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Mr. Robathan: This is an important point. I accept what the Minister has said about the search procedures,
but if it is so important to discover illegally held material on somebody's person, it is a little worrying that the absence of a woman police officer might mean that the person hiding that material would get away with it. Surely we must decide whether the needs of international nuclear disarmament should take priority over political correctness.
Mr. Page: My hon. Friend endorses the comment that I just made. The wording of the Bill means that a search will have to include male and female officers if it is to be effective. That is right, and nobody should be given the chance to evade the requirements of such important legislation.
Mr. Keetch: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that in all forms of search by all agencies in the United Kingdom there is always a male and a female officer present? Is he not aware that if a person to be searched were of the opposite sex to the officers conducting the search, there is no reason why that person could not be held until an officer of the same sex was available? Surely he should move on from this point?
Mr. Page: I am more than prepared to move on; I was saying that the Bill covers that point--and I do not find that objectionable or offensive. The hon. Gentleman can make his own points about other aspects of parliamentary activity and legislation, although they would have to be in order, otherwise Mr. Deputy Speaker, you would rightly come down on him and keep him in line.
As the Government made clear in another place, clause 5 is central to the Bill, and a number of my hon. Friends have homed in on that point. It has been made abundantly clear that the IAEA is not, and never has been, party to the European convention on human rights, and that the Government believe that the powers to be granted to IAEA inspectors to enter premises do not breach the convention. I am aware of the exchanges on that issue which took place in another place.
Nevertheless, I wonder whether the Department's confidence is entirely well founded. The extremely careful language used by Lord McIntosh of Haringey on 13 December and 24 January indicated that he anticipated potential legal challenge from UK citizens whose premises or homes might be entered by IAEA inspectors without warrants granted by justices of the peace. It was admitted in the other place that
- the courts should be able to decide for themselves whether that inconsistency--
- was relevant to any offence with which a person was charged under the Bill--[Official Report, House of Lords, 24 January 2000; Vol. 608, c. 1349.]
Of course it is right to restrict the disclosure of information obtained from persons subject to the provisions of the Bill or the additional protocol. I understand that there are circumstances in which such information may be disclosed. There should be no difficulty if the person from whom the information has been obtained consented, as envisaged by clause 6(2).
Clearly, information that is relevant to criminal allegations or offences must be disclosed to the prosecuting authorities, but what is the position of individuals or companies affected by the disclosure of commercially sensitive information in criminal proceedings that fail? One can easily envisage a situation in which information about nuclear fuel reprocessing--for example, at Sellafield, which is a highly sensitive subject--might be of great interest and value to competitors overseas. What redress would there be for individuals or organisations found innocent of alleged offences?
The fact that many of the provisions of clause 8 duplicate those of clause 4 has already attracted comment in another place. Clause 4 determines how information may be sought, if it is not supplied to the Secretary of State, and clause 8 deals with the powers that officers authorised by the Secretary of State will have to search premises for evidence that offences have been committed.
Mr. Bercow: Given that there is some lingering uncertainty as to whether the Bill in all its aspects is compatible with the European convention on human rights, would not Ministers do us a signal service were they to publish the legal advice that they received on that point from our old friends the Government lawyers?
Mr. Page: The Minister has no doubt heard my hon. Friend's request. It would be helpful if he would consider such a kind gesture to my hon. Friend. That would also be a service to the rest of the House.
I do not apologise for making detailed points because, although we are in favour of the Bill in principle, it is necessary to make sure that the matters of concern that I have raised are satisfactorily answered and given a clear bill of health. My final detailed point arises from clause 12.
It is clear that the Bill, if enacted, will apply throughout the United Kingdom, and if Her Majesty grants an Order in Council, to the Channel Islands and Isle of Man. I am intrigued to see that it may be applied to "any colony." What explanation can the Minister offer the House for that provision? Is the development of nuclear power programmes on St. Helena or the Falkland islands imminent? I should have thought not, but this may be one of the few occasions on which the Government are thinking ahead.
I hope that the Minister can provide answers to the questions that have been put to him not only by me, but by my hon. Friends in their contributions. I hope that we can then make sure that the Bill gets a quick passage on to the statute book, showing that we are fully behind its aims and objectives.
5.19 pm
Mr. Tony Colman (Putney): I support the Bill, which ratifies the additional protocol to the safeguards mandated in article 3 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, with wider provisions covering undeclared facilities and more effective inspections. It is substantially the private Member's Bill that I introduced--Bill No. 23 of the 1998-99 Session. I am delighted that the Government have found time to take the matter forward.
I am also delighted to pay tribute to a predecessor of mine as the Member of Parliament for Putney, the noble Lord Jenkins, who is 92 years old and still speaking
strongly in the other place on the cause of nuclear disarmament. He will be pleased that the Bill, although small in its way, is the way forward.I should also point out that I succeeded as Labour candidate for Putney the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), who, as my hon. Friend the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs said, will be representing the Government at the review of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty on 24 April. I am very pleased that, as the current Member of Parliament for Putney, I am able to follow in the tradition of those two very great men.
I should thank all those who helped me last year in pursuing my private Member's Bill, particularly Dr. Stephen Pullinger of the Institute for Science and International Security and Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym institute. I also thank the staff at the British embassy in Vienna and of the International Atomic Energy Agency for all their help, which enabled me fully to understand the workings of the IAEA and the need for the protocol. I also thank all-party groups that helped me to pursue the cause of ratification in Hong Kong, with the People's Republic of China, and in South Korea, in discussion with North Korea. I am grateful for the Korean ambassador's continuing support for the additional protocol.
Mr. Gibb: This is all very interesting, but why was there no requirement in clause 4 of the hon. Gentleman's private Member's Bill for Department of Trade and Industry inspectors--let alone international inspectors--to seek a search warrant from a justice of the peace?
Mr. Colman: I look forward to my hon. Friend the Minister answering that question in his winding-up speech.
Mr. Gibb: Will the hon. Gentleman give way again?
Mr. Colman: No, I should like to proceed with my speech.
In thanking the all-party British-American parliamentary group, I particularly draw attention to the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) and my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours). I am also grateful for the widespread support of the United States Administration--in both the House of Representatives and the Senate--for the additional protocol.
Mr. Bercow: I am listening intently to the hon. Gentleman. Am I right in thinking that he has just enunciated a novel notion of parliamentary responsibility? He said to my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton (Mr. Gibb) that it is the responsibility of the Minister to explain the lacuna in a Back-Bench Bill.
Mr. Colman: As I pointed out at the beginning of my speech, this Bill is substantially similar to my private Member's Bill, but its provisions are now those of a Government Bill, and I therefore look forward to the Minister dealing with it.
I am pleased that the United Kingdom is the first nuclear power to proceed with ratification of the additional protocol. I originally chose to promote my Bill
because I was concerned that, when United Nations inspectors were ordered out of Iraq in December 1998, there appeared to be no basis for a wider approach to enable all countries across the world to proceed with establishing a standard inspection regime. I was obviously very pleased, therefore, to discover that the additional protocol had been signed on 22 September and that we were able to take matters forward. The additional protocol cannot be imposed on Iraq because of sanctions dating from the end of the Iraq war in 1991. I call on Iraq to demonstrate its openness and to sign and ratify the protocol. As has been said, there is also need for Cuba, Israel, India and Pakistan to do so.
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