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Fraud
Mr. Field: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what is the margin of error for the inspection of fraud and error in each of the benefits inspected in the most recently published Area Benefit Review. [113629]
Mr. Rooker: There is 95 per cent. confidence that the true figures for fraud and error for Income Support and Jobseeker's Allowance in the most recently published Area Benefit Review report are within 8 per cent. of the estimates.
Mr. Field: To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security (1) what steps he is taking to (i) measure accurately and (ii) reduce fraud and error in (a) invalid care allowance, (b) disability living allowance and (c) incapacity benefit; [113795]
- (2) what was the monetary value of (i) official error, (ii) customer error, (iii) confirmed claimant fraud, (iv) high suspicion claimant fraud, (v) low suspicion claimant fraud, (vi) confirmed official fraud, (vii) high suspicion official fraud, (viii) low suspicion official fraud for (a) invalid care allowance, (b) disability living allowance and (c) incapacity benefit for each of the past three years. [113794]
Mr. Rooker: The results of national benefit reviews carried out on Invalid Care Allowance (ICA) and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) were published in July 1996 and February 1997 respectively. These are the latest figures for fraud and error in these benefits and the reports are in the Library.
We plan to conduct a national benefit review of Incapacity Benefit later this year.
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There are security checks in place in these benefits to make sure that tackling fraud and error is an integral part of their administration. In addition there are a number of initiatives to promote greater security and accuracy in these benefits. Examples include:
Mr. Rooker:
Information relating to the proceedings of Cabinet or Cabinet Committees is not made public under exemption 2 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government.
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what evaluations his Department has conducted of the use of biometric data as a means by which to reduce benefit fraud. [113793]
Mr. Rooker:
This Department already makes use of biometric data in certain exceptional circumstances. The War Pensions Agency use fingerprinting in overseas cases where they suspect that a pensioner or widow is no longer alive and a pension is still in payment. The Child Support Agency use DNA testing to confirm paternity, where the alleged non-resident parent has contacted the Agency to dispute that they are the father.
There are problems with biometric technology, such as the absence of 100 per cent. reliable tests to establish whether an individual matches his record in the database. Such failure rates would clearly be unacceptable from a Social Security customer service standpoint. Until we see advances in the biometric technology particularly in terms of reliability, but also in ease of use and cost we must continue to rely on other authentication techniques for bulk day to day business.
We will continue to monitor progress on the reliability of using biometric data to reduce benefit fraud.
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what steps his Department is taking to eradicate fraudulent housing benefit claims by landlords. [113792]
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Angela Eagle:
We have already introduced a range of approaches to tackle landlord fraud which we are continuing to develop;
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what the annual savings were from the weekly benefit savings scheme for each year from 1996 to 1999. [113791]
From April, the ICA payment order book, normally valid for 22 weeks, will be aligned to the length of time for which a qualifying benefit is in payment where that is shorter than 22 weeks.
From April, Automated Credit Transfer will be introduced for ICA customers receiving Income Support or Jobseeker's Allowance (Income Based).
For DLA, work being undertaken within the Disability Benefits Modernisation Programme which is focused on getting benefit entitlement right at the outset and keeping it right from first to final payment.
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security (1) which ministers are currently in the Ministerial counter-fraud group; [113620]
(2) how many times the Ministerial counter-fraud group (a) has met since it was formed and (b) met in 1999. [113621]
we are already involved in very successful joint activities between the Benefits Agency (BA), local authorities (LAs) and the police which are getting positive results;
we have given LAs new powers to control direct payments more tightly and recover overpayments more easily, and to require landlords to provide information;
we are involved in matching exercises with Inland Revenue (IR) of landlords and savings;
we have established an agreement with IR to allow BA and LA fraud investigators to ask centrally for tax information on a case by case basis.
We are setting up a new national benefits intelligence unit to co-ordinate and extend intelligence on Social Security fraud, as the basis for both prevention and detection;
overhauling and strengthening the capability and professionalism of investigators to tackle organised benefit fraud right across the benefit system. A senior civil servant will be appointed to manage the central organised fraud investigation service and to act as the Head of Profession for all benefit fraud investigators;
setting up new arrangements with local authorities to ensure investigations are targeted properly across the Social Security system.
| Financial year | Total weekly benefit savings claimed |
|---|---|
| 1996-97 | 1,509.0 |
| 1997-98 | 1,918.5 |
| 1998-99 | 1,645.5 |
Note:
The figures are not comparable, as from April 1998 the WBS claiming criteria was tightened.
| Financial year | Total weekly benefit savings claimed |
|---|---|
| 1996-97 | 293,672,397 |
| 1997-98 | 346,407,498 |
| 1998-99 | 235,679,923 |
Note:
The figures are not comparable, as from April 1998 the Weekly Benefit Savings claiming criteria for Local Authorities was tightened.
National Insurance
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security, pursuant to his answer of 17 January 2000, Official Report, column 334W, on National Insurance staff, if he will list the types of automatic security check that prompt a management check. [113665]
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Mr. Rooker:
The types of security features which trigger management checks are:
Mr. Rooker:
The number of staff who had National Insurance number allocation powers were reduced by critically reviewing the existing users and ensuring only those with essential business need were allowed to keep National Insurance number allocation powers, and restricting to a single group of specialists the facility to allocate National Insurance numbers.
Previously staff had various levels of access to the Departmental Central Index, each of which allowed them to carry out a range of activities on Departmental Central Index, such as viewing data, or allocating National Insurance numbers. The number of access levels providing the facility to allocate National Insurance numbers has been reduced, so that the power is not routinely given to staff who do not need it.
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if he will place in the Library a copy of his Department's formal memorandum of understanding with the British Cheque Cashers Association. [113619]
Mr. Rooker:
The Memorandum of Understanding between the British Cheque Cashiers Association and the Benefits Agency is still under negotiation at this time. Once the document is finalised a copy will be placed in the Library.
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what is the funding for the Departmental Programme Protection Fund for each year for which it has been budgeted; and what savings (a) it has achieved so far and (b) it is expected to achieve each year to meet the Public Service Agreement targets. [113790]
Mr. Rooker:
The Programme Protection Fund consists of money whose main purpose is to safeguard Social Security against fraud and error. The budget for the current financial year was £464 million, the actual level of spending will not be known until after the year ends. Funding for 2000-01 is currently being finalised.
One of the fund's main goals is to ensure the achievement of the Public Service Agreement target, to reduce fraud and error in Income Support and Jobseeker's Allowance by 30 per cent. by March 2007, with at least a 10 per cent. reduction by March 2002. We do not yet have figures for this, the first, year in which the fund has been in operation. However, our initial expectations are that we shall achieve a reduction in the rate of
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overpayments of 1.5 per cent. in 1999-2000, 3.5 per cent. in 2000-01 and 5 per cent. in 2001-02. We shall reconsider these figures in the light of performance in the first year.
where there is an excessive time between receiving access powers and the issue of a new National Insurance Number (NINO);
where a NINO is issued and no record of the issuer is held on the central database;
the audit trail and analysis (ATAS) system which detects when there is any unusual activity e.g. a larger than normal volume of NINOs issued.
Mr. Field:
To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security, pursuant to his answer of 17 January 2000, Official Report, column 334W, on National Insurance staff, by what criteria the number of staff able to allocate new numbers were reduced. [113664]
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