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Mr. Bercow: Is not the explanation for that blindingly obvious? Most of the seats of learning in this country are supremely unaware of the existence of the Bill, let alone of its potential application to them.

Mr. Forth: That is one explanation. Another might be that the universities are full of lefties and CND supporters. There could be any number of possible reasons. Perhaps it would be incautious of me to go into them in too much detail at this stage. I am merely flagging up the anxieties that it would be right for us to acknowledge about the protocol to which the Bill gives effect.

Mr. Fabricant: I wanted to intervene on my right hon. Friend before he left the subject of our academic institutions. Does he recall that the Minister admitted that there may be same-sex examination? What would he think if his daughter was being investigated or examined by a male examiner from abroad, probing--I do not know why the Minister laughs--every orifice?

Mr. Forth: I shall come to the sexual aspects of the Bill in due course, although not quite in the terms that my hon. Friend has asked. I certainly want to keep my daughter--or daughters, as it is--out of this altogether. I have highlighted some of the issues in my research and I shall deal with some of the implications of the provisions of clause 4(7), to which my hon. Friend referred, because they raise some important practical questions, not least on the difference of approach between clauses 4 and 5. We have not got anywhere near the Bill yet--I am still on the early stages of the protocol. I hope that he will forgive me if I try to keep my remarks in reasonable order, so that hon. Members can appreciate the development of my logic.

Having skirted briefly over article 2 of the protocol, I turn to article 4, which has the bland heading "Complementary Access". It also gives early hints of the extent of the powers that the protocol might lead us to have to give in the Bill. It again refers to the mysterious, shadowy international agency, whose composition we shall have to return to shortly, because it raises a lot of questions. The article says:


which I have touched on briefly--


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Here again, the scope of the protocol is broadened, which inevitably drives the provisions of the Bill--because the two are inextricably linked--to any location. That is far too all-encompassing and comprehensive to give our citizenry any relief.

I move rapidly on to article 5, which says that the United Kingdom shall provide the Agency with access to:


and so on. It then says


We have become distressingly used to such wording in domestic legislation. The protocol contains comprehensive and all-embracing provisions, talking about "any location", satisfying agency requirements "without delay", which is gratuitous and a bit insulting, and


It is one thing to make provision for access to specific locations. The earlier parts of the protocol lull us into a false sense of security that it is reassuringly specific, but it is nothing of the kind. I would not accuse any hon. Member, least of all those present, of having made only a superficial examination of anything, but even my superficial examination of article 5 has flushed out the fact that we are talking about adjacent locations. That makes it possible to extend the scope of the activities of the shadowy and rather sinister agency not just to the locations specified, but to adjacent locations--that gives very wide scope--"or through other means". That is our old friend the blanket provision, which would allow the agency to go almost anywhere and to do almost anything. That is the protocol to which we are being asked to give effect.

Mr. Fabricant: My right hon. Friend has rightly pointed out that the protocol covers academic institutions. Has he had a chance to estimate the disincentive for institutions such as Microsoft to invest in science parks adjacent to institutions such as Cambridge university, which has nuclear research facilities?

Mr. Forth: I do not want to explore that in too much detail at this stage, because my hon. Friend is inviting me to speculate on whether there is a difference in approach between, on the one hand, universities, other academic institutions and research and development facilities and commercial businesses such as Microsoft, which will carry out research and development that may have a bearing on nuclear facilities and could well be adjacent in location, and, on the other hand, more specifically nuclear facilities, which can be identified more readily. I shall not explore that at this stage. I suspect that some of my hon. Friends may want to pick up on that point later. I do not want to detain the House for too long.

Mr. Bercow: Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Forth: Well, yes, but I am trying to make progress.

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Mr. Bercow: My right hon. Friend is making splendid progress. However, is not the use of this rather worrying and vague term "by other means" indicative of a tendency, certainly in the context of the protocol and the Bill, to abandon the traditional British legislator's insistence upon specificity in favour of high-falutin' continental declarations of good intent? If this is to be an all-embracing power, is it not doubly important that aggrieved parties should have proper recourse to the law if they feel that the powers contained in the Bill and the protocol have been improperly applied?

Mr. Forth: I would have thought that that is self-evident, and obviously my hon. Friend does. However, that does not seem to have occurred to the Government. It is something that we want to explore when we come to examine the Bill in detail, as I hope that we shall do fairly shortly. We want to explore the differences between the relevant clauses. I am trying to get through the protocol as quickly as possible while doing it justice, and I want to move on.

I may surprise the House, including yourself, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because I want to identify what I think is a weakness in the provisions of the protocol that might undermine the effectiveness of its aims. I hope that this approach will show my even-handedness. I have been rather sceptical and negative about the protocol, and that reflects my general demeanour. I wish to examine some rather worrying provisions.

If the protocol and the inspection process are to be effective, it is essential that there should be the element of surprise. That being so, I was surprised when I read the detail of article 4b(i) and (ii) and then c and e. Article 4b(i) states that the agency


Sub-paragraph (ii) adds that there can be a period of


Paragraph c provides:


Astonishingly, paragraph e states:


If we are to have effective inspection within a highly sensitive area, it is astonishing that the inspectors should be trammelled and hemmed in by these provisions of notice. Whether we are talking about domestic school inspections or health and safety inspections, surely their effectiveness must be diminished by the extent to which advance notice must be given. If we are saying that the inspector has to say in writing, "Excuse me chaps, but we are coming to see you in a few days' time and we hope to root out all your nuclear secrets and find out how it is that you are making bombs without telling anyone," that is surely an ineffective approach.

Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East): Does my right hon. Friend's memory take him back to previous arms control treaties? There was once something called the seabed treaty, which provided that it was all right to have nuclear submarines patrolling the depths but not to install nuclear weapons on the seabed. Was not that truly likened

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to an agreement not to screw aircraft to the ground? In that sense, is not the Bill part of a long and honourable tradition?

Mr. Forth: That may be. I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that my hon. Friend will seek to catch your eye later. His knowledge of these matters is infinitely greater than mine will ever be, and I defer to him. He has illustrated what often underlies these measures: they are high on intent and aspiration and regrettably low on substance and effectiveness. My example seems to suggest that that is the position. Either we are serious about these matters or we are not.

Given all the high-flown words of Ministers, their attendance at conferences, their signing of documents and the issuing of protocols, where is the beef? The astonishing requirements of advance notice do not add anything to the effectiveness of the proposed measures. Almost certainly they detract from it.

I move on rapidly to article 4f, which states:


There is some reassurance for those of us who are worried about foreign nationals tramping round the United Kingdom and invading private premises and people's inherent and well-founded rights. There is some comfort that the inspectors will be accompanied by representatives of the United Kingdom, and as appropriate by Community inspectors,


Having given us an apparent assurance, that is almost immediately undermined by the document stating, as I read it and unless the Minister tells me otherwise, that it will be at the discretion of agency inspectors to determine whether they feel that they have been delayed or impeded. If they can argue that they will be delayed or impeded if they have to wait to be accompanied by representatives of the United Kingdom, they can exercise the enormous powers that are provided by the Bill without any such accompaniment. There is an attempt to give an assurance that Members might reasonably expect, but almost immediately that is taken away. That is characteristic of the protocol throughout in that it seeks to face both ways.

Article 7 deals with the important matter of sensitive information. It provides:


I think that there is a misprint--


It will help us in Committee and on Report if the Minister will explain how the Government envisage these important arrangements being made and being made effective. That will require an institutional arrangement and protocols within the protocol or within the terms of the Bill to try to ensure that concern about sensitive information is properly met. How will that be done?

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The article adds that the arrangements about protecting sensitivity


It appears that the agency always has a let out. Having been given an assurance about sensitivity or whatever, we are told almost immediately that if the agency sees things differently, it will always have the last word. Our citizenry and those running our academic and business institutions can well be uneasy about that.

I move on to article 11. The House will see that I am picking up pace as I go along.


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