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Mr. Hoon: I repeat that the UK forces are doing precisely what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said that they would in his statement this time last week. He said that they were present to ensure the evacuation of
British nationals by securing the airport, in the process allowing for the reinforcement of the UN contingent in Sierra Leone. That is precisely what they have been engaged in and precisely what has been happening over the past week.On the contribution that the forces have made to the UN in Sierra Leone, as I said in my statement, the situation on the ground has clearly enormously improved as a result of the presence of British forces, which has, for example, freed other UN forces for other tasks elsewhere in Sierra Leone by undertaking the responsibility of securing the airport. That has been an advantage. Certainly British forces have boosted the morale of the Government forces in Sierra Leone, which have had a good deal more confidence in going about their task in the past week than previously. The presence of our forces has contributed to that. However, we do not anticipate that British forces will become part of the UN force in Sierra Leone.
Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East): Does my right hon. Friend share my suspicion that some of those who are asking for clearer objectives are really saying, "Mission accomplished, let us fold our tents. Evacuation is complete, let us depart." If we had done that, the inhabitants of Freetown would have been left to an awful fate, and the UN would have been discredited. As Kofi Annan showed in his warm thanks to the Government and to our forces, had we not been there, the UN would have found it extremely difficult in future to launch such an operation.
What longer-term lessons does my right hon. Friend draw for the relationship of the United Kingdom and our armed forces with the UN in terms of training, communications and in ensuring that the UN is properly strengthened to carry out tasks in Africa and elsewhere?
Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend has asked me questions of a long-term nature that would probably be better addressed to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. However, the operation demonstrates the importance of ensuring that the UN has sufficient effective force and equipment in a theatre to enable it to do the job that was contemplated. One of the difficulties that the UN has undoubtedly faced in Sierra Leone is not having the authorised numbers--the numbers planned by the UN--available at the start of the operation. The actions of British forces have been designed to ensure that those numbers can be reached. Securing the airport will allow reinforcements to arrive relatively quickly.
Mr. Tom King (Bridgwater): Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he is entitled to the support of the House, as are our forces in Sierra Leone and offshore, at this difficult time? However, may I suggest that it does not help if he claims that the operation is a tremendous success for the strategic defence review? He is drawing on the particular capabilities and qualities of especially the Parachute Regiment, the Royal Marines and associated arms, which have been built up over decades by successive Governments.
The right hon. Gentleman rightly and unsurprisingly gives evidence to the House that the contribution of British forces has helped to support the morale and confidence of President Kabbah's forces. However, one of the real difficulties resulting from any early withdrawal from Sierra Leone is that it will have exactly the opposite
effect. I do not expect a detailed reply because it is clear that General Guthrie's report will be critical in this respect, but I hope that when considering what General Guthrie says about the actual military situation, the right hon. Gentleman and the Foreign Secretary will consider further what can be done to sterilise as far as possible any support going to the RUF from adjoining or other territories.
Mr. Hoon: If I gave the right hon. Gentleman the impression that I was claiming for the SDR the virtues of this rapid deployment, I apologise to him and to the House. However, the reality is that the SDR set out to build on the capabilities previously established. The deployment demonstrates--we have had discussion about the potential availability of both maritime and air assets--the importance of being able to deploy rapidly ground troops and supporting forces of a joint nature. The significant point about the SDR is that the conflicts that we face in future will most likely require rapid deployment.
I spoke to General Guthrie this morning, and I understand that he has had the opportunity of travelling round part of Freetown and seeing the British forces that are deployed there. I accept that his advice will be critical as to how the military campaign is continued. I anticipate that he will speak to representatives of countries that will be likely to deploy further force into Sierra Leone. When he returns to the UK, which will be shortly, we shall take further decisions in the light of what he has to report.
Mr. Mike Gapes (Ilford, South): Has my right hon. Friend seen the outpouring of support from the Sierra Leonean community in this country and the pictures and reports from that country, showing how delighted people are at the role that Britain is playing to restore and defend democratic government in Sierra Leone? Would it not be appalling if any politician in Britain, by omission or commission, gave the impression that we were interested only in saving the lives of white Europeans, and that we could not care less about black Africans?
Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. In addition to the Sierra Leonean community in the United Kingdom, President Kabbah spoke personally to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to thank him for the contribution that Britain has been able to make. In the plans for evacuation, I want to make it clear that we had a responsibility not only to British nationals, but to all the countries, particularly Commonwealth countries, that did not have diplomatic representation in Sierra Leone, for which we undertook consular responsibilities. It was never our intention, even as part of the evacuation process, simply to evacuate UK citizens.
Mr. Edward Garnier (Harborough): What were the characteristics of Mr. Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, that commended him to the Government last year, and how has he changed since?
Mr. Hoon: The United Kingdom did not make a judgment last year about the character of Mr. Sankoh, and would not do so now. He is responsible for breaching the agreement that he entered into last July. It was not a perfect agreement, but it offered the prospect of peace and stability in Sierra Leone. It was not a perfect solution;
it was the best on offer. For the purpose of trying to preserve peace and security in Sierra Leone, at least it offered some respite from the appalling civil war.It is Sankoh who has gone back on that agreement. He and his forces are responsible for the appalling bloodshed that has occurred since, and that is why the international community, through the United Nations, must take the action that it is taking now. We made no judgment about his character last July. It was simply the best offer that was available.
Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington): My right hon. Friend will have read reports in the media that the Sierra Leonean Army and the Revolutionary United Front have been involved in some appalling atrocities, against each other and against the civilian population. Can he assure us that when the training programme finally begins after the immediate conflict is over, the SLA will be fully trained in the need to treat troops and civilians decently?
Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend touches on a picture in Sierra Leone that is quite different from the one that we are used to when we think about disciplined armed forces. In Sierra Leone, bands of people are loosely attached to particular leaders and can switch from one side of a conflict to another at a moment's notice. It is an extremely uncertain, unstable, volatile situation. That is why it is important that we announce the need for effective training. Part of that training will undoubtedly be to provide the necessary discipline and commitment to the decisions of a democratically elected Government. Those are the kind of contributions that I believe that British trainers can make to the armed forces in Sierra Leone.
Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury): In his statement the Secretary of State made much of the role of the strategic defence review, and in an earlier answer said that the operation had had no significant impact on overstretch. Given that the SDR envisaged three parachute battalions, two of them in role, can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House how many soldiers are left in the other two parachute battalions, and how long it would be before one of them could be used in a similar operation? How long would it take to stand them up?
Mr. Hoon: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman understands that the designation of the spearhead battalion is not necessarily and solely a designation given to a parachute battalion. The designation rotates around the armed forces that are in a position to complete the job. That is why, in answer to the question about the impact of overstretch, I made it clear that in the short term there is no impact on overstretch. The short-notice availability of the spearhead battalion is designed to deal precisely with such an emergency situation. That is the purpose of the battalion. The question of how many other members of a parachute battalion are available does not arise in the context in which the hon. Gentleman puts it.
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