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Mr. Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green): I thank the Secretary of State for giving me prior sight of the statement, even though it was difficult to obtain a copy until shortly before he spoke. He will forgive me if some of my questions have already been answered.

The Opposition are proud of all that our armed forces have been asked to do and of what they achieve. Whatever they are asked to do, we will continue to support them. The situation was brought home to us last Wednesday, when we had a clear reminder--if any reminder were necessary--of how dangerous the situation in Sierra Leone is. We were also reminded how good our troops are when they came under fire, as the Secretary of State said, apparently from members of the Revolutionary United Front. Our troops behaved impeccably, drove away those fighters and, it seems, killed four of them. We understand, and I hope that the Secretary of State will confirm, that the people who took them on were not drug-crazed youngsters blazing away, but efficient, reasonably well trained and well armed troops. It is important to point that out, as it reminds us all the more how good our troops are.

We welcome the announcement of the withdrawal of the Paras. It must have been pretty miserable for them to sit in the airport in those conditions. We recognise that that consideration must have contributed to the MOD's decision, and we welcome that as well. Our thoughts are with the families of those Paras and all the others who are serving out there: it must be a difficult time for them, as they do not know when they will see their menfolk--or their women--again.

I welcome the Secretary of State's decision to make the statement. It is clear that things are moving fast in Sierra Leone. We called for statements, and the fact that the Secretary of State has responded is cause for congratulations.

Our position is also clear, and has been from the word go. We have always been worried, and continue to be worried, that without enough clarity--without a clear mission and simple tasks--we risk being sucked into a longer-term engagement that will chase events rather than controlling them. To an extent the Secretary of State faced that fact today, and gave answers to some of the questions that have been raised. We will, however, continue to support our armed forces. As the Secretary of State knows, more than a week ago we made a clear offer to support them and, if they are called on to do even more--to take a more aggressive stance in dealing with the RUF to stabilise the situation--to support the bringing in of the United Nations if necessary.

The statement raises questions which, at first glance, require answers. The Secretary of State spoke of the way in which rebel forces had been demobilised, with the Government of Sierra Leone controlling diamond producing in the long run. That seems to differ from what the Foreign Secretary has said in the past about arrangements in the Lome agreement to establish who controls the diamond fields. Will the Secretary of State explain exactly what that means?

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The Secretary of State spoke of other duties later in the year for our armed forces. Will he also explain exactly what that means? The reference seems somewhat open-ended, and I am not sure how it will work in practice. The right hon. Gentleman referred to military advice, and to advisers' being fully in place to advise and train Sierra Leone armed forces. There is a clear sense that that has already been announced: we knew that those advisers were being put in. I wonder why the Secretary of State felt it necessary to reannounce it. Are we talking about a greater number of advisers, or about an expansion of their role?

Back in March, a $16 million aid package was announced for just such a training scheme. Perhaps the Secretary of State could check with the Foreign Secretary, and ask what happened to that package. Was it sent, has it been used, or is it still part of the new package that the Secretary of State has announced? Furthermore, the commitment to the UN seems to run counter to the Foreign Secretary's assurances that we were not becoming embroiled in the workings of the UN in Sierra Leone. Surely the mission has changed in that respect: it has not remained exactly the same.

Let me now deal with questions concerning the Sierra Leone army, and the Secretary of State's announcement that we will provide it with arms. How will the MOD control the way in which those arms are handed out? We already know that there are at least five separate militias--a sort of alphabet soup of shifting allegiances. It is very difficult to track the way in which those militias work with, within or without the SLA. We know that last night members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council were engaged in a vicious fire fight with members of the Government, during which two members of UNAMSIL were shot dead, as well as three AFRC members. That illustrates just how difficult it is to define the clean break between who are members of the SLA, who are members of the militias, who is on the Government side and who is not. If we are not careful, we may risk arming some of the militias, and possibly even passing some arms to the RUF. How will we stabilise the position? What will we do about the militias, and what does the MOD plan to do with regard to the reconstruction of the SLA and the question of being sucked in?

What set tasks does the Secretary of State expect to be in place, so that we can define when we will withdraw British troops? What tasks will be achieved? We need to know exactly how the troops will be withdrawn.

Conservative Members still believe that greater clarity is required about our relationship with Sierra Leone, and whether it is necessary for us to take a more aggressive stance to stabilise the position, to drive back the RUF, and to work with the militias. If so, how will we control them? Will the Secretary of State confirm that that option remains open?

Mr. Hoon: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his unqualified support for British forces. I confirm that the RUF contingent that engaged in a fire fight with elements of the Parachute Regiment last Wednesday was well armed, well equipped and well organised. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his further thoughts for the families of those who are deployed in Sierra Leone. Arrangements are in place to ensure that those families are properly briefed about the circumstances.

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I take issue with the hon. Gentleman's comments about consistency. There is no inconsistency in the Government's position. If he compares the statement that I made today with that made by the Foreign Secretary on 8 May, the statement issued on behalf of the Prime Minister on 11 May, and the statement that I made last week, on 15 May, he will realise that our position has been clear and precise throughout.

On the hon. Gentleman's final question, the mission that we asked British forces to complete was set out in those statements: it is to secure the airport to allow for the evacuation of British and other entitled nationals and to permit reinforcement by the UN of its contingent in Sierra Leone. That remains the task in which British troops are engaged. If the hon. Gentleman requires a test for when we will have completed the mission, it is when the UN reaches its authorised limit. More important, the UN will then be in a position to secure the airport for further reinforcements, if necessary, to assume the responsibilities that British forces have undertaken.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the diamond areas and the Lome agreement. Clearly, it makes sense that we should ensure that the forces of the Government of Sierra Leone are in a position to secure the country which they have a mandate to represent. That includes the diamond- producing areas, which, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made clear in his statement, are the source of the instability in Sierra Leone. It therefore makes sense when training the forces of the Government of Sierra Leone to allow them to be properly equipped. That is consistent with decisions that had previously been made pursuant to the Lome agreement. That is why the training team, which was announced some time ago, will continue its task as soon as it is safe to do that. Frankly, the hon. Gentleman simply underlined the consistency of our approach throughout.

May I apologise to the hon. Gentleman for the late notice of the statement and explain that the "other duties" about which he asked are not necessarily in Sierra Leone. They are the normal duties on which we would expect the Parachute Regiment to be engaged. Given that the regiment was deployed as part of the Spearhead Battalion, it is right that, if possible, it should continue with its normal duties. The changeover allows that.

Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife): I, too, offer my support to the troops and their families in the same terms as the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith). I offer my support for the statement not least because the Secretary of State has outlined an identifiable political aim, namely the stability of Sierra Leone, the demobilisation of the rebels and bringing the control of diamonds into the hands of the Sierra Leone Government. That is a substantial political objective. When the Secretary of State says that British troops will not stay longer than necessary, is not the truth that they will have to stay as long as is necessary to achieve those political objectives?

It is also clear that the direction of United Kingdom forces, United Nations forces, the Sierra Leone army and the Nigerian forces is under the control of Brigadier Richards. Why do we not acknowledge that? Why are the Government reluctant to admit that they are doing good? The answer is that to do that would require them to go beyond the original stated purpose of evacuation and

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securing the airport. On any view, what is happening on the ground is at the very least a flexible interpretation of those original objectives.

There is some relief on the Liberal Democrat Benches that the Secretary of State has now abandoned the fiction that the British forces are not combat troops. Is it not clear that they have enjoyed success precisely because they are ready and capable of combat and because anyone who seeks to interfere with their activities will find that out to their cost?


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