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Mr. McNamara: I am sorry to pursue my hon. Friend on this issue, but he will recall that the Government's argument was precisely the one that he has just advanced: that one Parliament cannot bind another. The amendment that I moved does, in fact, bind a future Parliament. If we tried to alter the decision now that we have accepted the protocol on capital punishment, we would have to remove ourselves from the whole of the convention and from the Council of Europe.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are straying too far away from the new clause.
Mr. Dismore: I should be happy to engage in a debate with my hon. Friend on these issues in the Tea Room afterwards. I have made my point, and he has made his.
It is extremely important that we protect witnesses when they are giving evidence against a fellow professional. The nurse who thinks that a surgeon has done something a bit peculiar and goes to the police should be protected from the risk of victimisation by colleagues. People from whatever profession tend to close ranks against those who break them, and such medical professionals could be very exposed. Equally, witnesses giving evidence for the defence could be subject to the same pressure and intimidation as the defendant in the run-up to a trial.
That is why I think that the provisions on the protection of witnesses in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 should be extended to prosecutions under this legislation. However, I would go further than that and offer protection to the defendant. I hope that the hon. Member for Congleton would not dispute that such protection should also be offered to the deceased. It is not right or proper that someone who is no longer with us, and who is perhaps incidental to the prosecution, should be dragged through the courts when they have not consented to it because they are not in a position to do so. The individual's memory would be examined in the court.
I hope that the House will accept new clause 10 on the consent to prosecutions by the DPP, for the reasons that I have given. Should my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow press new clause 11, I hope that the House will reject it. I shall vote against it, because I think that the DPP is the more appropriate person to give consent than the Attorney-General.
Although I agree with the sentiments expressed in new clause 13, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Test, which would bring tort into the legislation, I think that
we need tort as well as criminal penalties. I support the suggestion that prosecution should only be on indictment, and I think that we need public restrictions for the reasons that I have outlined. I shall therefore press new clause 17, should it not be acceptable to the proponents of the Bill.
Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough): I believe that these new clauses are unnecessary. I do not believe that the intervention of the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions is necessary in what I believe will be clear matters. I shall explain why the law, once the Bill is enacted, will be quite clear and why it will not be necessary for the Attorney-General to vet any prosecutions.
In our common law, it is clear that it has always been wrong to bring about another person's death except for reasons of justice. That principle is based on the inviolability of human life. It is an absolutely clear and simple principle, and it has never been necessary to test these matters with the Attorney-General, the DPP or the House--it has been clear since time immemorial. Intentionally to cause the death of an innocent person has always been to commit the crime of murder.
Mr. Bob Russell (Colchester): Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Leigh: May I make a little progress, as I have only just started?
The Bland case recognised that, on the contrary--this is why it is so important--murder can be committed by an act of omission as well as by a positive act. It is my belief that the judgment in the Bland case contradicted the traditional principle that every human being has an inherent worth or dignity. It follows from that that just because I or anyone else thinks that a human life is no longer worth while, we do not have the right to end it. We do not have the right to make that judgment on the worth of any human life as individuals, parliamentarians, doctors, Attorney-Generals or DPPs. Human life is inherently worth while.
10.30 am
Anthony Bland died on 3 March 1993 of thirst consequent on feeding being withdrawn. He breathed and digested food unassisted, but the court found in that case that to continue feeding him was futile. It took the view--no one else did so: not the House, not the Attorney-General, not the public--that his life was no longer worth while.
Mr. Russell: The situation affected my first daughter on a life-support machine. When the life-machine was turned off, was that euthanasia, was that murder or was that compassion?
Mr. Leigh: I realise that this is a terribly sensitive subject. I think that we are all deeply sympathetic to the hon. Gentleman and to the intervention that he has made. It underlines the great care and sensitivity with which we should approach these matters, but I hope that he will not mind my saying that we are talking about a different situation. It has always been recognised that doctors have
the right to turn off a life-support machine. I will explain why, if the Bill is passed, that will continue to be the case, but I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making.Lord Mustill said in the judgment on the Bland case:
- The acute unease which I feel about adopting this way through the legal and ethical maze is I believe due in important part to the sensation that, however much the terminologies may differ, the ethical status of the two courses of action is for relevant purposes indistinguishable--
As a result of the Bland case, the floodgates have opened. As the British Medical Association, in its 1999 document entitled "Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment" recognised, the Bland case opened the right to withdraw tube feeding from those with severe dementia or strokes. That is what worries my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Mrs. Winterton) and others who speak on these matters.
We believe that doctors should not have discretion to pass judgment on the worthwhileness of human life. That, we believe, is incompatible with the dignity and inherent worth of life. All the Bill excludes--it is very clear; the courts can make a simple judgment--is a doctor's withdrawing treatment for the purpose of ending life. It allows doctors full discretion to take a view on whether the treatment that he is performing on the patient in very difficult circumstances is likely to benefit the patient significantly, or whether it will cause too much pain or too much discomfort for no discernible benefit.
Opposition to the Bill is, broadly speaking, based on the belief that severe decision-making problems will be imposed on doctors if the Bill is passed. Its opponents say that that is why we must have the new clauses. In fact, clause 1 is very clear. It states:
- It shall be unlawful for any person responsible for the care of a patient to withdraw or withhold from the patient medical treatment or sustenance if his purpose or one of his purposes in doing so is to hasten or otherwise cause the death of the patient.
Dr. Peter Brand (Isle of Wight): Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that there is a difference between ordinary means of intervention, and extraordinary means of intervention, or not starting treatment? There is a difference between ordinary treatment and extraordinary treatment, as has been recognised by the Catholic bishops in their recent paper on euthanasia and the withholding of treatment. Is he suggesting that clause 1 draws a distinction? Does it give guidance to doctors and to those who care for patients as to the level of treatment that would be expected?
Mr. Leigh: I shall try to explain why clause 1 is very clear. The hon. Gentleman draws attention to what the Catholic bishops said. I would not want to disagree with them in any way, and I am not sure that I am disagreeing with them because clause 1 is very clear: it deals with a deliberate act or omission the purpose of which is to end a life.
We easily distinguish someone's purpose in taking a particular action from the consequences, even the foreseeable consequences. The mere fact of the consequences being foreseeable does not necessarily mean that any doctor would fall foul of the Bill. Thus, for example, a foreseeable consequence of regular jogging is that I wear out my footwear, but wearing out my footwear is no part of my purpose in jogging; my purpose is to go for a run, maintain my health and so on.
If I drive 200 miles across country, I use petrol. That is a foreseeable consequence of what I am doing, but that is not why I drove 200 miles across country. I drove the 200 miles because I wanted to visit my friend. Therefore, the law is very clear about purpose and foreseeable consequence. An unnecessary smokescreen has been deliberately put up to envelope the Bill. The law is very clear.
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