters. We have legislation, we have schemes and we have a framework through the international commission. It was agreed in the Mitchell review that decommissioning should take place in and through the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and that that was the only way that it should be done.
There is excellent advice on the subject. Reference has been made to the fact that sources of the media, which in the past were favourable to republicanism, are now taking a different view. The Secretary of State referred to various editorials, and excellent advice appears in today's editorial in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. It asks why the IRA has not made a gesture and quotes one observer who said that, in the IRA's eyes,
On the other hand, I was glad to see that, in the IRA's statement issued on Saturday, it says that it poses no threat to the peace at present. I hope that that continues to be the case. We are, of course, disturbed by the explosion in Fermanagh and the fact that Continuity IRA, which had been thought to be quiescent, was responsible for that. I had the impression that the main threat from dissident republicans came from the Real IRA elements around Dundalk, but we now see that the elements around Fermanagh are also a threat. That underlines--as my hon. Friend the Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. Maginnis) would have reminded the Secretary of State had my hon. Friend been able to be here today--the need to maintain vigilance in Fermanagh. I am glad to see from the Secretary of State's reaction that he understands precisely the point that I make.
There is a serious threat not just from dissident republicans, but from other paramilitaries. May I commend to the Secretary of State the words on that point of the Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Ahern? In November last year in the Dail, he contemplated just this situation. If it became evident that people would not desist from their violence, he said that
"such a gesture would be symbolic of their being the bad guys".
The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette adds that the right of the people of Northern Ireland to live in peace
"matters more than a fear by the IRA that disarmament might send the wrong signal. If these 'hard men' are worried about being perceived as the bad guys, they should live up to the spirit as well as the letter of the Good Friday Agreement and give up the guns."
It is as simple as that.
"the only way to counteract such activity is to enforce the legislation in the toughest possible manner."
The legislation to which the Taoiseach referred was emergency legislation in the Irish Republic that was duplicated by the United Kingdom. Since then, it has simply not been utilised at all. It is quite remarkable that we passed emergency legislation that has remained dormant even though there has been a clear need for it in some circumstances.
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