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Staffing
Mr. Cousins: To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what conclusions he has reached about the future of the regional service centres and the Intervention Board Agency; and what are the resulting changes in location and employment. [123897]
Ms Quin: No decisions have been made on the future of the Ministry's Regional Service Centres (RSCs) or the Intervention Board Executive Agency (IBEA) following the recent review of CAP scheme administration.
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The review concluded that we could offer a radically improved service to farmers and significant savings to taxpayers by merging the payment functions of MAFF's RSCs and IBEA and making better use of available technology. The case for restructuring, which will require new funding, is being considered in the context of the Spending Review 2000.
My right hon. Friend the Minister has made it clear that he will not implement the recommendations of the review unless he is satisfied that we will be able to deliver clear benefits to public administration and to our client groups.
Aspartame
Mr. Baker: To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what monitoring the Food Standards Agency has undertaken of the number of people suffering an adverse reaction to aspartame; and how many cases have so far been reported of such a reaction, broken down by symptoms suffered. [124085]
Ms Stuart: I have been asked to reply.
The Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products, and the Environment will be publishing shortly a review of adverse reactions to food and food ingredients, including food additives. Their report discusses the difficulties in establishing the true incidence and prevalence of these reactions and attributing an adverse reaction to a specific food or food ingredient. Additionally, the Food Standards Agency has recently commissioned a feasibility study of methods to monitor potential adverse reactions to novel foods and the outcome of this will help to establish whether, and if so in what form, a practical monitoring system might be established. A copy of the COT's report will be placed in the Library as soon as it becomes available.
DEFENCE
Departmental Estate
Ms Christine Russell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he plans to publish his Department's Estate Strategy. [124931]
Dr. Moonie: "In Trust and On Trust", the Strategy for the Defence Estate, will be published tomorrow, meeting the commitment made by my Department following the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Copies will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses and it will also be placed on the worldwide web.
The Ministry of Defence has consulted closely with voluntary sector organisations who have an interest in the defence estate and with the Government's statutory advisers. The Strategy will deliver a more efficient and effective estate and will serve to ensure that Ministry of Defence targets resources to the estate in the most effective way. This is a far-reaching document which will be of benefit to all those with an interest in Ministry of Defence's estate.
CHOTS Project
Mr. Keetch: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his letter of 25 January, D/US of S/PK PQ0057K/00/M, what are the total life revenue and capital
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costs of the CHOTS project since conception, including upgrades one through eight; what further upgrades have been planned since March 1999; what are their estimated costs and completion dates; and if he will make a statement. [123647]
Dr. Moonie: This is a matter for the Chief Executive of the Defence Communication Services Agency. I have asked the Chief Executive to write to the hon. Member.
Letter from A. J. Roper to Mr. Paul Keetch, dated 6 June 2000:
- I am replying to your recent Parliamentary Question concerning the costs of the Corporate Headquarters Office Technology System (CHOTS) programme. As Chief Executive of the Defence Communication Services Agency, the CHOTS programme falls within my area of responsibility.
- The total life costs of the CHOTS programme since its conception in 1984, including upgrades, is estimated at £848.8M at current prices. This cost remains within existing Treasury approvals which cover the period until 2006.
- The last upgrade, known as CSV8 (CHOTS System Version 8), was completed on schedule in March 1999. Whilst no further major upgrades are currently planned, estimates include an assessment for ongoing technology refreshment of the system and a likely enhancement to cover the introduction of the Windows 2000 operating system. Beyond this, it is anticipated that CHOTS will form part of the Department's wider requirements for information delivery, to be met under a new Defence Information Infrastructure project managed by the Defence Procurement Agency under smart procurement principles.
Iraq (No-fly Zones)
Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions coalition aircraft patrolling the northern no-fly zone in Iraq released ordnance between 1 April 1991 and 16 December 1998 and (b) 20 December 1998 to date, stating in percentage terms (i) the nature of the threat, (ii) the category of the target attacked and (iii) the tonnage of ordnance released on each category of target in proportion to the overall tonnage released in those periods. [122846]
Mr. Hoon [holding answer 23 May 2000]: I am withholding detailed information on the activities of other allies in accordance with Part II Section 1.c of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
The UK has never released ordnance over the northern no-fly zone.
Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions coalition aircraft patrolling (a) the northern and (b) the southern no-fly zone in Iraq hit targets other than the intended target between (i) 1 April 1991 and 16 December 1998 and (ii) 20 December 1998 to date, stating what percentage this formed of overall attacks during those periods. [122848]
Mr. Hoon [holding answer 23 May 2000]: The coalition only ever targets, in self-defence, Iraqi military facilities that pose a threat to its forces carrying out legitimate patrols of the no-fly zones. The coalition goes to exceptional lengths to ensure that the right target is hit, including the employment of very strict target clearance procedures and precision guided munitions. We conduct painstaking battle damage assessment after every bomb is dropped. For these reasons we are confident that, in the vast majority of cases, released ordnance by coalition aircraft lands on, or very close to, its intended target.
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I am withholding detailed information on the activities undertaken by other allies in accordance with Part II Section 1.c of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
The UK has never released ordnance over the northern no-fly zone.
Between 1 April 1991 and 16 December 1998 UK aircraft released ordnance on two occasions. On both occasions all of the ordnance hit the intended targets. Since 20 December 1998, there have been two occasions when ordnance from UK aircraft appears to have hit unintended targets. The weapons released on these occasions represent 1 per cent. of the total tonnage of ordnance released by the UK over this period.
Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the total tonnage of ordnance released by coalition aircraft in operations to maintain (a) the southern and (b) the northern no-fly-zones in Iraq between (i) 1 August 1992 and 16 December 1998 and (ii) 20 December 1998 to date; and what is the monthly average in each of these periods. [122844]
Mr. Hoon [holding answer 23 May 2000]: I am withholding detailed information on the activities of other allies in accordance with Part II Section 1.c of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
Between 1 August 1992 and 16 December 1998, UK aircraft released 2.5 tons of ordnance over the southern no-fly zone at an average of 0.025 tons per month. We do not have sufficiently detailed records of coalition activity over this period to estimate what percentage of the coalition total this represents.
Between 20 December 1998 and 17 May 2000, UK aircraft released 78 tons of ordnance over the southern no-fly zones, at an average of 5 tons per month. This figure represents approximately 20 per cent. of the coalition total for this period.
The UK has never released ordnance over the northern no-fly zone.
Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the number of Iraqi civilians killed as a result of coalition aircraft responding to threats in (a) the northern and (b) the southern no-fly-zone in Iraq between (i) 1 April 1991 and 16 December 1998 and (ii) 20 December 1998 to date through (A) collateral damage, (B) attack on an unintended target and (C) malfunction of ordnance; and what percentage of attacks in the no-fly-zones resulted in civilian casualties in those periods. [122845]
Mr. Hoon [holding answer 23 May 2000]: The coalition only ever targets, in self-defence, Iraqi military facilities that pose a threat to its forces carrying out legitimate patrols of the no-fly zones. The coalition goes to exceptional lengths to ensure civilian casualties are kept to the absolute minimum possible, including the employment of very carefully controlled targeting procedures and precision guided munitions.
In practice, it is extremely difficult to give estimates of civilian casualties, despite the painstaking battle-damage assessment (BDA) that the coalition routinely carries out every time ordnance is released. However, we can demonstrate categorically that many of the Iraqi claims of
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civilian casualties are either exaggerated or wholly untrue. On a number of occasions the Iraqis have claimed that coalition aircraft have caused civilian casualties when allied aircraft have not released any munitions, or even been flying. The most recent example of this was on 17 May this year, when it seems very probable that the civilian casualties which the Iraqis claimed were caused by coalition activities, were in fact caused by an Iraqi air defence weapon. There have also been many instances when the Iraqis claimed civilians have been killed, where our BDA has clearly indicated that only military facilities were attacked.
Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions coalition aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly-zone in Iraq released ordnance between (a) 1 August 1992 and 16 December 1998 and (b) 20 December 1998 to date, stating in percentage terms (i) the nature of the threat, (ii) the category of the target attacked and (iii) the tonnage of ordnance released on each category of target in proportion to the overall tonnage released in those periods. [122847]
Mr. Hoon [holding answer 23 May 2000]: I am withholding detailed information on the activities undertaken by allies under Part II Section 1.c of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
Between 1 August 1992 and 16 December 1998, UK aircraft released ordnance over the southern no-fly zone on two occasions. The nature of the threat on both occasions was hostile electronic activity. In both cases, ordnance was directed against elements of Iraq's Ground Based Air Defence Systems, posing a direct threat to coalition forces.
Between 20 December 1998 and 17 May 2000 coalition aircraft were directly threatened by the Iraqi air defence forces on over 320 occasions. Aircraft responded in self-defence on 74 occasions against Iraqi military facilities posing a direct threat to coalition forces. Details of these threats, broken down by percentage, are as follows:
| Percentage | |
|---|---|
| Nature of threat | |
| Aircraft violations of southern no-fly zone | 51 |
| Anti-aircraft artillery/surface to air missile firings | 45 |
| Hostile electronic activity | 4 |
| Category of target attacked | |
| Ground based air defence system | 95 |
| Other military systems posing a direct threat to coalition forces | 5 |
| Tonnage of weapons released | |
| Ground based air defence system | 92 |
| Other military systems posing a direct threat to coalition forces | 8 |
Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions the Commander for British Forces in charge of (a) Operation Bolton, (b) Operation Warden and (c) preceding operations to maintain the no-fly zones in Iraq has requested authority from his Department to attack a target between (i) 1 April 1991 and 16 December 1998 and (ii) 20 December 1998 to
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date, stating in each case (A) the date of request, (B) the category of the target, (C) whether authority was given and (D) whether the target was attacked. [122849]
Mr. Hoon [holding answer 23 May 2000]: Commanders of British Forces operating over the Iraqi no-fly zones receive a directive from CJO that gives them highly detailed levels of delegated authority for target clearance.
(a)(i) Between 1 April 1991 and 16 December 1998, the Commander of British Forces for Operations over the southern no-fly zone referred to the UK for authority to attack targets beyond his delegated authority on one occasion. This approval was granted. I am withholding further details of this operation under Part II Section 1.a of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
(a)(ii) Between 20 December 1998 and 17 May 2000, the Commander of British Forces for Operation Bolton formally sought approval to attack targets beyond his delegated authority on four occasions. On each occasion approval was granted. I am withholding further details of this operation under Part II Section 1.a of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
(b) The UK has never released ordnance over the northern no-fly zone.
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