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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Walter: I do not wish to prolong the debate on organisations that are designated as permitted participants in a referendum campaign. Clause 99 deals with declarations and notifications for the purposes of clause 98. I wish to alert the Committee to what I see as more evidence of the problems in the Bill with regard to those who might well decide that they are or want to be permitted participants, but are not normally regarded as citizens of the United Kingdom or are not normally resident here.
Clause 99(4)(a) states:
In respect of a company, the name and the address of its registered office is required. To some extent, that brings companies within the scope of the Bill. None the less, there are no specific provisions, despite those in respect of permitted donors to political parties, that relate to a company
If a notification is
In the previous couple of debates on amendments to clause 98 and clause stand part, we have emphasised the fact that the Bill allows for an enormous leak which will permit foreign individuals, companies, unincorporated associations and other bodies to participate in our
democratic procedures without necessarily being United Kingdom nationals. It is a worrying provision and it is highlighted yet again in clause 99.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 100 and 101 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Stunell:
I beg to move amendment No. 13, in page 64, line 28, at end insert--
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Alan Haselhurst):
With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 12, in clause 103, page 64, line 40, at end insert--
Mr. Stunell:
I refer hon. Members to clause 101(1), which states:
Clause 101 establishes that the designated participants that meet certain criteria may receive financial assistance, and the decision on that will be made by the Electoral Commission. Clause 102, to which amendment No. 13 relates, deals with how permitted participants will be designated. Clause 102(5) provides for a situation in which designated participants make competing applications to become the organisation that will receive assistance. The special use of language in the Bill means that it is possible to lose sight of the fine distinctions between the two types of body, but a person, political party or organisation that fulfils certain criteria can
become a designated participant, which allows them to take part in the process. Beyond that, one or more of those designated participants can then apply to become an organisation that will receive assistance.
The amendment would extend the options available to the Electoral Commission when deciding between competing designated participants who wished to become the organisation eligible to receive assistance. The Bill, as drafted, provides the commission with two options--it can establish which of the permitted participants has the greatest popular support, or, if it is not satisfied that any of the applicants adequately represents those campaigning for a particular outcome, it can make no award. In other words, the commission has to make an all or nothing choice if there are competing demands for support.
The amendment would give the Electoral Commission more flexibility so that it could consider a third option. For example, in the feasible prospect of a referendum on the United Kingdom's joining the euro, it is likely that several bodies that are opposed to joining will compete to become the designated organisation. At one end of the spectrum of those opposed to joining will be the Socialist Workers party. Its reasons for opposing it might be complex and various, but they boil down to the argument that the euro is a capitalist plot that should be resisted at all costs. At the other end of the spectrum will be the so-called Democracy movement, which is equally ferociously opposed to the euro, essentially because it is a communist plot. Perhaps somewhere in the middle will be a large body of Conservatives, some of whom are what I call quitters and some of whom are stayers but all of whom are committed at the moment to opposing joining the euro.
As the Bill is drafted, all three of those umbrella bodies would be able properly to participate in the campaign, but it would be for the Electoral Commission to decide which body would receive financial support for making its case in the campaign. If people are confident that their factional view is likely to be seen as the majority view among those seeking a particular outcome, they would not have to worry because the commission would designate them and they would receive the money. However, there is a problem if--perhaps in some future referendum--the forces that want one particular outcome are all strongly motivated and strongly supported, and it is not so evident which should receive the financial support of the commission.
At the limit, the commission could toss a coin and say that the money would go to, for example, the SWP; or the commission could be unable to make up its mind, because there was too much controversy or uncertainty, and allocate no money to one side of the argument. While it may not be too helpful to pursue the specific case of the euro referendum to its logical conclusion, because people will argue that it is unlikely that the SWP would receive the money, I use it as an illustration of the fact that people can have fundamentally different reasons for supporting a particular outcome in a referendum. In some cases, it may be appropriate and proper for them to form an umbrella body that can qualify for support, but on other occasions that will not be possible.
Let us suppose that the line of thought represented by Lord Shore, the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner)
and the SWP was the ascendant view in popular opinion as we approached a referendum on the euro. I put it to Conservative Members that they would not be happy if all the money to support the no campaign went to that faction and none went to the Conservative faction.
Another likely future referendum is on stage 2 of the reform of the House of Lords. It is possible that some might want to vote against the reform package, their opposition being based on the fact that they wanted a wholly elected House of Lords and that what was being offered was a miserable and unworthy compromise. Some others might also be strongly opposed to the reforms because they wished to return to the hereditary principle. As the Bill stands, those two factions would either knock each other out, with the Electoral Commission making no grant, or one of them--if it could establish some ascendancy in its views--would be supported and the other would not.
We have said several times in previous debates that the Bill is fundamental. It is the first reworking, in detailed and substantial form, of legislation that goes back 117 years, and we do not know how frequently it will be updated in the future. We heard earlier that it is a framework Bill on which other legislation dealing with referendums will be based. Therefore, the issue that I have drawn to the Committee's attention requires careful consideration. It may be that the examples I have mentioned--of the referendums on the euro and the House of Lords--are not appropriate, but it seems likely that over the next few generations the situation I have outlined will arise. If so, the absence of a third option in the Bill will be a drawback that will have considerable consequences.
Amendment No. 13 would require that before the commission could adopt any sort of third-way approach, it would have to be satisfied that each alternative choice had substantial support. The Bill uses the phrase "to the greatest extent" to describe the necessary level of support, but that might be only 36 or 37 per cent. Alternative factions, with other views, might achieve support levels of 30, 32 or 33 per cent.
The amendment retains the need for support to be substantial: it would not mean that some crackpot from Hazel Grove could turn and claim a share of the money just because he said that he had a distinctly different way of looking at things. It also requires that there be a "distinct 'principal reason'" for seeking the same outcome. If those two conditions were met, the amendment would give the Electoral Commission the authority to split the amount of financial support given to those supporting a particular outcome--but only if it would be unreasonable not to do so.
The amendment would also provide that the split of the financial support available should be decided by the Electoral Commission. Amendment No. 12, to clause 103, is the consequential amendment that would implement that requirement.
Amendment No. 13 would prevent a difficulty that is certainly possible in theory, and which I submit is quite feasible in real life--namely, that it is possible for there to be more than one completely distinct and separate reason for wanting a particular outcome. I do not know how many such reasons for wanting a particular outcome it might be possible to have, but I suggest that three is a practical limit. The amendment would prevent money
going to an organisation that enjoyed only 35 per cent. support, when a larger number of people--the collective total of those who support the same outcome--would not get anything. It would also prevent the outcome whereby no money would be given to anyone simply because the Electoral Commission had lost patience with them all.
"A notification under this section must--
I imagine that, for the purposes of his home address in the United Kingdom, a hotel or a friend's address would be perfectly acceptable so long as he signed the notification.
(a) if given by an individual, state--
(i) his full name, and
(ii) his home address in the United Kingdom".
"registered under the Companies Act 1985 or the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1986, and . . . incorporated within the European Union, which carries on business in the United Kingdom."
There are no such provisions in clause 99 in respect of the declarations and notifications that have to be made.
"given by an unincorporated association",
it must state
"(i) the name of the association,
So one might well receive a notification from the good burghers of Calais who wished to participate in a referendum campaign and had a branch office in Dover. That would be sufficient for them to be permitted participants. If the limits in the Bill applied to them, as foreigners, they would be entitled to spend £500,000.
(ii) the address of an office of the association in the United Kingdom".
'(5A) In making any designation of a permitted participant under section 101(2) or (4) the Commission shall have regard to
(i) the separate levels of support for each of the permitted participants which have given notice under section 99(1)(b) or section 99(3)(b) that they propose to campaign for the same outcome, and
(ii) evidence submitted to it by any permitted participants relating to their principal reasons for campaigning for that outcome.
(5B) Where the Commission is satisfied that more than one permitted participant has demonstrated
(a) substantial support, and
(b) a distinct "principal reason" for campaigning for the same outcome, and
(c) that it would be unreasonable to refuse designation under section 101(1),
it may designate 2 or more permitted participants for assistance under section 103.
(5C) Where the Commission makes any designation under subsection (5C) above, they shall make such an apportionment of eligibility for assistance between the designated permitted participants as they think fit.'.
'(2A) Where more than one designation has been made under section 102(5B), that amount shall be apportioned in accordance with section 102(5C).'.
6.30 pm
"The Commission may . . . designate permitted participants as organisations to whom assistance is available".
We have a small language problem here in that there are designated organisations and permitted organisations. I do not claim that the Bill is ambiguous, but it is easy to become ambiguous when one is speaking about them.
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