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8.57 pm
Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton and Wanstead): I know that others want to speak in the debate so, in view of the time, I shall limit my remarks to just one subject--cluster bombs and Kosovo.
I do not believe, however, that the subject of nuclear weapons has been properly aired during the debate. The United Kingdom, Russia and the United States are developing policies that make it easier to use nuclear weapons, or to use them earlier in a dispute. Whatever the contorted logic that has led to that policy position in those countries, I do not believe that the majority of people in the UK or the other countries favour a policy to facilitate the use of nuclear weapons. I hope that we shall return to that debate in due course.
On cluster bombs and Kosovo, the situation in the former Yugoslavia had got to the stage where military action was justified, but the methods whereby some of the military strikes were carried out were questionable. The decision to drop weapons only from above 15,000 ft meant that the risk of casualties among allied pilots was reduced, but made the number of casualties on the ground far greater. Many of those casualties were civilians.
The objection is a matter not just of policy, but of physics. From 15,000 ft there is an appreciable delay-- 30 or 40 seconds--before a dropped bomb hits the ground. That means that a bomb may move from its target because of unexpected wind conditions, or there may be a change of circumstances on the ground, such as movement of civilian trucks or trains.
That is not the only limitation caused by the physics. From 15,000 ft it was impossible for pilots to confirm absolutely that their targets were not civilian vehicles. That led to many casualties.
The use of cluster bombs added a further level of indiscriminate use of military force. It is clear that the RAF was not ready to use these weapons under the operational conditions of Operation Allied Force. That is apparent from the trials that had to be held at Luce bay on 6 and 7 April 1999. If the RAF had been ready,
the trials would not have been needed. The greatest difference between using those weapons in Kosovo and during training is the height from which they are dropped. British cluster bombs--BL755s--were designed to be dropped from a much lower height than 15,000 ft.
The use of the weapons that we are considering had several consequences. The bomblets were scattered over a wider area than if they had been dropped from a lower height. It has also been alleged that deployment from a greater height meant that more bomblets did not explode when they hit the ground. That created an even bigger long-term hazard.
I have asked a series of parliamentary questions on the subject. The Ministry of Defence claimed that the height at which cluster bombs were dropped made no difference to their failure rate, which remained at 5 per cent. The RAF is not the only user of the BL755. Those weapons were sold to the former Yugoslavia and used by the Serbs against Croatia. The Croatian Government claimed that the failure rate for sub-munitions on the weapons used against them was nearer 7 per cent.
The difference between 5 per cent. and 7 per cent. may not seem great, but the RAF used more than 500 BL755s in the Kosovo operation. Each BL755 carries nearly 150 sub-munitions. The extra 2 per cent. would mean another 1,500 unexploded bombs in Kosovo.
It is important to make some form of independent assessment of the way in which the weapons behave in practice. No matter how good the case for military action, we have a moral duty to ensure that it does not have an appalling legacy.
The lessons of Kosovo must be learned. The use of cluster bombs should be properly and frankly assessed, and not whitewashed to justify the operation. I accept that the cost of reducing the risk to civilians may entail taking greater risks with the lives of armed forces personnel from this country and those of our allies. However, it is not right unnecessarily to slaughter many thousands of civilians because the risk to an individual pilot is slightly greater.
Mr. Mike Hancock (Portsmouth, South):
I join others in expressing my deep regret at the deaths of Michael Colvin and his wife Nichola. I knew Michael Colvin for nearly 30 years, from when he was first elected to Hampshire county council. During my time as leader of that council, he and the late former Member of Parliament for Eastleigh, Stephen Milligan, were usually the only Members of Parliament who readily supported the council when necessary. Michael Colvin supported many ventures in the county of Hampshire. He will be missed here, in his constituency, and in Europe, and I stress that Hampshire has lost a staunch supporter. I am sure that the county will at some stage want to record its regret at his death and its deepest appreciation of the part that he played in its life.
Michael Colvin made many interesting interventions during the time that I served with him on the Select Committee on Defence, not least in the battle to save
Haslar hospital. He, the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt)--who did not serve on the Committee--and I were instrumental in pushing through several of the final recommendations, which have left the door open for the Ministry of Defence to be able to save Haslar hospital. The Save Haslar campaign is very much alive, and it would be good to hear the Minister say something positive about the future of the hospital.
It is regrettable that I am speaking in a defence debate on the same day as I received a letter from the Minister for the Armed Forces that states that constituents' jobs are again on the line. In the letter, the Minister states that a review has identified efficiencies that can be made at the defence munitions depot as Gosport, and that up to 30 per cent. in manpower savings will have to be made in the next four months. That represents several hundred jobs in the Greater Portsmouth area--once again, jobs that we can ill afford to lose. Over the past century, they have been filled by men and women who have given loyal service in defence of the realm, and neither they nor their futures should be forgotten in the debate. The strategic defence review and the White Paper have come together, but they are littered beyond belief with financial inadequacies.
The Kosovo situation has been referred to today and last week. Like many Members, I have visited Kosovo more than once, and for a long time it has appeared to me that many people in that province see KFOR as the enemy. Sadly, as many Members predicted, the Kosovo Liberation Army will grasp any opportunity to push its political view. It wants a fully autonomous Kosovo, but if it cannot achieve that, its second-best option--which is probably the worst--is a Greater Albania. That may take longer to achieve, but it is the KLA's long-term aim. Any Member who has talked to representatives of those who hold the guns in Kosovo over the past few years knows that that is what they were fighting for and I believe that, before long, we shall be confronted with open hostility to our forces and others.
Lord Robertson recently made it clear to a meeting of the Western European Union at which all NATO Ministers were represented that 10 years was an optimistic appraisal of the time it would take to achieve any sort of solution in Kosovo. Once again, no real end-plan was in sight and no political solution offered, at either last week's NATO meeting or the WEU meeting the week before. That must be extremely worrying to everyone who cares about peace in Europe and in the world.
The lessons of Bosnia are there for us to learn, and those who have visited it recently will know that people have not put sectarianism behind them. There are still several different communities, investment goes into businesses on an ethnic basis--Muslims do not invest in non-Muslim businesses--and Bosnia consists of the old and the very young. All the well educated young people, who might have brought the country together, are long gone and many have no intention of ever going back. The same will be the case in Kosovo if we are not careful. Not enough effort has been put into thinking through the end result or learning the lessons of Bosnia. Sadly, a heavy price is still being paid.
I spent part of this morning with the Croatian ambassador and a constituent from a neighbouring constituency. We were talking to the Croatian authorities
about the death of his son--a young British soldier serving in Bosnia who was killed when he was attacked by Serbs while on leave in Croatia. We were trying to get justice so that the British Army would represent the father at the trial, but sadly no help has been forthcoming except to transport him there. He needs advice about what is going on in the court. Why has he been unable to get greater assistance from the Prime Minister and successive Defence Ministers? For goodness sake, I ask the Ministry of Defence to give the family some peace of mind and the legal representation in the court proceedings that they desire.
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