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Mr. Wilkinson: The hon. Gentleman referred to the south Atlantic, and I accept what he said about Argentina. Surely, however, the United Kingdom could conduct a Falklands-type operation rather better than it did in 1982. It now has the airborne early warning system, and the ability to project power more effectively. I wish that the hon. Gentleman would not spread doom and gloom, in a
military sense. The Falkland islanders ought to know that they have not only the political reassurance provided by a good relationship with Argentina, but the military reassurance that the garrison can, if necessary, be fully backed up by power projected by the United Kingdom.
Mr. Anderson: I could easily go over this ground with the hon. Gentleman, who has strong interests in the area. He should note the change in our merchant marine force that has occurred during the intervening period, and compare our ability to deploy shipping then with our inability to do the same now. I could list a series of categories that would demonstrate the unlikelihood of our being able to mount a similar operation on our own today.
Let me now deal with the geographical aspect. We now operate mainly as a regional power, consistent with our interests in Europe, but we bring vast reserves of experience and the excellence of our armed forces to that. The real year of change was 1989; indeed, some have argued--I think the Foreign Secretary did in a recent speech--that the millennium began not earlier this year but, in broader terms, in 1989, when the Berlin wall fell and, subsequently, the old Soviet Union collapsed.
Two interesting examples were given to a parliamentary body by General Klaus Naumann, then the chief European commander in NATO. He said that prior to 1989 he was a company commander on the borders of the old Czechoslovakia. Static, looking over the border, he knew every bush on the other side of the frontier that he had to patrol. That was a very different sort of warfare. Indeed, the number of troops that were deployed along that central European frontier has already been mentioned today.
The general identified a remarkable difference from those days. He said that on one occasion when he was at NATO headquarters he found a member of the Russian delegation engaged in improper activities--spying, effectively. He summoned the head of the Russian delegation, and said "I have caught your colleague in a position that is clearly wrong, but this is the information that he was seeking. If you would like to have a look at it, here it is." That gives some indication of the sea change that has taken place since 1989.
That change has affected every aspect of our defence. I am thinking, for instance, of the way in which procurement has altered. A good example is provided by the Upholder submarines. Because of the lengthy procurement times, they were planned in the early 1980s. More than £1 billion of taxpayers' money was spent on them. By the time that they were at the point of commission, however, their whole purpose--their role in the northern approaches--had been made obsolete. Alas, fairly recently we sold them--albeit rightly--to the Canadians, at the best price that we could get. That gives some idea of the effect of the change, not only in terms of our strategic targets, but in terms of the logistics, materiel and weaponry to perform the necessary tasks.
The new European policy will evolve. There are clearly substantial differences between us and some of our European allies. I concede that there was a political element in the St. Malo summit. It can be seen, in part but not entirely, in the context of the wish to be seen at the high table in Europe and the fact that the financial door was blocked at the time and remains so, but there was more to it than that. There was clearly a convergence,
which culminated in the summit, between the French, who were finding their independent stance--both in terms of procurement and generally--insupportable financially, and ourselves, who were seeking a wider role in Europe.St. Malo was broadly welcomed by our European allies, but it masks a somewhat different approach. Clearly, some in the European Union take the superstate approach. Any superstate must, by definition, have a military capacity, and--this may be connected with the Gaullist attitude of the past--must seek to distance itself from the United States. This Government, like this country, take a rather more pragmatic approach. We accept that there will be a security role for the European Union, and hope that there will be a wider definition in respect of the key NATO allies that are not part of the European Union, but we trust that it will be recognised that NATO remains the cornerstone of our defence policy, and that in many instances we shall wish to retain its assets. Indeed, it would be foolish to duplicate those assets even if there were a will to do so.
The undermining of some of the more grandiose European defence schemes is clear from the shrinking defence budgets of our European allies, and the lack of commitment to spend the money that could provide the heavy lift, the intelligence and the more sophisticated weaponry that our US allies can provide. There is first refusal--it is not a bad formula. The United States may feel, for whatever reason, that it is a European show, but still be prepared to co-operate. That is the point at which Europe will carry out the tasks, planning as far ahead as it usefully can. Those tasks must be fairly limited.
The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife said that the Petersberg tasks were essentially for the Western European Union to carry out, but I understand that the WEU's only operation at the moment is a limited police operation in Albania. It is not difficult to foresee quite a number of tasks, particularly in the border areas of Europe--such as the Balkans--where our interests are mightily engaged, yet where the United States, for various reasons, might not want to deploy their forces. European interests--as defined broadly in terms of refugee flows and economic instability--are engaged there, and we would wish to be engaged.
It is wrong that many Conservative leaders see the matter in terms only of a broad anti-Europeanism--a gut anti-European Unionism--rather than being pragmatic, seeing that there is a natural regional alliance and that there is a role for the new Europe in that area--not a role for some vast superstate, but a role that is pragmatically defined. So much for the role of the new Europe in defence. Clearly, there will be vast areas of possible activity.
There is an enormous technological gap between the defence forces of the United States and those of Europe. Indeed, that gap has been exacerbated by the admission of three new members--Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary--at the Washington summit in spring 1999.
The military capacity of those countries is very limited, so, in technological terms, Europe is almost splitting into three. The United States is light years ahead of the rest. We lead the second division, as it were, and the technological capacity of the three new countries is substantially behind. That causes a problem in terms of inter-operability and working together in a co-ordinated way.
One does not have to be a Marxist to say that the economic substructure is of some interest. Increasingly, European business, including European aerospace business, is going ahead and making alliances well beyond what is happening politically. One thinks of the vision of someone such as John Weston at British Aerospace, and the way in which transnational alliances are being formed. That forms the basis commercially and economically for a new European alliance.
There were great reservations in the United States about the movement in Europe following St. Malo. That was shown diplomatically when Strobe Talbott spoke at Chatham house in the autumn of last year. My understanding is that those anxieties have been largely allayed. It is wrong for people to pretend that there is a gulf of misunderstanding between ourselves and our United States allies on the matter.
I turn to limited national missile defence. A major problem is looming. Four criteria have been set.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The hon. Gentleman is a great expert in foreign affairs. I know that he will recognise that it is great mistake to think that the State Department is the sole reliable spokesman for American opinion, or even opinion in the Executive branch. Strobe Talbott may be rather more relaxed about European security and defence policy post-Helsinki than he was, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman is alive to the fact that there are still considerable reservations and concerns in the Department of Defence and, importantly, on Capitol hill.
Mr. Anderson: I said that the reservations and anxieties that were widespread in the autumn of last year and exemplified by Strobe Talbott's speech have been largely allayed and satisfied. When I say that, I mean that they have been allayed not just in the State Department but in much of the Administration as a whole.
Clearly, the problem on Capitol hill is different. There is a highly partisan atmosphere there, as one saw with the decision of the Senate, for partisan reasons, to oppose the President and not to ratify CTBT 2--but essentially the United States position as exemplified by the Administration is much more satisfied about any potential threat from developments in Europe.
On limited national missile defence, the criteria were set out by the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife: threat assessment, costs, existing treaties and so on. My judgment is that the decision will not be made according to those criteria, any more than the British Government's decision on the euro will be made according to the criteria for the euro. The matter is driven essentially by domestic politics in the United States. There is an enormous cross-party coalition in favour of some form of national missile defence. It derives in part from a feeling that the United States is vulnerable and the illusion that it can be made invulnerable as a result of such a system.
That raises many questions. The technical problems still have not been solved. Any so-called rogue state that has the capacity to send a ballistic missile to the United States will probably have the capacity to have a number of decoys--chaff and so on. There are still many technical and political questions with regard to the effect on Russia, the anti-ballistic missile treaty and China.
I well understand the Government's unwillingness to say that they need to make a decision, because they hide behind the hope that they will not have to make one--that there will been an accommodation between Russia and the United States, with a limited amendment of the ABM treaty. However, if, for whatever reason, Russia refuses to agree to such an amendment and the United States goes ahead anyway, a real dilemma will face this country.
If it is our view that the urge within the United States to deploy some form of national missile defence is unstoppable, will we then say that we accept the inevitable? Will we say that, having accepted that, we will accept the implications for Fylingdales and go ahead, hoping that we can perhaps limit the national missile defence system--although I fear that, rather like the housemaid's baby, although it is only small now it has the capacity to grow? Will we say, at the cost of enormous disruption and causing a great clash between ourselves and our United States allies, that we share the scepticism of a number of allies on the continent and will not allow Fylingdales to be used because we are looking at a wider basis and we see how the whole strategic balance could be jeopardised?
The Government hope that they will not have to face that problem, but alas they may have to if, as I fear, the drive on Capitol hill and within the Administration is unstoppable, if there is a Republican victory in the presidential elections in November, and if the Russians refuse to play the game and extract the best bargain that they can by agreeing to limited modifications of the ABM treaty.
It is true that some forces on Capitol hill say that the treaty is dead already because it was signed in 1972 between the United States and the former Soviet Union. They say that, although the Russian Federation is in most cases the successor state to the Soviet Union, so many other countries have been excluded from that federation that the treaty is no longer valid. Perhaps those forces on the hill will become very much stronger if there is a Republican victory in November.
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