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Mr. Nigel Beard (Bexleyheath and Crayford): There has in the past been a stereotyped view of the defence community as pickled in the values of 40 or 50 years earlier, introspective, and so ignorant of changing circumstances and suspicious of new ideas. Whatever the truth in the past, that stereotype is far from true about our Army, Navy and Air Force today. They are part of the mainstream of life in Britain and probably the most effective military force in the world.
Ministers are to be congratulated on the policies set out in the White Paper, which are family friendly, promote the education and training of individuals and provide for equal opportunities without discrimination. Life in the services is seen as either a long-term career or a constructive and attractive period of personal development for young men and women.
Not only is that policy the right way to treat people, but it is good for service morale and recruitment. Making our armed forces an integral rather than a detached part of British society results in their being better understood and appreciated by the people whom they serve.
There are bound to be differences between service and civilian life, but a determination is expressed in the White Paper to compensate for the adverse differences and to be a good employer for service men and women and their families. We can all endorse with pride what is being done on our behalf as employers of the nation's armed forces.
The strategic defence review, which is the foundation of the White Paper, was far from ignorant of changing circumstances. Major war in north-west Europe, which for 40 years was the primary focus of military planning, training and technology, is the least likely operation, now that the cold war has ended. As the White Paper states,
The White Paper is virtually silent on the large numbers of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons that are still ostensibly part of the defence arrangements of the US and Russia, and to a lesser extent of Britain and France. The progressive reduction of these nuclear armouries, which was foreseen in the START treaties, has stalled, with little disarmament achieved or foreseen. The reduced sense of urgency brought about by the end of the cold war is false security. A new initiative is required.
That impasse has also undermined the nuclear non- proliferation treaty. Progress in nuclear arms reduction by the US and Russia was an important inducement to smaller countries to forgo nuclear weapons. Now, as the White Paper makes clear, under the heading "New threats and challenges", dangers from the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential delivery systems are a notable cause for concern. The missile launches by India and Pakistan last April are particularly disturbing.
The White Paper goes on to refer to the threat from maverick states using weapons of mass destruction as part of a terrorist arsenal in what are called "asymmetric threats".
All that frankness in the White Paper is admirable, but nothing is said about what should be done. The belief is expressed that
Have not we come to a time when we must recognise that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty may fail, and that it would be wise to prepare for that? In the only reference to any counter-measure to a maverick attack, the White Paper states that
The scheme proposed by the US has been dubbed "son of star wars" after the scheme once proposed by President Reagan in order to keep out a soviet missile attack. That project collapsed because of expense and the likely technical infeasibility of countering a mass attack by the full menagerie of nuclear weapons, and because, if successful, it would have created instability in the east-west strategic balance.
That does not necessarily discredit current US proposals directed at keeping out two or three missiles, not a mass attack. If some such system could be successfully developed, it could underpin rather than undermine the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. States that do not yet possess nuclear weapons might be offered protection under the shield if they renounced them. The system would not be hostile towards Russia. Indeed, Russia and the European Union might share the same protective umbrella.
There is no basis for saying that the current US proposals are the right answer, but the threat exists. It is identified in the White Paper and by the US Government. It should not be ignored. The phrase in the White Paper--
I shall move now to my second category of operations, in which conventionally armed forces need to deploy quickly to unfamiliar places, to deal with unpredictable situations in concert with allies.
In this context, the European defence identity agreed at the Helsinki European Council is to be welcomed. It provides for a highly mobile force to be drawn together from each country's NATO forces and enables action to be taken where US interests are not involved. Similarly, the joint rapid reaction force, bringing together army, navy and air force contributions, is a positive response to the new circumstances that must be the focus of defence planning.
However, I am puzzled by the role of the 386 Challenger 2 main battle tanks in any operation that requires rapid deployment by sea and air. Challenger 2 is likely to be precluded from many operational areas simply
because available bridges will not take its weight. Are not heavy main battle tanks unsuitable for rapid reaction forces? If they move by sea, they arrive after airborne troops; if they travel by air, the required aircraft are immensely expensive. When they arrive, by whatever means, their range and manoeuvrability is limited.
What is the role of Challenger 2 in the next 10 years? What will rapid reaction forces do for armoured support? That may not be an easy problem to solve, but the White Paper should acknowledge the difficulty and the need to revise Army force structure for the new role.
The essence of the new flexible operational concept is what the White Paper describes as deployability. Without means of deploying fully equipped forces quickly and easily, the new strategy cannot be implemented.
The proposal to provide a six-vessel strategic sealift through a private finance initiative with the industry is imaginative. Given that contracts can be exchanged next year, it makes good sealift capability relatively quickly.
Existing RAF transport aircraft are all old and need replacing. They are unsuitable for a key role in the rapid deployment of forces. The White Paper currently gives no estimate of when the problem will be overcome; it simply promises a decision in the near future. That is a relaxed approach to the pivot of the strategic concept.
Without urgent replacement of the RAF's transport and refuelling aircraft, a strategy of timely flexible response is not an operational reality. Paragraph 40 of the White Paper makes that point, albeit a little less starkly. It states:
That question cannot be left to various factional interests in the Ministry of Defence to fight about. It requires not a manana approach, but "action this day" if the new defence strategy is to be fully operational in the near future.
The main Royal Navy contribution to flexible deployment appears to be two of the three amphibious ships, Fearless, Ocean and Intrepid, with some contribution from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Those ships can be moved to the area of operations as an emergency develops and sit over the horizon without political commitment to an operation until the last minute, when their impact can be immediate. The diplomatic and operational advantages are not matched when forces move by air. Any future ability to redeploy forces is likely to need a combination of strategic airlift and amphibious capability. They are complementary, not alternatives.
The White Paper is excellent in setting out policy on defence personnel and is to be applauded for that. Its analysis of the new threats to this country is frank, far-seeing and in keeping with the world as we perceive it. However, it is unsatisfactory in establishing how and when we will be in a position to implement the new strategy.
The White Paper suggests a rigid attachment to existing force structures that precludes reallocation of resources and reorientation of forces to match the new strategic
concept. That is shown by the incompatibility of Challenger 2 with the new strategy and the inability to restructure the RAF to put greater emphasis on modern transport aircraft.
in the post-Cold War strategic environment we are increasingly likely to face new and often unexpected operational challenges.
Those changed circumstances are essentially in two categories. The first involves nuclear and, to some extent, biological and chemical weapons. The second requires conventional armed forces to be able to deploy quickly to unfamiliar places, to deal with unpredictable situations, usually acting in concert with allies. I shall discuss these two sets of circumstances in the remainder of my speech.
no significant ballistic missile threat to the UK and its interests will exist for some years.
That is comforting, but should not we be using those years to prepare some defence?
the US are consulting closely with us on their plans to improve their defences against a projected limited inter-continental ballistic missile threat from proliferators.
It is all rather offhand, as though we were trying to humour the USA.
the USA are consulting closely with us--
hardly sounds like a dynamic search for a solution on our part. It behoves us in Europe, just as much as the US Government, to seek positive means to counteract a threat from maverick states and to underpin nuclear non-proliferation.
We cannot . . . deploy the JRRF quickly enough to meet the likely requirements of the new strategic environment.
If that profound weakness is to be overcome within current defence spending, it may mean some revision of RAF or perhaps naval force structure. If so, how much RAF strike attack and offensive support capability is to be given up to provide essential improvements in the RAF's strategic lift?
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