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Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden): The hon. Gentleman is referring to remarks by my hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), but I can assure him that the views expressed by my hon. Friend in the United States are shared by Congressmen and Senators. A lively debate is going on and should not be stifled. It has nothing to do with differences of opinion on Europe, but with the question of the alliance and how it should maintain its cohesiveness.
Mr. Smith: Much concern was expressed about the effect that the contribution in Washington has had on the whole debate on the future defence needs of Europe. Most importantly, it undermined this country's opportunity to ensure that our armed forces lead the way, as they have done in the past and as I am sure they will do for a long time in the future.
3.11 pm
Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife): The hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Mr. Smith) falls into that increasingly exclusive category of hon. Members who have actually served in the armed forces. Therefore when he speaks, as he has today with great sincerity and some passion, the House would do well to listen to what he has to say, especially about the change in attitude between the time when he first enlisted and today.
I confess to some reservations about the fact that we have abandoned the days of single service debates, and address these issues on the basis of a somewhat artificial split between personnel and procurement. Indeed, some
of my reservations are confirmed by the light attendance in the House this afternoon. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of any one of the armed services without drawing together the issues of personnel and procurement. We are engaged in something of an experiment and I hope that it will be carefully reviewed. If it is concluded that we could better serve our responsibilities by going back to single service debates, I hope that the Government will be sympathetic to that view.If I concentrate more on the Royal Air Force than on the other two services this afternoon, it is because I claim some front-line experience--if I may put it like that--of the RAF. Today's debate comes hard on the heels of a visit I made to RAF Leuchars in my constituency on Monday, by kind permission of Ministers. The future of that station is now assured because it is to be host in due course to three squadrons of Eurofighter, or Typhoon, as we must learn to call it.
On Monday, as on so many other occasions when I have met personnel from all three services, I was impressed by the professionalism and commitment of all those I met, from the station commander, Group Captain Peter Coker, down to the newest recruit. What was notable, in a station that has traditionally been associated with air defence, was an understanding at all levels of the changed environment in which the RAF has to operate and of the need to maximise deployability. The days of the RAF staying at home and going abroad only occasionally have long since gone. People understand and appreciate that the way in which the RAF fulfils its obligations will have to reflect that change.
The strategic defence review, which we debated, in part at least, only a few weeks ago, formally adopted an expeditionary strategy. However, that was no more than a theoretical recognition of what was already increasingly the practice. The word "expeditionary" in that context can easily--although not entirely--be reflected in the synonym "overseas". Our armed services have to have the means by which they can operate effectively overseas.
If an expeditionary strategy is to work, it needs to have the capacity for much more rapid deployment than we have previously had. Self-evidently, the effectiveness of personnel depends on the effectiveness and speed of their deployment. That is why a decision is urgently needed on the provision in the strategic defence review that the United Kingdom would acquire four C-17s or their equivalent. Debate is no doubt raging in the Ministry of Defence, and is certainly being carried on in national newspapers, with speculation falling on speculation.
I have three questions for the Minister on that issue. Is it the case that the Government intend to acquire not four aircraft but three, and not necessarily by outright purchase, while at the same time maintaining an interest in the airbus derivative with which British Aerospace is associated? What is the reason for delaying the decision? Has it anything to do with money and the Chancellor of the Exchequer? [Hon. Members: "Yes."] Well, I am an innocent in such matters, as the House will appreciate. I ask merely for the purpose of better informing the debate.
A less urgent decision, but one that may be significant for the expeditionary strategy, is the question of the roll on/roll off ferries, which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key). If the forces do not have those ferries, they may be able to get their personnel to
the area of deployment, but they will not able to transport the equipment necessary to sustain them when they get there.It would be extreme short-termism to sacrifice shipbuilding capacity on the Clyde for a temporary financial gain, and I do not believe that we would have to break the law on competitive bidding in Europe for civilian projects. It must be feasible to put together a package of ownership, operation, crewing and command that would make those vessels legitimately military and not civilian. If they are military in nature, that does not preclude competition, but it entitles the Government to take into account issues other than price when making the decision. It would be foolish to rush into the wrong decision, and much better to take time to reach a decision that satisfies the defence requirement and maintains a viable shipbuilding capacity. If the Secretary of State did talk about metal bashing--I noticed that he shook his head when that remark was attributed to him--it would have been a short-sighted view. How are we going to get the type 45 if we have no metal-bashers around? How will we be able to build ships to meet our naval commitments if we do not have some of those who were dismissively described as metal bashers?
Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood): The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making a most important point about shipbuilding and European Union rules about intervention funding. Is not it the case that in matters of international defence we should not be hidebound by rules of that kind? The national interest should prevail, and that would be good for Scotland and for the country as a whole.
Mr. Campbell: As the hon. Gentleman knows well, the treaty of Rome makes provisions that have the effect of excluding defence from the matters that have to be dealt with as part of the common market. I do not believe that it would be impossible to find a package that would fulfil the criteria that I mentioned and place those vessels in the military category.
The hon. Gentleman raises the subject of Europe in one category, but it arises in another. The UK armed forces now rarely act on their own. If a European security and defence identity is successfully created, the opportunities--indeed, the obligations--for joint operations with European allies will increase. I can claim that there is no greater enthusiast in the House of Commons than myself for integration in defence in Europe within the framework of NATO. I also hope that those who have heard me in the past remember that I have never contemplated what is sometimes described as a European army.
I do not believe that any country can abandon sovereignty over its own armed forces and the responsibility for deciding when and if they go to war. However, a European security and defence identity, if successfully created, will have long-term consequences for personnel in our armed services. Indeed, it may have long-term consequences for the structure and composition of our armed services if force specialisation and interoperability are more widely adopted than they have been.
From the standpoint of the interests and the welfare of our armed services, I do not believe that a European security and defence identity will bear proper fruit unless
it is capability led. Only a commitment to capability will provide comfort for those in the United States Congress--they have already been mentioned--who have expressed reservations. Indeed, only a fully capable security and defence identity will be able to fulfil the expectations attributed to it. Conversely, a weak or inadequate European security and defence identity would damage not merely Europe but NATO, too.I reaffirm the fact that my support depends on capability, not architecture. I have more than a sneaking suspicion that if we get the capability right, the architecture will almost certainly follow. I am equally strongly of the view that the converse is by no means certain.
We cannot call on others to reach the necessary level of expenditure and commitment unless we are willing and able to do so ourselves. As part of that, we need a successful strategy for overstretch and undermanning. Sometimes, we talk of those as though they were two separate issues, but as the hon. Member for Salisbury clearly demonstrated, they are inextricably linked.
I do not take the view that the way to deal with that problem is always to reduce commitments. If one reduces commitments, there is a price to be paid--one may gain financially, but one may well lose political influence. My answer to those who ask, "What about expenditure?", is to say that senior budget holders in all three armed services will say that the so-called 3 per cent. efficiency saving is the element of the present financial regime that causes them the greatest grief. If the Government are serious about ensuring that our armed services have the financial support and equipment to deal with overstretch and undermanning, they could take a financial step that would be received with extraordinary gratitude and acknowledgement throughout the armed services, and bring an end to that so-called efficiency saving.
On 22 February, when we last debated these issues, the Minister for the Armed Forces told the House of the various theatres from which we were withdrawing forces. Withdrawals of that type make sense only if the integrity of missions is not compromised as a result. I hope that we will not fall into the trap of saying that we have done better because we have brought people back. Often, maintaining the number of personnel, or putting more in, will be necessary.
I have Kosovo in mind. As we know, the failure to provide adequate civil administration there has thrown much more weight on the military presence. I have referred before to the continuing scandal of the failure to provide sufficient civilian police. That failure not only has consequences for the numbers there, but increases the pressure on those who are there. One would be glad to know--not in detail, but in principle--that the Government have some contingency plans for what has been loosely described in other quarters as a "spring offensive" of those warring factions in Kosovo who have not yet been willing to settle down.
We have a significant military presence in about 24 countries. Not all of them are as dangerous and difficult as Kosovo, but they require long absences from home base, station or port, for members of all three services. On a Thursday afternoon, I hesitate to burden the House with too many statistics, but it is worth going back to the 24-month standard, which was referred to earlier. In the Royal Armoured Corps, the interval
between operational tours in 1999-2000 is 12 months. In the Royal Artillery, it is 18 months, in the Royal Engineers, seven months, in the Royal Signals, six months, and in the infantry, 15 months. Anecdotally, it has been said that some signallers have been away from home for three Christmases in a row. That emphasises the degree of personal sacrifice that is necessarily involved in being in operations of that sort.On manpower shortages, in 1999 Royal Navy manpower was 4.6 per cent. down on what it should be, but that was worse than the previous year. Army manpower was 5.3 per cent. down, which again was worse. Only the Royal Air Force, with manpower 2.3 per cent. down on what it should be, was doing rather better than it had in the previous 12 months.
Undermanning has been well documented. The trained requirement of the Army is 105,300, but we are at least 5,000 short. The Secretary of State has said--I think that the Minister repeated this in his opening speech--that the requirement will be achieved by 2005. When the adjutant-general gave evidence to the Select Committee on Defence, he said of 1999-2000:
- this year I expect to meet virtually 100 per cent. of my recruiting targets for both officers and men and between 95 and 100 per cent. of my output training targets.
The deputy chief executive of the agency told me in a letter that part of the difficulty was
- the effects of the increased level of operational commitment by the Field Army
Many of the present difficulties had their origins in decisions taken some time ago. The Government have been entitled to enjoy some sort of honeymoon--I shall return to that--and turning this ship round, like turning an oil tanker round, is sometimes rather difficult. I do not wish to be over-harsh on the Government, but they may reach a point at which they will run out of excuses if they try to say that everything is the fault of those who went before.
Some of what I have said brings into sharp relief the way in which overstretch filters down to affect all levels of armed services operations. In June 1999, nearly half of Army personnel and 72 per cent. of Land Command personnel were on operations. At the same time, 476 RAF pilots were serving outside the mainland. In 1998-99, in a number of RAF squadrons the 140 nights away from home threshold was reached by more than 30 per cent. of personnel. On a more immediate and personal note from the point of view of those who were subjected to it, over the 1999-2000 Christmas and new year period--a traditional time for families to spend together, and the armed services are no different--35 per cent. of the Army's trained strength was serving abroad. That was 3,500 more than in 1998-99. The average soldier is
"out of bed" 20 per cent. of the time, with some divisions suffering significantly higher percentages, as has been acknowledged.I understand that the Government have commissioned an Army retention study, which has been mentioned today I think, and a number of other reports. I hope that those will be put into the Library and the public domain, not kept secret. They may not fall within the provisions of the freedom of information legislation, which is rather less vigorous than I should have liked, but I hope that--to enlist the support of those who have an interest in the matter--the Government will be willing to make the information that the reports contain available on a wider basis.
The hon. Member for Salisbury rightly mentioned divorce. He was also right to rely on those figures, as they were elicited by my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch) and myself in a series of questions to the Government. They are yet another index of the problems caused for those who serve in the armed services.
It is not just the Army that has had difficulties. Between August 1999 and January 2000, the Navy, the Air Force, the Royal Marines, the Territorial Army, the Naval Reserves and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force all saw a net outflow of trained personnel. In some respects, that was due to demographic and economic trends, which have worked against the training and manning agencies. Yet overstretch, inadequate or unavailable equipment or late delivery of large procurement projects have also had a significant effect.
The chief executive of the RAF Training Group Defence Agency wrote to me explaining why it did not achieve the target that it was obliged to achieve. Fast-jet pilot training had suffered because operational commitments took qualified flying instructors away from training. There were problems with aircraft serviceability, not enough trainers because of operations and not enough serviceable planes to train on. On the multi-engine programme, student numbers had to be reduced because of the delayed delivery of the C130J, and the front line could not absorb such pilots as there were. Instructor shortages resulted in the cancellation of navigator training courses, and some navigator recruits were switched to pilot training to make up for shortfalls elsewhere.
That, and much that has been said this afternoon--about which there is strong common ground throughout the House--illustrates the nature of the difficulty. It illustrates how, year on year, financial reductions and sometimes--to be blunt--poor management and decision making in the past have cumulatively contributed to our present difficulties.
The Government rightly began with the strategic defence review. They could reasonably argue, during that process and for some little time afterwards, that their concentration on that was paramount and justified. However, we have now passed from the period of conception to the period of delivery. The responsibility is now the Government's, and we will all be looking at whether the Government's aspirations are matched by their achievements.
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