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Mr. Bercow: I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way, but he has already covered the point. Does he agree that it is extraordinary that the Prime Minister not only asserts his profound opposition to the idea of a common European defence policy, but enthusiastically supports for the presidency of the European Commission a man who is utterly committed to the realisation of the goal of a common European defence policy? How does the Prime Minister expect to be taken remotely seriously on this matter, as on others, when he is manifestly at loggerheads with himself?
Mr. Duncan Smith: It is a conundrum. I have spent many a sleepless night wondering about the Prime Minister's split personality--the way in which, at one and the same time, he can be both Opposition and Government. He makes a statement, but, stepping to the other Dispatch Box, challenges himself and disapproves of his previous statement. It depends on the audience. One day, perhaps in The Guardian, the Prime Minister will make one policy statement, whereas, on another day, he will go out of his way to make a different statement, perhaps in the Daily Mail or The Daily Telegraph.
Mr. Duncan Smith: My hon. Friend can say that, but I would not be so unkind. On this key issue, however, we are considering not the Prime Minister's assurances, but the statements of other people.
It is no wonder that there are concerns in Washington and in NATO. The other day, some of my hon. Friends and I visited NATO. We certainly drew the conclusion that people there had serious concerns about the ESDI process, notwithstanding those people's determination to try to bind it to NATO.
There will be a problem whichever way the process goes. The process will either create a huge military structure that will operate as an alternative to NATO, or--perhaps this scenario is even more likely; it is even more dangerous--it will act as a smokescreen behind which the nations of Europe simply do not ante up in meeting their share of the NATO requirements.
Earlier, I quoted Lord Owen's comments disapproving of the process. I have also reminded the House that my former right hon. Friend--Malcolm Rifkind, who will return to the House at the next general election--has made it clear that he disapproves of the process. Like me, they believe that the European Union's involvement in the matter is part of the problem, not the solution. Everyone accepts that the European nations are not doing enough in
the new millennium to keep with their obligations to NATO. They are not doing enough to provide the type of forces that are required.
The solutions to the problem lie within NATO, not outside NATO. It has always been Britain's traditional role--one that we have played very well, regardless of change of Government--to make certain that the alliance never divided into false competing halves, composed of Europe and of north America. The alliance drew its strength from the fact that it was united. Sure, there were disagreements. Equally, as we have discovered recently, there are times when not everyone will operate together. Nevertheless, by creating an artificial structural division, the Government have risked NATO's coherence. Not one country--certainly not the serious major countries--in NATO entertains increasing its defence budget significantly, if at all. I fear that, behind the screen of the proposed new structure, the defence budgets of many of those countries will decrease. We may, therefore, end up with the worst of all worlds.
As the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife said, signals from the European nations to the United States convey the message not only that the United States' involvement is ever less welcome, but that those countries are ever less capable of mounting a serious defence posture.
The process has already begun, which is why various American diplomats and politicians are warning the nations of Europe. The Secretary of State is always very keen to quote Strobe Talbott, and, when he does, I always ask him, please, to read on a bit, to get to the rest of Mr. Talbott's speech--the part in which he describes his fears. Here is such a section. Mr. Talbott said:
It is also no good simply to claim that the process is an extension of the Americans' policy, or that it was initiated because of Kosovo. As I said, the process was started well before Kosovo.
The Government embarked on the process with such speed, in 1998, not because they felt that there was a military reason to do so, but because they were genuinely scared of being isolated in Europe. The single currency was about to start and Ministers found themselves outside of it. Their panic caused them to find a mechanism by which they would be able, in a big way, to reaffirm their European credentials. The Government therefore decided to play the defence card--giving us the best conceivable example of precisely what the Government are all about. They are about not serious policy making, but cynical gestures aimed at achieving their own cynical ambitions. Their position, however, is a foolish gamble that will divide NATO at a critical time.
Yesterday, the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife and I touched on the most critical issue in this debate--the reason why, now, more than at any
time since the mid-1980s, NATO needs to act together. I have long believed that there is an increasingly serious threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and of weapons of mass destruction. I expressed that fear in the House in 1993, and I have remained convinced of the threat ever since.
What has changed the debate is that, in 1998, the Rumsfeld commission report on ballistic missile proliferation was presented to the United States Senate, making it clear that the assessment of the threat from rogue states armed with ballistic missiles was far greater than estimated previously. The report went on to say that, within approximately five years from the date of the report's publication, the United States would be within target range of missiles stationed in North Korea and Iran. The report drew on Central Intelligence Agency sources and on other intelligence sources, and it was considered to be authoritative.
Although the report obviously accepted that there was a margin of error in the judgments made, none the less, it made a very powerful point that dramatically changed thinking on the issue in the United States. It is sad that, with full knowledge of that report, little has changed in any respect in the United Kingdom or in the rest of western Europe.
Last year, I tried to point out that I thought that the British Government should now take a lead in persuading NATO to engage the United States about its proposals for a defensive shield, rather than allowing European nations to snipe at the proposals from the sidelines. The fact is that, whether the Government like it or not--this is the crucial point--the USA will proceed with development and deployment of that shield. It would be useful for the Government to make a clear statement of their position as there is nothing in the White Paper except a subtle shift of language.
The report states that
At no stage has the Ministry of Defence given us an indication of the meaning of the term "some years". If it is different from that in the Rumsfeld report in the United States and estimates that there are many more years to prepare, can the Minister please tell us why? If it is the same, why are we not stepping up activity and taking action? More particularly, the inclusion of the word "significant" in relation to ballistic missile threat indicates that the Ministry of Defence may have shifted slightly. At least it recognises that there is a threat, but I wonder what is meant by the word "significant". I would say that one missile armed with a chemical or biological warhead is a significant enough threat. We need to see off that threat one way or another.
I have described proliferation as the chain which links nations around the globe, but right hon. and hon. Members may not realise the extent to which it has been taking place right under their noses with a degree of complacency. It all starts with China and North Korea and North Korea's missile programme--from the Taep'o-dong missile launched in 1998 that splashed down in the sea of Japan and gave us a clear indication of the ranges being achieved to the later No-dong 1 and 2 programmes. They have
absolutely convinced anyone who knows anything at all about this that the North Koreans now have the technology to produce three-stage rockets, which is the real key to producing ballistic missiles.
Whether or not North Korea poses a threat, it has helped to develop the technology in Iran, Iraq and, I understand, in other countries such as Pakistan. The key question is what we will be able to do about it. The ranges of such missiles are increasing every week. People are working on them and every year there are new developments which produce greater capacity.
There are significant links between China and North Korea and only 18 months ago China produced a missile capable of a range of 12,000 km. It will not be long before the technology finds its way to North Korea and the other rogue states that we are justifiably worried about.
Another issue that is not addressed in the White Paper involves the changing situation in Russia--not just what has been happening in Chechnya, but Mr. Putin's strident language in respect of his rights over nuclear weapons, the use to which he sees them being put and his involvement with others who wish to receive that technology about which he made some interesting statements recently.
I am concerned because I think--and the Conservative party believes--that the British Government should be taking a lead in NATO. Instead of taking a lead and trying to create or negotiate a NATO programme, the Government seem to be trying to play both ends of the argument. On one hand, they are aware of, and worried about, their French counterparts in ESDI, who are implacably opposed to the US defensive shield, as well as any discussion about a NATO programme. On the other hand, the US is going ahead and the Government try to make some quiet and careful concessions, fearful of reawakening their own Back Benchers who seem implacably opposed to any change in the anti-ballistic missile treaty or the development of such a shield.
As a result, Britain, instead of leading the debate within NATO, as we have traditionally done at critical moments, has nothing constructive or positive to say and we watch complacently as the tension within NATO grows and the threat from outside gets ever closer.
What is the lesson for leaders such as Milosevic? Over the past 12 months they will have learned that in conventional terms they clearly have no hope of dealing with NATO so there is no point in a confrontation. However, they will also have learned that if they happen to have a ballistic missile or other mass destruction capability, there is a chance that NATO might think again or take a different view. That is the key question that we will have to answer. The Secretary of State knows that it is not just about the threat to the United Kingdom, but perhaps even more urgently, it is about the threat to our deployed forces in theatre, to which we seem to have no answer. If the Government could put one half of the energy that they have put into rushing the creation of the ESDI into ballistic missile defence, by now we might just have the beginning of a constructive NATO response to what the Americans are engaged in and to the development of the threats from elsewhere.
The Secretary of State said that the Conservatives had no policy. Let me tell him that last year we committed to that as a policy. I hope that the Government will recognise that it is a serious policy position and that they will move
to it as rapidly as they possibly can. If they did so, I would not make childish remarks; I would simply welcome it as a constructive move for the British Isles and for NATO.
The Select Committee report is probably the most critical White Paper that I have seen of Government policy. Almost from the outset it makes it clear that the delivery of the SDR is seriously in question. It makes it clear that the wheels are wobbling dangerously, but not quite falling off. I thought that the most telling paragraph was paragraph 17, which states:
"We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO. That's a long-term concern, obviously, but NATO, after all, is about the long term".
Those are genuine concerns. Although the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife and I may not agree on specific policy, I agree with him that the Americans are very worried about the process. It is no good simply saying, "These are the statements that they have made supporting the process", when the truth is that they have deep concerns about it.
"no significant ballistic missile threat to the UK and its interests will exist for some years".
Even the Select Committee reminded us that they thought that the attention given to theatre defence was "inadequate".
"The performance report in its present form tells us very little about how the Ministry of Defence has performed over the years in question. It measures resources and activity but hardly even begins to measure outputs . . . the performance report is inadequate for its stated purpose."
That is a damning indictment of Government policy. It is remarkable because it is from a Labour-dominated Committee.
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