| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
5.29 pm
Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North): The strategic defence review correctly tried to base defence policy on foreign policy--we could hardly have a better expression of intent in the present world than the one given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence--on making the world a better and safer place. Central to that is the question of weapons of mass destruction. It is an issue of enormous importance and it is pleasing that the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs is considering it. We have had the benefit from that in the valuable contributions to the debate from my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) and from the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir J. Stanley).
It is clear that the basis of the Government's policy on weapons of mass destruction is that of arms control. For example, there is our commitment to the test ban treaty, nuclear safeguards, biological and chemical weapons conventions, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, START 3 and our commitment to enter into an arms reduction process when we feel it appropriate to do so. In response to a remark by the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, my memory of what my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office said on 24 January was that he reiterated that basic policy. It is a policy that probably is the subject of general agreement or consensus on both sides of the House.
In this brief contribution I want to concentrate on one vital issue, which I believe could undermine that policy. That issue, which has been repeatedly referred to, is national missile defence. I suspect that there may be divergent views within parties on both sides of the House, and hon. Members' remarks have hinted at that. It is correct for us to debate that subject because although it could be said to be a matter for the United States--and for Russia, in that it may affect the anti-ballistic missile treaty, which was originally a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union--I believe that there are legitimate concerns for Britain. I shall give three main reasons for that.
First, there are legitimate concerns that NMD could undermine our whole arms control posture. Secondly, Britain obviously could be used as a surveillance base at Menwith and Fylingdales. In addition, The Sunday Times made the suggestion, although I do not know whether it has any foundation, that we might be requested to have interceptor launch sites in British territory. Thirdly, as the Defence Secretary has said, there is the possibility of Britain or NATO looking at the feasibility of missile defence.
The United States says that it is acquiring the system because of the risk posed by rogue states, namely the danger of unstable dictators acquiring nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and rocket delivery systems. At present, there are almost certainly some states that we would class in that category which have or are close to obtaining crude forms of nuclear weapons and, possibly, crude delivery systems. One thinks particularly of present information about North Korea.
Some people in the United States have suggested that those nations have missiles that are capable of long-distance flights, but I think that it is questionable. Given that crude nuclear weapons tend to be heavy, it is reasonable to doubt that crude delivery systems would be capable of delivering them. Clearly, however, it is possible to imagine that within the next decade or so, some of those states could develop more sophisticated systems.
Even if we were to reach a situation in which one of those states was able to launch crude but probably untested nuclear weapons on crude but probably untested rocket delivery systems, should we, as the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) suggested, believe that they would readily attempt to attack the United States and would not be deterred by the
knowledge that the US possesses several thousand such missiles? When the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) was pressing his point about the dangers posed by such states, he seemed to be implying that no deterrent exists in the United States or other members of NATO.To launch such an attack would be suicidal. Can one rule out the possibility that a suicidal maniac could gain control of nuclear weapons? No, one cannot, but in a world where nuclear weapons have been invented, there is no such thing as absolute security. We have to live with different balances and levels of risk. What frightens me in this case is that we may, out of fear of wanting to counter one threat, increase a greater and more dangerous threat without removing the original threat.
Even if NMD proves to be technologically possible, which is still questionable, it will, as has already been said, provide no protection against the device brought into a country on a lorry, by boat or in a suitcase. Such a device could be used not only by a rogue state, but by a terrorist organisation against which deterrence would not be feasible.
The concern about NMD is that it could undermine the anti-ballistic missile treaty, particularly, as the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir J. Stanley) indicated, if phase 2 is introduced. However, even phase 1 could undermine the treaty.
There is concern about the views expressed by some defence commentators in the United States, especially right-wing members of the Republican party--the people who are sometimes described as unilateralists or aggressive isolationists. They have said that they would be prepared unilaterally to abrogate the ABM treaty. If they did so, they would undermine both the basis for all treaties and all confidence and trust in the United States--especially if a Republican Administration reneged on a treaty that was originally introduced by a Republican president, Richard Nixon. If it happened, there would have to be grave concern that Russia and China would believe that NMD was directed not at rogue states but at themselves. They would cease to believe any promises that were made, because if one Administration could renege on another's promises, how could they be sure that future Administrations would not do the same?
We could end up involved, once again, in a dangerous arms race. As the shadow Defence Secretary said, nuclear proliferation is already frightening; it would become far more worrying if it were to accelerate. I am surprised that, when talking about the 1980s, the hon. Gentleman did not think of another lesson from that time. At the time the Americans were considering SDI--the strategic defence initiative--Baroness Thatcher and Lord Howe argued that it would be dangerous, precisely because it would undermine the entire arms control regime.
In that context, I was relieved when, yesterday, during the nuclear non-proliferation review conference, the five recognised nuclear states--the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council--issued a joint statement in which they stated their belief in preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty. I trust that that implies that the current US Administration are committed at least to negotiating with Russia on an ABM treaty before considering the introduction of NMD.
Even if that were to be done, I hope that serious consideration would be given to Chinese perceptions: there are clear indications that China is gravely concerned
about the threat of NMD and is considering the possibility of increasing its nuclear stockpiles. I hope that the views of all other states would be taken into account. It is noticeable that, at the nuclear non-proliferation treaty discussions, the vast majority of states have expressed concern about NMD. NMD is not worth while if all it does is create destabilisation and thereby reduces our safety.My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East asked what if the Americans were to go ahead with NMD without ensuring that the arms control regime was preserved? What should Britain's response to our American allies be if they start asking us for either the use of surveillance posts, or launch pads for interceptor missiles? In the first instance, that might appear to be an extremely unattractive bargain: remember, national missile defence is so called because it was intended only to provide cover for the United States of America.
Even though, when the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green suggested that North Korea would be wildly keen to attack the United Kingdom with nuclear weapons, one has to wonder why North Korea--or any other state that is feared to have developed nuclear capability--should be keen to do so. One must acknowledge that, if we were to help with NMD, the risk of the areas involved becoming targets would clearly be increased. Therefore, helping might be a rather unattractive option for the north of Yorkshire.
Of course, the United States might offer to extend the cover of NMD to Britain, or that there would be additional jobs created in the localities, or that lucrative contracts might benefit other parts of Britain. When the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) spoke of operational and commercial benefits, that might have been what he meant. However, it would be a poor deal if we were trading off against such benefits the safety of our people and our planet.
Would NMD work? The past record of interception systems is poor. We all remember George Bush saying--I do not recall the exact numbers, so I will guess at them--that the Patriot missiles managed to down 41 out of 43 Scuds. Later, a congressional inquiry suggested that the number downed was much lower. No clear evidence could be produced that even one Scud had been successfully intercepted. The U.S. Defence Department said that it had managed to get its missiles to explode near the Scuds, even if it did not manage to bring them down. In the event of an in-coming nuclear missile, I would find that rather cold comfort.
So far, the tests that have been done on national missile defence have been unsuccessful. It is thought that the only successful interception occurred by a fluke. The main first series of tests will not close before 2001. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was right to say that the matter should be subject to "calm and measured debate".
I fear, however, that as my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East suggested, that is not happening in the US at present. Instead, there is hype, vested interests, what Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex, the possibility of multimillion dollar contracts, and the possibility of pork barrel politics, during a period of election campaigning. That is a dangerous time and a dangerous way for these matters to be discussed.
I realise that the influence that the United Kingdom can have on the United States is limited, and that private rather than megaphone diplomacy is needed. The point
made by the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) that we can be "critical and constructive partners" was valid. I hope that we will try to use what influence we can on the United States to discourage precipitate action on the matter, and to encourage the "calm and measured" debate to which the Secretary of State referred.The dangers from proliferation are vast and real. It is tempting to think that there can be some simple, single, magical, technological solution, but I fear that it is a complex issue, where solutions may be complex, multiple, mostly diplomatic and highly imperfect. In a world where nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, absolute security may no longer be possible. In trying to pursue the dream of absolute security, it would be folly to throw away the only real, albeit limited and tenuous, security that we have.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |