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4.30 pm
I shall cite two case studies in support of my argument. The first involves a lone parent who suffers agoraphobia and depression as a result of repeated assaults by her ex-husband, to whom she was married for 10 years. She also suffers from dyslexia. Until she sought advice, she was completely unaware that there were any exemptions from the requirement to co-operate. Her ex-husband still has some contact with the children, but she is terrified of him. She receives incapacity benefit and income support. Although she received several letters from the CSA, she did not respond to any of them because she was frightened and depressed; as a result, however, she was threatened with a benefit penalty. With the help of an adviser, she won her case at a tribunal, even though initially she was reluctant to appeal because she was too afraid.
In the second case, a lone parent with two sons, aged six and eight, was notified that a benefit penalty would be imposed because the CSA did not accept that she was exempt. She had been threatened by her ex-partner, who told her that, if she co-operated with the CSA, he would withdraw contact with the children. Her sons had suffered badly from his previously having withdrawn contact for one year; they had exhibited signs of intense distress. The woman had only just re-established that contact. She argues that her children are at risk of undue distress,
but that argument has been rejected by the CSA. She is now in turmoil, taking antidepressants, while awaiting an appeal against the benefit penalty.
The system causes hardship to the very children whom it is meant to support. Children in one-parent families are among the poorest in the land, and their parents can ill afford to lose a significant proportion of the already small sum on which they are expected to live. That is why we tabled our amendment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social Security (Angela Eagle):
I shall try to deal with the issues as they were raised during the debate. They are quite wide ranging, but I shall do my best.
New clause 4 is designed to influence the way in which the CSA organises its resources in respect of collection and enforcement activities. The agency would have to take action against non-resident parents who have made no child support maintenance payments, who comprise 30 per cent. of the current case load, before turning to those who are partially compliant, who comprise 23 per cent. of the case load. I understand why the Opposition have been motivated to set out such priorities.
My argument has already been touched on by the hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns): the solution lies in the simplification of the CSA's business and process that the Bill will bring about. Under the current, complex formula, the CSA spends 90 per cent. of its time on collection and only 10 per cent. on enforcement. Under the new system, much more of the CSA's time will be spent on proper enforcement of maintenance agreements, once they are reached.
Mr. Burns:
Is there not a problem with relying on good nature and the simplicity of the system? No matter how much simpler the new system is to operate, if the parent who has to pay child maintenance does not like the amounts, he will attempt to avoid paying by delaying or employing some other method. There will still be a huge backlog because of resistance on the part of paying parents.
Angela Eagle:
There are fewer ways to stymie the new simplified system than there are to stymie the current complex formula. I cannot guarantee that there will never be a backlog, but we believe that, once the new formula is in place and the CSA is up and running at full speed, maintenance assessments will be made within four to six weeks, instead of the current six months.
Mr. Burns:
The Minister refers to the formula, but it will not stop those parents who think that they know how much they will have to pay having no contact with the CSA, replying to letters or demands for information by querying them or not supplying all the information, or not supplying accurate and correct information. Those problems will still remain, however simple the system is, if a group of people want deliberately to string out or avoid paying.
Angela Eagle:
Of course some things can be strung out. My argument with the new clause is that it creates a priority list that demonstrates to people that, if they pay something, however little, the CSA will leave them alone while it chases other people. I think that we can pick up everybody. Some people will be more obstructive than
Mr. Pickles:
The Minister seems to suggest that the new clause represents the Opposition's policy. In fact, it reflects what was the Labour party's policy. Will she explain how the target of catching up with the 100,000 who are not making a contribution will be met? How will she target them? Surely she is not saying that the simplified formula alone, which we support, will achieve the target? People are avoiding making payments because they have no intention of doing so, and not because of the formula. If the hon. Lady will take us through how the target will be achieved, I am sure that we shall make rapid progress.
Angela Eagle:
The present system involves more than 100 different facts being established before a maintenance order can properly be calculated. Changes of circumstances happen so regularly that the assessment can virtually be out of date before it can be administered and notified to those who are responsible for paying it. The proposed formula is radically simpler. It will be necessary to establish the number of children and the income of the father, and then make a simple calculation. It will leave the CSA with much more time to pursue the more difficult cases.
We want to ensure that non-resident parents will all meet their responsibilities for their children, and make regular and reliable payments of maintenance. We do not want to create perverse incentives to pay a little so that fathers are not chased for the rest, while people who have disappeared from the system--there will always be difficult cases in any system--are left to be pursued at length. That is not appropriate. Our priority is to ensure that all fathers make the proper payments.
The provision proposed in new clause 5--
Mr. Webb:
I asked the Minister a specific question on new clause 4 about the agency's incentives and the targets that it is given. Presumably, targets are set to try to make the agency prioritise particular actions. Do the agency's targets encourage it to pursue non-payers?
Angela Eagle:
The targets relate not to the amounts of maintenance paid but to the speed and accuracy of assessment, which is the main work that the CSA does with 90 per cent. of its time and to case and cash compliance. With the new system, we shall be able to take a completely new look at how the targets operate. Clearly, we would not wish to establish targets that would create incentives for odd results. I entirely take the hon. Gentleman's point.
We are asked in new clause 5 to put in place a provision that already exists in section 31 of the Child Support Act 1991, which allows for a deduction from earnings order to be made in respect of the current maintenance liability, plus an amount for arrears. About 98 per cent. of the almost 130,000 deductions from earnings orders in force cover arrears as well as current liability. Those figures are from November last year, and are our most recent ones. New clause 5 is unnecessary because what is sought is already done.
We all know that the complexities of the current formula leave the agency with little time for collecting maintenance, which is why a radical simplification has been brought before the House.
Amendment No. 76 would reduce and time-limit reduced benefit decisions. Because of the way in which it is drafted, it would also reduce the benefit of the parent with care by 20 per cent. of the whole. The 40 per cent. reduction in place relates only to the adult applicable allowance, so the proposed 20 per cent. represents a higher proportion.
Listening to the speech of the hon. Member for St. Ives (Mr. George), one would think that good cause did not exist, but it does and it works effectively. If there are cases around the edge that he wishes to bring to my attention, we shall examine them.
The plain fact is that if a woman suspects that, by engaging the CSA, she may be in danger of violent behaviour from her ex-partner, that constitutes good cause. There is no way that the CSA will pursue maintenance if she can show good cause for its not pursuing it.
The issue of sanctions and reduced benefit decisions involves parents with care who refuse to get the CSA involved, and are happy for the taxpayer to pay for the upkeep of their children, without good cause. In other words, they are not in danger of a violent reaction from their ex-partners. The benefit deductions are designed to persuade those people to come into the system.
We do not believe that payment of child support should be optional, and that people should be able to choose. That is partly to protect the taxpayer. It ought to be the exception, rather than the rule, that child support is not in payment.
Mr. Swayne:
Where it is shown that there is good cause, is that not a matter for referral to the police for investigation? It cannot be left that someone should get off, just by making such a threat.
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