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Mr. Bercow rose--

Mr. Cash rose--

Mr. Campbell: I give way to the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash).

Mr. Cash: I am grateful, as ever, for the right hon. and learned Gentleman's courtesy. I mentioned blackmail because I had heard people in the candidate countries referring to it. I refer the right hon. and learned Gentleman to the recent speech of Mr. Geremek in Poland. He makes a good case for not wanting to be taken into the sort of European Union that is being proposed.

Mr. Campbell: I visited Poland not long ago. Politicians of any party to whom I spoke were at pains to tell me that the United Kingdom had to ensure the success of the intergovernmental conference that dealt with enlargement, and that Poland's entry into the European Union was not delayed. Consideration of its candidacy comes hard upon its entry to NATO. Poland, like the Czech Republic and Hungary, views the twin track of NATO and the European Union as fundamental to underpinning the democratic process on which they have embarked after the years of the cold war.

It is essential for the meeting to lay a proper basis for the treaty of Nice, which will follow. That requires re-weighting votes in the Council of Ministers. Such a measure will protect the interests of larger states, including the United Kingdom. We need a formula to prevent the size of the Commission from increasing unreasonably. Again, that is in the interests of the United Kingdom. When qualified majority voting suits United Kingdom interests, for example on liberalising transport, we should be willing to consider an extension of QMV on

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a case-by-case, merit-by-merit basis. Many people would believe that forgoing that opportunity would deny the interests of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Paul Tyler (North Cornwall): Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that QMV would be critical in reforming the CAP, to which hon. Members have referred?

Mr. Campbell: How, without a system of qualified majority voting, shall we reform the CAP, which takes 50 per cent. of the European Union's budget? However, let us be clear: there can be no question of moving towards QMV on defence, taxation, resources, social security, borders and treaty change. Those are of such peculiar and distinct interest to the people of the United Kingdom that the veto must be retained. I suspect that the those on the three Front Benches are united on that, if on nothing else.

Re-weighting votes, considering the size of the Commission, and the case-by-case extension of QMV cannot prejudice the interests of the United Kingdom. There is also another check and balance: any treaty of Nice will have to be ratified by the House. Some of us are survivors of the Maastricht debates. We stayed up quite late at night; we were sometimes sent home at 10 o'clock because the Government of the day could not guarantee carrying the 10 o'clock motion. However, no one could argue that the Maastricht treaty was not subject to line-by-line examination and that the anxieties felt by hon. Members--mainly Conservative Members--were not properly canvassed and taken into account. If there is a ratification process, there will be every opportunity to consider the interests of the United Kingdom, about which hon. Members are rightly concerned.

There is something to be said for the almost lyrical view of enlargement that the right hon. Member for Horsham espoused. Any delay or blocking of enlargement will prejudice the interests of those who have applied for entry; it will certainly dash their hopes. Most important, it will inhibit their progress towards fully fledged, free-market democracy, which is in their interests and those of the rest of us.

The right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) has a proposal for referendums; it is not only one referendum that he has in mind. We should examine the proposal with some care, lest it prove a recipe for paralysis. It may turn out to be a recipe for a constant referendum campaign. As has already been said, there was no referendum on the Single European Act 1986 or on the Maastricht treaty. If there is to be a referendum on, for example, agreeing to QMV on transport, I suspect that the United Kingdom electorate would quickly suffer referendum fatigue.

There is a constant argument about clarity in the European Union. It is argued that there is a need for clear specification of the rights and the responsibilities of nation states, a clear description of the rights and responsibilities of European Union institutions and a clear acknowledgement of the rights of individual citizens. There is also a constant and justified clamour for ensuring constitutional recognition of the principle of subsidiarity. That is why I do not shrink from the notion that we need a constitution for Europe. Such a constitution should embody the principles that I outlined. Perhaps it should

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provide for freedom of information so that transparency can be more easily achieved. It could provide that the Council's legislative deliberations should be held in public.

Anxiety has been expressed about a charter of fundamental rights. It was clear from the exchange between my right hon. Friend the Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Mr. Maclennan) and the right hon. Member for Hodge Hill, who leads the Council of Europe delegation, that there is a problem because the European Union treaties contain no code of human rights and the European Court of Human Rights has no jurisdiction when any EU institution breaches the convention of human rights. It cannot give redress to any individual who has been the subject of behaviour or conduct that might otherwise lead to a right of redress.

The House of Lords report, which was published on 24 May, has already been mentioned. It stated:


It continues with the following judgment:


Considered in that way, there is a great deal to be said for a charter.

The incorporation of the European convention on human rights in domestic law has already occurred in Scotland, and will happen in England and Wales later this year. The Scottish experience would persuade anyone that incorporation is not without implications or some surprising consequences. I accept that the judicial system north and south of the border must have time to adjust to the incorporation of the European convention on human rights in domestic law.

To incorporate a new charter at this stage would significantly increase the burden on the legal system. I therefore support the proposal that the European Union should accede to the convention. That would create a right of jurisdiction in the European Court of Human Rights in the circumstances that I outlined.

Mr. Bercow: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Campbell: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I want to make a little more progress. I do not wish to blunt his anxiety.

The correct place for such a charter, if it is to be justiciable, is at the heart of a constitution for Europe. I agree with the right hon. Member for Horsham about that. I believe that a constitution is desirable for the reasons that I have already outlined, but we cannot expect such a development for some time. I would expect and hope all hon. Members to wish to subscribe to a charter that establishes the fundamental rights of individuals, guarantees them from abuse of power and affirms their personal liberty.

Mr. Bercow: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. Would he concede that it is improbable, to put it mildly, that the centralising majority

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of states in the European union would agree to a decentralising constitution? Would he agree that one does not have to look into a crystal ball when one can read the book? Does he recall that neither under article 3b of the Maastricht treaty, on subsidiarity, nor under the protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality of the Amsterdam treaty has a single directive or regulation adversely affecting this country been repealed?

Mr. Campbell: I am a devolver by nature. I have supported home rule for the United Kingdom all my political life. If a model constitution appeared that did not contain in sufficient form the principle of subsidiarity, to which I have already referred, I would not subscribe to it. If we are to have a constitution, the principle of subsidiarity must be a fundamental part of the approach that it enshrines.

Let me deal with the European security and defence policy--the ESDP as we must learn to call it now, rather than ESDI. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Portillo) is not present, because he might have detected a hint of nostalgia in what I am about to say. No one is proposing Brussels cap badges; no one is proposing a European army. There is no replacement of NATO, and no bar to individual states taking military action in their own interests, as in Sierra Leone or the Falklands. It is a capability-driven exercise designed to allow Europe to take a far greater share of responsibility for its own security.

The way to enshrine the primacy of NATO is to ensure that it has a formal right of first refusal, and that no action by the European Union members of NATO can be taken until NATO has considered whether it is an operation in which it wants to become involved. That would deal with the anxieties of people in the United States, and certainly with those of members of NATO that are not members of the European Union.

The decision to commit forces should remain with domestic Parliaments in all circumstances. Indeed, I would go a little further than that. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) recently made a compelling point about the need to ensure that when British forces have been committed, they enjoy the support of the House of Commons in a resolution. We deploy troops under Executive privilege--as part of the royal prerogative. Some constitutional change in that area would be highly desirable.

It is unquestionably true that a weak European security and defence policy will damage NATO. A strong policy would sustain it, and would rebalance an Atlantic partnership that I do not believe can be sustained in its present form. The Clinton Administration have shown an understandable--from their point of view--reluctance to engage on the ground in Europe. We should ask ourselves whether we think that a Gore or Bush Administration would be any less reluctant. To put it a little more colloquially, are we willing to bet that for the foreseeable future the United States Administration would, in all circumstances, be willing to come to the aid of a Europe whose collective securities is not at risk, and for which an article 5 situation did not arise, but which was unable to deal with instability on its own borders? The answer to that question has to be that we cannot afford to make that bet. That is perhaps the most compelling of all arguments for the creation of a European security and defence policy.

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In the forthcoming general election, whenever it is held, there may be vigorous debate on the European Union. However, I suspect that the public find these matters rather less compelling than the House does on occasions such as this. In that debate, Liberal Democrats will be happy to defend our policies, not least because our record in these matters has shown that our judgment has consistently proved to be well founded.


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