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Dr. Lewis: In support of what my hon. Friend--
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. Perhaps I could help the hon. Gentleman. He has developed the habit of addressing the hon. Member to whom he is speaking; he should always address the Chair.
Dr. Lewis: I beg your pardon, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I take it that you refer to the direction in which I am facing rather than my terms of address, because I have endeavoured to use the correct ones.
Does my hon. Friend realise that his remarks are supported by the fact that in 1992 we had the revelation that the biological weapons convention, which was concluded in 1972, shortly after the NPT, was systematically flouted by the Soviet Union, as it then was? While western democracies disarmed in accordance with the convention's provisions, the Soviet Union exploited their disarmament by redoubling its efforts to acquire lethal systems.
Mr. Wilshire: Those are very important points. I intended to come on to them, but they have been well made by my hon. Friend, so I will not need to go into detail in that part of my speech.
Mr. Savidge: Surely the very point of the intervention by the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) is that there was insufficient verification of adherence to that particular treaty. That is why we require verification, which the Bill tries to supply.
Mr. Wilshire: I said at the outset, and will say again as I develop my points, that I have no objection in principle to that objective in this Bill or any other. However, the verification that the hon. Gentleman wants has to apply to every signatory state, and not only to the good boys who are trying to be better.
Mr. Maclean: Surely the point that my hon. Friend is making is that either we have a protocol with no teeth which everyone signs without proper verification, or we have a protocol such as that in the Bill which has teeth and includes verification, but which will simply not be signed by the countries that we want to sign it. Some of us suspect that the Bill is a gesture, despite its teeth, because the countries that we need to inspect will not touch the protocol with a bargepole.
Mr. Wilshire: My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. One of the tests that we have to apply before we vote tonight is whether, having listened to contributions by hon. Members on both sides of the House, we think that the Bill is window dressing or whether we believe that it will make a difference. We have to look back to the beginnings of the NPT and be clear in our minds about its basic objectives so that we can ask whether the Bill advances them.
The NPT was based on the two principles of nuclear weapons states disarming and other states not seeking to acquire the weapons that nuclear weapons states would get rid of. We need to ask ourselves what progress has been made before we can decide whether the Bill will help. The NPT started out with five nuclear weapons states and the rest of the world was non-nuclear. We now know for certain that the five have become seven and there are question marks over other countries--some are probable and some are possible nuclear weapons states.
We need to know where we stand with countries such as Israel, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria. Dare I suggest that although the current Government of South Africa have renounced nuclear weapons, there is still a question mark about what happened in the past and whether they know the whole story? I mean that as no criticism; I just put that point into the pot. We started with five nuclear weapons states; we know that we have seven, but the number could be significantly higher.
We have to decide whether we have made progress and ask why non-nuclear weapons states are becoming restive. They notice that progress on the disarmament agreements entered into by the nuclear weapons states has slowed down and is not as fast as they would have hoped. They also notice that the United States is setting up a national missile defence system, which leads certain countries to believe that they need to acquire nuclear weapons, or to develop more weapons, to counter it.
That is the context of the non-proliferation treaty--the point that we have reached. The Minister tells us that the Bill is essential to advance the non-proliferation treaty. Given the worries that I have mentioned, is the measure as central and urgent as he wants us to believe it is? He will no doubt address that question in his winding-up speech.
We must be sure that the Bill will help to reassure non-nuclear weapons states--otherwise we will not encourage them to turn their backs on developing their own nuclear weapons. We know that the safeguard agreements to which we and many other countries have signed up have not stopped the clandestine development of nuclear weapons. We discovered that only too clearly during the Gulf war. We then discovered what had been going on in Iraq.
Mr. Colman: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. He points out that the previous safeguards agreement did not give the International Atomic Energy Agency the right to search for and identify nuclear weapons in Iraq, despite the fact that Iraq was a signatory. Does that not clearly show the need for the additional protocol to be put in place and made to apply to all the countries that do not claim to have nuclear weapons?
Mr. Wilshire: I would not go that far down the track with the hon. Gentleman. I accept that we need to do something, but I have some doubts about whether the Bill meets that need. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that safeguard agreements patently have not worked. There can be no dispute about that, since we discovered what went on in Iraq, and have subsequently discovered what has been going on in North Korea. In those cases, there can be no argument about the fact that the current arrangements have failed, and we do not know whether they may also have failed in other countries.
We must ask ourselves whether the Bill will increase the chances of detection and prevention: I have my doubts. When the Minister was challenged, he said that he thought it would do what was necessary. One of the reasons that he gave was that the operators are happy with the terms of the Bill. I wanted to intervene on the Minister at the time, but although he took several other interventions, I did not get the chance. I make no criticism of the hon. Gentleman for that.
I was not impressed with the idea that the operators who were to be inspected were happy. If I were an operator who was up to no good, and the Minister presented the details to me and asked whether they were okay, and I spotted a huge great loophole, I would still smile quietly to the Minister and say, "I am delighted, Minister. I'll sign that with pleasure." The fact that the operators are happy does not get me any further in deciding whether I want to vote with the Minister or against him tonight.
The Minister also said that he was happy with the Bill. I hope that he will tell us when he replies how he reached that contented state. I am not a nuclear physicist. I am not sure whether he is, but if he is, he will have understood all the arguments. I, as a layman, have struggled, and it would not mean much to the House if I said that I was happy.
I should be grateful if the Minister would tell us who or what led him to his present state of happiness; who offered him the advice that persuaded him to back the Bill; and whether those who gave him that advice had any vested interest in the nuclear industry. If they have links to an operator, they will have said, "Minister, you can be happy." The operators may have seen a loophole, as may the experts, if they were wearing two hats.
Dr. Julian Lewis: Is there not a further difficulty? Whereas the civil operators in this country have no intention, one hopes, of trying surreptitiously to flout the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty, they are not best placed to judge whether the Bill will close the loopholes that could be exploited by operators in other countries who would be minded to try to dodge the provisions of the NPT.
Mr. Wilshire: That is a valid point. I assume that most or all of the additional protocols being negotiated will contain broadly the same provisions, so a loophole in the United Kingdom would be a loophole in North Korea or Iraq. That reinforces the argument that it is wrong to accept that the operators are content, in whichever country.
As well as considering the NPT, we must consider the Bill in the context of other issues arising out of nuclear control and disarmament. By focusing on the Bill and the issues under the NPT, we may be suggesting that other initiatives are less important, because we are not giving time tonight to them. Should the comprehensive test ban treaty be given greater priority than the Bill gives to the non-proliferation treaty?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman cannot discuss that on Second Reading of this Bill, which deals with the control of civil nuclear power.
Mr. Wilshire: The issue that we are discussing, Mr. Deputy Speaker, is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We may be discussing the inspection of civil facilities, but--
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Precisely. That is what we are discussing in the context of the Bill, and I advise the hon. Gentleman to stick with it.
Mr. Wilshire: I will do that, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but the House is being invited to make up its mind whether the Bill is the correct measure that we should be considering if we are trying to achieve a safer world, which is what the debate is about--whether we should
focus on the NPT, which is the origin of the Bill, or whether Parliament should use its time to discuss other measures. I believe that that is relevant.
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