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Mr. Clifton-Brown: I am pleased to make my first speech on the Report stage of the Bill--indeed, my only speech on the Bill--at this time of night. As a former member of the Public Accounts Committee, I was privileged to serve under my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr. Davis). He is an excellent Chairman. The House greatly benefits from his chairmanship.
I have listened to some of the debate. The Economic Secretary claimed that new clause 3 duplicated the efforts of the Government's internal audit service by granting the Comptroller and Auditor General access to all Departments. New clause 4 provides for additional tasks to those that the Government's internal audit service undertakes.
My hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) said that the Economic Secretary had advanced the arguments but not the reasons. I say that she advanced the means--taxpayers' money--but not the
ways in which to carry out proper scrutiny. New clause 4 is eminently sensible. It is moderate, and carefully considered and drafted. I cannot understand why the Government are so suspicious of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office. They should be able not only to audit Departments, non-departmental public bodies and other public expenditure but to engage in a value for money exercise. As I said in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr. Hayes), for every £1 spent on the value for money exercise, £8 of public money is saved.
If the Economic Secretary listened instead of talking, she might learn something. She does not seem to want to save public money; she is leaving the Chamber. That shows the Government's contempt for saving public money. The Economic Secretary leaves the Chamber during non-political, non-partisan remarks.
It is worth considering the renown of the National Audit Office, which is clearly demonstrated by the fact that it audits the United Nations accounts. The National Audit Office is renowned throughout the world, and it draws on professional expertise from throughout the world. It is respected in all the accounting convention conferences and is therefore able to set a benchmark on a range of international comparators for the ability of each Department to perform. It can measure the output of every Department far better than any Government internal audit service. [Interruption.] I am glad that the Economic Secretary finds that so funny. Perhaps she will consider the new clause carefully. If not, perhaps she will give good reasons.
The more the Government laugh, the more the public understand that they do not care about taxpayers' money. That becomes clearer by the day. It will be even clearer as the Government become more unpopular in the opinion polls. The Government's current behaviour shows that they do not give a damn about the fact that the National Audit Office is renowned world wide. I should have thought that they would want such an audit service, which has enormous democratic legitimacy. The Government should consider extending that worthwhile service.
I understand that it is awkward for Ministers to be subjected to an internal review, and to have matters pointed out to them week after week when individual Departments, non-departmental public bodies and next steps agencies fail to live up to the highest worldwide standards.
If the Government thought about it carefully, they should welcome that, because Ministers do not have time to go around and look at every nook and cranny where taxpayers' money is being spent. I should have thought that they would welcome somebody looking carefully with an independent eye at the whole situation and assessing it on the basis of international comparators--saying, "You could do a little better in this respect. Money is being wasted here. It is being duplicated there. It is not being contracted out properly here. We could have a better PFI arrangement here."
This is a very sensible new clause to add to a Bill that I welcome enormously. When I was on the Public Accounts Committee, the whole aspect of resource accounting seemed to me to add great clarity to the way in which the House can appropriate public money and scrutinise how it is spent. This is a worthwhile Bill, and the new clause
would add to it, which is exactly what Parliament should be all about. It should be improving an already worthwhile Bill.
The Public Accounts Committee is accountable to the House. It has huge powers to require witnesses to come to its hearings and question them in a way that no other financial Committee of the House can. It produces very worthwhile reports which the House can scrutinise and be absolutely certain that public money is being properly safeguarded and, if the new clause is adopted, properly used and properly enhanced.
In an ever more complicated world, that power, that duty, is ever more important. As we get more and more convoluted--we have non-departmental bodies themselves incorporating independent companies to carry out their work, so we are getting further and further away from the individual Department--there is more scope for fraud and misappropriation of public money, and the work done by the National Audit Office, as an independent office, becomes ever more important. That is why the new clause is so important.
There is a safeguard in the new clause, because the Treasury has the power by order to vary the Departments and bodies to which the National Audit Office can apply the performance indicators. Moreover, it would not come into operation until the statutory instrument was laid before the House.
In conclusion--[Hon. Members: "Ah."] Labour Members say "Ah", but I can tell them that I am quite capable of speaking for another hour on this topic. What do they want me to do? Do they wish me to keep speaking? Then we might find ever more nooks and crannies that we could investigate where performance indicators might be applied. I can reel off a whole list off the top of my head. We used to examine them week in, week out in the Public Accounts Committee. I have a good memory. I can remember where the nooks and crannies are. I hope that the Minister will not require me, perhaps on the next group of amendments, to speak at even greater length, and that she will accept the new clause.
Mr. Swayne:
I assure you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that at this stage I have no intention, or indeed ability, to speak for another hour. I rise for my second intervention with the intention of speaking for a significantly shorter time than on the earlier occasion. New clause 1 was much more widely drawn than new clause 4.
What I have found surprising, and touching in a way, is how both the Conservative Front-Bench spokesman, my hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin), and the Liberal Front-Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey)--
Mr. Letwin:
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. At this hour of the morning, I cannot resist telling him that if he has gone all touchy-feely, my faith in human nature will finally dissolve.
Mr. Swayne:
My hon. Friend may find, as I proceed, that it is not quite as touchy-feely as he imagines.
What I found touching was the fact that both my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton expected the Minister to accept the new clause, in a reasonable way. I cannot imagine anything that the Minister would do with less alacrity. What I see is the proper tension--the natural tension--between those who seek to hold the Executive to account and the interest of the Executive in defending their preserve.
We who seek to hold the Executive to account consider the new clause to be entirely reasonable, but, were I in the Minister's position, I would consider it to be irksome and unpleasant. Surely the Minister, wishing to defend the interests of the Executive, will resist the new clause, because, while it may impose an entirely reasonable condition on the Executive, the condition is not one that the Executive would welcome.
Subsection (2) of the new clause states:
Moreover, subsection (4) states that the CAG may examine the document when he receives it,
The Minister may think that Departments are, to an extent, protected by subsection (5), which states that the CAG will not
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A department to which this section applies in any financial year shall prepare a performance statement in respect of that year analysing the performance of the department in using the resources to which the accounts relate in achieving its objectives for that financial year.
That is a very demanding requirement to place on a Department--a requirement for it to account for the resources that it has used in achieving its objectives. That would be a substantial piece of work for any Department to have to supply in any year. I would quite understand if Departments--protected as they are, in this instance, by the Minister--sought to resist the imposition of the requirement.
and may report on it to the House of Commons.
We, of course, will impose an additional layer of expectations and scrutiny on the Department concerned.
question the merits of the policy objectives of a department to which the performance statement relates.
But we will! When the CAG reports to the House, we will question those objectives and whether they were appropriate--and the process of making the report, subjecting it to the CAG and presenting it to the House will lay bare to the House the appropriateness or otherwise of the objectives.
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