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Mr. Mitchell: And a lot of jobs for lawyers.

Ms Jones: We will not go into that subject just now.

With two systems, we would end up with all the problems associated with conflicting jurisdictions. Therefore, almost everyone from whom the European Scrutiny Committee took evidence felt that a legally binding charter was an extremely bad idea. I remind the House that the Committee took evidence from, among other people, a judge from the European Court of Justice and one of the United Kingdom's leading human rights barristers.

My main concern is that a legally binding charter would result in a two-tier system of human rights protection in greater Europe. We could end up with a system in which the older and richer western democracies are within the charter's jurisdiction and use the Luxembourg court, whereas the Council of Europe's 26 other members are left out in the cold and remain within the jurisdiction of the European convention on human rights and the Strasbourg court.

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One of the Council of Europe's greatest features is the work that it does for the younger democracies that join it. Usually, those states are leaving communism behind and rely greatly on the council to help them to establish the rule of law and various democratic procedures, including human rights protection. Every single one of the states seeking to join the European Union is a member of the Council of Europe. When they see the European Court of Human Rights hand down judgments against countries such as the United Kingdom, as occasionally happens, and when they see the United Kingdom Government agree to abide by those decisions, they receive an important message. The message is that the European convention on human rights is applied equally across all 41 member states, and that--regardless of whether a country is a founding member of the Council of Europe and has a centuries-old democracy, or is a newer member that embraced democracy in just the past one or two years--human rights protection applies evenly to everyone. The message is extremely important for younger democracies and newer members.

My biggest fear is that, if the charter becomes justiciable and we end up joining what might be considered to be the more exclusive or superior human rights protection club, we shall be sending the completely wrong signal to the Council of Europe's remaining members. We would be seen effectively to be turning our back on the other 26 members. By looking to the Luxembourg court, we shall inevitably be weakening the Strasbourg court and the European convention on human rights. I think that it would be dangerous to take that route on human rights protection in Europe.

I am disappointed that the European Union has decided to take that route, primarily because I think that it has much better things to do with its time. Enlargement of the EU is important--I completely agree with it--and much work needs to be done if it is to be successful. The UK Government have made their position clear: they want only a declaration. As we all know, the nature of the horse trading--I am aware of what I am saying when I use that phrase--that goes on in Europe, which sets the tone for the negotiations, will mean that immense pressure will be put on my hon. Friend the Minister of State to go along with a charter that is legally binding. That may not happen this year, but it will in a few years' time. If it happens, it will be a sad day for human rights protection in greater Europe.

5.50 pm

Mr. William Cash (Stone): The value of the report from the European Scrutiny Committee lies largely in the fact that, contrary to all the spin that we get about Europe from both sides of the argument, it describes what is really happening in the European Union. I strongly recommend that people read it for that reason, if for no other.

I also strongly support my party's position, including its general view on preventing political union and on the saving of the pound. The question that I wish to address, which is relevant to both sides of the House--there are differences of opinion on both sides and throughout the country--is not merely whether a problem exists, but what we are going to do about it. The remedy simply cannot be achieved without fundamental renegotiation of the treaties.

I was delighted to hear from my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench that we shall oppose the Nice treaty, although how far and to what extent has not been made

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explicit yet. Furthermore, we would subject any additional powers that might be granted under the Nice treaty to a referendum. However, the tree of European government has grown from the root of the Maastricht treaty, whereas the Single European Act and other previous treaties were not about European government, although they involved degrees of political co-operation.

The fundamental reason that we need a referendum on the Nice treaty--and on the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties, and therefore the whole issue of European union--is that the issue is one of European government, as many right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken today have conceded. If the question is who governs Britain and how, and we are prepared to have a referendum on the treaty of Nice, it follows--as night follows day--that we must have a full and comprehensive referendum on the root of the problem, which is Maastricht itself and the treaty on the European Union.

The guiding principle on those questions, for both parties, must be the national interest, and not merely party unity. I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends, and--if I may presume to do so--Labour Members to bear that in mind. In respect of our great Conservative party, we have been through all this before on several occasions in the past 150 to 170 years. For example, we went through it with repeal of the corn laws, with tariff reform and home rule, and with appeasement in the 1930s. Although there were apparent splits in the Conservative party on those occasions, the matters involved were resolved in the national interest.

With the corn laws, for instance, Peel eventually had to resign, and the Conservative party adopted a policy of free trade. We progressed from that to democracy. A free market and a free political system run together--one is not possible without the other. The same process applied to the question of the future of Europe in the 1930s.

The national interest will prevail in the Conservative party. I am delighted at the direction adopted by the present leadership of the party. If I urge the party's leaders to go a little further than they would prefer, I do so because I want them to succeed. I believe that we will succeed if we have a policy that is clear enough for the British people to understand.

I also believe that if we do so we will close the 3 per cent. gap between the Conservative party and the Government. I pay tribute to my party's leadership for everything that has been done to narrow the gap. I congratulate the Government on what they have done to contribute to it as well--as the Prime Minister might have said to me on another occasion.

An interesting poll of Conservative Members has been held over the past year and a half. It was a confidential poll, prepared under the auspices of Nottingham university. I make no secret of its findings, which have appeared in the newspapers. Indeed, I wrote an article about them for The Daily Telegraph some time ago.

The poll found that 67 per cent. of Tory Members responded positively to the question whether they wanted to rule out the single currency for ever. It does not follow that people who repudiate monetary union and the single currency and want the treaties to be renegotiated must therefore want to withdraw from the European Union.

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Mr. Donald Anderson: It is even more alarming that a similar poll of candidates selected to represent the Conservative party in safe seats found that they are as extreme as existing Conservative Members of Parliament.

Mr. Cash: There is nothing extreme about wanting to preserve democracy. In this debate, hon. Members of all parties have refused to see the extent of the powers that would be conferred on a European central bank if Britain were to adopt the euro. In fact, the Red Book shows--and the Chancellor has admitted--that this country, as a result of the stability and growth pact and the Maastricht treaty, is already within the confines of European economic government. However, that is a separate but important question.

The arrangements for the central bank mean that the bankers from the member states would not be allowed to seek or take instructions from member states. That means that we risk having our democracy and accountability taken away. No Member of Parliament, Conservative or Labour, would be wrong to insist on ruling that out absolutely.

The extent of the central bank's proposed powers is the reason why some 70 per cent. of people would reject the single currency. Real people in this country--not the euro-fanatics or the theoreticians--know what is at stake. If we lose the right to govern ourselves, we will lose the right to family life and to existing within our nation and our society. It affects every aspect of our lives.

On the question of renegotiation meaning withdrawal, let me say that we cannot predict the outcome of negotiations. Every single negotiation--and the IGC is yet another--is conducted under the auspices of article 48 of the treaty. It is here in the European Scrutiny Committee report on the IGC and it has been reaffirmed time and again. It states quite clearly:


it does not say one way only.

There is an obligation on the Government to have regard to the wishes of the British people and--if the 70 per cent. figure that I have given is anything to go by--to table amendments in line with those wishes, and not to take the view that people's rights can be taken away and their democracy undermined by giving in to the kind of system that is now under way.

I now turn to other matters and begin with defence. At about midnight, a paper became available that should have been provided to the European Scrutiny Committee yesterday. It sets out "Principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU/NATO relations". I alluded to it briefly in an intervention in the Foreign Secretary's speech. I wish that I could read it all out, but I shall not.

Yesterday, the European Scrutiny Committee considered papers in respect of the strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence. The explanatory memorandum that was signed by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz), stated:


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I dare say that the Minister for Europe knows--certainly Defence Ministers will know--what the EU structure comprises. It involves, for example, references to our potential adversaries having access to nuclear weapons, so we are not talking about a minor issue. The Minister looks puzzled; perhaps his officials forgot to put that in his Red Box.

The permanent structure to which I have referred crops up yet again in the paper that was presented late. It states:


It also sets out the following principle:


It could not be clearer that under these arrangements--buried in the middle of the night and not revealed, as they should have been, by the time of this debate, with the Government covering up so that we would not be able to debate them properly--there is a problem that is identified in the Defence Committee report, which was annexed yesterday, but which there was no opportunity to read in time. It says:


Therefore, we have a great deal to consider in relation to this IGC.

We also know that there are proposals for the common foreign and security policy to be made an integral part of the treaty arrangements. I should be very interested to know whether the Minister for Europe is prepared not merely to waffle about it but to tell us explicitly, as he has not done with respect to the charter of fundamental rights, that we will not merely rule it out, in the words of the Foreign Secretary, but veto the proposals. These papers, which are for Feira, clearly show that these matters will be discussed at Feira and that they will do immense damage to the British people.

Finally, I do not agree with the notion of flexibility. The hard-core, two-tier Europe was run out by the Conservative party in the 1996 elections--


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