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10.2 pm
Mr. Öpik: In view of the Secretary of State's response to his right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), I imagine that this is the last time that we shall have a chance to debate this matter before the Bill can be used. That is regrettable because, at the very least, a short debate would have been helpful. I am sorry that he did not feel able to give that guarantee.
Nevertheless, decommissioning has been widely debated tonight, and it is obvious that we are close to a watershed on the whole issue. I have just three short comments to make. First, I re-emphasise how important
it is to take seriously the points made by the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon), because he represents a legitimate and considerable body of people in the community in Northern Ireland who will regard the enactment of this Bill--the suspension of the Assembly--as a very negative statement with regard to devolution as a whole. I plead with the Minister to be extremely sensitive to the need to ensure that there are confidence- building measures in place for those communities, a willingness to explain exactly what is going on and an assurance that this is not a one-way walk from the Assembly to a dark place from which we had all sincerely hoped we had moved forward.
Secondly, it is important for us to recognise the potential for division and recrimination, the noise created by this between the communities as all sides blame each other for the potential suspension of the Assembly. The Government must play a part in ensuring that we do not end up with own goals as a result of the implementation of a suspension.
Thirdly, we need to remember that this is an emergency only if we make it so. The Bill is probably right. It is not a matter of principle; it is a matter of political probabilities that we are discussing it at all. However, it is right only so long as we make sure that the political temperature is kept down as it is moved forward. I see the Bill as an attempt to avert an emergency on 22 May, by which time, as we all know, full decommissioning is meant to have taken place. I think that the Government should play it by ear, and listen carefully as the public in Northern Ireland inevitably respond to any suspension.
Let me conclude with an emotional response. I feel very sad about what we have done today. In comparison with where we were, say, five years ago, we have made tremendous and unexpected progress, but it now seems that we are going to take a couple of steps back. In fact, that is not surprising: a characteristic element of the Northern Ireland peace process has been the taking of two steps forward and one step back. I hope that this really is just one step back, and that we shall not allow the process to begin to atrophy or stall just because the difficult decision to suspend the Assembly has been made.
Mr. McDonnell:
This has been a sombre debate. I contrast it with the time, nearly two years ago, when we had a sense of hope and a sense of the future. It was then that we realised that the Belfast agreement might give us the opportunity of ensuring that the future of the island of Ireland would be determined not by the gun or the bomb or by British mandate, but by the Irish people themselves.
The agreement gave the Unionists the possibility that their future would be decided neither by some form of brute force nor by a British sell-out. They would be a
party to decisions: that is why they would regain the structures of a statelet. For republicans and nationalists, there was the acceptance of the sovereignty of the Irish people as a whole, and the prospect of a mechanism to create a united Ireland. The agreement gave all of us--both traditions--peace and an opportunity to involve ourselves in policy making and governmental structures that would have an impact on the day-to-day lives of the citizens of the Six Counties of Northern Ireland. It offered the chance of a normalisation of politics--of the politics that we have taken for granted on this island: politics that are determined by electoral mandates and policy discussion in a civilised framework.
The agreement gave us the chance of a radical reform programme, the achievement of equality, respect for human rights and, in every area of policy and everyday life, a debate about what the quality of life should be. I am sorry that some quarters have appealed tonight for a retreat from that programme of reform, for it is important that we press on.
For some of us, the agreement provided the hope of a united island of Ireland at some time in the future, on the basis of agreement and mutual respect for different traditions. It provided the hope of an Ireland strengthened by the process of agreement. We accepted that peace was never to be a single act and that there were never to be any armistices. It was a process that would be achieved in stages. There must be incremental steps: lessening violence, removing violence, engaging in dialogue, achieving the appreciation of different perspectives and the understanding of different views, and securing agreement for a way forward.
That is why the Bill is such a step backwards--and it is a major step backwards. It removes the structures of the government of Northern Ireland that would make possible the debate, the process of reform and the dialogue. I am confident that we shall eventually restore those structures and achieve peace, but, as we have heard today, there is a history of structures being abolished or suspended that goes back about a quarter of a century.
I believe that the Bill poses a risk. Some people are trying to use the decommissioning issue to undermine elements in the Good Friday agreement, and some are trying to undermine the agreement overall. Decommissioning has become a weapon in the hands of anti-agreement elements--of rejectionists. It was used first as an excuse to delay the setting up of the Executive; now it is used to put the whole peace process in jeopardy. But what does decommissioning mean? The IRA has not fired weapons or exploded bombs since the restoration of the ceasefire on 20 July 1997. Before that, the ceasefire had lasted from 13 October 1994 to 9 February 1996. With the exception of the tragedy at Canary wharf, the IRA had held a disciplined ceasefire, with weapons out of commission for more than five years.
No one in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s would have ever been optimistic enough to hope that that could be achieved within that time scale. The weapons are out of commission. We are urged today to suspend the arrangements and structures that have consolidated that ceasefire, that form of decommissioning. Why? Because some want to press some extraordinary process of surrender--and surrender is what it will be viewed as.
Mr. Harry Barnes (North-East Derbyshire):
All the hon. Members who have spoken in the debate so far,
Mr. McDonnell:
Decommissioning has been recognised as a responsibility. That is why the agreement was signed, but decommissioning itself is a process and the achievement for most of us was peace, the lack of bombs and the lack of the use of the gun. That has been achieved. That is an argument of good faith, which has been demonstrated, but the ramifications of pressing the process to its nth degree have already been explained: the risks of splits and jeopardy for all. This week's bomb is a reminder of the problems and of how it is difficult to hold organisations and traditions together.
Mr. Winnick:
Most of us were against the IRA campaign of terror, as we were against the so-called loyalists on the other side during those long 30 years. We made our position clear. Will my hon. Friend take into account the article in The Irish Times today--which I have already quoted in an intervention--by my friend the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume), who pleaded with the IRA for some form of decommissioning? We should bear it in mind that it was he who set the peace process in motion in the first place.
Mr. McDonnell:
I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes. Of course, we are all pleading with all sides to move forward together on a path to peace and to decommissioning in the end, but let us make it clear that the agreement contains no provision for the suspension of power and did not set a deadline--the deadline has been set as a result of an external intervention by the Unionists. It is the exercise of a Unionist veto on the agreement, a veto that is dangerous.
The Unionist veto was dangerously used in 1975 and 1985. There have been periods when it has undermined the democratic institutions that British Governments have tried to establish in the Six Counties. We are seeing it again now. Why should we allow a timetable to be imposed by one of the parties to the agreement which is not in the agreement?
A lasting peace can be founded only on trust. It is clear that sufficient trust has not been established between the parties to the conflict. The irony of the Bill is that it suspends the operation of the key body that is engendering trust--the Assembly. The Assembly is the key forum, in which representatives from all the constituencies and all the parties are able to meet, mix, discuss and work together on common problems in the interests of their community. That process is a key foundation stone of building trust to secure decommissioning. After only eight weeks' operation, we are asked to suspend that key body of trust and confidence building.
The Bill's wide-ranging powers are shocking. The Secretary of State is able by order not just on this occasion through the Bill, but on future occasions, to suspend the Assembly and all the mechanisms associated with the agreement without full and adequate debate. Orders are never adequately debated in the Chamber. That wide- ranging power does not even contain a review element;
there is no review element on revocation or restoration. It is government by order. There is no power in the legislation for consultation with the Irish Government, although I accept Ministers' assurances on that point.
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